Religion and Ethics Forum
Religion and Ethics Discussion => Christian Topic => Topic started by: Sebastian Toe on June 01, 2015, 11:43:44 PM
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Indulging Alien's logic for now from the other thread ie
if we have two people who think that moral value 'x' (eg TACTDJFF) is wrong and always will be. Then logically, both must agree that objective morality exists for a minimum of that instance.
That in itself does not provide a process to establish OM and to be fair to Alien I don't think he has claimed that there.
Now that is out of the way,
could anyone who believes that OM exists, explain what method there is for establishing that or any other moral value?
I would expect (or at least hope :-\ ) to see a process which is independent of opinion.
edit, Happy to make modifications to the question if it is not clear enough.
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I think we are in for a long wait.
We have already had 9 months of evasion, obfuscation, and assertion masquerading as a method.
I predicted more of the same.
I hope to be wrong.
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Well, agreeing that an example of OM exists is still based on opinion, and so is self-refuting ;)
I think that it's very unlikely that anyone will present a method, for the simple reason that one doesn't exist.
ht
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Well, agreeing that an example of OM exists is still based on opinion, and so is self-refuting ;)
I think that it's very unlikely that anyone will present a method, for the simple reason that one doesn't exist.
ht
I don't think one can exist. The only method offered, is assertion. OM exists because I say so. What a disgusting thread that was.
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Well, agreeing that an example of OM exists is still based on opinion, and so is self-refuting ;)
I think that a small indulgence is needed in order to get to the next step.
I think that it's very unlikely that anyone will present a method, for the simple reason that one doesn't exist.
I'm interested in the thought process involved. I might learn something!
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Indulging Alien's logic for now from the other thread ie
if we have two people who think that moral value 'x' (eg TACTDJFF) is wrong and always will be. Then logically, both must agree that objective morality exists for a minimum of that instance.
That in itself does not provide a process to establish OM and to be fair to Alien I don't think he has claimed that there.
I'm not quite sure what you mean by "a minimum of that instance", but if I do then yes that is what I have claimed. Forgive me for not expanding on this bit, but see below.Now that is out of the way,
could anyone who believes that OM exists, explain what method there is for establishing that or any other moral value?
I would expect (or at least hope :-\ ) to see a process which is independent of opinion.
edit, Happy to make modifications to the question if it is not clear enough.
I will write a post which is as comprehensive as I can, endeavouring to explain things in a way which people here can understand. It won't get done this week though.
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It might be best to write something brief as an overview simply to save you time.
It could be that you mention something early that you then build on, that is only to be refuted and collapse the rest of your reasoning.
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I'm not quite sure what you mean by "a minimum of that instance",.
..there might be no other 'morality' scenario upon which the two people agree.
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I will write a post which is as comprehensive as I can, endeavouring to explain things in a way which people here can understand. It won't get done this week though.
No worries, thanks.
Any other OMers feel free to jump in though, any-time.
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I'm not quite sure what you mean by "a minimum of that instance",.
..there might be no other 'morality' scenario upon which the two people agree.
Ta.
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I will write a post which is as comprehensive as I can, endeavouring to explain things in a way which people here can understand. It won't get done this week though.
I think most of us get the old:-
if we have two people who think that moral value 'x' (eg TACTDJFF) is wrong and always will be. Then logically, both must agree that objective morality exists for a minimum of that instance.
I think we've buried the attempted semantic trickery in that statement because what ole Al will do is post an essay on that before bouncing back to the old argument, objective moral values exist therefore god init.
So the following doesn't fly:-
I think action X is wrong independent of anyone else's opinion, but not my own opinion.
I think action X was wrong in the past.
I think action X will be wrong in the future.
When I'm not alive these opinions will not exist, i.e. subjective.
Can we stick to action X rather than TACTDJFF because it will prevent Al attempting to lay semantic traps for people.
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Even if every living person agreed that an action was moral or immoral, that doesn't mean there is an objective morality floating about somewhere.
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I will write a post which is as comprehensive as I can, endeavouring to explain things in a way which people here can understand. It won't get done this week though.
I think most of us get the old:-
if we have two people who think that moral value 'x' (eg TACTDJFF) is wrong and always will be. Then logically, both must agree that objective morality exists for a minimum of that instance.
I think we've buried the attempted semantic trickery in that statement because what ole Al will do is post an essay on that before bouncing back to the old argument, objective moral values exist therefore god init.
So the following doesn't fly:-
I think action X is wrong independent of anyone else's opinion, but not my own opinion.
I think action X was wrong in the past.
I think action X will be wrong in the future.
When I'm not alive these opinions will not exist, i.e. subjective.
Can we stick to action X rather than TACTDJFF because it will prevent Al attempting to lay semantic traps for people.
Agreed.
These are just Alien own deeply fervently held subjective opinions.
We get that.
In what way are they objective though, is what he needs to demonstrate.
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The reason given by God for not murdering someone is, that person is made in God's image (Genesis 9:6). I thought I'd throw that in.
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The reason given by God for not murdering someone is, that person is made in God's image (Genesis 9:6). I thought I'd throw that in.
Thanks, but pointless, atheists do not accept the existence of god.
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These are just Alien own deeply fervently held subjective opinions.
We get that.
In fact, does objective thinking really exist? Whatever one thinks will necessarily be coloured by one's own experiences, hopes, upbringing, etc. . Subjectivity will always have a part to play - whatever the field of study.
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These are just Alien own deeply fervently held subjective opinions.
We get that.
In fact, does objective thinking really exist? Whatever one thinks will necessarily be coloured by one's own experiences, hopes, upbringing, etc. . Subjectivity will always have a part to play - whatever the field of study.
The speed of light is not subjective.
We can all if we so desire and have the knowledge can measure it and we will ALL get the same objective answer.
This is the whole point. Morality is not like this, it is always subjective, there is no objective moral answer out there.
If there was, you would be able to tell me if same sex marriage is objectively right or wrong, and your opinion on the matter would not come into it.
Can you do that?
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The reason given by God for not murdering someone is, that person is made in God's image (Genesis 9:6). I thought I'd throw that in.
So why does the bible record him as murdering so many people? ???
ht
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A point to bear in mind..
Part of the reason it is not a simple answer as to how we determine the content of OM is because the content will depend on the theory of how it is that morality is objective that we are advocating – Moral realism isn’t a single position it’s a plurality of positions in exactly the same way as anti-realism is. So for example if I said to an anti-realist ‘how do we make decide what is right or wrong?’ an individual subjectivist, a societal relativist, a basic principle relativist, etc would all give different answers…
So too with moral realism. If someone thought for example that moral truth was grounded in a form of traditional divine command theory they would say objective morality is based on Gods commands which has presumably been revealed to us in specific definite ways if you hold to a literalist interpretation of Christianity or Islam or whatever.
If you thought that moral realism was grounded in our implicit assumptions within a shared human sensibility then your method would not be to read off truth but rather to draw out what lies behind moral disagreement and then (slowly) tease out how we would react if things were slightly different in order to edge towards consensus.
If you thought that moral truth was grounded in certain core virtues that underpin rational discourse and therefore need to be implicitly embraced by anyone who accepts the practice of ethics then you would have to articulate why these virtues were implicit in rational discourse and draw out how they should be applied in a moral situation.
Etc. Etc. for the record my own view is none of the above although all of the above have been advocated by various types of moral realists. Importantly though agreement on a method doesn’t wipe out moral disagreement – People who agree on virtues that underpin rational discourse for example might disagree for a range of reasons while accepting the same methodology, e.g.
- Disagree on facts, e.g. on extent of suffering caused to animals in modern farming or impact fracking will have on peoples wellbeing balanced against its benefits,..
- Disagree due to interest and emotions/defence of vested positions which distort weight place on arguments beyond what rationally entails
- People talking past one another through different understandings of issue.
All of these are causes of disagreement that mesh together in complex ways, particularly in relation to human societies were moral issues are usually located, that can lead to disagreement in morality even if it was a matter of moral facts – indeed all of these lead to disagreements in science and social science about things that are undisputedly factual too.
So yes moral realists can articulate a way that we progress towards moral truth, depending on the version of moral realism they advocate but this doesn’t make it formulaic or able to simply arrive at undisputed conclusions in most cases.
Regards
DT
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The reason given by God for not murdering someone is, that person is made in God's image (Genesis 9:6). I thought I'd throw that in.
So why does the bible record him as murdering so many people? ???
ht
Where does it record that, please?
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The reason given by God for not murdering someone is, that person is made in God's image (Genesis 9:6). I thought I'd throw that in.
So why does the bible record him as murdering so many people? ???
ht
Where does it record that, please?
Flood/Noah - ring any bells?
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The reason given by God for not murdering someone is, that person is made in God's image (Genesis 9:6). I thought I'd throw that in.
So why does the bible record him as murdering so many people? ???
ht
Where does it record that, please?
Flood/Noah - ring any bells?
You do know he's going to go for the 'god can't murder' drivel, don't you? He'll probably try to argue that 'god owns our SOUL and can EAT it if he wants to' or some such nonsense, which will completely contradict the claims about his god being 'good'.
ht
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Well, agreeing that an example of OM exists is still based on opinion, and so is self-refuting ;)
I think that it's very unlikely that anyone will present a method, for the simple reason that one doesn't exist.
ht
I don't think one can exist. The only method offered, is assertion. OM exists because I say so. What a disgusting thread that was.
1) Not at all: Firstly there is the ''with bother with morality if it's purely subjective'' argument.
2) There is the argument from ''moral imperfection''
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Well, agreeing that an example of OM exists is still based on opinion, and so is self-refuting ;)
I think that it's very unlikely that anyone will present a method, for the simple reason that one doesn't exist.
ht
I don't think one can exist. The only method offered, is assertion. OM exists because I say so. What a disgusting thread that was.
1) Not at all: Firstly there is the ''with bother with morality if it's purely subjective'' argument.
2) There is the argument from ''moral imperfection''
I think you'll find that both of those are figments of your imagination, Vlad.
ht
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I think this topic is ripe for a formal two contributor debate. I don't want to accuse Al of obfuscation but the most pertinent points have been made on this topic by HT and its very easy for HT's awesome contributions to get drowned out.
All those in favour say aye! :)
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I think this topic is ripe for a formal two contributor debate. I don't want to accuse Al of obfuscation but the most pertinent points have been made on this topic by HT and its very easy for HT's awesome contributions to get drowned out.
All those in favour say aye! :)
If ht has the patience and energy to keep shooting Vlad's idiotic assertions down, it does more good than harm.
If not, I agree with you,
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I think this topic is ripe for a formal two contributor debate. I don't want to accuse Al of obfuscation but the most pertinent points have been made on this topic by HT and its very easy for HT's awesome contributions to get drowned out.
All those in favour say aye! :)
Aye.
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Now that is out of the way,
could anyone who believes that OM exists, explain what method there is for establishing that or any other moral value?
I would expect (or at least hope :-\ ) to see a process which is independent of opinion.
To clarify, you understand that the claim is that a particular set of statements have the statement "Morality is objective" as their logical conclusion, and so subscribers to those statements should be prepared to subscribe to "Morality is objective" (else logically contradict themselves).
You already have the process to get from A to B which is independent of opinion. It's a purely logical one. You could then ask "so where does A come from" and A will also derive from a previous set of statements that have A as their logical conclusion. And so subscribers to them should subscribe to A.
So you have your process that is independent of opinion. That is, the process itself is. What won't be independent of opinion is the actual subscribing to the axioms that start it all. But then that is par for the course for anything, not just OM.
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I think this topic is ripe for a formal two contributor debate. I don't want to accuse Al of obfuscation but the most pertinent points have been made on this topic by HT and its very easy for HT's awesome contributions to get drowned out.
All those in favour say aye!
If that happens I think it would need to be understood that Alan’s take on OM isn’t shared by all advocates of OM include some other OM theists.
As per HTs contribution, as I think Synonym pointed out quite well on the previous thread a number of HT’s oft repeated points were if anything particularly weak. He seemed to constantly equate the fact that having an opinion about something with something only being an opinion which is clearly not the case, and indeed does so again here on this thread:
Well, agreeing that an example of OM exists is still based on opinion, and so is self-refuting
Unless you made the basic error of thinking anything that is an opinion automatically made it ONLY an opinion then this statement just doesn’t make sense. It might make sense to say agreeing on an example of OM doesn’t in itself prove OM (which I agree it doesn’t) but it certainly isn’t self-refuting.
Regards
DT
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I think this topic is ripe for a formal two contributor debate. I don't want to accuse Al of obfuscation but the most pertinent points have been made on this topic by HT and its very easy for HT's awesome contributions to get drowned out.
All those in favour say aye! :)
If ht has the patience and energy to keep shooting Vlad's idiotic assertions down, it does more good than harm.
If not, I agree with you,
Vlad wow no, Al is on record as conceding he could be wrong about torturing a child to death just for fun, but other than some flaky moral positions he's interlectually sound.
I can't recall Vlad making a coherent point let alone an coherent argument.
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I think this topic is ripe for a formal two contributor debate. I don't want to accuse Al of obfuscation but the most pertinent points have been made on this topic by HT and its very easy for HT's awesome contributions to get drowned out.
All those in favour say aye! :)
If ht has the patience and energy to keep shooting Vlad's idiotic assertions down, it does more good than harm.
If not, I agree with you,
Vlad wow no, Al is on record as conceding he could be wrong about torturing a child to death just for fun, but other than some flaky moral positions he's interlectually sound.
I can't recall Vlad making a coherent point let alone an coherent argument.
Could be? I would be.
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You do know he's going to go for the 'god can't murder' drivel, don't you?
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Genesis 9:6
"Whoever sheds human blood, by humans shall their blood be shed; for in the image of God has God made mankind."
God makes a distinction between unjust and just killing here. Over to you to show that the flood was unjust.
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I think this topic is ripe for a formal two contributor debate. I don't want to accuse Al of obfuscation but the most pertinent points have been made on this topic by HT and its very easy for HT's awesome contributions to get drowned out.
All those in favour say aye! :)
If ht has the patience and energy to keep shooting Vlad's idiotic assertions down, it does more good than harm.
If not, I agree with you,
Vlad wow no, Al is on record as conceding he could be wrong about torturing a child to death just for fun, but other than some flaky moral positions he's interlectually sound.
I can't recall Vlad making a coherent point let alone an coherent argument.
Could be? I would be.
TACTDJFF = (a) morally wrong
TACTDJFF =(b) morally good
Your position is (a) but you could be wrong, since its independent of your opinion. Like the speed of light, if there is a pencil on my desk, unlike love or beauty which you can't be wrong about since they are entirely dependant on opinion.
Unless you provide a method to prove (a) independent of opinion of course, which we are all looking forward to.
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You do know he's going to go for the 'god can't murder' drivel, don't you?
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Genesis 9:6
"Whoever sheds human blood, by humans shall their blood be shed; for in the image of God has God made mankind."
God makes a distinction between unjust and just killing here. Over to you to show that the flood was unjust.
Sorry you want it explained to you how the killing of children is unjust?
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Unless you provide a method to prove (a) independent of opinion of course, which we are all looking forward to.
I don’t think anyone with OM thinks they can prove it as far as I know. The metaphysical status of morality is like all metaphysical questions something that can’t be definitively proved in any sense equivalent to scientific proof, that’s why the area is called metaphysics rather than physic although there might be logical proofs of some metaphysical questions in so far as we agree on the premises.
With all metaphysical questions we can draw out what is logically entailed by each position and make a case for viewing the issue in this way rather than another as well as clearing up any conceptual confusion which can often be involved. The argument between moral realism and anti-realism has always been of this form and it’s a confusion on your part if you think it can be approached differently.
Regards
DT
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I think this topic is ripe for a formal two contributor debate. I don't want to accuse Al of obfuscation but the most pertinent points have been made on this topic by HT and its very easy for HT's awesome contributions to get drowned out.
All those in favour say aye! :)
If ht has the patience and energy to keep shooting Vlad's idiotic assertions down, it does more good than harm.
If not, I agree with you,
Vlad wow no, Al is on record as conceding he could be wrong about torturing a child to death just for fun, but other than some flaky moral positions he's interlectually sound.
I can't recall Vlad making a coherent point let alone an coherent argument.
Could be? I would be.
TACTDJFF = (a) morally wrong
TACTFJFF =(b) morally good
Your position is (a) but you could be wrong, since its independent of your opinion. Like the speed of light, if there is a pencil on my desk, unlike love or beauty which you can't be wrong about since they are entirely dependant on opinion.
Unless you provide a method to prove (a) independent of opinion of course, which we are all looking forward to.
What's TACTFJFF ?
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I don’t think anyone with OM thinks they can prove it as far as I know. The metaphysical status of morality is like all metaphysical questions something that can’t be definitively proved in any sense equivalent to scientific proof, that’s why the area is called metaphysics rather than physic although there might be logical proofs of some metaphysical questions in so far as we agree on the premises.
I think Al's view of morality is different to yours.
With all metaphysical questions we can draw out what is logically entailed by each position and make a case for viewing the issue in this way rather than another as well as clearing up any conceptual confusion which can often be involved. The argument between moral realism and anti-realism has always been of this form and it’s a confusion on your part if you think it can be approached differently.
I don't think objective moral values is a metaphysical question whereas objective morality might be.
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I think this topic is ripe for a formal two contributor debate. I don't want to accuse Al of obfuscation but the most pertinent points have been made on this topic by HT and its very easy for HT's awesome contributions to get drowned out.
All those in favour say aye! :)
I'm flattered, but I don't think there's much point. Al and I had quite a lot of debate on the original threads. The sticking point was the idea that having an opinion that something was objectively moral, for me, was not evidence of OM existing. Al seemed to disagree.
ht
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What's TACTFJFF ?
Edited.
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I don't think objective moral values is a metaphysical question whereas objective morality might be.
That would be interesting - objective morality which does not include moral values.
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I think this topic is ripe for a formal two contributor debate. I don't want to accuse Al of obfuscation but the most pertinent points have been made on this topic by HT and its very easy for HT's awesome contributions to get drowned out.
All those in favour say aye! :)
If ht has the patience and energy to keep shooting Vlad's idiotic assertions down, it does more good than harm.
If not, I agree with you,
Vlad wow no, Al is on record as conceding he could be wrong about torturing a child to death just for fun, but other than some flaky moral positions he's interlectually sound.
I can't recall Vlad making a coherent point let alone an coherent argument.
Could be? I would be.
TACTDJFF = (a) morally wrong
TACTDJFF =(b) morally good
Your position is (a) but you could be wrong, since its independent of your opinion. Like the speed of light, if there is a pencil on my desk, unlike love or beauty which you can't be wrong about since they are entirely dependant on opinion.
Unless you provide a method to prove (a) independent of opinion of course, which we are all looking forward to.
"Your position is (a) but you could be wrong, since its independent of your opinion." No. I could be wrong, because I am fallible. I don't think I am in this case though.
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I think Al's view of morality is different to yours.
Agreed.
I don't think objective moral values is a metaphysical question whereas objective morality might be.
If you mean then the actual content of the values (i.e. is X wrong) rather than the question of whether morality is objective then I’m not clear what form you think a proof of this would look like either? I’ve already talked about how someone who believed in OM might have a method for discovering it dependent on their view of OM, but I really don’t know what you are asking for when you say ‘prove’ here. “What is it that would satisfy you that it was proved in relation to questions of this nature?
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You do know he's going to go for the 'god can't murder' drivel, don't you?
--------
Genesis 9:6
"Whoever sheds human blood, by humans shall their blood be shed; for in the image of God has God made mankind."
God makes a distinction between unjust and just killing here. Over to you to show that the flood was unjust.
On well that is fine then! It is, of course, perfectly 'just' for God to murder all humans bar a chosen few.
In the immortal words of Mr MacInroe, 'you cannot be serious', but sadly you probably are. Good job then that the global flood story is nonsense, and even though it is nonsense the morality portrayed in it stinks to high heaven.
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You do know he's going to go for the 'god can't murder' drivel, don't you?
--------
Genesis 9:6
"Whoever sheds human blood, by humans shall their blood be shed; for in the image of God has God made mankind."
God makes a distinction between unjust and just killing here. Over to you to show that the flood was unjust.
Sorry you want it explained to you how the killing of children is unjust?
The theology is this: God allows the world to continue as long as there are people who are being saved. When it gets to the point that the professing believers marry unbelievers, then the children of those marriages become unbelievers and soon there are no believers left- God will not allow the world to continue in that state, because the human heart is corrupt, even in children. You do not need to teach a child how to lie- he will work it out himself.
That's the view of Matthew Henry on the reason for the flood, and why it was just, in Genesis 6. The sons of God are thought to represent religious people, and the daughters of men, irreligious people.
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Splendid view of children you have there, with a large steaming pat of misogyny thrown in for good measure.
The aggressive anti-theism has just ratcheted up a few notches, which is always welcome.
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SPUD
That's a long way of saying that you do not understand that it is unjust!
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You do know he's going to go for the 'god can't murder' drivel, don't you?
--------
Genesis 9:6
"Whoever sheds human blood, by humans shall their blood be shed; for in the image of God has God made mankind."
God makes a distinction between unjust and just killing here. Over to you to show that the flood was unjust.
Sorry you want it explained to you how the killing of children is unjust?
The theology is this: God allows the world to continue as long as there are people who are being saved. When it gets to the point that the professing believers marry unbelievers, then the children of those marriages become unbelievers and soon there are no believers left- God will not allow the world to continue in that state, because the human heart is corrupt, even in children. You do not need to teach a child how to lie- he will work it out himself.
That's the view of Matthew Henry on the reason for the flood, and why it was just, in Genesis 6. The sons of God are thought to represent religious people, and the daughters of men, irreligious people.
That is one of the sickest posts I have ever read!
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You do know he's going to go for the 'god can't murder' drivel, don't you?
--------
Genesis 9:6
"Whoever sheds human blood, by humans shall their blood be shed; for in the image of God has God made mankind."
God makes a distinction between unjust and just killing here. Over to you to show that the flood was unjust.
Sorry you want it explained to you how the killing of children is unjust?
The theology is this: God allows the world to continue as long as there are people who are being saved. When it gets to the point that the professing believers marry unbelievers, then the children of those marriages become unbelievers and soon there are no believers left- God will not allow the world to continue in that state, because the human heart is corrupt, even in children. You do not need to teach a child how to lie- he will work it out himself.
That's the view of Matthew Henry on the reason for the flood, and why it was just, in Genesis 6. The sons of God are thought to represent religious people, and the daughters of men, irreligious people.
That is one of the sickest posts I have ever read!
Agreed
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You do know he's going to go for the 'god can't murder' drivel, don't you?
--------
Genesis 9:6
"Whoever sheds human blood, by humans shall their blood be shed; for in the image of God has God made mankind."
God makes a distinction between unjust and just killing here. Over to you to show that the flood was unjust.
Well, let's look at it within it's own parameters, shall we?
On one side we have a deity who is, allegedly, all-powerful and all-knowing.
On the other side we have a large population of humans, including children below the age of responsibility and some still in the womb.
This all-knowing deity decides that everyone except a handful of people are so evil that they deserve to die.
(Note that this group of people includes a drunkard who wanders round naked, and later curses one of his children for covering him up. Presumably stopping someone from getting a tan is objectively immoral...)
This all-knowing deity appears to not know that there is a difference between nature and nurture, or that people are capable of changing, and rising above their upbringing. This all-knowing deity appears to not know of any way to give people a change of heart (which is odd, considering that so many christians make precisely that claim).
Alternatively, this all-knowing deity is aware that, due to the deterministic nature of the universe he has created, all these people have been created by him solely for the purpose of being killed by drowning.
The there's the 'all-powerful' bit. Are you seriously telling me that an all-powerful deity could think of no other way to sort out the problem than mass killing?
Just: based on or behaving according to what is morally right and fair.
Well, that's an interesting one, isn't it? 'Just' includes the idea of 'moral'. No doubt Spud's argument will include some guff about his god defining morality (although I don't remember him getting involved in the OM discussion), which will, inevitably, mean that his god can't be immoral, and therefore anything his god does is moral and just and good.
That, along with the medieval idea that his god somehow 'owns' us and can do what it likes with our lives, will surely allow Spud to sleep well, safe in the knowledge that millions of people are killed by his god, like wheat being harvested, or some such metaphor.
Those of us who have empathy, and base our morality on a concept such as 'least harm', will look at these alleged events and the arguments for them, and see that they are abhorrent.
To make a claim that a 'just god' could cause the deaths of thousands, if not millions, and then claim that that was at all 'just' is disgusting - especially when combined with the additional claims that this god was all-knowing and all-powerful.
Even we, as limited, flawed, human beings, could devise ways to fix this situation which did not require deaths, and certainly not deaths in such a cruel way. However evil the people were, to have to watch your children and loved ones drowning, while being able to do nothing about it, is repugnant.
And then to think that we are supposed to be happy that they all died, including the recently-born and those not yet born... it boggles the (moral) mind. And yet, it is a large number of the people who do believe this who are then vehemently anti-abortion! Are they trying to make up for all the unborn children killed by their god?
The theology is this: God allows the world to continue as long as there are people who are being saved. When it gets to the point that the professing believers marry unbelievers, then the children of those marriages become unbelievers and soon there are no believers left- God will not allow the world to continue in that state, because the human heart is corrupt, even in children. You do not need to teach a child how to lie- he will work it out himself.
That's the view of Matthew Henry on the reason for the flood, and why it was just, in Genesis 6. The sons of God are thought to represent religious people, and the daughters of men, irreligious people.
I've just seen this reply by Spud. It looks like I was right.
ht
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"Your position is (a) but you could be wrong, since its independent of your opinion." No. I could be wrong, because I am fallible. I don't think I am in this case though.
I'm not following shouldn't that read.
'you could be wrong'
'no yes'
'I could be wrong'
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If you mean then the actual content of the values (i.e. is X wrong) rather than the question of whether morality is objective then I’m not clear what form you think a proof of this would look like either? I’ve already talked about how someone who believed in OM might have a method for discovering it dependent on their view of OM, but I really don’t know what you are asking for when you say ‘prove’ here. “What is it that would satisfy you that it was proved in relation to questions of this nature?
There are two things, (1) morality (2) moral vales. If I base my morality on an axiom 'do least harm to humans' then there are objective values based on the axiom, so torturing children does more harm to humans therefore based on the axiom it would be objectively wrong.
Which is why when we have a debate over morality the axiom is assumed.
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"Your position is (a) but you could be wrong, since its independent of your opinion." No. I could be wrong, because I am fallible. I don't think I am in this case though.
I'm not following shouldn't that read.
'you could be wrong'
'no yes'
'I could be wrong'
No.
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If you mean then the actual content of the values (i.e. is X wrong) rather than the question of whether morality is objective then I’m not clear what form you think a proof of this would look like either? I’ve already talked about how someone who believed in OM might have a method for discovering it dependent on their view of OM, but I really don’t know what you are asking for when you say ‘prove’ here. “What is it that would satisfy you that it was proved in relation to questions of this nature?
There are two things, (1) morality (2) moral vales. If I base my morality on an axiom 'do least harm to humans' then there are objective values based on the axiom, so torturing children does more harm to humans therefore based on the axiom it would be objectively wrong.
Which is why when we have a debate over morality the axiom is assumed.
don't see how this answers the question...you've given a statement of how you think morality works...although anything derived from a relative axiom is not objective and its misleading to suggest it is..but that's another matter.
The question I wanted clarity on is what kind of proof are you asking for when you asked Alan to prove OM? What would a proof that satisfies you look like?
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although anything derived from a relative axiom is not objective and its misleading to suggest it is..but that's another matter.
Incorrect. Time is relative (lunchtime doubly so) but we have no trouble measuring it objectively.
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"Your position is (a) but you could be wrong, since its independent of your opinion." No. I could be wrong, because I am fallible. I don't think I am in this case though.
I'm not following shouldn't that read.
'you could be wrong'
'no yes'
'I could be wrong'
No.
Care to explain?
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"Your position is (a) but you could be wrong, since its independent of your opinion." No. I could be wrong, because I am fallible. I don't think I am in this case though.
I'm not following shouldn't that read.
'you could be wrong'
'no yes'
'I could be wrong'
No.
Care to explain?
I could be wrong since I am fallible. You said my position was that I could be wrong since it's independent of my opinion. Those are different positions. So it was a "No" rather than a "Yes."
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don't see how this answers the question...you've given a statement of how you think morality works...although anything derived from a relative axiom is not objective and its misleading to suggest it is..but that's another matter.
Ok lets just park that for now.
The question I wanted clarity on is what kind of proof are you asking for when you asked Alan to prove OM? What would a proof that satisfies you look like?
I have no idea that is why I can't wait to hear what Al has to offer. I assume it will be method the demonstrates 'action X is morally wrong' independent of anyone's opinion.
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"Your position is (a) but you could be wrong, since its independent of your opinion." No. I could be wrong, because I am fallible. I don't think I am in this case though.
I'm not following shouldn't that read.
'you could be wrong'
'no yes'
'I could be wrong'
No.
Care to explain?
I could be wrong since I am fallible. You said my position was that I could be wrong since it's independent of my opinion. Those are different positions. So it was a "No" rather than a "Yes."
So could you be wrong about liking marmite?
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"Your position is (a) but you could be wrong, since its independent of your opinion." No. I could be wrong, because I am fallible. I don't think I am in this case though.
I'm not following shouldn't that read.
'you could be wrong'
'no yes'
'I could be wrong'
No.
Care to explain?
I could be wrong since I am fallible. You said my position was that I could be wrong since it's independent of my opinion. Those are different positions. So it was a "No" rather than a "Yes."
So could you be wrong about liking marmite?
No, I definitely do not like marmite.
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although anything derived from a relative axiom is not objective and its misleading to suggest it is..but that's another matter.
Incorrect. Time is relative (lunchtime doubly so) but we have no trouble measuring it objectively.
Throughout this thread it’s been quite consistent for OM to refer to the view that moral truths are factual statements that exist independently of what anyone’s opinion is about their truth. A moral statement derived from an axiomatic opinion is not objective in this sense. It’s because of this need for clarity over the various ways we can use the term ‘objective’ that philosophers more often use the term moral realism now days.
The question remains the same though if it was rephrased in terms of moral facts,,,, how would you propose Alan prove that a particular moral statement is a moral fact as Jakswan asked him to do? What form of answer would you want to see that you would meet your requirement for ‘proof’?
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Throughout this thread it’s been quite consistent for OM to refer to the view that moral truths are factual statements that exist independently of what anyone’s opinion is about their truth. A moral statement derived from an axiomatic opinion is not objective in this sense.
In what way can an opinion by axiomatic?
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Throughout this thread it’s been quite consistent for OM to refer to the view that moral truths are factual statements that exist independently of what anyone’s opinion is about their truth. A moral statement derived from an axiomatic opinion is not objective in this sense.
In what way can an opinion by axiomatic?
Jakeswan gives the example of minimising human suffering as a basic principle of his belief. Despite his acceptance of this as a foundational axiom for his morality There are many who do not accept this form of negative Utilitarianism as in any way adequate for guiding moral action.
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There are many who do not accept this form of negative Utilitarianism as in any way adequate for guiding moral action.
Drit, like whom?
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Well I think you could pretty much pick any name in modern moral philosophy because I'm not sure i can name anyone who does endorse negative utilitarianism..
Want a name? Alisdair McIntyre was voted the philosophers philosopher and as a leading moral philosopher im sure he'll do as an example. Robert Nozick is another...Thomas Nagel....
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Well I think you could pretty much pick any name in modern moral philosophy because I'm not sure i can name anyone who does endorse negative utilitarianism..
Want a name? Alisdair McIntyre was voted the philosophers philosopher and as a leading moral philosopher im sure he'll do as an example. Robert Nozick is another...Thomas Nagel....
So basing morals on doing least harm / causing most happiness is negative utilitarianism?
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Well I think you could pretty much pick any name in modern moral philosophy because I'm not sure i can name anyone who does endorse negative utilitarianism..
Want a name? Alisdair McIntyre was voted the philosophers philosopher and as a leading moral philosopher im sure he'll do as an example. Robert Nozick is another...Thomas Nagel....
So basing morals on doing least harm / causing most happiness is negative utilitarianism?
I would have thought that the presence of the psycho and sociopath would have put paid to the greatest happiness angle.
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Well I think you could pretty much pick any name in modern moral philosophy because I'm not sure i can name anyone who does endorse negative utilitarianism..
Want a name? Alisdair McIntyre was voted the philosophers philosopher and as a leading moral philosopher im sure he'll do as an example. Robert Nozick is another...Thomas Nagel....
So basing morals on doing least harm / causing most happiness is negative utilitarianism?
I would have thought that the presence of the psycho and sociopath would have put paid to the greatest happiness angle.
I'm neither of those thanks.
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Well I think you could pretty much pick any name in modern moral philosophy because I'm not sure i can name anyone who does endorse negative utilitarianism..
Want a name? Alisdair McIntyre was voted the philosophers philosopher and as a leading moral philosopher im sure he'll do as an example. Robert Nozick is another...Thomas Nagel....
So basing morals on doing least harm / causing most happiness is negative utilitarianism?
I would have thought that the presence of the psycho and sociopath would have put paid to the greatest happiness angle.
I'm neither of those thanks.
But isn't that exactly what you would say if you were one?
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Well I think you could pretty much pick any name in modern moral philosophy because I'm not sure i can name anyone who does endorse negative utilitarianism..
Want a name? Alisdair McIntyre was voted the philosophers philosopher and as a leading moral philosopher im sure he'll do as an example. Robert Nozick is another...Thomas Nagel....
So basing morals on doing least harm / causing most happiness is negative utilitarianism?
Yes
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Well I think you could pretty much pick any name in modern moral philosophy because I'm not sure i can name anyone who does endorse negative utilitarianism..
Want a name? Alisdair McIntyre was voted the philosophers philosopher and as a leading moral philosopher im sure he'll do as an example. Robert Nozick is another...Thomas Nagel....
So basing morals on doing least harm / causing most happiness is negative utilitarianism?
Yes
Wow! Then I'm a negative utilitarianist! We learn something every day. :)
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Well I think you could pretty much pick any name in modern moral philosophy because I'm not sure i can name anyone who does endorse negative utilitarianism..
Want a name? Alisdair McIntyre was voted the philosophers philosopher and as a leading moral philosopher im sure he'll do as an example. Robert Nozick is another...Thomas Nagel....
So basing morals on doing least harm / causing most happiness is negative utilitarianism?
Yes
Wow! Then I'm a negative utilitarianist! We learn something every day. :)
Every days a school day
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Well I think you could pretty much pick any name in modern moral philosophy because I'm not sure i can name anyone who does endorse negative utilitarianism..
Want a name? Alisdair McIntyre was voted the philosophers philosopher and as a leading moral philosopher im sure he'll do as an example. Robert Nozick is another...Thomas Nagel....
So basing morals on doing least harm / causing most happiness is negative utilitarianism?
Yes
I don't think so.
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don't see how this answers the question...you've given a statement of how you think morality works...although anything derived from a relative axiom is not objective and its misleading to suggest it is..but that's another matter.
Ok lets just park that for now.
The question I wanted clarity on is what kind of proof are you asking for when you asked Alan to prove OM? What would a proof that satisfies you look like?
I have no idea that is why I can't wait to hear what Al has to offer. I assume it will be method the demonstrates 'action X is morally wrong' independent of anyone's opinion.
Well the reason i ask is because with metaphysical questions asking for proof just doesn't make sense, at least if you are talking of anything other than a purely logical proof and so if Alan can't 'prove' this as I doubt he can it wouldn't be a failure of his arguement but rather a failure to ask an intelligible question. Lots of type of questions aren't subject to proof, for example some temporal ones aren't either for different reasons... if I said it was a fact I was listing to New Model Army when I was driving home last night in my car alone, and you asked me to prove it, my inability to do so wouldn't be an indication that it wasn't true...only that you had asked a daft question inappropriate to the type of fact we were discussing.
Adding 'independent of opinion' potentially makes your question even dafter depending on what you mean by that if you simply mean that Alan's view of OM should not derive its objectivity from people's opinion about it all wel and good, although I recall Alan being explicit about not thinking this, but if your making the same mistake Horsethorn has repeatedly done of implying that if something is an opinion it is only an opinion and can't also be an objective fact then that's clearly not true.
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...but if your making the same mistake Horsethorn has repeatedly done of implying that if something is an opinion it is only an opinion and can't also be an objective fact then that's clearly not true.
If it's an objective fact then how can anybody truthfully refer to it as just their opinion?
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Well the reason i ask is because with metaphysical questions asking for proof just doesn't make sense, at least if you are talking of anything other than a purely logical proof and so if Alan can't 'prove' this as I doubt he can it wouldn't be a failure of his arguement but rather a failure to ask an intelligible question.
I never asked for proof I asked for a method, you were the one who brought up proof in message 34 and several times since.
Lots of type of questions aren't subject to proof, for example some temporal ones aren't either for different reasons... if I said it was a fact I was listing to New Model Army when I was driving home last night in my car alone, and you asked me to prove it, my inability to do so wouldn't be an indication that it wasn't true...only that you had asked a daft question inappropriate to the type of fact we were discussing.
I wouldn't ask for proof I'd use a method and assign a loose probability to it.
Adding 'independent of opinion' potentially makes your question even dafter depending on what you mean by that if you simply mean that Alan's view of OM should not derive its objectivity from people's opinion about it all wel and good,
Wel and good then.
although I recall Alan being explicit about not thinking this,
Sure.
The definition of objective morality as used in the argument for the existence of God from the existence of objective morality is that something is morally right or wrong independent of how many people think it so.
but if your making the same mistake Horsethorn has repeatedly done of implying that if something is an opinion it is only an opinion and can't also be an objective fact then that's clearly not true.
No, no one has stated that.
All we are saying is that an opinion (always subjective) has no impact on the value of things that are objective. An opinion can have the same value as an objective fact, no one has said otherwise. That is not hard for to understand is it?
Its pretty simple Al has asserted TACTDJFF is morally wrong independent of how many people think it so.
We are asking Al to back up his assertion with a method for how he arrived at this 'objective fact' as you refer to it.
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...but if your making the same mistake Horsethorn has repeatedly done of implying that if something is an opinion it is only an opinion and can't also be an objective fact then that's clearly not true.
If it's an objective fact then how can anybody truthfully refer to it as just their opinion?
If it's an objective fact then how can anybody truthfully refer to it as just their opinion?
Delete the ‘just’ which no one has claimed and the answer is quite easily, it applies to any fact I think is true but can’t verify. I can have the opinion that Jesus did not claim to be God in the way Christians claim he did and I might have some good but not conclusive reasons for thinking it – it’s my opinion based on an assessment of the limited information we do know. Nevertheless, whether or not Jesus claimed to be God is an objective fact, and its objective irrespective of whether I can demonstrate it, and if my opinion was correct the statement ‘Jesus did not claim to be God’ is both my opinion and also a fact.
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I never asked for proof I asked for a method, you were the one who brought up proof in message 34 and several times since.
Quote from you reply 32 on page 2 of this thread,
Unless you provide a method to prove (a) independent of opinion of course, which we are all looking forward to.
No, no one has stated that.
Really? So how do you make sense of Horsethorns statement that any example of OM is an opinion and therefore self-refuting? In what sense can an opinion about an OM be self-refuting if as you say it has no impact on the value of things that are objective?
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I never asked for proof I asked for a method, you were the one who brought up proof in message 34 and several times since.
Quote from you reply 32 on page 2 of this thread,
Unless you provide a method to prove (a) independent of opinion of course, which we are all looking forward to.
No, no one has stated that.
Really? So how do you make sense of Horsethorns statement that any example of OM is an opinion and therefore self-refuting? In what sense can an opinion about an OM be self-refuting if as you say it has no impact on the value of things that are objective?
Lazy language on my part for the first, to clarify I'm asking for a method.
I think HT was making the point that if something is objective then opinion is irrelevant relative to its objective value.
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Delete the ‘just’ which no one has claimed and the answer is quite easily, it applies to any fact I think is true but can’t verify. I can have the opinion that Jesus did not claim to be God in the way Christians claim he did and I might have some good but not conclusive reasons for thinking it – it’s my opinion based on an assessment of the limited information we do know. Nevertheless, whether or not Jesus claimed to be God is an objective fact, and its objective irrespective of whether I can demonstrate it, and if my opinion was correct the statement ‘Jesus did not claim to be God’ is both my opinion and also a fact.
Obviously you can only have an opinion about unknown objective facts.
I confess that I'm not sure what it is that we are discussing.
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So how do you make sense of Horsethorns statement that any example of OM is an opinion and therefore self-refuting? In what sense can an opinion about an OM be self-refuting if as you say it has no impact on the value of things that are objective?
Having an opinion that something is OM is self-refuting because by it being an opinion, the 'objective' bit is necessarily contradicted. You are basically saying that something is subjectively objective.
ht
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So how do you make sense of Horsethorns statement that any example of OM is an opinion and therefore self-refuting? In what sense can an opinion about an OM be self-refuting if as you say it has no impact on the value of things that are objective?
Having an opinion that something is OM is self-refuting because by it being an opinion, the 'objective' bit is necessarily contradicted. You are basically saying that something is subjectively objective.
ht
That is incorrect surely. By the same token, having an opinion that the speed of light is 3x108ms-1 (approx) would be self-reputing "because it is an opinion".
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So how do you make sense of Horsethorns statement that any example of OM is an opinion and therefore self-refuting? In what sense can an opinion about an OM be self-refuting if as you say it has no impact on the value of things that are objective?
Having an opinion that something is OM is self-refuting because by it being an opinion, the 'objective' bit is necessarily contradicted. You are basically saying that something is subjectively objective.
ht
That is incorrect surely. By the same token, having an opinion that the speed of light is 3x108ms-1 (approx) would be self-reputing "because it is an opinion".
In this case though the speed of light (approx) is a fact that is separate and distinct from any opinions about it, whereas 'TACTDJFF is always wrong' isn't a fact but is an opinion: and this is an important difference.
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So how do you make sense of Horsethorns statement that any example of OM is an opinion and therefore self-refuting? In what sense can an opinion about an OM be self-refuting if as you say it has no impact on the value of things that are objective?
Having an opinion that something is OM is self-refuting because by it being an opinion, the 'objective' bit is necessarily contradicted. You are basically saying that something is subjectively objective.
ht
That is incorrect surely. By the same token, having an opinion that the speed of light is 3x108ms-1 (approx) would be self-reputing "because it is an opinion".
In this case though the speed of light (approx) is a fact that is separate and distinct from any opinions about it, whereas 'TACTDJFF is always wrong' isn't a fact but is an opinion: and this is an important difference.
You make the statement "TACTDJFF isn't a fact". That is a claim you need to back up.
You do realise that things can be both a fact and an opinion, don't you.
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So how do you make sense of Horsethorns statement that any example of OM is an opinion and therefore self-refuting? In what sense can an opinion about an OM be self-refuting if as you say it has no impact on the value of things that are objective?
Having an opinion that something is OM is self-refuting because by it being an opinion, the 'objective' bit is necessarily contradicted. You are basically saying that something is subjectively objective.
ht
That is incorrect surely. By the same token, having an opinion that the speed of light is 3x108ms-1 (approx) would be self-reputing "because it is an opinion".
But there are methods for testing the speed of light, which are repeatable, and also form the basis of various predictions, also testable. In other words, these things are demonstrable. How will you do this with OM?
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So how do you make sense of Horsethorns statement that any example of OM is an opinion and therefore self-refuting? In what sense can an opinion about an OM be self-refuting if as you say it has no impact on the value of things that are objective?
Having an opinion that something is OM is self-refuting because by it being an opinion, the 'objective' bit is necessarily contradicted. You are basically saying that something is subjectively objective.
ht
That is incorrect surely. By the same token, having an opinion that the speed of light is 3x108ms-1 (approx) would be self-reputing "because it is an opinion".
In this case though the speed of light (approx) is a fact that is separate and distinct from any opinions about it, whereas 'TACTDJFF is always wrong' isn't a fact but is an opinion: and this is an important difference.
You make the statement "TACTDJFF isn't a fact". That is a claim you need to back up.
You do realise that things can be both a fact and an opinion, don't you.
Well here we are - Gord is of the opinion that it isn't a fact and you are of the opinion that it is a fact. It's clear from your request that you are fully aware of what has been asked of you for the past year over 89 drawn out pages of bluster on how someone should conclude OM if they believe X, as you are asking for the parallel from Gordon. This is the point we have reached, is it, shifting the burden?
I suppose you don't think it's sufficient for your request for Gordon to just state he believes the opposide of X therefore he should not conclude OM?
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So how do you make sense of Horsethorns statement that any example of OM is an opinion and therefore self-refuting? In what sense can an opinion about an OM be self-refuting if as you say it has no impact on the value of things that are objective?
Having an opinion that something is OM is self-refuting because by it being an opinion, the 'objective' bit is necessarily contradicted. You are basically saying that something is subjectively objective.
ht
That is incorrect surely. By the same token, having an opinion that the speed of light is 3x108ms-1 (approx) would be self-reputing "because it is an opinion".
But there are methods for testing the speed of light, which are repeatable, and also form the basis of various predictions, also testable. In other words, these things are demonstrable. How will you do this with OM?
As I have mentioned many times before. However,... my point here is that (Dyrghtons quote of) ht's claim that "Having an opinion that something is OM is self-refuting because by it being an opinion, the 'objective' bit is necessarily contradicted" is what I am discussing. ht seems to be arguing that having an opinion on something and that thing being a fact are mutually exclusive. They are not. That is the point I am making here and have demonstrated it. Of course this does leave us with the difficulty/opportunity of demonstrating that OM exists, but that is a separate matter.
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So how do you make sense of Horsethorns statement that any example of OM is an opinion and therefore self-refuting? In what sense can an opinion about an OM be self-refuting if as you say it has no impact on the value of things that are objective?
Having an opinion that something is OM is self-refuting because by it being an opinion, the 'objective' bit is necessarily contradicted. You are basically saying that something is subjectively objective.
ht
That is incorrect surely. By the same token, having an opinion that the speed of light is 3x108ms-1 (approx) would be self-reputing "because it is an opinion".
In this case though the speed of light (approx) is a fact that is separate and distinct from any opinions about it, whereas 'TACTDJFF is always wrong' isn't a fact but is an opinion: and this is an important difference.
You make the statement "TACTDJFF isn't a fact". That is a claim you need to back up.
You do realise that things can be both a fact and an opinion, don't you.
Well here we are - Gord is of the opinion that it isn't a fact and you are of the opinion that it is a fact. It's clear from your request that you are fully aware of what has been asked of you for the past year over 89 drawn out pages of bluster on how someone should conclude OM if they believe X, as you are asking for the parallel from Gordon. This is the point we have reached, is it, shifting the burden?
I suppose you don't think it's sufficient for your request for Gordon to just state he believes the opposide of X therefore he should not conclude OM?
I have given reasons why I believe OM exists. Here Gordon is stating that TACTDJFF is not a fact as if that affects the claim that "Having an opinion that something is OM is self-refuting because by it being an opinion, the 'objective' bit is necessarily contradicted." My point here is that having an opinion on something does not thereby make self-refuting something which is claimed to be objective. That is the sole point I am making here. OM might not exist, but it still wouldn't make ht's (quoted) statement actually correct.
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So how do you make sense of Horsethorns statement that any example of OM is an opinion and therefore self-refuting? In what sense can an opinion about an OM be self-refuting if as you say it has no impact on the value of things that are objective?
Having an opinion that something is OM is self-refuting because by it being an opinion, the 'objective' bit is necessarily contradicted. You are basically saying that something is subjectively objective.
ht
That is incorrect surely. By the same token, having an opinion that the speed of light is 3x108ms-1 (approx) would be self-reputing "because it is an opinion".
In this case though the speed of light (approx) is a fact that is separate and distinct from any opinions about it, whereas 'TACTDJFF is always wrong' isn't a fact but is an opinion: and this is an important difference.
You make the statement "TACTDJFF isn't a fact". That is a claim you need to back up.
You do realise that things can be both a fact and an opinion, don't you.
Indeed they can, and my claim is that 'TACTDJFF' is an opinion, and based on what has been said here I doubt that many, if any, would disagree.
I'm also saying that TACTDJFF isn't a fact because there are no good reasons to ever think that it is, since it doesn't seem likely that it could be confirmed on any basis or method similar to confirming the facts of the speed of light (approx) that you cited. This is, of course, exactly what this and the other thread are about - those like yourself who claim TACTDJFF isn't just opinion haven't yet explained on what basis it could be considered to correspond to a definition of being factual.
Having an opinion about established facts such as the speed of light is pointless unless the opinion calls into question the basis of how the fact hs been established, since if not then the fact and what anyone thinks about the fact are separate matters: whether I agree or disagree with the how the speed of light has been calculated is irrelevant to the facts about the speed of light.
When it comes to TACTDJFF all that has ever been presented has been opinion - and if you have something factual then please let us see it: remember the objective morality as evidence for God is your claim and not mine.
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So how do you make sense of Horsethorns statement that any example of OM is an opinion and therefore self-refuting? In what sense can an opinion about an OM be self-refuting if as you say it has no impact on the value of things that are objective?
Having an opinion that something is OM is self-refuting because by it being an opinion, the 'objective' bit is necessarily contradicted. You are basically saying that something is subjectively objective.
ht
That is incorrect surely. By the same token, having an opinion that the speed of light is 3x108ms-1 (approx) would be self-reputing "because it is an opinion".
In this case though the speed of light (approx) is a fact that is separate and distinct from any opinions about it, whereas 'TACTDJFF is always wrong' isn't a fact but is an opinion: and this is an important difference.
You make the statement "TACTDJFF isn't a fact". That is a claim you need to back up.
You do realise that things can be both a fact and an opinion, don't you.
Well here we are - Gord is of the opinion that it isn't a fact and you are of the opinion that it is a fact. It's clear from your request that you are fully aware of what has been asked of you for the past year over 89 drawn out pages of bluster on how someone should conclude OM if they believe X, as you are asking for the parallel from Gordon. This is the point we have reached, is it, shifting the burden?
I suppose you don't think it's sufficient for your request for Gordon to just state he believes the opposide of X therefore he should not conclude OM?
I have given reasons why I believe OM exists. Here Gordon is stating that TACTDJFF is not a fact as if that affects the claim that "Having an opinion that something is OM is self-refuting because by it being an opinion, the 'objective' bit is necessarily contradicted." My point here is that having an opinion on something does not thereby make self-refuting something which is claimed to be objective. That is the sole point I am making here. OM might not exist, but it still wouldn't make ht's (quoted) statement actually correct.
Yes, yes, yes, yadda, yadda. I'd be surprised if anyone else is really that bothered. You've found something else to latch onto to prolong even further you getting off your arse and actually producing something that can be independently verified for OM.
How long are you going to string this latest diversion on for?
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So how do you make sense of Horsethorns statement that any example of OM is an opinion and therefore self-refuting? In what sense can an opinion about an OM be self-refuting if as you say it has no impact on the value of things that are objective?
Having an opinion that something is OM is self-refuting because by it being an opinion, the 'objective' bit is necessarily contradicted. You are basically saying that something is subjectively objective.
ht
That is incorrect surely. By the same token, having an opinion that the speed of light is 3x108ms-1 (approx) would be self-reputing "because it is an opinion".
In this case though the speed of light (approx) is a fact that is separate and distinct from any opinions about it, whereas 'TACTDJFF is always wrong' isn't a fact but is an opinion: and this is an important difference.
You make the statement "TACTDJFF isn't a fact". That is a claim you need to back up.
You do realise that things can be both a fact and an opinion, don't you.
Indeed they can, and my claim is that 'TACTDJFF' is an opinion, and based on what has been said here I doubt that many, if any, would disagree.
I'm also saying that TACTDJFF isn't a fact because there are no good reasons to ever think that it is, since it doesn't seem likely that it could be confirmed on any basis or method similar to confirming the facts of the speed of light (approx) that you cited. This is, of course, exactly what this and the other thread are about - those like yourself who claim TACTDJFF isn't just opinion haven't yet explained on what basis it could be considered to correspond to a definition of being factual.
Having an opinion about established facts such as the speed of light is pointless unless the opinion calls into question the basis of how the fact hs been established, since if not then the fact and what anyone thinks about the fact are separate matters: whether I agree or disagree with the how the speed of light has been calculated is irrelevant to the facts about the speed of light.
When it comes to TACTDJFF all that has ever been presented has been opinion - and if you have something factual then please let us see it: remember the objective morality as evidence for God is your claim and not mine.
Gordon,
"TACTDJFF" is not actually an opinion. "TACTDJFF is objectively morally wrong" is an opinion (and in my view also true). As I've pointed out to a couple of others above, it was your statement seeming to say that opinions and facts are mutually exclusive that I was arguing against here.
I'm going to hold off posting on this thread for a short while, but will be back.
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Gordon,
"TACTDJFF" is not actually an opinion. "TACTDJFF is objectively morally wrong" is an opinion (and in my view also true). As I've pointed out to a couple of others above, it was your statement seeming to say that opinions and facts are mutually exclusive that I was arguing against here.
I'm going to hold off posting on this thread for a short while, but will be back.
I'm sure ,Alan, after all this time and effort on OM, that we all understand here that TCTDJFF now serves as a handy shorthand for the full monty.
Nor was I arguing that facts and opinions were always mutually exclusive: for example, we might both hold the opinion that the recently retired Tony McCoy was a superlative jockey, and the facts of his record back this up. It is also though true that ABBA were extremely successful recording artists in the latter half of the 20th century, as their sales figures would no doubt confirm, in spite of their making crap records (which is my opinion, and other opinions are available)!
Opinions and facts are not the same thing and the distinction between them is an essential one whether or not they coincide, since conflating opinions and facts is could well be problematic if the latter can't be shown to be identifiable on a separate basis from the former.
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So how do you make sense of Horsethorns statement that any example of OM is an opinion and therefore self-refuting? In what sense can an opinion about an OM be self-refuting if as you say it has no impact on the value of things that are objective?
Having an opinion that something is OM is self-refuting because by it being an opinion, the 'objective' bit is necessarily contradicted. You are basically saying that something is subjectively objective.
ht
That is incorrect surely. By the same token, having an opinion that the speed of light is 3x108ms-1 (approx) would be self-reputing "because it is an opinion".
That is after the fact. :) We have a method for objectively testing the speed of light that relies on no ones opinion. What we are asking you to do is provide a similar method for moral values.
I know you'll be tempting to go down old rabbit holes but bear in mind this:-
I think cheese tastes nice, would have tasted nice 100 years ago, will taste nice 100 years in the future, however I don't subscribe to taste being objective. Do you think taste is objective?
If not why not?
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...
I know you'll be tempting to go down old rabbit holes but bear in mind this:-
I think cheese tastes nice, would have tasted nice 100 years ago, will taste nice 100 years in the future, however I don't subscribe to taste being objective. Do you think taste is objective?
If not why not?
Sigh. You still don't even understand what I am arguing for.
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Perhaps because you can't state it clearly?
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Perhaps because you can't state it clearly?
Andy and Synonym seem to understand it. For example, see
http://www.religionethics.co.uk/index.php?topic=8931.msg525930#msg525930
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...
I know you'll be tempting to go down old rabbit holes but bear in mind this:-
I think cheese tastes nice, would have tasted nice 100 years ago, will taste nice 100 years in the future, however I don't subscribe to taste being objective. Do you think taste is objective?
If not why not?
Sigh. You still don't even understand what I am arguing for.
Simple question, evasion noted.
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I think cheese tastes nice, would have tasted nice 100 years ago, will taste nice 100 years in the future, however I don't subscribe to taste being objective.
Surely taste is an experiential concept at its very core. You can say that if you had been around 100 years ago then your senses would deliver a pleasant response to the cheese you put in your mouth, and the same holds for any point in time where you exist and are eating cheese.
One theory is that right and wrong work in a sort of similar way, in that they are basically about the responses the thought of something provokes in a person, but this isn't the same as saying that this is what they mean as a concept.
To talk about objective taste and asking if it is the case that "taste" is independent of minds and their senses, doesn't really make a lot of sense. It's not so much a question of whether this is or isn't true, because it is a surely a fairly incoherent notion before we even get on to that.
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Gordon,
"TACTDJFF" is not actually an opinion. "TACTDJFF is objectively morally wrong" is an opinion (and in my view also true). As I've pointed out to a couple of others above, it was your statement seeming to say that opinions and facts are mutually exclusive that I was arguing against here.
I'm going to hold off posting on this thread for a short while, but will be back.
I'm sure ,Alan, after all this time and effort on OM, that we all understand here that TCTDJFF now serves as a handy shorthand for the full monty....
I would normally agree with you, I think, but bear in mind that this thread has been characterized by at least some people not even understanding what is being argued for. Anything which can lead to continues confusion is perhaps best avoided.
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Perhaps because you can't state it clearly?
Andy and Synonym seem to understand it. For example, see
http://www.religionethics.co.uk/index.php?topic=8931.msg525930#msg525930
Andy's posts seem to indicate he understands what you are not arguing, not that he understands what you are.
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:'(
I think cheese tastes nice, would have tasted nice 100 years ago, will taste nice 100 years in the future, however I don't subscribe to taste being objective.
Surely taste is an experiential concept at its very core. You can say that if you had been around 100 years ago then your senses would deliver a pleasant response to the cheese you put in your mouth, and the same holds for any point in time where you exist and are eating cheese.
One theory is that right and wrong work in a sort of similar way, in that they are basically about the responses the thought of something provokes in a person, but this isn't the same as saying that this is what they mean as a concept.
To talk about objective taste and asking if it is the case that "taste" is independent of minds and their senses, doesn't really make a lot of sense. It's not so much a question of whether this is not isn't true, because as a concept it is a fairly incoherent notion surely before we even get on to that.
And since jakswan is not arguing that taste is objective, is a fairly pointless post. He is merely pointing out that the language used does not give indication of either objectivity being real or even assumed by the person using the language.
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He doesn't have to believe it in order to be using it as a reduction to the absurd of Alan's reasoning. Which is what he was appearing to me to be doing.
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He doesn't have to believe it in order to be using it as a reduction to the absurd of Alan's reasoning. Which is what he was appearing to me to be doing.
Agreed that is what he is doing, so addressing it as you did was pointless
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So how do you make sense of Horsethorns statement that any example of OM is an opinion and therefore self-refuting? In what sense can an opinion about an OM be self-refuting if as you say it has no impact on the value of things that are objective?
Having an opinion that something is OM is self-refuting because by it being an opinion, the 'objective' bit is necessarily contradicted. You are basically saying that something is subjectively objective.
ht
That is incorrect surely. By the same token, having an opinion that the speed of light is 3x108ms-1 (approx) would be self-reputing "because it is an opinion".
We can indeed have opinions about the speed of light. People had them before it was determined what that speed was.
However, once we worked out a way to determine that speed objectively, the opinions became redundant and irrelevant.
We can indeed have opinions about the OM of a situation. People had them before it was determined what that OM was.
However, once we worked out a way to determine that morality objectively, the opinions became redundant and irrelevant.
Hold on - we haven't yet found a way to determine morality objectively, all we have at present is opinion.
We seem to be at the same stage with OM as science was when people were saying 'the speed of light is really, really fast, and it's the same all the time'/'the speed of light is really, really fast, and it's different in different substances'(etc), but we hadn't yet worked out a method to test those opinions against reality.
What we need is a method, which is independent of opinion, to determine the OM of a situation.
ht
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He doesn't have to believe it in order to be using it as a reduction to the absurd of Alan's reasoning. Which is what he was appearing to me to be doing.
Agreed that is what he is doing, so addressing it as you did was pointless
In what way? If you take someone's reasoning and then substitute for part of it, except that the new version is rather incoherent at a conceptual level, then what will this tell you about the original reasoning?
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Because if applicable to the idea of morality then it would fail for the same in coherency. You are effectively making jakswan's point for him.
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Of course holding an opinion on anything could be true/ false, accurate/inaccurate, valid/invalid. The point is surely that any opinion, of itself, is no guide at all as to whether such an opinion is any of the above.
Hence, like others, I have consistently suggested that the idea of an objective morality needs some sort of method outside personal opinion to justify its objective basis. And for those who request what methods I would suggest, I'm afraid I have none. It is surely for those who suggest that morality has an objective basis to come up with a means of determining such. So far, in endless posts, I have not seen so far any method suggested which has tested the opinion that morality has an objective basis.
I have my own ideas of where my morality originates, but, of course, these are my opinions only. I still optimistically await some sort of verifiable method for objective morality, but, I fear I will wait in vain.
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Because if applicable to the idea of morality then it would fail for the same in coherency. You are effectively making jakswan's point for him.
Not entirely sure what you mean.
Position A:
"1) All men are human
2) David Cameron is a man
3) Therefore David Cameron is human
1&2 logically lead to 3. And subscribers to 1&2 are logically bound to accept 3."
Position A will not be troubled by substituting something incoherent into it such as:
Position B:
"1) All men are human
2) My dog Rex is a man
3) Therefore my dog Rex is human
1&2 logically lead to 3. And subscribers to 1&2 are logically bound to accept 3."
Great, this demonstrates that if you start with absurd you end with absurd. This does nothing to rebut the original position.
In Alan's case you could claim that the notions of morality being independent of minds and human agreement, and that a moral value would still hold even if everyone who believed this died out, are incoherent or false, but this will need a separate argument.
You will achieve nothing to trouble it by substituting something that probably is incoherent in its place. As the notion of an experiential concept such as how things taste being independent of minds and senses, is.
Once again, Alan's notions and argument may or may not be incoherent or false, but the specific tactic employed by Jakeswan of applying the same position to taste does nothing here.
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Once again, Alan's notions and argument may or may not be incoherent or false, but the specific tactic employed by Jakeswan of applying the same position to taste does nothing here.
Not really, morality is the principles concerning the distinction between good and bad behaviour, taste is the principles concerning the distinction between good and bad flavours.
Al has argued that if I think an action was always good, is now good and will be good in the future I'm logically bound to accept morality is objective.
I don't see the distinction between that and 'Al has argued that if I think something will taste good in the future and has always tasted good then I'm logically bound to accept that taste is objective'.
Al's make the assertion that good is not subjective at its very core and he is going to provide a method to demonstrate that it isn't. Hopefully he won't be asking anyone for their opinion in the process.
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Not really, morality is the principles concerning the distinction between good and bad behaviour, taste is the principles concerning the distinction between good and bad flavours.
As experienced by a taster. You need to have a taster whose senses are reporting positive feedback. Whether you need a mind in order for morality is another question.
Al has argued that if I think an action was always good, is now good and will be good in the future I'm logically bound to accept morality is objective.
I don't see the distinction between that and 'Al has argued that if I think something will taste good in the future and has always tasted good then I'm logically bound to accept that taste is objective'.
Yes, you could substitute taste into Alan's argument just as I substituted a dog Rex into position A above. You then get something like:
1) Cheese tastes good
2) Cheese will always taste good even if everyone dies out other than the people who find it to taste horrible
3) Cheese tasting good is objective, and so taste is objective
1&2 logically lead to 3. And subscribers to 1&2 are logically bound to accept 3.
Insert an incoherent notion into Alan's argument and derive an incoherent conclusion. What does this tell us about Alan's position?
Al's make the assertion that good is not subjective at its very core and he is going to provide a method to demonstrate that it isn't. Hopefully he won't be asking anyone for their opinion in the process.
Since he is discussing with people what we all believe, you might be asked what you believe about the matter. Which is not the same as saying that the matter relies on or derives from belief.
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As experienced by a taster. You need to have a taster whose senses are reporting positive feedback. Whether you need a mind in order for morality is another question.
It sure is and we are all looking forward to Al who is going demonstrate that actually it is different.
Yes, you could substitute taste into Alan's argument just as I substituted a dog Rex into position A above. You then get something like:
1) Cheese tastes good
2) Cheese will always taste good even if everyone dies out other than the people who find it to taste horrible
3) Cheese tasting good is objective, and so taste is objective
1&2 logically lead to 3. And subscribers to 1&2 are logically bound to accept 3.
Insert an incoherent notion into Alan's argument and derive an incoherent conclusion. What does this tell us about Alan's position?
Al's argument contained an incoherent notion.
Since he is discussing with people what we all believe, you might be asked what you believe about the matter. Which is not the same as saying that the matter relies on or derives from belief.
I might think speed of light in a vacuum is 30mph when we have a method to measure the same it renders my belief irrelevant.
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Al's argument contained an incoherent notion.
Maybe, maybe not, but replacing a claimed incoherent notion with an almost certainly incoherent notion won't really do any work to demonstrate this.
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Delete the ‘just’ which no one has claimed and the answer is quite easily, it applies to any fact I think is true but can’t verify. I can have the opinion that Jesus did not claim to be God in the way Christians claim he did and I might have some good but not conclusive reasons for thinking it – it’s my opinion based on an assessment of the limited information we do know. Nevertheless, whether or not Jesus claimed to be God is an objective fact, and its objective irrespective of whether I can demonstrate it, and if my opinion was correct the statement ‘Jesus did not claim to be God’ is both my opinion and also a fact.
Obviously you can only have an opinion about unknown objective facts.
I confess that I'm not sure what it is that we are discussing.
Well I was simply answering your question. I guess when you ask a question with an obvious answer it shouldn't really be a shocker when the answers obvious...
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So how do you make sense of Horsethorns statement that any example of OM is an opinion and therefore self-refuting? In what sense can an opinion about an OM be self-refuting if as you say it has no impact on the value of things that are objective?
Having an opinion that something is OM is self-refuting because by it being an opinion, the 'objective' bit is necessarily contradicted. You are basically saying that something is subjectively objective.
ht
That is incorrect surely. By the same token, having an opinion that the speed of light is 3x108ms-1 (approx) would be self-reputing "because it is an opinion".
We can indeed have opinions about the speed of light. People had them before it was determined what that speed was.
However, once we worked out a way to determine that speed objectively, the opinions became redundant and irrelevant.
We can indeed have opinions about the OM of a situation. People had them before it was determined what that OM was.
However, once we worked out a way to determine that morality objectively, the opinions became redundant and irrelevant.
Hold on - we haven't yet found a way to determine morality objectively, all we have at present is opinion.
We seem to be at the same stage with OM as science was when people were saying 'the speed of light is really, really fast, and it's the same all the time'/'the speed of light is really, really fast, and it's different in different substances'(etc), but we hadn't yet worked out a method to test those opinions against reality.
What we need is a method, which is independent of opinion, to determine the OM of a situation.
ht
Saying an opinion is redundant if the thing its about is objectively testable doesn't stop it being an opinion. Everything we believe is by definition our opinion and some are also facts (whether we know them or not) and some are also measurable facts. Your claim was very specific, that:
"Having an opinion that something is OM is self-refuting because by it being an opinion, the 'objective' bit is necessarily contradicted."
But nothing you have said about light implies this. Having an opinion about the speed of light either before or after we measure it and regardless of whether or not you consider it to be irrelevant, does not make the objectivity of the speed of light self refuting. However we view Alans argument, Alan is correct that the particular critique you have articulated just doesn't work as an argument.
Demonstrability is a different thing entirely from something being self-refuting and its a mistake to conflate the two.
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Of course holding an opinion on anything could be true/ false, accurate/inaccurate, valid/invalid. The point is surely that any opinion, of itself, is no guide at all as to whether such an opinion is any of the above.
Hence, like others, I have consistently suggested that the idea of an objective morality needs some sort of method outside personal opinion to justify its objective basis. And for those who request what methods I would suggest, I'm afraid I have none. It is surely for those who suggest that morality has an objective basis to come up with a means of determining such. So far, in endless posts, I have not seen so far any method suggested which has tested the opinion that morality has an objective basis.
I have my own ideas of where my morality originates, but, of course, these are my opinions only. I still optimistically await some sort of verifiable method for objective morality, but, I fear I will wait in vain.
No one has claimed OM can be independently verified have they? I might be wrong its been a long thread (the other one anyway) but its certainly not a view I have..the majority of accademic philosophers are moral realists, atheists and theists alike, but I don't think I can think of anyone who thinks that OM is verifiable..what makes you think that it should be?
I think its been clarified a number of times that verifiability isn’t possible (although that doesn’t mean we can’t make progress towards discovering moral truth). The issue is 'can moral statements be facts?', and things can be facts whether we can verify them or not. I’ve given examples of factual questions we can't verify and every time I do someone will say ‘well obviously it can be a fact about [whatever] irrespective of whether we can verify it’ yet a few paragraphs on we still get someone harping on about ‘independently verifying OM’ as if they were making some sort of meaningful point that makes any difference to the debate over whether morality is objective.
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So how do you make sense of Horsethorns statement that any example of OM is an opinion and therefore self-refuting? In what sense can an opinion about an OM be self-refuting if as you say it has no impact on the value of things that are objective?
Having an opinion that something is OM is self-refuting because by it being an opinion, the 'objective' bit is necessarily contradicted. You are basically saying that something is subjectively objective.
ht
That is incorrect surely. By the same token, having an opinion that the speed of light is 3x108ms-1 (approx) would be self-reputing "because it is an opinion".
In this case though the speed of light (approx) is a fact that is separate and distinct from any opinions about it, whereas 'TACTDJFF is always wrong' isn't a fact but is an opinion: and this is an important difference.
You make the statement "TACTDJFF isn't a fact". That is a claim you need to back up.
You do realise that things can be both a fact and an opinion, don't you.
Indeed they can, and my claim is that 'TACTDJFF' is an opinion, and based on what has been said here I doubt that many, if any, would disagree.
I'm also saying that TACTDJFF isn't a fact because there are no good reasons to ever think that it is, since it doesn't seem likely that it could be confirmed on any basis or method similar to confirming the facts of the speed of light (approx) that you cited. This is, of course, exactly what this and the other thread are about - those like yourself who claim TACTDJFF isn't just opinion haven't yet explained on what basis it could be considered to correspond to a definition of being factual.
Having an opinion about established facts such as the speed of light is pointless unless the opinion calls into question the basis of how the fact hs been established, since if not then the fact and what anyone thinks about the fact are separate matters: whether I agree or disagree with the how the speed of light has been calculated is irrelevant to the facts about the speed of light.
When it comes to TACTDJFF all that has ever been presented has been opinion - and if you have something factual then please let us see it: remember the objective morality as evidence for God is your claim and not mine.
Sorry where in the definition of a fact is verification? Some people believe other universes exist. If this was true this would be unverifiable even in principle as we cannot observe other universes. Nevertheless if another universe existed it would be a fact that it exists whether or not I can verify it. It does not cease to be a fact because it is not observable.
Other metahpyiscal questions are also in principle unverifiable – take for example determinism – it is impossible in principle to verify if determinism is true or false because it would only take 1 undetermined event to contradict this and until a theoretical end of the universe when ‘everything has happened and is known’ we couldn’t know if there was one. Equally we could never show that something was undetermined unless we could know every possible cause and have ruled them out which we also can’t do in practice. Metahpysical questions are often in principle undeterminable, yet we can and have made progress with many metaphysical questions.
Meta-ethical questions are just the same.
What we can do is give an account of how ethical truths can be fact we discover just as the anti-realist can try to give an account of morality as an invention, it’s then about testing the implications of our theory against our moral intuitions and moral reasoning as it is practiced, not about making a measurement that is anything like an observation in physics.
Regards
DT
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Al's argument contained an incoherent notion.
Maybe, maybe not, but replacing a claimed incoherent notion with an almost certainly incoherent notion won't really do any work to demonstrate this.
Good isn't a incoherent notion.
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No one has claimed OM can be independently verified have they? I might be wrong its been a long thread (the other one anyway) but its certainly not a view I have..the majority of accademic philosophers are moral realists, atheists and theists alike, but I don't think I can think of anyone who thinks that OM is verifiable..what makes you think that it should be?
I think its been clarified a number of times that verifiability isn’t possible (although that doesn’t mean we can’t make progress towards discovering moral truth). The issue is 'can moral statements be facts?', and things can be facts whether we can verify them or not. I’ve given examples of factual questions we can't verify and every time I do someone will say ‘well obviously it can be a fact about [whatever] irrespective of whether we can verify it’ yet a few paragraphs on we still get someone harping on about ‘independently verifying OM’ as if they were making some sort of meaningful point that makes any difference to the debate over whether morality is objective.
Al seems to think he can demonstrate objective moral values. Of course we do get you and others harping on about how morality could be objective, I'd accept could.
Al tells us though his belief in a god is based on this argument, its one of the famous flaky five, not sure he'll be satisfied with.
1. If objective moral values and duties exist, God could exist.
2. Objective moral values and duties could exist.
3. Therefore, God could exist.
If pigs could fly there would be flying pigs. :)
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Splendid view of children you have there,
Have you read Lord of the Flies?
A group of isolated, 'innocent' schoolboys turn into murderers.
We are told the situation before the flood. Matthew Henry says,
"In all ages there has been a peculiar curse of God upon marriages between professors of true religion and its avowed enemies. The evil example of the ungodly party corrupts or greatly hurts the other. Family religion is put an end to, and the children are trained up according to the worldly maxims of that parent who is without the fear of God."
It seems God knew that mankind (except Noah) had rejected him, with no hope of restoration.
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Splendid view of children you have there,
Have you read Lord of the Flies?
A group of isolated, 'innocent' schoolboys turn into murderers.
Yes. It's a novel, not a work of bleeding non-fiction, you plank.
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Splendid view of children you have there,
Have you read Lord of the Flies?
A group of isolated, 'innocent' schoolboys turn into murderers.
Yes. It's a novel, not a work of bleeding non-fiction, you plank.
Of course it is, everyone knows unsupervised pupils given sharp sticks trees and rocks self organise into secular humanist reading and discussion groups and organise sponsored walks for charity.
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Hi DT,
Quote from Mess. 113 by Dryghton's Toe:
No one has claimed OM can be independently verified have they? I might be wrong its been a long thread (the other one anyway) but its certainly not a view I have..the majority of accademic philosophers are moral realists, atheists and theists alike, but I don't think I can think of anyone who thinks that OM is verifiable..what makes you think that it should be?
Well, maybe you should look back again at the thread 'Objective morality exists!' where Alan made the point(repeatedly) that if one considered TACTDJFF to be morally wrong in all circumstances, then that person must also believe in an objective morality. (I hasten to say that this isn't my position, as I clearly stated in Mess. 26).
However, the point was repeatedly stressed by others that it would still only be opinion that objective morality exists unless it can demonstrated by some means independent of opinion. That's why so many people, including myself, have asked for a method which would demonstrate the objective existence of morality.
If you look back through the original thread you will find that this is a recurring theme throughout the many posts. If a person suggests that objective morality exists then it is surely encumbent upon them to demonstrate its validity, rather than resort to simple opinion.
I think its been clarified a number of times that verifiability isn’t possible (although that doesn’t mean we can’t make progress towards discovering moral truth). The issue is 'can moral statements be facts?', and things can be facts whether we can verify them or not. I’ve given examples of factual questions we can't verify and every time I do someone will say ‘well obviously it can be a fact about [whatever] irrespective of whether we can verify it’ yet a few paragraphs on we still get someone harping on about ‘independently verifying OM’ as if they were making some sort of meaningful point that makes any difference to the debate over whether morality is objective.
Glad to see that you don't think that it can be verified in any meaningful way. That's my position too.
You then ask, can moral statements be facts? I would suggest, not in any objective sense, because there is no evidence that morality exists outside the animal brain, unless one counted as fact certain evolutionary/cultural/social tendencies which it may be possible to quantify.
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So how do you make sense of Horsethorns statement that any example of OM is an opinion and therefore self-refuting? In what sense can an opinion about an OM be self-refuting if as you say it has no impact on the value of things that are objective?
Having an opinion that something is OM is self-refuting because by it being an opinion, the 'objective' bit is necessarily contradicted. You are basically saying that something is subjectively objective.
ht
That is incorrect surely. By the same token, having an opinion that the speed of light is 3x108ms-1 (approx) would be self-reputing "because it is an opinion".
We can indeed have opinions about the speed of light. People had them before it was determined what that speed was.
However, once we worked out a way to determine that speed objectively, the opinions became redundant and irrelevant.
We can indeed have opinions about the OM of a situation. People had them before it was determined what that OM was.
However, once we worked out a way to determine that morality objectively, the opinions became redundant and irrelevant.
Hold on - we haven't yet found a way to determine morality objectively, all we have at present is opinion.
We seem to be at the same stage with OM as science was when people were saying 'the speed of light is really, really fast, and it's the same all the time'/'the speed of light is really, really fast, and it's different in different substances'(etc), but we hadn't yet worked out a method to test those opinions against reality.
What we need is a method, which is independent of opinion, to determine the OM of a situation.
ht
Saying an opinion is redundant if the thing its about is objectively testable doesn't stop it being an opinion. Everything we believe is by definition our opinion and some are also facts (whether we know them or not) and some are also measurable facts.
Correct.
Your claim was very specific, that:
"Having an opinion that something is OM is self-refuting because by it being an opinion, the 'objective' bit is necessarily contradicted."
But nothing you have said about light implies this.
Perhaps you have misunderstood. (Having an opinion that X is objectively morally good) is self-refuting, because 'objective', we agreed some time ago, means 'independent of opinion'.
So 'having an opinion...' refutes (or cancels out, if your prefer) '...objectively...' It equates to saying 'subjectively objective', which is an oxymoron.
Having an opinion about the speed of light either before or after we measure it and regardless of whether or not you consider it to be irrelevant, does not make the objectivity of the speed of light self refuting.
I agree. What I said was that once we have a method to determine c, the opinions become redundant and irrelevant, because we know objectively what c is. People can still have opinions about it, but those opinions are pointless when we have access to the fact.
However we view Alans argument, Alan is correct that the particular critique you have articulated just doesn't work as an argument.
I'm not convinced. I think you (and Alan) have misunderstood it.
Demonstrability is a different thing entirely from something being self-refuting and its a mistake to conflate the two.
I agree. Luckily, I haven't.
However, as no method for demonstrating OM has been forthcoming, opinion is all we have, which refutes any possibility of OM due to the 'independent of opinion' bit.
ht
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Perhaps you have misunderstood. (Having an opinion that X is objectively morally good) is self-refuting, because 'objective', we agreed some time ago, means 'independent of opinion'.
How is that self-refuting? I am of the opinion that the speed of light is independent of my opinions. I believe it is unaffected by what I believe.
If you have an opinion on a matter this is not the same as saying that the matter is now dependent on your opinion.
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Perhaps you have misunderstood. (Having an opinion that X is objectively morally good) is self-refuting, because 'objective', we agreed some time ago, means 'independent of opinion'.
How is that self-refuting?
I thought the next sentence explained that...
So 'having an opinion...' refutes (or cancels out, if your prefer) '...objectively...' It equates to saying 'subjectively objective', which is an oxymoron.
I am of the opinion that the speed of light is independent of my opinions. I believe it is unaffected by what I believe.
That's not an equivalent.
(1) 'I am of the opinion that TACTDJFF is morally good. In my opinion it has always been morally good, and always will be, regardless of what other people think'
An equivalent would be
(2) 'I am of the opinion that the speed of light is 123.456m/s. In my opinion it has always been that speed, and always will be, regardless of what other people think.'
The difference is that we have a means of testing the speed of light which is not dependent on opinion.
If you have an opinion on a matter this is not the same as saying that the matter is now dependent on your opinion.
Except that's what Alien has been arguing. He has been claiming that (1) means that you must believe that OM exists.
Does having the opinion that c is 123.456 m/s mean that you believe objective speed exists?
ht
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Does having the opinion that c is 123.456 m/s mean that you believe objective speed exists?
Not on its own. If however I believed that the speed is that and will be that independently of what anyone believes, then I believe that the speed is objective.
That we have a method of verifying what I believe about the speed to be true or false, has nothing to do with the fact that I believe the matter to be independent of what I believe. And I am not contradicting myself by having an opinion on a matter which I believe is independent of what I believe.
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Does having the opinion that c is 123.456 m/s mean that you believe objective speed exists?
Not on its own. If however I believed that the speed is that and will be that independently of what anyone believes, then I believe that the speed is objective.
So what you believe is independent of what you believe? :)
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No, what I believe depends on what I believe. The subjects of my beliefs may not depend on my beliefs, and I may believe that they do not depend on my beliefs.
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No, what I believe depends on what I believe. The subjects of my beliefs may not depend on my beliefs, and I may believe that they do not depend on my beliefs.
So there may be objective moral values the flaky five just got a little flakier. :)
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Does having the opinion that c is 123.456 m/s mean that you believe objective speed exists?
Not on its own. If however I believed that the speed is that and will be that independently of what anyone believes, then I believe that the speed is objective.
How does having a belief differ from having an opinion?
That we have a method of verifying what I believe about the speed to be true or false, has nothing to do with the fact that I believe the matter to be independent of what I believe.
And you don't see the contradiction inherent in that?
And I am not contradicting myself by having an opinion on a matter which I believe is independent of what I believe.
No, but you are contradicting yourself if you then say that objective speed exists objectively because you believe it does.
ht
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And you don't see the contradiction inherent in that?
No because I can recognise that it is possible to form beliefs and opinions about matters that are unaffected by what is going on inside my head.
No, but you are contradicting yourself if you then say that objective speed exists objectively because you believe it does.
Who has said that? Who has said that objective morality exists because someone believes it does?
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Who has said that? Who has said that objective morality exists because someone believes it does?
Al:-
If someone agrees with me that an act, any act, is morally wrong and that this does not depend on how many people believe it to be so, they are logically bound to believe in the existence of objective morality.
Of course we pointed out that it does depend on one person, the one holding the opinion.
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That doesn't say that OM exists because of something a person believes. It says that the person ought to believe that OM exists because of something else they believe.
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That doesn't say that OM exists because of something a person believes. It says that the person ought to believe that OM exists because of something else they believe.
I suppose, I don't think Al quite got past that 'someone' in his statement is a person, nonsensical.
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Hi Enki,
Well, maybe you should look back again at the thread 'Objective morality exists!' where Alan made the point(repeatedly) that if one considered TACTDJFF to be morally wrong in all circumstances, then that person must also believe in an objective morality.
I may be wrong, but I think you are misinterpreting what Alan was trying to do with this – he certainly claims you are all misinterpreting him as he said above, whether I am too only he can confirm. I don’t think he is saying that if you think TACTDJFF is morally wrong in all circumstances it is an example of OM BECAUSE you think it, rather I reckon he is trying to say that TACTDJFF is an example of something that reveals our basic intuitions about morality such that we couldn’t ever consider it right even if there was only one person around to have a view on it, and that was the psychopath doing the torturing….in other words I think he was hoping this would get people to admit that opinions about TACTDJFF were irrelevant and it had to be considered wrong because of fundamental features inherent in the act itself. He then no doubt wanted to go on and say it is just this intuition – that moral wrongness is inherent in the qualities of the act itself rather than in anyone’s opinions about them that show the objective character of OM.
I think Alan didn’t help himself at times with the way he worded things. Further, I don’t think principles lie at the centre of morality at all, nevertheless this is my interpretation of Alan’s intention I think rather than interpreting Alan as arguing that the objectivity of morality derived from the fact that we all agree about it being wrong.
Synonym wrote:
That doesn't say that OM exists because of something a person believes. It says that the person ought to believe that OM exists because of something else they believe.
Bang on...which is what Alan was trying to do I think.
However, the point was repeatedly stressed by others that it would still only be opinion that objective morality exists unless it can demonstrated by some means independent of opinion. That's why so many people, including myself, have asked for a method which would demonstrate the objective existence of morality.
Depends on the suitably of the point made here. If it is, as HT has taken it, that the very fact our view on OM is our opinion in itself invalidates that it can be OM that’s just a mistake because there is no reason an opinion is only an opinion and that we can’t also have opinions about things that are also facts.
If you mean that his argument is invalid unless he can prove OM then this is also wrong because meta-ethics, just as metaphysics, are rarely if ever things that are capable of this sort of proof. Rather we have to test whether how well our theories of morality can explain morality as it is practiced. The nature and character of our moral thought.
You then ask, can moral statements be facts? I would suggest, not in any objective sense, because there is no evidence that morality exists outside the animal brain, unless one counted as fact certain evolutionary/cultural/social tendencies which it may be possible to quantify.
Well there is ‘evidence’ if an assumption of fact is explicit in our moral discourse, which I have argued it is…it leaves you with either having to accept OM or to argue that all of our sense of morality is a distortion or an illusion. As a metaphysical question if you were looking for a stronger form of evidence equivalent to something in the natural sciences then you are just misappropriating standards of proof from one field of human inquiry to another where they don’t and couldn’t possibly apply.
Regards
DT
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Perhaps you have misunderstood. (Having an opinion that X is objectively morally good) is self-refuting, because 'objective', we agreed some time ago, means 'independent of opinion'.
How is that self-refuting? I am of the opinion that the speed of light is independent of my opinions. I believe it is unaffected by what I believe.
If you have an opinion on a matter this is not the same as saying that the matter is now dependent on your opinion.
Absolutely right.
HT wrote:
Perhaps you have misunderstood. (Having an opinion that X is objectively morally good) is self-refuting, because 'objective', we agreed some time ago, means 'independent of opinion'.
So 'having an opinion...' refutes (or cancels out, if your prefer) '...objectively...' It equates to saying 'subjectively objective', which is an oxymoron.
Same mistake again ‘m afraid HT. Something existing independent of opinion doesn’t mean we can’t have an opinion about it….it just means its not dependent on that opinion for its objectivity. You are still assuming that if we have an opinion of something is the same as something being only an opinion but this is not the case.
Regards
DT
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Al tells us though his belief in a god is based on this argument, its one of the famous flaky five,
And
So there may be objective moral values the flaky five just got a little flakier.
Hmm.. whenever I see a phrase like the ‘flaky five’ from atheists it usually turns out to be vacuous rhetoric based on an a misrepresentation of what is being said, and it looks like we have just the same thing again here.
If by ‘flaky’ you mean the moral argument for God doesn’t work because it doesn’t prove God, then all your doing is making exactly the same mistake as you did when you talked about proving OM. Theistic arguments for God aren’t meant to be proof of God – even William Lane Craig who I am told is the target of the term ‘flaky five’ doesn’t think so and has said as much. No theistic philosophers’ think that it is irrational to come to atheist conclusions and that would be the case if there was a knock down argument for God they were ignoring.
The moral argument, like all the arguments for God is part of a cumulative case, and like all arguments its conclusion can only be drawn if you accept the premise. A huge number of people think that the character of morality is objective including the majority of philosophers, even though only a minority of philosophers are theists. (Numbers don’t make the argument correct of course – but they do show that some of the sillier accusations levelled in the last thread about people only believing in OM because they believe in God are simply incorrect).
If you were one of the many people who think morality has an objective character than the argument has force, if you don’t then it won’t. Some people argue that they have very different intuitions, some people are even total psychopaths with no care for morality at all… no one I think would expect such people to be persuaded by the moral argument. Nevertheless for a great many of us, theists and atheists alike, who do think our morality seems to be making truth claims that are truths we observe in morally relevant acts rather than something we invent, then it’s entirely relevant to ask how that can be the case. If God is the best explanation then this adds to the cumulative case for God….that’s the scope of the argument.
If you were expecting more….an out and out proof or something then your just misrepresenting the argument and indeed misrepresenting more widely the whole way we can make progress in philosophy more generally.
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If you were expecting more….an out and out proof or something then your just misrepresenting the argument and indeed misrepresenting more widely the whole way we can make progress in philosophy more generally.
The argument is basic logic which even you should be able to comprehend. It is flaky as it has flaky premises and a flaky conclusion.
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Oh I can comprehend it fine, it has a valid form and a premise (a first one at least) that many people would accept and is compelling enough to be the dominant position for philosophers, atheist and theist alike (premise 1that is)...I guess the term 'flaky' sits better with a sneer than 'it's a valid arguement but I don't agree with its premise even though many do find good reason to accept it'.
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Oh I can comprehend it fine, it has a valid form and a premise (a first one at least) that many people would accept and is compelling enough to be the dominant position for philosophers, atheist and theist alike (premise 1that is)...I guess the term 'flaky' sits better with a sneer than 'it's a valid arguement but I don't agree with its premise even though many do find good reason to accept it'.
The argument is as follows:-
1. If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.
2. Objective moral values do exist.
3. Therefore, God exists.
You think that premise one is a dominant position for atheist philosophers?
Quite happy to outline why I think it is flaky, I have posted at length on this argument before, I suggest you ask for clarification before labelling people in future.
Am I to assume you wish to defend this argument? You have been something of a cheerleader in the past.
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No it's been presented in a number of forms, what you present as premise 2 is what I refer to as premise 1.
And I would not defend yr other premise as written, but rather:
1. Objective moral values exist
2. God is the best explanation for objective moral values
3. Therefore objective moral values gives us reason to believe in God.
Its premise 2 as I have presented it where I would depart from Alan's version of it a little and not premise 1, which is what the last thread was entirely about.
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1. Objective moral values exist.
Unprovable affirmation.
2. God is the best explanation for objective moral values.
No he isn't. An unknown force is the best explanation for objective moral values.
3. Therefore objective moral values gives us reason to believe in God.
No they don't. Objective moral values give us reason to believe that some unknown power created them.
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No it's been presented in a number of forms, what you present as premise 2 is what I refer to as premise 1.
And I would not defend yr other premise as written, but rather:
1. Objective moral values exist
2. God is the best explanation for objective moral values
3. Therefore objective moral values gives us reason to believe in God.
Its premise 2 as I have presented it where I would depart from Alan's version of it a little and not premise 1, which is what the last thread was entirely about.
Thanks. So lets start on (1); Can you give an example of an objective moral value and how you know its objective without resorting anyone's opinion?
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HT wrote:
Perhaps you have misunderstood. (Having an opinion that X is objectively morally good) is self-refuting, because 'objective', we agreed some time ago, means 'independent of opinion'.
So 'having an opinion...' refutes (or cancels out, if your prefer) '...objectively...' It equates to saying 'subjectively objective', which is an oxymoron.
Same mistake again ‘m afraid HT. Something existing independent of opinion doesn’t mean we can’t have an opinion about it….it just means its not dependent on that opinion for its objectivity. You are still assuming that if we have an opinion of something is the same as something being only an opinion but this is not the case.
Regards
DT
No, it doesn't mean we can't have an opinion on it, I agree. Good job that's not what I'm saying, isn't it?
Once again, you have misunderstood.
If I say that I have a negative positive number, the 'negative' and 'positive' cancel out, and the number is negative.
If I say that I have a subjective opinion on objective morality, the 'subjective' and 'objective' cancel out, and we are left with a subjective morality.
ht
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DT - I am intrigued by one of your points above, where you talk about qualities in the act itself. I just wonder what you mean by this, as it suggests that there is an act, along with its qualities, which exist independently. This is starting to remind me of the tree falling in the forest and so on, but while we can conceive of an act which is not observed, we can't experience one. I suppose then we are back to the issue of subjective/objective, and the oddity of something being wrong without anyone thinking so.
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DT - I am intrigued by one of your points above, where you talk about qualities in the act itself. I just wonder what you mean by this, as it suggests that there is an act, along with its qualities, which exist independently. This is starting to remind me of the tree falling in the forest and so on, but while we can conceive of an act which is not observed, we can't experience one. I suppose then we are back to the issue of subjective/objective, and the oddity of something being wrong without anyone thinking so.
Is it clear what constitute's a moral act? Is it an act which benefits or at least does least harm to other humans? If so, why why would a god who created every living thing on Earth only consider harm to humans and not dags and cats, bears and leopards - or for that matter, grass and trees!
Objective morality must take into account the what, as well as the why.
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Hi DT,
In response to your post 133:
I may be wrong, but I think you are misinterpreting what Alan was trying to do with this – he certainly claims you are all misinterpreting him as he said above, whether I am too only he can confirm. I don’t think he is saying that if you think TACTDJFF is morally wrong in all circumstances it is an example of OM BECAUSE you think it,
But I didn't say this. I said that he suggested that anyone who thinks that TACTDJFF is morally wrong(or even morally right) in all circumstances should also logically accept that OM exists.(see his Mess 1312 in the original thread). I am very happy to accept that this is NOT a valid argument for OM in itself because it is simply opinion. I repeat that I have never stated that I believe TACTDJFF is wrong in all circumstances.
rather I reckon he is trying to say that TACTDJFF is an example of something that reveals our basic intuitions about morality such that we couldn’t ever consider it right even if there was only one person around to have a view on it, and that was the psychopath doing the torturing….in other words I think he was hoping this would get people to admit that opinions about TACTDJFF were irrelevant and it had to be considered wrong because of fundamental features inherent in the act itself. He then no doubt wanted to go on and say it is just this intuition – that moral wrongness is inherent in the qualities of the act itself rather than in anyone’s opinions about them that show the objective character of OM.
I have understood this from the start. Indeed, at an early stage, Alan suggested this. He sees the idea of TACTDJFF as being wrong as 'blindingly obvious'(post 83). The problem with this approach is that whatever reasons Alan(or others) have given for justifying the immorality of TACTDJFF, they still remain opinions, and do not necessarily point to the existence of an objective morality which is extraneous to human beings. Furthermore, intuition, I would suggest, is no argument for the existence of OM. That is not to say that morality is not inherent in the act itself, but to suggest that this is so, rather than being a human construct, needs some more objective method for reaching that conclusion.
I think Alan didn’t help himself at times with the way he worded things. Further, I don’t think principles lie at the centre of morality at all, nevertheless this is my interpretation of Alan’s intention I think rather than interpreting Alan as arguing that the objectivity of morality derived from the fact that we all agree about it being wrong.
Fair enough.
Synonym wrote:
That doesn't say that OM exists because of something a person believes. It says that the person ought to believe that OM exists because of something else they believe.
Bang on...which is what Alan was trying to do I think.
I really have no problem with this, as I have explained above. If a person believes something which fits with a definition of OM, then logically they should accept OM.
Depends on the suitably of the point made here. If it is, as HT has taken it, that the very fact our view on OM is our opinion in itself invalidates that it can be OM that’s just a mistake because there is no reason an opinion is only an opinion and that we can’t also have opinions about things that are also facts. If you mean that his argument is invalid unless he can prove OM then this is also wrong because meta-ethics, just as metaphysics, are rarely if ever things that are capable of this sort of proof. Rather we have to test whether how well our theories of morality can explain morality as it is practiced. The nature and character of our moral thought.
On the first part of this paragraph I have already said this when I suggested in Mess 105 of this thread "Of course holding an opinion on anything could be true/false, accurate/inaccurate, valid/invalid."
On the second part, if we are to abandon the sort of proof that I (and others) request, then I would happily agree that our theories of morality have to be tested, and the nature and character of our moral thought have to be studied, and, as a most important rider, we have to also try to find the origins of our moral thought and behaviour.
Well there is ‘evidence’ if an assumption of fact is explicit in our moral discourse, which I have argued it is…it leaves you with either having to accept OM or to argue that all of our sense of morality is a distortion or an illusion. As a metaphysical question if you were looking for a stronger form of evidence equivalent to something in the natural sciences then you are just misappropriating standards of proof from one field of human inquiry to another where they don’t and couldn’t possibly apply.
Well my own attitude to morality is as follows:
I see morality as a human construct based upon the need for social cohesion, driven by the qualities of empathy and altruism and and fashioned by culture, nurture and rationality. I would suggest that my personal morals are a result of these, and capable of wide interpretation given any particular 'moral' situation. I may well be wrong on any particular instance according to others who may take a contrary and opposing view. Indeed I may even change my moral stance if I am convinced that I should do so. I try to follow what I think is reasonable 'moral' behaviour according to the view of morality that I have described.
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Once again, you have misunderstood.
If I say that I have a negative positive number, the 'negative' and 'positive' cancel out, and the number is negative.
If I say that I have a subjective opinion on objective morality, the 'subjective' and 'objective' cancel out, and we are left with a subjective morality.
Who is saying that they have a subjective opinion on objective morality though?
If I say that I am of the opinion that the speed of light is c and will be c irrespective of whether anyone agrees, I am offering an opinion, but not a subjective one. I am stating what I believe the truth of an objective matter to be.
If I say that I am of the opinion that TACTDJFF is wrong and will be wrong irrespective of whether anyone agrees, I am offering an opinion, but we do not know at this stage whether I am offering a subjective opinion or whether I am stating what I believe the truth of an objective matter to be.
In order to say that offering an opinion on X being objective is self-refuting, you first need to presuppose that the opinion is of the subjective variety.
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If I say that I am of the opinion that the speed of light is c and will be c irrespective of whether anyone agrees, I am offering an opinion, but not a subjective one. I am stating what I believe the truth of an objective matter to be.
Opinion is always subjective, your opinion of c will cease to exist when you do.
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Quote from: Dryghtons Toe on Today at 07:49:08 AM
1. Objective moral values exist.
Unprovable affirmation.
Unprovable yes but grounded in our moral experience nonetheless.
Quote
2. God is the best explanation for objective moral values.
No he isn't. An unknown force is the best explanation for objective moral values.
An unknowable force with intention and the ability to define moral truth...that's what we mean by God or at least part of it.
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Thanks. So lets start on (1); Can you give an example of an objective moral value and how you know its objective without resorting anyone's opinion?
If morality is objective then every moral judgement that is correct is an example....so if discrimination against people for being gay is wrong its objectively wrong. You can't read OM like a list but we can make progress towards discovering it. How we do that is dependent on the account we gave of how OM exists. So if OM is grounded in God for example part of discovering OM will be deepening our experience of God and our understanding of his character and intention. How successful we are at this will define how successful we are at recognising OM.
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HT wrote:
Perhaps you have misunderstood. (Having an opinion that X is objectively morally good) is self-refuting, because 'objective', we agreed some time ago, means 'independent of opinion'.
So 'having an opinion...' refutes (or cancels out, if your prefer) '...objectively...' It equates to saying 'subjectively objective', which is an oxymoron.
Same mistake again ‘m afraid HT. Something existing independent of opinion doesn’t mean we can’t have an opinion about it….it just means its not dependent on that opinion for its objectivity. You are still assuming that if we have an opinion of something is the same as something being only an opinion but this is not the case.
Regards
DT
No, it doesn't mean we can't have an opinion on it, I agree. Good job that's not what I'm saying, isn't it?
Once again, you have misunderstood.
If I say that I have a negative positive number, the 'negative' and 'positive' cancel out, and the number is negative.
If I say that I have a subjective opinion on objective morality, the 'subjective' and 'objective' cancel out, and we are left with a subjective morality.
ht
No it doesn't, it only cancels out if OM depended on my opinion for its objectivity, but I don't think that and I don't think Alan does either. you can't have a negative positive, because of the rules of maths. Subjective opinion by contrast is a property of my beliefs and If my subjective opinion is about X being an objective fact AND X is also is an objective fact (whether I know it or not) then my subjective belief about X does nothing to negate its objectivity.
Regards
DT
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DT - I am intrigued by one of your points above, where you talk about qualities in the act itself. I just wonder what you mean by this, as it suggests that there is an act, along with its qualities, which exist independently. This is starting to remind me of the tree falling in the forest and so on, but while we can conceive of an act which is not observed, we can't experience one. I suppose then we are back to the issue of subjective/objective, and the oddity of something being wrong without anyone thinking so.
Hi Wiggs,
Yes this goes back to the scientific realism vs irrealism point we touched on before- if you were a scientific realist you would believe that our observations of the world are accurate representations of the way the world is and someone who is both a scientific realist and a moral realist would say the same for how we experience morally relevance in the world. If you're not a scientific realist then it you're not going to except this, nevertheless the scientific anti-realist would still understand that we can make a meaningful distinction between subjective and objective... a flower petal is objective in a way that our taste in marmite isn't... the first, on an anti-realist view of science is conception dependent but not perception dependent, while the latter is both. There is a prominent form of moral realism that embraces a scientific anti-realism annd argues morality is objective in exactly this way (i.e. conception dependent but not perception dependent).
Regards
DT
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Is it clear what constitute's a moral act? Is it an act which benefits or at least does least harm to other humans? If so, why why would a god who created every living thing on Earth only consider harm to humans and not dags and cats, bears and leopards - or for that matter, grass and trees!
Objective morality must take into account the what, as well as the why.
The only person who has talked about 'least harm to humans' was Jakswan I think when he tried to define his axioms. I'd definitely expect acts towards animals to count as morally relevant which is why I am a vegetarian.
Regards
DT
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Hi enki
Hi DT,
In response to your post 133:
Quote
I may be wrong, but I think you are misinterpreting what Alan was trying to do with this – he certainly claims you are all misinterpreting him as he said above, whether I am too only he can confirm. I don’t think he is saying that if you think TACTDJFF is morally wrong in all circumstances it is an example of OM BECAUSE you think it,
But I didn't say this. I said that he suggested that anyone who thinks that TACTDJFF is morally wrong(or even morally right) in all circumstances should also logically accept that OM exists.(see his Mess 1312 in the original thread). I am very happy to accept that this is NOT a valid argument for OM in itself because it is simply opinion. I repeat that I have never stated that I believe TACTDJFF is wrong in all circumstances.
Quote
rather I reckon he is trying to say that TACTDJFF is an example of something that reveals our basic intuitions about morality such that we couldn’t ever consider it right even if there was only one person around to have a view on it, and that was the psychopath doing the torturing….in other words I think he was hoping this would get people to admit that opinions about TACTDJFF were irrelevant and it had to be considered wrong because of fundamental features inherent in the act itself. He then no doubt wanted to go on and say it is just this intuition – that moral wrongness is inherent in the qualities of the act itself rather than in anyone’s opinions about them that show the objective character of OM.
I have understood this from the start. Indeed, at an early stage, Alan suggested this. He sees the idea of TACTDJFF as being wrong as 'blindingly obvious'(post 83). The problem with this approach is that whatever reasons Alan(or others) have given for justifying the immorality of TACTDJFF, they still remain opinions, and do not necessarily point to the existence of an objective morality which is extraneous to human beings. Furthermore, intuition, I would suggest, is no argument for the existence of OM. That is not to say that morality is not inherent in the act itself, but to suggest that this is so, rather than being a human construct, needs some more objective method for reaching that conclusion.
Disagree that metaphysical questions need an objective method - in fact they often can't possibly have a provable objective method, although they may well have a method depending on your account of moral realism. Bit its just wrong to suggest looking to reason from our intuitions invalidates the objectivity of anything we believe that's based on them.. in fact everything we believe is based on foundational assumptions and intuitions we have no objective way of demonstrating including all science and philosophy. We all assume for example that our memory and reason are generally reliable mechanisms that don't routinely mislead us, and no argument or observation we could make or conclusion based on them could possibly demonstrate that was true. Asking for objective methods to solve metaphysical questions is a misapplication of a scientific methodology to questions where it simply can't apply.
On the first part of this paragraph I have already said this when I suggested in Mess 105 of this thread "Of course holding an opinion on anything could be true/false, accurate/inaccurate, valid/invalid."
On the second part, if we are to abandon the sort of proof that I (and others) request, then I would happily agree that our theories of morality have to be tested, and the nature and character of our moral thought have to be studied, and, as a most important rider, we have to also try to find the origins of our moral thought and behaviour.
Not much disagreement with this then although I'd expect we'd disagree on what the origins of moral thought are or on an 'objective' way of identifying what this was.
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Thanks. So lets start on (1); Can you give an example of an objective moral value and how you know its objective without resorting anyone's opinion?
If morality is objective then every moral judgement that is correct is an example....so if discrimination against people for being gay is wrong its objectively wrong. You can't read OM like a list but we can make progress towards discovering it.
So short answer would have been 'no', your one of those 'why use five words when 100 will do' types aren't you! :)
How we do that is dependent on the account we gave of how OM exists.
Like its subjective.
So if OM is grounded in God for example part of discovering OM will be deepening our experience of God and our understanding of his character and intention. How successful we are at this will define how successful we are at recognising OM.
But if its the great fairy or Santa then that will be different, like it changes from person to person, based on personal feelings, tastes, or opinions.
Perhaps we need to go over what objective means because I don't think you understand the basics.
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Is it clear what constitute's a moral act? Is it an act which benefits or at least does least harm to other humans? If so, why why would a god who created every living thing on Earth only consider harm to humans and not dags and cats, bears and leopards - or for that matter, grass and trees!
Objective morality must take into account the what, as well as the why.
The only person who has talked about 'least harm to humans' was Jakswan I think when he tried to define his axioms. I'd definitely expect acts towards animals to count as morally relevant which is why I am a vegetarian.
Regards
DT
Yes that was a very basic outline of my morality so don't get too carried away with it, you were too quick to label me last time.
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Once again, you have misunderstood.
If I say that I have a negative positive number, the 'negative' and 'positive' cancel out, and the number is negative.
If I say that I have a subjective opinion on objective morality, the 'subjective' and 'objective' cancel out, and we are left with a subjective morality.
Who is saying that they have a subjective opinion on objective morality though?
Everyone. By definition.
If I say that I am of the opinion that the speed of light is c and will be c irrespective of whether anyone agrees, I am offering an opinion, but not a subjective one. I am stating what I believe the truth of an objective matter to be.
All opinions are, by definition, subjective.
If I say that I am of the opinion that TACTDJFF is wrong and will be wrong irrespective of whether anyone agrees, I am offering an opinion, but we do not know at this stage whether I am offering a subjective opinion or whether I am stating what I believe the truth of an objective matter to be.
All opinions are, by definition, subjective.
In order to say that offering an opinion on X being objective is self-refuting, you first need to presuppose that the opinion is of the subjective variety.
Nope. All opinions are, by definition, subjective.
ht
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HT wrote:
Perhaps you have misunderstood. (Having an opinion that X is objectively morally good) is self-refuting, because 'objective', we agreed some time ago, means 'independent of opinion'.
So 'having an opinion...' refutes (or cancels out, if your prefer) '...objectively...' It equates to saying 'subjectively objective', which is an oxymoron.
Same mistake again ‘m afraid HT. Something existing independent of opinion doesn’t mean we can’t have an opinion about it….it just means its not dependent on that opinion for its objectivity. You are still assuming that if we have an opinion of something is the same as something being only an opinion but this is not the case.
Regards
DT
No, it doesn't mean we can't have an opinion on it, I agree. Good job that's not what I'm saying, isn't it?
Once again, you have misunderstood.
If I say that I have a negative positive number, the 'negative' and 'positive' cancel out, and the number is negative.
If I say that I have a subjective opinion on objective morality, the 'subjective' and 'objective' cancel out, and we are left with a subjective morality.
ht
No it doesn't, it only cancels out if OM depended on my opinion for its objectivity,
Nope. It cancels out because you have subjective opinion of something allegedly objective.
but I don't think that and I don't think Alan does either.
If Alan doesn't think that, why does he always begin with someone's opinion?
you can't have a negative positive, because of the rules of maths.
That's right. So, are you saying that you *can* have a subjective objective?
Subjective opinion by contrast is a property of my beliefs and If my subjective opinion is about X being an objective fact AND X is also is an objective fact (whether I know it or not) then my subjective belief about X does nothing to negate its objectivity.
Agreed. However, for OM, we have no means (so far, despite asking many times) to determine whether a particular situational morality is objective or not.
It may well be that your subjective morality opinion matches the objective morality of a given situation, but we have no way to tell.
ht
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Whether one phrases an opinion as if it relates to an objective truth or not, has no bearing on the existence of such a truth.
I am much more interested in Dryghton's Toe idea of something referred to.as 'moral experience' as there seem to be some implied claims about what it is which give some indication of morality not being purely opinion as taste. Please expand.
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All opinions are, by definition, subjective.
So having an opinion on anything, whether you are making a value or aesthetic judgment, or whether you are expressing what you consider the truth of a factual matter to be, is by definition subjective.
So when I opine that global warming is occurring, the subjectivity of my opinion cancels out any potential objectivity of global warming occurring, and leaves us with global warming occurring being subjective.
Or we could make a distinction between opinions on subjective and objective matters, and say that having an opinion on a moral issue necessarily leading to subjective morality, presupposes that the opinion is on a subjective matter in the first place.
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So having an opinion on anything, whether you are making a value or aesthetic judgment, or whether you are expressing what you consider the truth of a factual matter to be, is by definition subjective.
Yes.
So when I opine that global warming is occurring, the subjectivity of my opinion cancels out any potential objectivity of global warming occurring, and leaves us with global warming occurring being subjective.
No the statement 'global warming occurring' is true / false independent of your opinion, the statement 'my opinion global warming occurring' is not true / false independent of your opinion.
Or we could make a distinction between opinions on subjective and objective matters, and say that having an opinion on a moral issue necessarily leading to subjective morality, presupposes that the opinion is on a subjective matter in the first place.
We make the distinction of subjective / objective because the truth of a claim doesn't change according to subject making it.
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^ wot 'e sed.
ht
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Jakswan not sure what your point is. You explain the difference between something being objective or subjective. OK, but the claim was that offering an opinion on a moral matter had a kind of cancelling effect and turned the moral matter into a subjective matter.
If you agree that a matter being objective is unnaffected by someone's opinion on it, then you should agree that we cannot conclude a matter is subjective because of an opinion on it.
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Jakswan not sure what your point is. You explain the difference between something being objective or subjective. OK, but the claim was that offering an opinion on a moral matter had a kind of cancelling effect and turned the moral matter into a subjective matter.
If you agree that a matter being objective is unnaffected by someone's opinion on it, then you should agree that we cannot conclude a matter is subjective because of an opinion on it.
Moral questions are always a matter of someones opinion, even huge numbers of people.
Some things are fact, like the SOL in a vacuum, and can be measured so I can remove opinion.
How do you remove subjective opinion from some moral question?
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Hi DT,
From your reply 153:
Disagree that metaphysical questions need an objective method - in fact they often can't possibly have a provable objective method, although they may well have a method depending on your account of moral realism. Bit its just wrong to suggest looking to reason from our intuitions invalidates the objectivity of anything we believe that's based on them.. in fact everything we believe is based on foundational assumptions and intuitions we have no objective way of demonstrating including all science and philosophy. We all assume for example that our memory and reason are generally reliable mechanisms that don't routinely mislead us, and no argument or observation we could make or conclusion based on them could possibly demonstrate that was true. Asking for objective methods to solve metaphysical questions is a misapplication of a scientific methodology to questions where it simply can't apply.
I don't have anything against the idea of OM at all, in the same way that I don't have any problem with the existence of a God.
I agree that OM does not seem to lend itself be demonstrated by any naturalistic method and I would agree with you that OM isn't invalidated by the lack of an objective method. But it isn't supported either. So, what we seem to be left with is intuitive assumption. William Lane Craig seems to state this when he asserts 'Objective moral values and duties do exist' in the third of his 'Five arguments for God' (http://www.reasonablefaith.org/the-new-atheism-and-five-arguments-for-god), and backs it up by simply saying that people believe that this is true.
Unfortunately the trouble as far as the intuitive approach goes, I personally don't feel that OM exists just as I feel that no God exists. However, even my own intuitions do not satisfy me, because I see so many examples of the intuitive approach alone leading to contradictory assumptions. So, for me, the intuitive approach is beset with difficulties.
Now if we take the example of TACTDJFF, on all sorts of levels(including the intuitive approach) I see this as morally wrong, but only because I am a human being. If no human beings existed, and we substitute other entities for human beings in the original example, my judgement of right/wrong becomes meaningless and I see no reason to imbue the idea of TACTDJFF in this case with any moral dimension at all. Only as a human being does the idea of morality seem meaningful. Hence, I suggest that morality is a human construct, although I would accept that certain other animal species show some forms of proto-morality certainly.
Alternatively, to convince me that OM exists, or that there are moral truths associated with particular acts, some form of demonstration backing up such a belief((or opinion) is needed that this is so. As none seems to be forthcoming, then I am left with what I find to be compelling evidence that humanity's focus on the moral dimension is in fact the result of evolutionary traits.
Not much disagreement with this then although I'd expect we'd disagree on what the origins of moral thought are or on an 'objective' way of identifying what this was.
Fair enough.
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Jakswan not sure what your point is. You explain the difference between something being objective or subjective. OK, but the claim was that offering an opinion on a moral matter had a kind of cancelling effect and turned the moral matter into a subjective matter.
If you agree that a matter being objective is unnaffected by someone's opinion on it, then you should agree that we cannot conclude a matter is subjective because of an opinion on it.
You seem to often post on these topics where your main assertion is 'objective morality could exist', not really debating that. Al's position is that 'objective morality does exist' we are asking for evidence / method so that he can back up his claim.
So far Al has offered 'if you think X is always true independent of anyone's opinion then you must think X is objective', which would be correct.
However if your position is I think X is true independent of anyone else's opinion then you need not think X is objective.
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So short answer would have been 'no', your one of those 'why use five words when 100 will do' types aren't you!
No I'm one of those 'when someone asks a question with a silly assumption embed with it, explain why its a silly assumption rather than let them go on talking drivel types.
Quote
How we do that is dependent on the account we gave of how OM exists.
Like its subjective.
That depends whether or not the account you give of morality is objectively true or not, which is the thing we are discussing, so if your assuming it isn't you are just begging the question.
Quote
So if OM is grounded in God for example part of discovering OM will be deepening our experience of God and our understanding of his character and intention. How successful we are at this will define how successful we are at recognising OM.
But if its the great fairy or Santa then that will be different, like it changes from person to person, based on personal feelings, tastes, or opinions.
Depends how its grounded in God, if it was based on a traditional divine command theory account that might wash as a critique but I don't hold to that and neither did Alan from what I can tell, so It doesn't.
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Yes that was a very basic outline of my morality so don't get too carried away with it, you were too quick to label me last time.
Well the problem with deriving morality from axions is that they are never adequate to express our moral positions which is no doubt why you feel the need to backtrack. You told us twice what your core axiom was on this thread and the last... if you aren't going to say what you mean then you can hardly blame people for thinking you mean what you say.
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From HT:
Nope. It cancels out because you have subjective opinion of something allegedly objective.
I have the subjective opinion that Barak Obama exists as an objective being. On your logic that must cancel out that fact that he exists and mean that he is just a figment of my imagination then and will no doubt cease to exist.
The reason your attempt to compare subjectivity to numbers doesn't work is because there are different types of subjectivity.. subjective opinion of a point of view and subjective opinion of a claim to the ontology of an object in itself are very different.
In terms of point of view, our opinions are as you say always subjective and so in this sense it can never be objective by definition – anything we believe is our subjective belief.
But that's not true of objects – an object can either (a) exist objectively or (b) it can exist only as an artefact of subjective opinion.
We can have a subjective opinion about (a) or (b) and indeed our subjective opinion can relate to the very question of the objectivity of (a) and (b), vut our opinion will have no effect on this at all because the objectivity or subjectivity of the object is logically and ontologically distinct from our opinion about it.
If Alan doesn't think that, why does he always begin with someone's opinion?
Hes trying to show that sope beliefs you already have about morality require you to accept other beliefs
That's right. So, are you saying that you *can* have a subjective objective?
I'm saying you can have a subjective opinion about something that is an objective fact, like my belief in Barak Obama, and also that my subjective opinion about him does not make my claim that he exists objectively 'self refuting', for the reasons explained above.
Agreed. However, for OM, we have no means (so far, despite asking many times) to determine whether a particular situational morality is objective or not
It may well be that your subjective morality opinion matches the objective morality of a given situation, but we have no way to tell.
First bit great you agree! but then claiming subjective beliefs about objective things is 'self-refuting' as you did is incorrect, so your initial statement was wrong. Whether or not we can verify its objectivity on the other hand is a different question entirely and would not be relevant to making my belief ''self-refuting'. Objective existence is an ontological property... why would you possibly think verification made a difference to that??
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Moral questions are always a matter of someones opinion, even huge numbers of people.
Some things are fact, like the SOL in a vacuum, and can be measured so I can remove opinion.
How do you remove subjective opinion from some moral question?
You're not removing opinion, you are providing evidence to confirm it....our opinion still exists. But the act of verification doesn't make any difference to SOLs objectivity. Just like alternate universes, we can't ever confirm them, but if you are of the opinion they exist the fact that you can't verify them won't stop them existing if they do.
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^ wot 'e sed.
ht
Lol. Nothing in wot he said gives any weight to your claim that having a subjective belief about something being objective is self-refuting.
Jakswan not sure what your point is. You explain the difference between something being objective or subjective. OK, but the claim was that offering an opinion on a moral matter had a kind of cancelling effect and turned the moral matter into a subjective matter.
If you agree that a matter being objective is unnaffected by someone's opinion on it, then you should agree that we cannot conclude a matter is subjective because of an opinion on it.
wot 'e sed
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Nearly Sane and Enki will come back to you I'm out of time,
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From HT:
Nope. It cancels out because you have subjective opinion of something allegedly objective.
I have the subjective opinion that Barak Obama exists as an objective being. On your logic that must cancel out that fact that he exists and mean that he is just a figment of my imagination then and will no doubt cease to exist.
Once again, you have misunderstood.
It's nothing to do with the 'target'. You could have any opinion you like about the existence of Barack. Your opinion would be irrelevant to that, as we have a means of determining his existence.
The contradiction is in the fact that it *is* an opinion, and yet that opinion is the basis of something which is defined to be independent of opinion.
You could also have any opinion you liked about the existence of trees, cars, houses, cups, clouds... Your opinion would be irrelevant to that, as we have a means of determining their existence.
you could have any opinion you like about the existence of the Yeti, Nessie, Bigfoot... Your opinion would be irrelevant to that, as we have a means of determining their existence (which hasn't uncovered any credible evidence yet).
You could also have any opinion you liked about the existence of objective morality... Your opinion would be irrelevant to that, as we have a means of determining its existence. Oh wait, no we don't, because despite the number of times a method has been requested, one has not been forthcoming.
It is my opinion that tea tastes nice. In my opinion, it has always tasted nice and will always taste nice, regardless of whether anyone agrees with me.
It is my opinion that TACTDJFF is wrong, it has always been wrong and will always be wrong, regardless of whether anyone agrees with me.
According to Alan's argument, I believe in both an objective morality and an objective taste.
The reason your attempt to compare subjectivity to numbers doesn't work is because there are different types of subjectivity.. subjective opinion of a point of view and subjective opinion of a claim to the ontology of an object in itself are very different.
In terms of point of view, our opinions are as you say always subjective and so in this sense it can never be objective by definition – anything we believe is our subjective belief.
But that's not true of objects – an object can either (a) exist objectively or (b) it can exist only as an artefact of subjective opinion.
We can have a subjective opinion about (a) or (b) and indeed our subjective opinion can relate to the very question of the objectivity of (a) and (b), vut our opinion will have no effect on this at all because the objectivity or subjectivity of the object is logically and ontologically distinct from our opinion about it.
Yep.
If Alan doesn't think that, why does he always begin with someone's opinion?
Hes trying to show that sope beliefs you already have about morality require you to accept other beliefs
That's lovely, but they are beliefs/opinions, and therefore are subjective.
That's right. So, are you saying that you *can* have a subjective objective?
I'm saying you can have a subjective opinion about something that is an objective fact, like my belief in Barak Obama, and also that my subjective opinion about him does not make my claim that he exists objectively 'self refuting', for the reasons explained above.
See above.
Agreed. However, for OM, we have no means (so far, despite asking many times) to determine whether a particular situational morality is objective or not
It may well be that your subjective morality opinion matches the objective morality of a given situation, but we have no way to tell.
First bit great you agree!
It's what I have said all along.
but then claiming subjective beliefs about objective things is 'self-refuting' as you did is incorrect, so your initial statement was wrong.
See above.
Whether or not we can verify its objectivity on the other hand is a different question entirely and would not be relevant to making my belief ''self-refuting'. Objective existence is an ontological property... why would you possibly think verification made a difference to that??
I don't. See above.
It's nothing to do with the existence of the thing, it's about claiming that an opinion can be objective.
ht
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No I'm one of those 'when someone asks a question with a silly assumption embed with it, explain why its a silly assumption rather than let them go on talking drivel types.
Look here: Mirror.
That depends whether or not the account you give of morality is objectively true or not, which is the thing we are discussing, so if your assuming it isn't you are just begging the question.
If you think your account of morality is objective then I'm happy for you, if you want to convince me of this as well its time to come up with some decent arguments.
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Yes that was a very basic outline of my morality so don't get too carried away with it, you were too quick to label me last time.
Well the problem with deriving morality from axions is that they are never adequate to express our moral positions which is no doubt why you feel the need to backtrack. You told us twice what your core axiom was on this thread and the last... if you aren't going to say what you mean then you can hardly blame people for thinking you mean what you say.
I'm not backtracking I'm quite happy to discuss my morality in detail if you like, this thread wasn't about that. I would ask you before slapping labels around you clarify a persons position.
It makes you look as if you are creating straw-men and just further undermines and already compromised reputation.
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The contradiction is in the fact that it *is* an opinion, and yet that opinion is the basis of something which is defined to be independent of opinion.
That opinion is the basis of a further opinion held about that something (which is defined to be independent of opinion). It is not the basis of the something itself.
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The contradiction is in the fact that it *is* an opinion, and yet that opinion is the basis of something which is defined to be independent of opinion.
That opinion is the basis of a further opinion held about that something (which is defined to be independent of opinion). It is not the basis of the something itself.
So it is doubly subjective, then.
ht
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Some of the analogies being used don't help me. For example, the use of Obama, and my opinion that he exists, can be set against my experiences, which convince me that he exists, such as film of him, TV, and so on. In fact, it is likely that I could go to a meeting to see him speak; so my opinion exists within that context, in fact, is born out of it. How does this connect with OM, which I cannot experience, cannot locate, etc. OK, I can think about it - then what?
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Some of the analogies being used don't help me. For example, the use of Obama, and my opinion that he exists, can be set against my experiences, which convince me that he exists, such as film of him, TV, and so on. In fact, it is likely that I could go to a meeting to see him speak; so my opinion exists within that context, in fact, is born out of it. How does this connect with OM, which I cannot experience, cannot locate, etc. OK, I can think about it - then what?
I think the issue here is whether it makes any difference about how we talk about things. It was the reason I would say why I found synonym' s posts about the way we talk about the marmite question as backing up jakswan' s point. If I state that I think marmite tastes good and will taste good no matter what anyone else says, it neither posits OT (objective taste) nor does it mean that talking about objective taste makes any real sense.
In the absence of any method using this sort of it is implied by the utterance approach doesn't really advance anything. That we are still going round and round on it, and in part because I don't think we are even clear what Alan's argument is, makes me inclined to skip a lot of posts on here. I really struggle to see what OM can mean for exactly the same reason that Synonym thinks is a problem with OT. Any judgement seems bounded by having a personal concept of good and any societal norm derived from that seems an element if society and hence by nature subjective, and not in the light of an intersubjective methodology to establish it as happens in science but simply by whatever means allows for a dominant opinion.
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NS - yes, I think for me it has become almost meaningless, so that the words 'objective' and 'morality' resemble a kind of indeterminate jelly, which might contain anything, or nothing.
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NS - yes, I think for me it has become almost meaningless, so that the words 'objective' and 'morality' resemble a kind of indeterminate jelly, which might contain anything, or nothing.
Well, clearly OM is quantum ;)
ht
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NS - yes, I think for me it has become almost meaningless, so that the words 'objective' and 'morality' resemble a kind of indeterminate jelly, which might contain anything, or nothing.
Well, clearly OM is quantum ;)
ht
Epigenetic quantum
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NS - yes, I think for me it has become almost meaningless, so that the words 'objective' and 'morality' resemble a kind of indeterminate jelly, which might contain anything, or nothing.
Well, clearly OM is quantum ;)
ht
Epigenetic quantum
Yes, but is it philosophically materialist epigenetic quantum?
ht
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NS - yes, I think for me it has become almost meaningless, so that the words 'objective' and 'morality' resembles a kind of indeterminate jelly, which might contain anything, or nothing.
Well, clearly OM is quantum ;)
ht
Schrodinger's morality, it's both subjective and objective, until certain Christians start discussing it, when it collapses into a hideous inchoate blob. In fact, the Blob!
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Quote from: Dryghtons Toe on Today at 07:18:50 AM
From HT:
Quote
Nope. It cancels out because you have subjective opinion of something allegedly objective.
I have the subjective opinion that Barak Obama exists as an objective being. On your logic that must cancel out that fact that he exists and mean that he is just a figment of my imagination then and will no doubt cease to exist.
Once again, you have misunderstood.
It's nothing to do with the 'target'. You could have any opinion you like about the existence of Barack. Your opinion would be irrelevant to that, as we have a means of determining his existence.
You're back to verification again!!!....yet you've said before and in this same post that:
Quote from: Dryghtons Toe on Today at 07:18:50 AM
Whether or not we can verify its objectivity on the other hand is a different question entirely and would not be relevant to making my belief ''self-refuting'. Objective existence is an ontological property... why would you possibly think verification made a difference to that??
I don't. See above.
It's nothing to do with the existence of the thing, it's about claiming that an opinion can be objective.
Yet that's exactly what you're doing. You keep talking about opinion being irrelevant as this that has any meaning in this debate. Whether you consider it irrelevant or not is besides the point. You've already said you agree that our opinion is always subjective, so my opinion of Barak Obama (BO) existing is still my subjective opinion whether you can verify him or not or whether or not you deem it relevant. It doesn't cancel out BO existing in reality because he is the target of my subjective belief not the belief itself. Same with OM, I may believe it is objective, and my belief is a subjective belief, but it doesn't cancel out OM because OM is the target of my belief and is no way dependent on it or my beliefs subjectivity for its (the targets) objectivity. You're right that I can't definitively demonstrate it, but that wouldn't make a difference to it being self-refuting...as I asked before, why would you think it would do that?
The contradiction is in the fact that it *is* an opinion, and yet that opinion is the basis of something which is defined to be independent of opinion.
No its absolutely not the basis for it. The Objectivity of OM has nothing to do with my belief about it. If morality is Objective its objective whether or not I or anyone else thinks it is.
You could also have any opinion you liked about the existence of trees, cars, houses, cups, clouds... Your opinion would be irrelevant to that, as we have a means of determining their existence.
Again so what? relevant or otherwise its still an opinion. You seem to think that the people who think morality is objective think its objectivity is dependent on what we believe but it isn't. We think that if we are consistent about what we believe then facts about our morality mean we should believe it is objective, but we don't think that its objectivity in itself is dependent on our or anyone else's belief.
You could also have any opinion you liked about the existence of objective morality... Your opinion would be irrelevant to that, as we have a means of determining its existence. Oh wait, no we don't, because despite the number of times a method has been requested, one has not been forthcoming.
Again you seem to think a method of verification makes a difference to the claim of something being ontologically objective but you never explain why. You say you don't when challenged about it but keep repeatedly making references to it as if it made a difference....
It is my opinion that tea tastes nice. In my opinion, it has always tasted nice and will always taste nice, regardless of whether anyone agrees with me.
It is my opinion that TACTDJFF is wrong, it has always been wrong and will always be wrong, regardless of whether anyone agrees with me.
According to Alan's argument, I believe in both an objective morality and an objective taste.
No you don't because the claim that tea tastes nice is a claim that 'you think teas tastes nice'...taste as a subjective state is a claim about your disposition towards tea. It isn't contradicted by someone thinking it is not nice. But when Alan says TACTDJFF is wrong, he is not claiming 'wrong' means anything like 'I don't like it but its ok if you like it', he's saying it is wrong for everyone whatever their 'taste' may be for causing pain, and he's saying that everyone else who also thinks its wrong for everyone (i.e. not at all like our taste in tea) should, to be consistent, recognise that this universality is indicative of an objective feature of morality that makes it quite distinct from matters of taste like liking tea.
Quote
If Alan doesn't think that, why does he always begin with someone's opinion?
Hes trying to show that some beliefs you already have about morality require you to accept other beliefs
That's lovely, but they are beliefs/opinions, and therefore are subjective.
Yes they are that's right, but the target of the belief isn't, and in this case the target of the belief is the ontological state of morality's objectivity and that is not dependent on my belief for its objectivity.
See above.
I did, you just fell back to relying on verification again without justification, despite also admitting that verification made no difference to objectivity.
It's nothing to do with the existence of the thing, it's about claiming that an opinion can be objective.
Which no one is doing. We are claiming the target of an opinion (in this case the objectivity of morality) can be objective and that its objectivity is independent of our belief or our ability to verify it or whether you or anyone else consider it 'relevant'.
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Quote from: Dryghtons Toe on Today at 07:16:09 AM
No I'm one of those 'when someone asks a question with a silly assumption embed with it, explain why its a silly assumption rather than let them go on talking drivel types.
Look here: Mirror.
what a fabulous response! Here's another one you can use.
I say "look here Jakswan, Scott Adams drew you into the latest Dilbert cartoon"
http://i.imgur.com/XgtJTMj.jpg
Now you copy the post and link and then say "no thats you that is," and then all your atheist chums can laugh and laugh and think how clever and funny you are :D
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Some of the analogies being used don't help me. For example, the use of Obama, and my opinion that he exists, can be set against my experiences, which convince me that he exists, such as film of him, TV, and so on. In fact, it is likely that I could go to a meeting to see him speak; so my opinion exists within that context, in fact, is born out of it. How does this connect with OM, which I cannot experience, cannot locate, etc. OK, I can think about it - then what?
The point of BO isn't that its broadly analogous with OM, its simply to point out that the objectivity of the target of our subjective opinion is not in any way 'refuted' by the subjectivity of my opinion.
Any target will serve as an example...something unverifiable like a belief in the 'objective existence of other universes would' do just as well.
It would only make a difference if you somehow thought verification could effect the ontological state of objectivity that something had, but as I asked HT, why would we think that?
I think the issue here is whether it makes any difference about how we talk about things. It was the reason I would say why I found synonym' s posts about the way we talk about the marmite question as backing up jakswan' s point. If I state that I think marmite tastes good and will taste good no matter what anyone else says, it neither posits OT (objective taste) nor does it mean that talking about objective taste makes any real sense.
See comments on HTs post re liking tea!
Any judgement seems bounded by having a personal concept of good and any societal norm derived from that seems an element if society and hence by nature subjective
Any moral judgement we make WILL be our subjective opinion just like any judgement we might make about other universes existing will be our subjective opinion, yet both of these opinions have a subject which (the realist would argue) can be right or wrong independent of my opinion. Whether or not we can verify them with a methodology doesn't alter this either way.
Regards
DT
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Enki,
I don't have anything against the idea of OM at all, in the same way that I don't have any problem with the existence of a God.
I agree that OM does not seem to lend itself be demonstrated by any naturalistic method and I would agree with you that OM isn't invalidated by the lack of an objective method. But it isn't supported either. So, what we seem to be left with is intuitive assumption. William Lane Craig seems to state this when he asserts 'Objective moral values and duties do exist' in the third of his 'Five arguments for God' (http://www.reasonablefaith.org/the-new-atheism-and-five-arguments-for-god), and backs it up by simply saying that people believe that this is true.
The argument for OM doesn't just say it exists because people think it, it says the assumption of objectivity is implicit in our moral discourse and without it we can't maintain a sense of morality that is anything like morality as it is practiced.
Unfortunately the trouble as far as the intuitive approach goes, I personally don't feel that OM exists just as I feel that no God exists. However, even my own intuitions do not satisfy me, because I see so many examples of the intuitive approach alone leading to contradictory assumptions. So, for me, the intuitive approach is beset with difficulties.
Talking about an 'intuitive approach' makes it sound like there is an alternative to trusting our intuitions as the basis of our metaphysical beliefs, but of course there isn't. Empiricism for example has its own assumptions at its base so to pose it as an alternative is to having to trust some basic intuitions is to miss the intuitions we all stand upon, whatever our beliefs. I have no problem with the fact that some people disagree with me though, I only have a problem with the type of atheists who think that anyone who doesn't share their point of view is irrational.
Now if we take the example of TACTDJFF, on all sorts of levels(including the intuitive approach) I see this as morally wrong, but only because I am a human being. If no human beings existed, and we substitute other entities for human beings in the original example, my judgement of right/wrong becomes meaningless and I see no reason to imbue the idea of TACTDJFF in this case with any moral dimension at all. Only as a human being does the idea of morality seem meaningful. Hence, I suggest that morality is a human construct, although I would accept that certain other animal species show some forms of proto-morality certainly.
I don't share Alan's trust in moral principles and if another species had different capacities to us, it may be that ideas like pain are meaningless so how we might apply objective moral truths like justice or compassion might be diffenrence,..but then the term torture wouldn't really apply either. Torture means consciously and deliberately inflicting suffering, and in this case it’s for someone else’s enjoyment…..so for this description to apply we are necessarily assuming that these other beings are at the very least centres of consciousness with a capacity to suffer and enjoy, who can act in a self-directed intentional manner. If this description does apply then I can’t see any reason why moral judgements wouldn’t apply because the situation is bursting with morally relevant features. If you do then I’d like to hear why.
Alternatively, to convince me that OM exists, or that there are moral truths associated with particular acts, some form of demonstration backing up such a belief((or opinion) is needed that this is so. As none seems to be forthcoming, then I am left with what I find to be compelling evidence that humanity's focus on the moral dimension is in fact the result of evolutionary traits.
I’d 'demonstrate' it (or at least make a justified argument for it) by pointing out that our moral practice has a range of features that we can only adequate make sense of if it is objective – our morality assumes truth even at the deepest levels; we justify our moral judgements in the same manner as we do for other factual claims - on features of the situation we are judging as opposed to our personal preferences that we might appeal to in liking tea; on the phenomenology of our moral experience, which is such that we perceive morally relevant features as implicit in situations rather than merely a deriving from our own non-cognitive reactions, and morality imposes constraints and demands on us despite and sometimes quite opposed to what we may desire to do. On the previous thread I delved into the example of when we change our moral opinions – including at times our most basic moral principles – this can be a major and traumatic event in people’s lives which we agonise over and are quite fundamental to our self-identity. When we make such changes in basic views the crucial feature is that we do so because we recognise our old views were wrong. If morality was invention we can’t adequately make sense of these most basic features of the role of ethics in our life….yet these aren’t just peripheral aspects of our lives we can just discard, they are among the most profound and defining aspects of the human condition.
As for evolution, neither a realist nor an anti-realist about morality need disagree that it is through our evolution that morality develops, but they would both have a different interpretation of how it develops in that context. While you assume that it means it’s something invented for survival the realist would simply say that it is via our evolution that we develop the capacities to discover moral truth. In other words the evolutionary and social context of morality is no challenge to realism in the slightest and only seems like one if you smuggle in a whole bag of additional anti-realist assumptions in your argument to start with.
I probably won't be able to reply again for a few days now.
Regards
DT
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Hi DT,
I probably won't be able to reply again for a few days now.
No problem. It will give me time to digest what you have said.
Also my internet connection only gives me intermittent access to this forum while working normally with all other sites.
:)
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Quote from: Dryghtons Toe on Today at 07:16:09 AM
No I'm one of those 'when someone asks a question with a silly assumption embed with it, explain why its a silly assumption rather than let them go on talking drivel types.
Look here: Mirror.
what a fabulous response! Here's another one you can use.
I say "look here Jakswan, Scott Adams drew you into the latest Dilbert cartoon"
http://i.imgur.com/XgtJTMj.jpg
Now you copy the post and link and then say "no thats you that is," and then all your atheist chums can laugh and laugh and think how clever and funny you are :D
No, I did note how this allowed you to evade the other point made in that post though.
'If you think your account of morality is objective then I'm happy for you, if you want to convince me of this as well its time to come up with some decent arguments.'
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he's saying it is wrong for everyone whatever their 'taste' may be for causing pain, and he's saying that everyone else who also thinks its wrong for everyone (i.e. not at all like our taste in tea) should, to be consistent, recognise that this universality is indicative of an objective feature of morality that makes it quite distinct from matters of taste like liking tea.
No, I can say everyone should vote Lib Dems but still accept others have different opinions and accept voting is subjective.
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Quote from: Dryghtons Toe on Today at 07:18:50 AM
From HT:
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Nope. It cancels out because you have subjective opinion of something allegedly objective.
I have the subjective opinion that Barak Obama exists as an objective being. On your logic that must cancel out that fact that he exists and mean that he is just a figment of my imagination then and will no doubt cease to exist.
Once again, you have misunderstood.
It's nothing to do with the 'target'. You could have any opinion you like about the existence of Barack. Your opinion would be irrelevant to that, as we have a means of determining his existence.
You're back to verification again!!!....yet you've said before and in this same post that:
Quote from: Dryghtons Toe on Today at 07:18:50 AM
Whether or not we can verify its objectivity on the other hand is a different question entirely and would not be relevant to making my belief ''self-refuting'. Objective existence is an ontological property... why would you possibly think verification made a difference to that??
I don't. See above.
It's nothing to do with the existence of the thing, it's about claiming that an opinion can be objective.
Yet that's exactly what you're doing. You keep talking about opinion being irrelevant as this that has any meaning in this debate. Whether you consider it irrelevant or not is besides the point. You've already said you agree that our opinion is always subjective, so my opinion of Barak Obama (BO) existing is still my subjective opinion whether you can verify him or not or whether or not you deem it relevant. It doesn't cancel out BO existing in reality because he is the target of my subjective belief not the belief itself. Same with OM, I may believe it is objective, and my belief is a subjective belief, but it doesn't cancel out OM because OM is the target of my belief and is no way dependent on it or my beliefs subjectivity for its (the targets) objectivity. You're right that I can't definitively demonstrate it, but that wouldn't make a difference to it being self-refuting...as I asked before, why would you think it would do that?
The contradiction is in the fact that it *is* an opinion, and yet that opinion is the basis of something which is defined to be independent of opinion.
No its absolutely not the basis for it. The Objectivity of OM has nothing to do with my belief about it. If morality is Objective its objective whether or not I or anyone else thinks it is.
You could also have any opinion you liked about the existence of trees, cars, houses, cups, clouds... Your opinion would be irrelevant to that, as we have a means of determining their existence.
Again so what? relevant or otherwise its still an opinion. You seem to think that the people who think morality is objective think its objectivity is dependent on what we believe but it isn't. We think that if we are consistent about what we believe then facts about our morality mean we should believe it is objective, but we don't think that its objectivity in itself is dependent on our or anyone else's belief.
You could also have any opinion you liked about the existence of objective morality... Your opinion would be irrelevant to that, as we have a means of determining its existence. Oh wait, no we don't, because despite the number of times a method has been requested, one has not been forthcoming.
Again you seem to think a method of verification makes a difference to the claim of something being ontologically objective but you never explain why. You say you don't when challenged about it but keep repeatedly making references to it as if it made a difference....
It is my opinion that tea tastes nice. In my opinion, it has always tasted nice and will always taste nice, regardless of whether anyone agrees with me.
It is my opinion that TACTDJFF is wrong, it has always been wrong and will always be wrong, regardless of whether anyone agrees with me.
According to Alan's argument, I believe in both an objective morality and an objective taste.
No you don't because the claim that tea tastes nice is a claim that 'you think teas tastes nice'...taste as a subjective state is a claim about your disposition towards tea. It isn't contradicted by someone thinking it is not nice. But when Alan says TACTDJFF is wrong, he is not claiming 'wrong' means anything like 'I don't like it but its ok if you like it', he's saying it is wrong for everyone whatever their 'taste' may be for causing pain, and he's saying that everyone else who also thinks its wrong for everyone (i.e. not at all like our taste in tea) should, to be consistent, recognise that this universality is indicative of an objective feature of morality that makes it quite distinct from matters of taste like liking tea.
Quote
If Alan doesn't think that, why does he always begin with someone's opinion?
Hes trying to show that some beliefs you already have about morality require you to accept other beliefs
That's lovely, but they are beliefs/opinions, and therefore are subjective.
Yes they are that's right, but the target of the belief isn't, and in this case the target of the belief is the ontological state of morality's objectivity and that is not dependent on my belief for its objectivity.
See above.
I did, you just fell back to relying on verification again without justification, despite also admitting that verification made no difference to objectivity.
It's nothing to do with the existence of the thing, it's about claiming that an opinion can be objective.
Which no one is doing. We are claiming the target of an opinion (in this case the objectivity of morality) can be objective and that its objectivity is independent of our belief or our ability to verify it or whether you or anyone else consider it 'relevant'.
I'm not sure whether I am not explaining this very well, or whether you are misunderstanding me still.
"No you don't because the claim that tea tastes nice is a claim that 'you think teas tastes nice'...taste as a subjective state is a claim about your disposition towards tea. It isn't contradicted by someone thinking it is not nice. But when Alan says TACTDJFF is wrong, he is not claiming 'wrong' means anything like 'I don't like it but its ok if you like it', he's saying it is wrong for everyone whatever their 'taste' may be for causing pain, and he's saying that everyone else who also thinks its wrong for everyone (i.e. not at all like our taste in tea) should, to be consistent, recognise that this universality is indicative of an objective feature of morality that makes it quite distinct from matters of taste like liking tea."
My claim that I think tea tastes nice is exactly equivalent to my claim that TACTDJFF is wrong. It is my opinion on both matters.
As you say, my claim about tea is not refuted by someone else not liking tea, and neither is my claim about TACTDJFF refuted by someone disagreeing.
If Alan is, as you say, claiming that when he says that TACTDJFF is wrong means that "he's saying it is wrong for everyone whatever their 'taste' may be for causing pain", then he is making a claim of objectivity. However, like my view of tea, it is his opinion and therefore the claim of objectivity fails (by definition).
It may be that there is an objective taste and/or an objective morality, but it can't be asserted into existence through "he's saying it is wrong for everyone whatever their 'taste' may be for causing pain".
It may also be that my claim about tea and Alan's about TACTDJFF do actually match the relevant objective taste/morality, but that would be coincidence rather than either of us identifying the OT/OM. And views of tea varying or views of TACTDJFF agreeing are just that - agreement or lack of it; they can't be evidence for OT/OM because that's ad populum.
Haven't got much time right now, might have another go at this later.
ht
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I'm trying to line this up in the right order, in order to do it justice. The objectivity of morality isn't determined by our beliefs, but by aspects of certain actions, which have apparently objective aspects, e.g. cruelty. Also, the way we arrive at moral judgments indicates that we are referring to something objective, for example, it's difficult to change your mind about morality.
Is that a fair summary? It still seems vitiated to me by involving feelings - for example, we often dislike cruelty, so you could argue that our sense of wrongness reflects that. In fact, the word 'cruel' is intrinsically judgmental.
Is there something wrong about which we don't have feelings, and the wrongness of which is inherent in the act itself? But here, I pause at that word 'itself'. What does that mean? It seems to complete a circle - things in themselves are objective. Well, duh.
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Hi DT,
The argument for OM doesn't just say it exists because people think it, it says the assumption of objectivity is implicit in our moral discourse and without it we can't maintain a sense of morality that is anything like morality as it is practiced.
I accept that this is a reasonable argument for those who have a fundamental belief in OM. However, I would counter that by saying that the fact that I have an instinctive and emotional sense of morality says nothing about it having an objective existence. I suggest that it is just as reasonable to suggest that natural selection has built us this way in order to develop strategies that are tailored to the social world we live in.
Talking about an 'intuitive approach' makes it sound like there is an alternative to trusting our intuitions as the basis of our metaphysical beliefs, but of course there isn't. Empiricism for example has its own assumptions at its base so to pose it as an alternative is to having to trust some basic intuitions is to miss the intuitions we all stand upon, whatever our beliefs. I have no problem with the fact that some people disagree with me though, I only have a problem with the type of atheists who think that anyone who doesn't share their point of view is irrational.
The fact we are inclined to trust our intuitions as the basis of our metaphysical beliefs is coloured by the fact that those same intuitions can vary widely. Therefore I don't feel that this is a justification that those basic intuitions(including my own) are necessarily correct. Thus, for myself, I can happily assume that the world around me is absolutely real for all practical purposes, but it does not mean that it might not be some form of highly complex illusion. Science, as you intimate, is clearly founded on the belief that the natural world exists and can be understood and manipulated. For my own part, it seems to be a basic part of my nature that I am sceptical about all manner of things, and will only be convinced when I am faced with clear evidence. Incidentally, as an atheist, I have never been of the opinion that those who do not share my point of view are therefore irrational. That sounds like quite an 'irrational' approach.
I don't share Alan's trust in moral principles and if another species had different capacities to us, it may be that ideas like pain are meaningless so how we might apply objective moral truths like justice or compassion might be diffenrence,..but then the term torture wouldn't really apply either. Torture means consciously and deliberately inflicting suffering, and in this case it’s for someone else’s enjoyment…..so for this description to apply we are necessarily assuming that these other beings are at the very least centres of consciousness with a capacity to suffer and enjoy, who can act in a self-directed intentional manner. If this description does apply then I can’t see any reason why moral judgements wouldn’t apply because the situation is bursting with morally relevant features. If you do then I’d like to hear why.
My position would be as follows:
If other entities were involved in Alan's scenario, and asuming no humans existed, then I would consider my own present views, which are entirely from a human perspective, to be superfluous. There is no way that I could feel I should or could impose my own views on such an hypothetical situation.
If, on the other hand, we take Alan's scenario as is, then, of course I would feel TACTTDJFF to be wrong, as I have already said. However, I suggest that humans do often react in this way to the immediacy of such a situation. If one changes the parameters only slightly, then it is not so clear cut at all. For instance, if one changes it a little to 'someone else torturing a child to death in order to give us pleasure' then it does not seem so clear cut. Examples of this approach might be the prevailing atitudes to child labour in the brickyards, the coal mines etc. during the 19th Century when large swathes of the population did not feel so incensed about the immorality of such a situation, or even today, when child labour has been used in different parts of the world to satisfy our enjoyment of fashionable clothing.
I am of the opinion that a scenario is, of itself, neither moral nor immoral. It seems to depend on how we, as human beings, view it. For instance, on a personal level, someone who has recently been bereaved, might react with strong emotions to some particular action or object which reminds them of their loved one. This does not mean that the action or object has some intrinsic quality associated with this emotion, it simply means for that person it becomes a trigger to set off the emotion. For another person it may have no such meaning. Morality, it seems to me, is something like this writ large. By that, I mean that the vast majority of human beings react in roughly similar ways to particular acts, either with abhorrence or commendation, and we give these feelings the names morality/immorality because we think that others should also react as we do.
I’d 'demonstrate' it (or at least make a justified argument for it) by pointing out that our moral practice has a range of features that we can only adequate make sense of if it is objective – our morality assumes truth even at the deepest levels; we justify our moral judgements in the same manner as we do for other factual claims - on features of the situation we are judging as opposed to our personal preferences that we might appeal to in liking tea; on the phenomenology of our moral experience, which is such that we perceive morally relevant features as implicit in situations rather than merely a deriving from our own non-cognitive reactions, and morality imposes constraints and demands on us despite and sometimes quite opposed to what we may desire to do. On the previous thread I delved into the example of when we change our moral opinions – including at times our most basic moral principles – this can be a major and traumatic event in people’s lives which we agonise over and are quite fundamental to our self-identity. When we make such changes in basic views the crucial feature is that we do so because we recognise our old views were wrong. If morality was invention we can’t adequately make sense of these most basic features of the role of ethics in our life….yet these aren’t just peripheral aspects of our lives we can just discard, they are among the most profound and defining aspects of the human condition.
The trouble I find with this approach is that, apart from our general moral feelings, our moral practices can deviate quite strongly according to how we rationalise them in any given situation. Apart from the most generalised moral attitudes(which I would explain through feelings such as empathy, sympathy, social cohesion etc) we can make contrary 'moral' decisions according to how we analyse a situation(E.G. assisted suicide, abortion).
As far as your idea of the trauma of changing our moral opinions goes, I quite agree with you when you say that it can be intensely traumatic. However, changing all sorts of things in our lives, when we change our deep seated outlooks, can be traumatic too. We may be in the process of changing our views of another person, which may release similar agonised feelings. We may realise(through illness, for instance) that what we thought was an entirely adequate lifestyle has to change dramatically for us to remain healthy. This may induce its own major mental problems as we go through a period when we lose our self confidence. What I am saying is that changes in our moral attitudes, as with other things which are deeply ingrained in our lives and in our thinking, can have an understandable traumatic effect on us. If a person, after an intense period of soul searching , changes from being a theist to an atheist, I would not suggest that this demonstrates the truth or otherwise of atheism, so I'm not sure why a person changing their fundamental moral attitudes demonstrates the actual existence of OM.
As for evolution, neither a realist nor an anti-realist about morality need disagree that it is through our evolution that morality develops, but they would both have a different interpretation of how it develops in that context. While you assume that it means it’s something invented for survival the realist would simply say that it is via our evolution that we develop the capacities to discover moral truth. In other words the evolutionary and social context of morality is no challenge to realism in the slightest and only seems like one if you smuggle in a whole bag of additional anti-realist assumptions in your argument to start with.
I'm hoping that we may have some measure of agreement here. I would happily accept that one can positively engage with the idea of evolution playing its part in developing moral attitudes while suggesting that there is an objective morality which underlies it, just as it is quite possible for a person who takes on board evolution to also believe in the existence of a god. No problem at all. For me, however, I see no evidence of such(either God or OM), so I see no reason to change my opinions on either count. This is very different to trying to prove OM is wrong. I just take a different view.
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No, I did note how this allowed you to evade the other point made in that post though.
'If you think your account of morality is objective then I'm happy for you, if you want to convince me of this as well its time to come up with some decent arguments.'
Be assured I have no desire to convince you of anything, with your record I can think of nothing that would make me doubt my beliefs more than knowing you agreed with me. Nevertheless, its a little Ironic that you accuse me of evading answering questions when I've gone into the issue to at least as much detail as anyone else on either side, and seeing as by contrast even when we take your contributions word for word in the context it was said, you end up crying that this is apparently a 'straw man'. Perhaps this is just another of your 'no one said anything about proof ....oh wait, I did..' moments.
No, I can say everyone should vote Lib Dems but still accept others have different opinions and accept voting is subjective.
That's because voting is subjective is a different sense to the one we have been discussing meaning something we think should be up to us individually. Nevertheless the reason we vote is usually because we think that the Lib Dems will govern better and that there policies will be more successful than others, and these are factual questions...ones we can't know the answer too with any certainty to be sure as politics and economics are complex and the answers will only be seen in time but they are factual claims nonetheless.
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I'm not sure whether I am not explaining this very well, or whether you are misunderstanding me still.
"No you don't because the claim that tea tastes nice is a claim that 'you think teas tastes nice'...taste as a subjective state is a claim about your disposition towards tea. It isn't contradicted by someone thinking it is not nice. But when Alan says TACTDJFF is wrong, he is not claiming 'wrong' means anything like 'I don't like it but its ok if you like it', he's saying it is wrong for everyone whatever their 'taste' may be for causing pain, and he's saying that everyone else who also thinks its wrong for everyone (i.e. not at all like our taste in tea) should, to be consistent, recognise that this universality is indicative of an objective feature of morality that makes it quite distinct from matters of taste like liking tea."
My claim that I think tea tastes nice is exactly equivalent to my claim that TACTDJFF is wrong. It is my opinion on both matters.
As you say, my claim about tea is not refuted by someone else not liking tea, and neither is my claim about TACTDJFF refuted by someone disagreeing.
You are applying the word 'refuting' to the two cases as if its saying the same thing but it isn't. If someone disagrees that tea is nice, they are disagreeing with you purely by reference to their internal subjective perception of tea - it isn't an attempt to 'refute' your preference at all because one persons preference doesn't in any way necessarily effect or negate the others - there is no refuting involved they just have different tastes. I don't think you are making a mistake in liking tea. But the whole point about a disagreement were one person thinks TACTDJFF (or anything!) is morally ok and we say it isn't, the claim isn't one where we just accept that I am reacting with an emotional 'boo' to TACTDJFF and they are giving it an emotional 'hurray'. If someone thinks it is ok, we do want to refute them in the true sense of refute, we think they are making a mistake by missing things about the nature of TACTDJFF that they should be paying attention too which make it wrong and are prepared to blame or praise them accordingly. Reducing the way we reason about morality to a type of emotivist reaction like preferring tea is a gross distortion of our ethical practice.
Alan is, as you say, claiming that when he says that TACTDJFF is wrong means that "he's saying it is wrong for everyone whatever their 'taste' may be for causing pain", then he is making a claim of objectivity. However, like my view of tea, it is his opinion and therefore the claim of objectivity fails (by definition).
This can be taken 2 ways,
1) To simply be saying ‘An opinion in itself can never establish somethings objectivity’. This is correct, but also trivial as no one is claiming that the objectivity of morality is dependent on opinions for its objectivity...not me, not Alan, as I said before.
Or you could mean:
2) to say that ‘If you have an opinion about something - being objective, then that claim to objectivity will necessarily be false (as an opinion is by its nature is a subjective thing).
As no one is defending (1) I took it that you meant (2), but unfortunately (2) is a logical error for the reason I said before – the objectivity of the target of the belief is not dependent on opinion for its objectivity and there are lots of things we could put in place of - in (2) to show that our belief in their objectivity does not affect its actual objectivity (alternative universes, etc). The problem comes whenever we have discussed this you have then tried to rely on other factors like ‘verification’ or ‘relevance’ to sustain your argument…but to say something fails ‘by definition’ or is ‘self-refuting’ MEANS that it has to fail by virtue of the factors that you define as self-refuting alone - in this case being an opinion about somethings objectivity – to be self-refuting means you don’t need to appeal to anything else to show why it’s wrong. Seeing as I can have an opinion about the objectivity of lots of things existing objectively – some verifiable like Barak Obama and some not like alternative universes – and that my opinion doesn’t affect their objective existence in any way, then I can know that (2) is false.
It may be that there is an objective taste and/or an objective morality, but it can't be asserted into existence through "he's saying it is wrong for everyone whatever their 'taste' may be for causing pain".
Which no one is arguing for OM including Alan. The argument is that if you hold certain beliefs about morality then to be consistent you have to hold that morality is OM.
It may also be that my claim about tea and Alan's about TACTDJFF do actually match the relevant objective taste/morality, but that would be coincidence rather than either of us identifying the OT/OM.
Well that depends with OM, although no one claims a simple read-off method of determining OM, however Moral Realists do think that we can discover moral truth and make progress in towards it, the method we use will depend on the account of moral realism as per examples in reply 18 on page 1 on this thread.
And…… views of TACTDJFF agreeing are just that - agreement or lack of it; they can't be evidence for OT/OM because that's ad populum.
As above the argument is not that the evidence that OM exists is based on the agreement of subjective views, although they might be evidence that certain ways we think about moral questions assumes objectivity and that if we are to sustain our moral practice as it is and be consistent in our beliefs we should also therefore accept OM. I do agree though that the example of TACTDJFF has become a distraction in this argument. It’s a simple attempt at a short cut to OM that in my view leads to more confusion than progress.
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wigginhall
Hi Wiggs, this is going to be a long response but I thought it was worth the time because I also pick up things relevant to Enki’s points and also because the emotion bit is pretty fundamental and easily misunderstood.
I'm trying to line this up in the right order, in order to do it justice. The objectivity of morality isn't determined by our beliefs, but by aspects of certain actions, which have apparently objective aspects, e.g. cruelty. Also, the way we arrive at moral judgments indicates that we are referring to something objective, for example, it's difficult to change your mind about morality.
Is that a fair summary?
Erm, not really no, not the last bit at least. But to start with the first bit, actions certainly have morally relevant features which we perceive, all realists would probably agree. Some would say that moral facts are just truths in the act themselves while others would argue that the truth arises in relation to a combination of both the facts themselves and a certain conception of the world we bring to understanding those facts – however crucially the latter type of realist would argue that there is a correct way to perceive the world in terms of moral qualities.
A theist might for example argue that the morally ‘correct’ way to see the world is one that recognises teleological facts about God’s purpose in the universe. God has created a universe to bring about conscious agents with specific, physical psychological and spiritual needs and part of the purpose of the universe is to allow those agents to flourish. Part of what is required to flourish (in its fullest sense including our spiritual flourishing) involves developing certain virtues of character. It is only someone who possesses the right balance of virtues who will be in the position to generate a correct conception of a situation and comprehend the facts in a way that gives the right answers to moral questions. For the rest of us we have to make our best approximation based on our limited understanding of what it means to live a good flourishing life. We might have different opinions of what it means to live a good flourishing life, but there is only one (broadly speaking) right answer to this question and it is related to our purpose as defined by God and actualised in our nature. The method for recognising these virtues is to deepen our understanding of what it means to flourish, both in relation to our physical and psychological needs on one hand (through observation and reason) and also spiritually through deepening our understanding and relationship with God on the other.
As for the second bit, the example of changing our moral views isn’t of an objective character because it’s difficult to do, it’s because when we change our beliefs we do so because we think there is a right answer to moral questions and that our previous belief wasn’t hitting it. We don’t just think I thought X yesterday but today my taste in X has changed so I will change my moral position. The point about this being difficult isn’t that the difficulty we feel in itself implies objectivity (rather the sense of a right answer does that) its rather that the difficulty we feel in trying to get to the right answer is an indicator of how important this is to some of the most central elements of the human condition and also that any ‘thin senses’ of truth that anti-realists might try refer to instead just can’t account for this. In other words, this core sense of striving for the right answer in relation to our basic beliefs is not something we can just discard without also discarding central elements of our humanity.
I emphasise this because, as I have argued throughout the last thread, even if moral truth is as fundamental to our moral reasoning as I maintain – accepting OM is not the only logical choice…the other is to say our morality as practiced is a distortion and should be replaced if we are going to be honest to the implication of anti-realism. The challenge for anyone taking this route would be (i) explain how it could possibly have arisen that our morality is so universally and fundamentally distorted and (ii) how we can salvage something that gives us anything like the motivation and structure to our moral reasoning if we abandon the implicit assumption of realism.
It still seems vitiated to me by involving feelings - for example, we often dislike cruelty, so you could argue that our sense of wrongness reflects that. In fact, the word 'cruel' is intrinsically judgmental.
Is there something wrong about which we don't have feelings, and the wrongness of which is inherent in the act itself? But here, I pause at that word 'itself'. What does that mean? It seems to complete a circle - things in themselves are objective. Well, duh.
You mentioned this on the previous thread and it seems that your core objection is based on the fact that our feelings are so intimately bound up with morality. The presumption you seem to be making is that the realist thinks morality is fundamentally dispassionate if it is to be cognitive. Although this might have appealed to Kant, I don’t think any living moral realist thinks this – they all maintain a fundamental role for our feelings in moral judgements although there are 2 very different camps of types of realists who disagree about how they are related.
Camp 1 are ‘externalists about motivation.’ Which mean they argue that although we can recognise moral facts rationally, just recognising them in themselves does not motivate us to act on them. Our feelings are what motivates us to act morally and so in a morally responsive person what makes us react to things the way we do is by both recognising the fact that something is wrong with torture because of what it means to inflict deliberate pain, while at the same time also being repulsed by it so that we want to do something about it. This group of realists would say that for the most part morally sensitive people are both emotional and reason but also that it is possible for wicked people to understand that something is morally wrong yet not care about it. Equally good people can react strongly emotionally to something that we really do not desire to do but do it anyway because we recognise it is the right thing to do (e.g. feel upset about having to putting a suffering animal out of its misery or sacrificing our life for a moral duty. Our feelings might be pulling us all over the place in these situations and its our rational understanding of what is right that leads us to the correct course of action).
Camp 2 argue that the model of moral cognition that the anti-realist and the realists in camp 1 share is a huge over-simplification in the way it seeks to neatly demarcate beliefs and desires as separate types of states. They don’t deny that it is possible for beliefs and desires to be distinct, but they do think in relation to motivational states these are both cognitive and motivational at the same time – in other words we have conceptions of the world which are rational cognitive models of what we are perceiving and it is these very conceptions of reality that demand we act in certain ways and intrinsically involve value. Two people could both see the same thing and describe the same features but fit that description into very different overarching conceptions of reality, some of which may demand them to act and some which don’t. This camp would argue that is not possible to make intelligibly understand any desire we can come up with. Wanting a saucer of mud makes no sense unless we can’t conceive of a way of understanding those facts in a way anyone could want. On the other hand one person may see climbing up a cliff as a terrible situation to avoid while someone else does it for a hobby, and although they see the same thing, their conception of what they are perceiving is very different. On this view moral reason and feelings are entirely bound up together with our conception of the world and value is something we perceive like everything else within this conception.
Regards
DT
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Hi Enki
I accept that this is a reasonable argument for those who have a fundamental belief in OM. However, I would counter that by saying that the fact that I have an instinctive and emotional sense of morality says nothing about it having an objective existence. I suggest that it is just as reasonable to suggest that natural selection has built us this way in order to develop strategies that are tailored to the social world we live in.
Then we would have to apply our ideas to examples of how we make particular decisions and see if it fits with the theory. My argument isn't just that I think A and you think B, its about giving account that makes sense of how we reason about morality in practice. If our morality was just invention, we'd also have to give an account why truth is so deeply presupposed within it and how such a universal distortion could possibly come about.
The fact we are inclined to trust our intuitions as the basis of our metaphysical beliefs is coloured by the fact that those same intuitions can vary widely. Therefore I don't feel that this is a justification that those basic intuitions(including my own) are necessarily correct. Thus, for myself, I can happily assume that the world around me is absolutely real for all practical purposes, but it does not mean that it might not be some form of highly complex illusion. Science, as you intimate, is clearly founded on the belief that the natural world exists and can be understood and manipulated. For my own part, it seems to be a basic part of my nature that I am sceptical about all manner of things, and will only be convinced when I am faced with clear evidence. Incidentally, as an atheist, I have never been of the opinion that those who do not share my point of view are therefore irrational. That sounds like quite an 'irrational' approach.
What I'd say to that is, if we drilled down into what counted as evidence for you we'd end up with some basic intuitions which cannot be evidenced. Nevertheless I'm glad re yr opinions on theism its nice to be able to have an amicable exchange.
My position would be as follows:
If other entities were involved in Alan's scenario, and asuming no humans existed, then I would consider my own present views, which are entirely from a human perspective, to be superfluous. There is no way that I could feel I should or could impose my own views on such an hypothetical situation.
Well you might not think you could but you should make a judgement about what is the right action to take when confronted with something that matches the description TACTDJFF applies. I think if we can make intelligible sense that this description was accurate we have enough of a shared conception of reality to justify our acting. Nevertheless...
If, on the other hand, we take Alan's scenario as is, then, of course I would feel TACTTDJFF to be wrong, as I have already said. However, I suggest that humans do often react in this way to the immediacy of such a situation. If one changes the parameters only slightly, then it is not so clear cut at all. For instance, if one changes it a little to 'someone else torturing a child to death in order to give us pleasure' then it does not seem so clear cut. Examples of this approach might be the prevailing atitudes to child labour in the brickyards, the coal mines etc. during the 19th Century when large swathes of the population did not feel so incensed about the immorality of such a situation, or even today, when child labour has been used in different parts of the world to satisfy our enjoyment of fashionable clothing.
The reason I don't like TACTDFJFF as an example is that I don't think morality is about principles at all and I agree small changes in circumstances can make a big difference about what is right. I think this because right action is to do with how we apply virtues to situations and nothing like a set of rules we read off and try to apply uniformly.
I am of the opinion that a scenario is, of itself, neither moral nor immoral. It seems to depend on how we, as human beings, view it.
Agree with that. I just think that some ways of viewing it are accurate and some are not.
For instance, on a personal level, someone who has recently been bereaved, might react with strong emotions to some particular action or object which reminds them of their loved one. This does not mean that the action or object has some intrinsic quality associated with this emotion, it simply means for that person it becomes a trigger to set off the emotion. For another person it may have no such meaning.
no disagreement with that either although this is not intrinsically a moral situation you are describing of course.
Morality, it seems to me, is something like this writ large. By that, I mean that the vast majority of human beings react in roughly similar ways to particular acts, either with abhorrence or commendation, and we give these feelings the names morality/immorality because we think that others should also react as we do.
I think we often react in common because we share a conception of reality to a large extent and this includes perceiving moral properties...however I think your last sentence is very revealing "we think that others should also react as we do". To say this is to acknowledge that we think moral judgements have right answers -we think if someone who tolerates torture of children is wrong and blameworthy, unlike someone who prefers a different beverage to us which is nothing like this. Its also why we struggle to get to the right answer when we change our moral beliefs.
The trouble I find with this approach is that, apart from our general moral feelings, our moral practices can deviate quite strongly according to how we rationalise them in any given situation. Apart from the most generalised moral attitudes(which I would explain through feelings such as empathy, sympathy, social cohesion etc) we can make contrary 'moral' decisions according to how we analyse a situation(E.G. assisted suicide, abortion).
This is not a contradiction to realism, it sounds exactly like what a realist of the camp 2 I described in my reply to Wiggs would say.
As far as your idea of the trauma of changing our moral opinions goes, I quite agree with you when you say that it can be intensely traumatic. However, changing all sorts of things in our lives, when we change our deep seated outlooks, can be traumatic too. We may be in the process of changing our views of another person, which may release similar agonised feelings. We may realise(through illness, for instance) that what we thought was an entirely adequate lifestyle has to change dramatically for us to remain healthy. This may induce its own major mental problems as we go through a period when we lose our self confidence. What I am saying is that changes in our moral attitudes, as with other things which are deeply ingrained in our lives and in our thinking, can have an understandable traumatic effect on us. If a person, after an intense period of soul searching , changes from being a theist to an atheist, I would not suggest that this demonstrates the truth or otherwise of atheism, so I'm not sure why a person changing their fundamental moral attitudes demonstrates the actual existence of OM.
See comments on this in reply to Wiggs post...the trauma isn't the indicator of OM, the sense of there being a 'right answer' is...the trauma is an indicator of why we can't simply say something like "although we might have evolved to want other people to react as we do, its really just a matter of emotional taste" without massively undermining the role and structure of morality in our lives.
Regards
DT
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Be assured I have no desire to convince you of anything,
Good man, we'll agree to disagree then.
That's because voting is subjective is a different sense to the one we have been discussing meaning something we think should be up to us individually.[/quote[
Nope its exactly the same.
Nevertheless the reason we vote is usually because we think that the Lib Dems will govern better and that there policies will be more successful than others, and these are factual questions
Like its the same but different?
...ones we can't know the answer too with any certainty to be sure as politics and economics are complex and the answers will only be seen in time but they are factual claims nonetheless.
Oh dear now its looks like its different but the same.
Next DT will be along to tell us shit isn't food unless you are a fly.
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Be assured I have no desire to convince you of anything,
Good man, we'll agree to disagree then.
That's because voting is subjective is a different sense to the one we have been discussing meaning something we think should be up to us individually.[/quote[
Nope its exactly the same.
Nevertheless the reason we vote is usually because we think that the Lib Dems will govern better and that there policies will be more successful than others, and these are factual questions
Like its the same but different?
...ones we can't know the answer too with any certainty to be sure as politics and economics are complex and the answers will only be seen in time but they are factual claims nonetheless.
Oh dear now its looks like its different but the same.
Next DT will be along to tell us shit isn't food unless you are a fly.
You think believing something should be up to us to decide means the same thing as it only existing as a subjective truth? Ohh good job! Tell your atheist buddies you have actually found a way to prove God doesn't exist! ...as religion is something we are free to choose in democracies then that follows that means that God can't exist objectively, right! You can write a book and be famous. :)...jakeswan ..who did what Dawkins never could.
Or perhaps it's just that in democracies we think people should be free to make up their mind about truth claims tht we can't prove and yet recognise these can still be factual questions...
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Tell your atheist buddies you have actually found a way to prove God doesn't exist!
Any intelligent person knows that it is impossible to prove one way or the other. Some people are convinced by the "evidence" presented, others are more sceptical.
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Tell your atheist buddies you have actually found a way to prove God doesn't exist!
Any intelligent person knows that it is impossible to prove one way or the other. Some people are convinced by the "evidence" presented, others are more sceptical.
I agree. However if there was no distinction between saying if something should be up to us to decide and saying something is just a subjective truth then the fact that religion is up to us to decide then we could at a stroke prove that this meant God didn't exist as an objective being. ...we can't of course but thats because there is an obvious difference between allowing something to be up to us to believe and it meaning that the target of our belief is only subjective.
So not the same but different/ different but the same after all
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I agree. However if there was no distinction between saying if something should be up to us to decide and saying something is just a subjective truth then the fact that religion is up to us to decide then we could at a stroke prove that this meant God didn't exist as an objective being. ...we can't of course but thats because there is an obvious difference between allowing something to be up to us to believe and it meaning that the target of our belief is only subjective.
So not the same but different/ different but the same after all
I am not going to pretend I understand all that, because I don't, so I can't answer. :)
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Leonard, i just think you can eat this in the middle thats all. I wasn't claiming anyone thought they could disprove God. I was pointing out that a distinction Jakswan had denied was infact a valid distinction. No doubt in time it will become another of those things hes posted which he wants us to pretend he hadn't.
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Leonard, i just think you can eat this in the middle thats all. I wasn't claiming anyone thought they could disprove God. I was pointing out that a distinction Jakswan had denied was infact a valid distinction. No doubt in time it will become another of those things hes posted which he wants us to pretend he hadn't.
OK, sorry I butted in. :-[
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You think believing something should be up to us to decide means the same thing as it only existing as a subjective truth?
Nope, I'm not even sure what you mean.
Ohh good job! Tell your atheist buddies you have actually found a way to prove God doesn't exist! ...as religion is something we are free to choose in democracies then that follows that means that God can't exist objectively, right! You can write a book and be famous. :)...jakeswan ..who did what Dawkins never could.
I think you've become hysterical and got carried away.
Or perhaps it's just that in democracies we think people should be free to make up their mind about truth claims tht we can't prove and yet recognise these can still be factual questions...
People are free to make up their mind about any number of things that could be objective or subjective. I didn't think this was a complex point. There are people out there that believe ghosts, near death experiences, aliens, bigfoot, gods, fairies.
If you want to convince me of those things then you had better come with good arguments.
What is baffling though is that you said 'Be assured I have no desire to convince you of anything', I can only assume you are doing a lot of work to convince yourself, bless. :)
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People are free to make up their mind about any number of things that could be objective or subjective. I didn't think this was a complex point. There are people out there that believe ghosts, near death experiences, aliens, bigfoot, gods, fairies.
Oh good. Well I guess being free to believe something and it being subjective in terms of its truth value isn’t the same thing after all. We’ll just add it to the things to just forget you said then.
What is baffling though is that you said 'Be assured I have no desire to convince you of anything', I can only assume you are doing a lot of work to convince yourself, bless.
Didn’t you agree with that along the lines of it being mutual? Yet you go on too…well if you’d prefer me to just ignore your posts I’m happy to do so. Seeing as there are others here I’m having more reasonable engagements with and seeing we apparently can’t take what you write as being what you believe anyway it will probably save us both a lot of time.
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Oh good. Well I guess being free to believe something and it being subjective in terms of its truth value isn’t the same thing after all. We’ll just add it to the things to just forget you said then.
Where do you think I said anything other?
Didn’t you agree with that along the lines of it being mutual? Yet you go on too…well if you’d prefer me to just ignore your posts I’m happy to do so. Seeing as there are others here I’m having more reasonable engagements with and seeing we apparently can’t take what you write as being what you believe anyway it will probably save us both a lot of time.
I'm not really sure, Al claims moral values exist and are objective because they would exist even if no one held those values.
He's going to forward a method to help us establish how they are objective soon I'm sure, been a year now but soon.
Various others have supported Al but so far no one has defended his argument.
Your defence of his claim seems to amount to wishful thinking/assertion and even then you are falling short of Al's claim anyway, your position:-
moral values exist and could be objective
If I've got this wrong enlighten me or if your position is:-
moral values exist and could be objective but what others think is irrelevant
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I'm not sure whether I am not explaining this very well, or whether you are misunderstanding me still.
"No you don't because the claim that tea tastes nice is a claim that 'you think teas tastes nice'...taste as a subjective state is a claim about your disposition towards tea. It isn't contradicted by someone thinking it is not nice. But when Alan says TACTDJFF is wrong, he is not claiming 'wrong' means anything like 'I don't like it but its ok if you like it', he's saying it is wrong for everyone whatever their 'taste' may be for causing pain, and he's saying that everyone else who also thinks its wrong for everyone (i.e. not at all like our taste in tea) should, to be consistent, recognise that this universality is indicative of an objective feature of morality that makes it quite distinct from matters of taste like liking tea."
My claim that I think tea tastes nice is exactly equivalent to my claim that TACTDJFF is wrong. It is my opinion on both matters.
As you say, my claim about tea is not refuted by someone else not liking tea, and neither is my claim about TACTDJFF refuted by someone disagreeing.
You are applying the word 'refuting' to the two cases as if its saying the same thing but it isn't. If someone disagrees that tea is nice, they are disagreeing with you purely by reference to their internal subjective perception of tea - it isn't an attempt to 'refute' your preference at all because one persons preference doesn't in any way necessarily effect or negate the others - there is no refuting involved they just have different tastes. I don't think you are making a mistake in liking tea. But the whole point about a disagreement were one person thinks TACTDJFF (or anything!) is morally ok and we say it isn't, the claim isn't one where we just accept that I am reacting with an emotional 'boo' to TACTDJFF and they are giving it an emotional 'hurray'. If someone thinks it is ok, we do want to refute them in the true sense of refute, we think they are making a mistake by missing things about the nature of TACTDJFF that they should be paying attention too which make it wrong and are prepared to blame or praise them accordingly. Reducing the way we reason about morality to a type of emotivist reaction like preferring tea is a gross distortion of our ethical practice.
And what if I have a deep emotional connection to liking tea? I would be wanting to 'refute' the other person's taste just as much.
However, the emotional content is neither here nor there; it is the logic which is equivalent. The problem is that, outside one or two very specific situations (such as TACTDJFF), there is just as much variation in moral judgment as there is in opinions about tea. Shall we replace 'TACTDJFF' with 'same sex marriage'?
Alan is, as you say, claiming that when he says that TACTDJFF is wrong means that "he's saying it is wrong for everyone whatever their 'taste' may be for causing pain", then he is making a claim of objectivity. However, like my view of tea, it is his opinion and therefore the claim of objectivity fails (by definition).
This can be taken 2 ways,
1) To simply be saying ‘An opinion in itself can never establish somethings objectivity’. This is correct, but also trivial as no one is claiming that the objectivity of morality is dependent on opinions for its objectivity...not me, not Alan, as I said before.
Or you could mean:
2) to say that ‘If you have an opinion about something - being objective, then that claim to objectivity will necessarily be false (as an opinion is by its nature is a subjective thing).
As no one is defending (1) I took it that you meant (2), but unfortunately (2) is a logical error for the reason I said before – the objectivity of the target of the belief is not dependent on opinion for its objectivity and there are lots of things we could put in place of - in (2) to show that our belief in their objectivity does not affect its actual objectivity (alternative universes, etc). The problem comes whenever we have discussed this you have then tried to rely on other factors like ‘verification’ or ‘relevance’ to sustain your argument…but to say something fails ‘by definition’ or is ‘self-refuting’ MEANS that it has to fail by virtue of the factors that you define as self-refuting alone - in this case being an opinion about somethings objectivity – to be self-refuting means you don’t need to appeal to anything else to show why it’s wrong. Seeing as I can have an opinion about the objectivity of lots of things existing objectively – some verifiable like Barak Obama and some not like alternative universes – and that my opinion doesn’t affect their objective existence in any way, then I can know that (2) is false.
It was (1) that I was meaning, because that is exactly what Alan tries to do. "If you believe that X is wrong always & forever, then you believe in OM"
It may be that there is an objective taste and/or an objective morality, but it can't be asserted into existence through "he's saying it is wrong for everyone whatever their 'taste' may be for causing pain".
Which no one is arguing for OM including Alan. The argument is that if you hold certain beliefs about morality then to be consistent you have to hold that morality is OM.
Yes, and that is self-refuting, because of your (1) above,
It may also be that my claim about tea and Alan's about TACTDJFF do actually match the relevant objective taste/morality, but that would be coincidence rather than either of us identifying the OT/OM.
Well that depends with OM, although no one claims a simple read-off method of determining OM, however Moral Realists do think that we can discover moral truth and make progress in towards it, the method we use will depend on the account of moral realism as per examples in reply 18 on page 1 on this thread.
Except that we are no discussing MR, we're discussing Alan's claims about OM.
And…… views of TACTDJFF agreeing are just that - agreement or lack of it; they can't be evidence for OT/OM because that's ad populum.
As above the argument is not that the evidence that OM exists is based on the agreement of subjective views, although they might be evidence that certain ways we think about moral questions assumes objectivity and that if we are to sustain our moral practice as it is and be consistent in our beliefs we should also therefore accept OM.
If it wasn't for that pesky problem that opinion can't be a basis for OM, of course.
I do agree though that the example of TACTDJFF has become a distraction in this argument. It’s a simple attempt at a short cut to OM that in my view leads to more confusion than progress.
But if we move away from Alan's TACTDJFF, his entire argument for OM will collapse even more than it has done already.
ht
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Objective morality?
Remove the concept of God for a moment. ( it's causing an issue)
Secular humanism
//objective standards emerge, and ethical values and principles may be discovered, in the course of ethical deliberation.[33]
Many Humanists adopt principles of the Golden Rule. Some believe that universal moral standards are required for the proper functioning of society. However, they believe such necessary universality can and should be achieved by developing a richer notion of morality through reason, experience and scientific inquiry rather than through faith in a supernatural realm or source.[citation needed]//
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secular_humanism
Isn't that what objective morality is?
If it is, then objective morality can exist.
Isn't that what secular humanism is trying to achieve?
From my link
//Secular humanism affirms that with the present state of scientific knowledge, dogmatic belief in an absolutist moral/ethical system (e.g. Kantian, Islamic, Christian) is unreasonable. However, it affirms that individuals engaging in rational moral/ethical deliberations can discover some universal "objective standards".//
If it's universal " objective standards" then it can't all be considered subjective opinion.
Hi Rose,
You’re right that there are lots of atheists who are moral realists. However on this thread and the previous one there has been a stark division between theists who are realists and atheists who are not (although it seems there are also some theists who are not which is a very unusual position).
I don’t think it’s right to say that objective morality is just the same thing as universal agreement or what society 'needs'. It is of course true that atheist realists can’t rely on appeals to revelation and have to construct an account of moral realism out of appeals to just observation and logic. How you do that is the crux of course and so far no one has attempted to defend a view of atheistic moral realism, although I have hinted at a few ways this has been attempted. Defending this would bring into play a whole range of arguments in relation to the justifications for the 2nd premise of the moral argument – that we can only make sense of OM if we believe in God (or my softer version that God is the best explanation for OM).
It would be great in terms of opening up the discussion if you wanted to argue for this position.
Regards
DT
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Oh good. Well I guess being free to believe something and it being subjective in terms of its truth value isn’t the same thing after all. We’ll just add it to the things to just forget you said then.
Where do you think I said anything other?
Didn’t you agree with that along the lines of it being mutual? Yet you go on too…well if you’d prefer me to just ignore your posts I’m happy to do so. Seeing as there are others here I’m having more reasonable engagements with and seeing we apparently can’t take what you write as being what you believe anyway it will probably save us both a lot of time.
I'm not really sure, Al claims moral values exist and are objective because they would exist even if no one held those values.
He's going to forward a method to help us establish how they are objective soon I'm sure, been a year now but soon.
Various others have supported Al but so far no one has defended his argument.
Your defence of his claim seems to amount to wishful thinking/assertion and even then you are falling short of Al's claim anyway, your position:-
moral values exist and could be objective
If I've got this wrong enlighten me or if your position is:-
moral values exist and could be objective but what others think is irrelevant
yes you've got it wrong but luckily I've explained it in replies to others so I don't need to do so again.
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Hi Ht,
And what if I have a deep emotional connection to liking tea? I would be wanting to 'refute' the other person's taste just as much.
You might, but you'd be making a mistake in doing so because you'd be missing that them liking tea doesn't in any way negate your enjoyment of it.
However, the emotional content is neither here nor there; it is the logic which is equivalent. The problem is that, outside one or two very specific situations (such as TACTDJFF), there is just as much variation in moral judgment as there is in opinions about tea. Shall we replace 'TACTDJFF' with 'same sex marriage'?
You can if you like but it doesn't change anything as OM isn't based on agreement. If its right to support /allow gay people to get marriage its objectively right whether or not people disagree with it.
It was (1) that I was meaning, because that is exactly what Alan tries to do. "If you believe that X is wrong always & forever, then you believe in OM"
well then I agree with (1) I just don't think that's what Alan was trying to do, but if he was he was definitely wrong. He said pretty explicitly this wasn't what he meant though, even if at other times he was a bit unclear.
Quote from: Dryghtons Toe on June 14, 2015, 09:42:45 PM
Quote
It may be that there is an objective taste and/or an objective morality, but it can't be asserted into existence through "he's saying it is wrong for everyone whatever their 'taste' may be for causing pain".
Which no one is arguing for OM including Alan. The argument is that if you hold certain beliefs about morality then to be consistent you have to hold that morality is OM.
]Yes, and that is self-refuting, because of your (1) above,
No its not because its not claiming to establish OM by itself, only to point out that its what you should believe in order to be consistent.
Except that we are no discussing MR, we're discussing Alan's claims about OM.
That's not correct, the Op asked the question "could anyone who believes that OM exists, explain what method there is for establishing that or any other moral value?" so its throwing it open to other people who support OM not just Alan.
If it wasn't for that pesky problem that opinion can't be a basis for OM, of course.
which of course is only a problem if you think any argument can definitive establish a metaphysical proposition...but as it can't and as the intention is to get people to be consistent in their beliefs, then its not a problem at all!
But if we move away from Alan's TACTDJFF, his entire argument for OM will collapse even more than it has done already.
I have no idea where Alan would have gone but the argument for OM certainly doesn't rely on TACTDJFF as an example.
Regards
DT
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The argument is that if you hold certain beliefs about morality then to be consistent you have to hold that morality is OM.
No we have covered this you are conflating objective morality and objective moral values. If you subjectively base your morality on what the Bible says then you can arrive at objective moral values, pick your axioms.
Here was Al's argument:-
objective morality is that something is morally right or wrong independent of how many people think it so.
If someone agrees with me that an act, any act, is morally wrong and that this does not depend on how many people believe it to be so, they are logically bound to believe in the existence of objective morality.
I agree some acts are morally wrong and that this does not depend on me thinking it so.
My beliefs are consistent with morality being subjective.
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Alien on July 10, 2014, 11:47:56 AM
If someone agrees with me that an act, any act, is morally wrong and that this does not depend on how many people believe it to be so, they are logically bound to believe in the existence of objective morality.
Why? They are simply giving their opinion that it is wrong no matter how many people believe it to be so, so as an opinion it can only be subjective.
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Hi Ht,
And what if I have a deep emotional connection to liking tea? I would be wanting to 'refute' the other person's taste just as much.
You might, but you'd be making a mistake in doing so because you'd be missing that them liking tea doesn't in any way negate your enjoyment of it.
And someone having a different opinion about TACTDJFF doesn't change my view, either.
However, the emotional content is neither here nor there; it is the logic which is equivalent. The problem is that, outside one or two very specific situations (such as TACTDJFF), there is just as much variation in moral judgment as there is in opinions about tea. Shall we replace 'TACTDJFF' with 'same sex marriage'?
You can if you like but it doesn't change anything as OM isn't based on agreement. If its right to support /allow gay people to get marriage its objectively right whether or not people disagree with it.
Exactly. Unfortunately, we don't seem to be able to find a way to determine what that OM might be.
It was (1) that I was meaning, because that is exactly what Alan tries to do. "If you believe that X is wrong always & forever, then you believe in OM"
well then I agree with (1) I just don't think that's what Alan was trying to do, but if he was he was definitely wrong. He said pretty explicitly this wasn't what he meant though, even if at other times he was a bit unclear.
He does say that, doesn't he - but if you look at when he tries to make his case, his first point is always something like 'I think that TACTDJFF is wrong', or 'do you think TACTDJFF is wrong'.
It may be that there is an objective taste and/or an objective morality, but it can't be asserted into existence through "he's saying it is wrong for everyone whatever their 'taste' may be for causing pain".
Which no one is arguing for OM including Alan. The argument is that if you hold certain beliefs about morality then to be consistent you have to hold that morality is OM.
Yes, and that is self-refuting, because of your (1) above,
No its not because its not claiming to establish OM by itself, only to point out that its what you should believe in order to be consistent.
Except that 'believing' (a subjective act) counters 'objective' - which is why opinion (/belief) is irrelevant to OM. Sure, someone can believe it exists, but until they present the method which is independent of their opinion, it's still an opinion.
Except that we are no discussing MR, we're discussing Alan's claims about OM.
That's not correct, the Op asked the question "could anyone who believes that OM exists, explain what method there is for establishing that or any other moral value?" so its throwing it open to other people who support OM not just Alan.
...and this strand of the discussion is about Alan's claims about OM.
If it wasn't for that pesky problem that opinion can't be a basis for OM, of course.
which of course is only a problem if you think any argument can definitive establish a metaphysical proposition...but as it can't and as the intention is to get people to be consistent in their beliefs, then its not a problem at all!
No, it's only a problem if you use opinion as a basis for OM.
But if we move away from Alan's TACTDJFF, his entire argument for OM will collapse even more than it has done already.
I have no idea where Alan would have gone but the argument for OM certainly doesn't rely on TACTDJFF as an example.
Regards
DT
Really? What other situation would you suggest?
My opinion is that Alan chose that example because it would have almost universal agreement, and that would bolster his claim. Several people suggested other situations in the original threads, but for some reason, they didn't have the same level of agreement.
I did find it very strange when Alan went through the phase of asking everyone whether they thought TACTDJFF was right or wrong, and lambasted people when they wouldn't answer - as though anyone's opinion was relevant to OM! :)
ht
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The argument is that if you hold certain beliefs about morality then to be consistent you have to hold that morality is OM.
No we have covered this you are conflating objective morality and objective moral values. If you subjectively base your morality on what the Bible says then you can arrive at objective moral values, pick your axioms.
Here was Al's argument:-
objective morality is that something is morally right or wrong independent of how many people think it so.
If someone agrees with me that an act, any act, is morally wrong and that this does not depend on how many people believe it to be so, they are logically bound to believe in the existence of objective morality.
I agree some acts are morally wrong and that this does not depend on me thinking it so.
My beliefs are consistent with morality being subjective.
Its not a matter of conflation, an objective moral value is a part of what we mean by OM and having an axiom that you hold too doesn't make it objective nor any of the values derived from it. The quotes you print from Alan's argument seem to suggest that he means it to be interpreted in exactly the way I suggested - that if you think any act (i.e. not just TACTDJFF) is morally wrong and you think it is not morally wrong dependent on anyone's opinion then (in order to be consistent) you are bound to believe in OM. If you don't believe they are independent of opinion then you won't.
From Leonard:
Why? They are simply giving their opinion that it is wrong no matter how many people believe it to be so, so as an opinion it can only be subjective.
There opinion is subjective, but the subject of their opinion (objectivity of OM) need not be. Alan's not saying it proves it, he's saying you should therefore accept OM if you are being consistent.
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And someone having a different opinion about TACTDJFF doesn't change my view, either.
Sure, but so what? You could be wrong and the difference between TACTDJFF and liking tea is we would think it bizzare if you blamed someone or thought they were making a mistake for liking tea, but we don't think that about people who think TACTDJFF is ok. We think they are wrong just like we might think they were wrong if they made any other factual claim we thought was incorrect.
Exactly. Unfortunately, we don't seem to be able to find a way to determine what that OM might be.
We do depending on your account of OM. For example, if OM is rooted in teleological facts in relation to Gods purpose as manifested in the universe and that our physical, psychological and spiritual flourishing is part of that purpose, we would be able to make observations and logical influences about the facts of our flourishing and we would be able to gain insights in to our spiritual flourishing through developing our relationship with God. In this way we do discover the content of moral truth.
He does say that, doesn't he - but if you look at when he tries to make his case, his first point is always something like 'I think that TACTDJFF is wrong', or 'do you think TACTDJFF is wrong'.
And the quotes by Alan reproduced by Jakswan above explain why he is saying that I think, as per my reply to him.
Except that 'believing' (a subjective act) counters 'objective' - which is why opinion (/belief) is irrelevant to OM. Sure, someone can believe it exists, but until they present the method which is independent of their opinion, it's still an opinion.
and
No, it's only a problem if you use opinion as a basis for OM.
That's saying our opinion of OM is our opinion - which is tautologically true but so what? Neither Alan (as far as i can tell) or I are saying that our argument proves OM. We are saying that if you are going to maintain morality as we practice and the assumptions implicit within it, then as Alan says they " are logically bound to believe in the existence of objective morality" in order to be consistent. Its not a deductive argument because you always have the alternative option of discarding the assumptions of our moral practice as an illusion. For those of us who don't however, there is a reason to believe in OM and if premise 2 is right (which we haven't discussed) this is also a reason to believe in God on the same basis (consistency of belief).
...and this strand of the discussion is about Alan's claims about OM.
Well you made some quite general claims about the nature of understanding arguments from objectivity which would have implications beyond Alan's argument and as per above, i also think you are misrepresenting Alan's argument in the way I have explained, and that your criticisms in general do not work against his arguement properly understood.
Really? What other situation would you suggest?
My opinion is that Alan chose that example because it would have almost universal agreement, and that would bolster his claim. Several people suggested other situations in the original threads, but for some reason, they didn't have the same level of agreement.
I agree he is using it because there is universal agreement but I think you are missing the point of why he thinks this should serve as an example - some people confuse various forms of moral relativism with the trivial fact that when we make moral decisions we have to weigh up lots of factors about the case in order to get to the right decision. They think that moral realists have to believe in a set of principles like 'its wrong to kill' that apply in all circumstances when in fact most of us believe that there may be circumstances when killing is the right thing to do. But that's a misconception about moral realism - moral realists readily embrace the fact that in deciding what the right thing to do is we need to weigh a wide range of factors that will effect what the right answer is.....but what the realist DOES believe is that at the end of the process of weighing up all of the relevant factors, there is a right answer. Now Alan and others use the example of TACTDJFF because they hope it will avoid the discussion getting bogged down in the specifics of 'what if this' and 'what if that' which make no difference to the issue of whether, after all is considered there is a right answer. I by contrast think its not a good tactic precisely because it doesn't help people get over the misconception that moral realists think that believing in OM means we can't take account of differing circumstances when weighing up the right thing to do.
As i said before, any moral issue a realist might argue is correct, is being argued for as being objectively correct. I for example think it is wrong to discriminate people on grounds of there sexuality. If my arguments against discrimination are correct, according to moral realism, it is objectively wrong no matter how many people might disagree with me, what society enshrines in its laws or anything else.
I did find it very strange when Alan went through the phase of asking everyone whether they thought TACTDJFF was right or wrong, and lambasted people when they wouldn't answer - as though anyone's opinion was relevant to OM!
As per Jakswan's quote from Alan, he wasn't just asking people if they believe TACTDJFF was wrong, he was asking them to confirm they believe "that an act, any act, is morally wrong and that this does not depend on how many people believe it to be so".
So he's doing this not only to get people to admit that it is wrong, he wants them to admit that our assumption of wrongness is independent of anyone's opinion...and so to be consistent in our beliefs we should also accept OM.
Regards
DT
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Hi DT,
Then we would have to apply our ideas to examples of how we make particular decisions and see if it fits with the theory. My argument isn't just that I think A and you think B, its about giving account that makes sense of how we reason about morality in practice. If our morality was just invention, we'd also have to give an account why truth is so deeply presupposed within it and how such a universal distortion could possibly come about.
And I would suggest that our moral reasoning and feelings fit well with the evolutionary model . Most of our moral decisions are directed towards the smoother functioning of the society we live in, and as society changes, our moral decisions tend to alter accordingly. Also, we have evidence that in certain circumstances which involve brain damage or indoctrination, our moral attitudes can also change. For me, this suggests that it is the working of our brain which is the focal point of our feelings of morality/immorality.
What I'd say to that is, if we drilled down into what counted as evidence for you we'd end up with some basic intuitions which cannot be evidenced. Nevertheless I'm glad re yr opinions on theism its nice to be able to have an amicable exchange.
I would agree. Obviously I would suggest that these basic intuitions are simply part of the general evolutionary complexity of the human brain. I do accept however that other views can be equally valid.
As regards an amicable exchange of views, I have never seen any reason not to have such. I take part in such discussions, not only to clarify my own views, but to assess and learn from the views of others. If the exchange isn't reasonably amicable, then I find my ability to do the above becomes increasingly curtailed.
Well you might not think you could but you should make a judgement about what is the right action to take when confronted with something that matches the description TACTDJFF applies. I think if we can make intelligible sense that this description was accurate we have enough of a shared conception of reality to justify our acting.
I'm afraid that would not be applicable as I suggested that no humans actually existed in this scenario, which would obviously include myself. So I would suggest that my opinions would therefore be meaningless. As regards the idea that, by projecting myself into this scenario, I should be against another entity's TACTDJFF, I would and should not make a decision until I was aware of all the salient information which should inform such a decision. I could not, for instance, know whether such an act actually encouraged the survival of this particular species. It is interesting to note that there is a completely natural tendency amongst male lions(admittedly not aware in the same sense as human beings) to kill the offspring of a female lion that they wish to pair with, in order to give their own progeny a greater survival chance.
The reason I don't like TACTDFJFF as an example is that I don't think morality is about principles at all and I agree small changes in circumstances can make a big difference about what is right. I think this because right action is to do with how we apply virtues to situations and nothing like a set of rules we read off and try to apply uniformly.
I tend to agree with you here, although probably for different reasons. I also think that general principles are all very well, but it is the particulars of a situation which help us decide whether we think it moral/immoral. Where I think I differ is that, for me, it would depend on the person, and how their moral views have been fashioned as to how they would judge any particular moral situation.
Agree with that. I just think that some ways of viewing it are accurate and some are not.
No problem. I quite accept that you think this.
no disagreement with that either although this is not intrinsically a moral situation you are describing of course.
I happily accept that. It wasn't meant to be. I simply wanted to show that there are all manner of situations which can trigger our emotions on a personal level, but intrinsically situations/objects have no emotional content.
I think we often react in common because we share a conception of reality to a large extent and this includes perceiving moral properties..
Again I am in broad agreement, although, I would add that our conception of what is moral can be affected by all sorts of environmental/cultural influences which can change over time. Our disagreement is surely where this perception of moral properties comes from.
however I think your last sentence is very revealing "we think that others should also react as we do". To say this is to acknowledge that we think moral judgements have right answers -we think if someone who tolerates torture of children is wrong and blameworthy, unlike someone who prefers a different beverage to us which is nothing like this. Its also why we struggle to get to the right answer when we change our moral beliefs.
Interesting. To me, it simply means that we attach such importance on an emotional level to certain situations that we find it hard to conceive that others should think differently. Obviously, therefore, in such situations we think that we are right in our assessment and consequentially we think that others must be wrong. This, of course, says nothing about the actual rightness and wrongness of any particular situation, or even if there is any intrinsic rightness or wrongness in the situation at all. I, of course, would suggest, that this is the way evolution has made us in order to maintain the viability of our species, wouldn't I? When you talk about liking a different beverage, I don't think I agree that this is so different. If drinking tea had any strong emotional overtones such that we felt our species threatened by those who do not drink tea, then, I suggest, drinking tea would then become a clear moral issue. An instance of such a transformation is smoking, which was once accepted as simply a matter of taste. However, with the clear knowledge of the harm it can do to the individuals and those around them, it has become much more of a moral issue than previously.
This is not a contradiction to realism, it sounds exactly like what a realist of the camp 2 I described in my reply to Wiggs would say.
Yes, I've read that. I don't actually disagree that that our moral views are a part of our overall world view, and the weight we give to our moral values and feelings are a part of that. The problem always arises as to how we have these feelings and values, whatever they are. The title of this thread is: "Objective reality is independent of opinion....or is it?" I suggest that our 'conception of the world' is a belief system, and any belief system is, of itself, an opinion. Hence the moral values and feelings we have, as part of that belief system, unless they can be demonstrated as having an objective basis, are simply beliefs or opinions. And, for me, all opinions/beliefs are open to question.
See comments on this in reply to Wiggs post...the trauma isn't the indicator of OM, the sense of there being a 'right answer' is...the trauma is an indicator of why we can't simply say something like "although we might have evolved to want other people to react as we do, its really just a matter of emotional taste" without massively undermining the role and structure of morality in our lives.
Well, I suggest that you underestimate the power of emotions here. For me, it is not 'just a matter of emotional taste'. We try to rationalise the powerful emotions evoked by all sorts of situations in a socio-political and cultural setting so that our society can function reasonably well. As society changes, so do many of its underlying attitudes and moral thinking.
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There opinion is subjective, but the subject of their opinion (objectivity of OM) need not be. Alan's not saying it proves it, he's saying you should therefore accept OM if you are being consistent.
Jolly good, I agree some acts are morally wrong and that this does depend on me thinking it so I'm consistent. I think almost everyone arguing against Al would agree.
We tried to explain that to Al but he then went onto ask things like (paraphrasing) will you think it when your dead, weird I know but hey ho.
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I suggest that our 'conception of the world' is a belief system, and any belief system is, of itself, an opinion. Hence the moral values and feelings we have, as part of that belief system, unless they can be demonstrated as having an objective basis, are simply beliefs or opinions. And, for me, all opinions/beliefs are open to question.
Quite!
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Jolly good, I agree some acts are morally wrong and that this does depend on me thinking it so I'm consistent. I think almost everyone arguing against Al would agree.
We tried to explain that to Al but he then went onto ask things like (paraphrasing) will you think it when your dead, weird I know but hey ho.
I assume he’s suggesting that you are not accurately representing your moral intuitions about this, after all when we talk about our moral intuitions we aren’t just talking about our surface beliefs or a particular theory someone ascribes to about morality, but rather some very deep seated implicit assumptions that are integral to our moral practice. Nevertheless it would be right to say (as I did earlier) that the moral argument is forceful for those who think morality is objective (as many do, including many atheists). For those who don’t it won’t be.
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Hi enki
And I would suggest that our moral reasoning and feelings fit well with the evolutionary model . Most of our moral decisions are directed towards the smoother functioning of the society we live in, and as society changes, our moral decisions tend to alter accordingly. Also, we have evidence that in certain circumstances which involve brain damage or indoctrination, our moral attitudes can also change. For me, this suggests that it is the working of our brain which is the focal point of our feelings of morality/immorality.
Just like your previous appeal to evolution it does nothing to decide between realism and anti-realism about morality. From a realist point of view it would be bizarre if moral truth involved things that led us to a morality that was destructive of society – indeed if we are social animals and if we accept that morality is aimed at our flourishing why would it? As for the brain damage – well first as I and others keep pointing out there are many atheist moral realists, but further no one thinks consciousness (on in which our ability to perceive moral truth relies) is unrelated to the brain. Whether its wholly caused by the brain is a bigger and wider question but the key point here is there’s nothing in what you’ve said that would lead us to prefer an anti-realist account, yet there are features in the aspects of morality I pointed out that lead us to a realist account.
I'm afraid that would not be applicable as I suggested that no humans actually existed in this scenario, which would obviously include myself. So I would suggest that my opinions would therefore be meaningless. As regards the idea that, by projecting myself into this scenario, I should be against another entity's TACTDJFF, I would and should not make a decision until I was aware of all the salient information which should inform such a decision. I could not, for instance, know whether such an act actually encouraged the survival of this particular species. It is interesting to note that there is a completely natural tendency amongst male lions(admittedly not aware in the same sense as human beings) to kill the offspring of a female lion that they wish to pair with, in order to give their own progeny a greater survival chance.
We'll have to disagree on this one. If there is sufficient basis for understanding the capacities of the other to correctly ascribe the description TACTDJFF to them then it’s allows us to draw reasonable moral conclusions. However the second bit of what you say is right in that we need to have all of the salient information and this again is quite right from a realist point of view. As per my previous reply to HT, a realist doesn’t necessarily think morality is encompassed by simple principles, on the contra, we should take ‘all of the salient features into account’ into making our decision and if we didn’t have a full grasp of all of these (which we might not have of another species) then our judgement will be in error. But the realists believes, after we do discover all of the salient features and take them into account, then there is a right answer.
I tend to agree with you here, although probably for different reasons. I also think that general principles are all very well, but it is the particulars of a situation which help us decide whether we think it moral/immoral. Where I think I differ is that, for me, it would depend on the person, and how their moral views have been fashioned as to how they would judge any particular moral situation.
Sure, but saying how I have been fashioned means how I have come to develop my particular moral perspective – and that’s true of course and it could also be true say of how I have been fashioned (my previous experience, education, etc) in terms of how I understand what is going on in a baseball match…but none of that would prevent there from being a right answer to either what’s going off in a baseball match or whats the right thing to do in a given situation. How we have been fashioned is about our limits, but our continued discovery and growth can lead us to a fuller more complete conception of a situation, moral or otherwise.
I happily accept that. It wasn't meant to be. I simply wanted to show that there are all manner of situations which can trigger our emotions on a personal level, but intrinsically situations/objects have no emotional content.
Sure – and the realist doesn’t identify emotion and moral perception as identical so that’s all good too….and my account of emotional response doesn’t put it just down to the object either – (the camp 2 realist version at least )would say its rather in the interplay between natural facts and our conception of a situation…our particular moral vision developed by people whose conception of the world is shaped by the virtues necessary for our flourishing.
Again I am in broad agreement, although, I would add that our conception of what is moral can be affected by all sorts of environmental/cultural influences which can change over time. Our disagreement is surely where this perception of moral properties comes from.
Absolutely right that environmental/cultural factors shape our conceptions, as they do even our conceptions of the natural world…but so what? Disagreement isn’t a problem for the realist any more than for the anti-realist. It’s just that when people disagree we think they are disagreeing about a question with a right answer, whether either of them are correct or not.
Interesting. To me, it simply means that we attach such importance on an emotional level to certain situations that we find it hard to conceive that others should think differently. Obviously, therefore, in such situations we think that we are right in our assessment and consequentially we think that others must be wrong. This, of course, says nothing about the actual rightness and wrongness of any particular situation, or even if there is any intrinsic rightness or wrongness in the situation at all. I, of course, would suggest, that this is the way evolution has made us in order to maintain the viability of our species, wouldn't I? When you talk about liking a different beverage, I don't think I agree that this is so different.
But it does speak to our expectation of a right or wrong answer which is a characteristic of factual questions not questions of taste. The fact that I love the music of New Model Army and am emotionally attached to it may lead me to defend and try to convince people to like them too – even to be disappointed when they don’t. But if I went so far as to say you were wrong in your judgement for not agreeing with me on this then I would be making a mistake of reason by not understanding the limits of questions of taste. Now it may be you want to say the same about morality – that our sense of moral truth is just an error –but if you do that you need to both (a) provide an account of how this error has been so universally made and (b) accept the consequences for our moral practice of seeing this element as delusional - and these are enormous.
If drinking tea had any strong emotional overtones such that we felt our species threatened by those who do not drink tea, then, I suggest, drinking tea would then become a clear moral issue. An instance of such a transformation is smoking, which was once accepted as simply a matter of taste. However, with the clear knowledge of the harm it can do to the individuals and those around them, it has become much more of a moral issue than previously.
That’s right. But it’s not become an issue of the rightness or wrongness of whether you enjoy the sensation, it’s become an issue because of the factual questions of its effects and consequences for us. Questions with a right answer we have arisen due to growth in our factual understanding.
Yes, I've read that. I don't actually disagree that that our moral views are a part of our overall world view, and the weight we give to our moral values and feelings are a part of that. The problem always arises as to how we have these feelings and values, whatever they are. The title of this thread is: "Objective reality is independent of opinion....or is it?" I suggest that our 'conception of the world' is a belief system, and any belief system is, of itself, an opinion. Hence the moral values and feelings we have, as part of that belief system, unless they can be demonstrated as having an objective basis, are simply beliefs or opinions. And, for me, all opinions/beliefs are open to question.
Its not quite an opinion but ok if you like ..and crucially of course opinions can be correct…what makes them correct being independent of any opinion, and the same is true of our conceptions of the world. All beliefs I would say are open to question - I have no problem with that and likewise we should always ask ourselves if our conception of the world is adequate. But again none of that is a problem for realism - its only a problem if you think there is no right answer. Whether or not there is an objective basis is of course what we are discussing and its a metaphysical question...so like all metaphysical questions we can't demonstrate them like we can with science, we rather make an argument for them in terms of their explanatory power - in this case its ability to explain morality as we experience it. So far the points you raised against realism in relation to morality have been nothing a realist can't cope with, by contrast your reduction of questions of moral truth to an analogy with taste doesn't fit at all with the way we experience morality or its importance in defining our humanity.
Well, I suggest that you underestimate the power of emotions here. For me, it is not 'just a matter of emotional taste'. We try to rationalise the powerful emotions evoked by all sorts of situations in a socio-political and cultural setting so that our society can function reasonably well. As society changes, so do many of its underlying attitudes and moral thinking.
Not sure how this comment follows from what we were talking about in terms of the importance we place on finding the right answer when changing our core belief and its defining role for our humanity and purpose. Societies certainly change their attitudes – but they do so because they think the old ones were incorrect.
Regards
DT
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Hi DT,
Sorry I haven't replied sooner. Been quite busy over the weekend.
I never entered this discussion either in this thread or the original one to state that OM can't exist, but to show the flaws in Alan's arguments(especially the ones predicated on his TACTDJFF example) that OM must exist. Of course there are differing opinions on this, and atheists being a disparate bunch, some would take an entirely different position to me. I find that no problem at all.
I have suggested that the ideas inherent in evolution can account for our sense of morality. If you wish to go further and suggest that these moral ideas have a basis in a morality which is extraneous to human thinking, no problem at all. However, to convince me, some sort of evidence is needed that this is so. I suggest that evidence of the flavour of 'I have a strong, deep seated, intuitive feeling that X is right and Y is wrong' is not the evidence I am looking for. Perhaps I may put it this way. The fact that I live my life as if free will existed is not evidence that it actually does.
We have both agreed that any particular situation is not moral/immoral of itself. Therefore it has to be the human mind acting on such a situation that decides thus. I have suggested that it is quite reasonable to suggest that the morality/immorality of such a situation therefore exists solely in the human mind. Now, I accept that if one has a different world view, for instance that is quite feasible to think that the moral values which exist in our mind come from some sort of outside source(perhaps similar to the Platonic world of forms), then that too could be entirely possible. Unfortunately, for me, I repeat that I would have to have convincing evidence that this source actually exists. And, I don't.
My position is that in all sorts of areas(e.g. god, beauty, morality, spirituality) we often think we are right to believe that they have an existence(or not, as the case may be). My contention is that, unless there is actual solid evidence that they exist, then it is just as reasonable to suggest that they are products of the human mind. In other words, we tend to think that our views at any given moment on a myriad of situations are the right ones. And, as you say, when we disagree with another view, we tend to think that it is we who have the 'right' answer, whether we do or not. I don't see this as a problem at all. For me, this is the way nature, through evolution, has created us.
I do think that there are some similarities between questions of taste and those of morality. As I have already stated, questions of morality seem to have a much deeper emotional base, and therefore the rightness or wrongness of these is held with much greater conviction.(I would suggest, for powerful evolutionary reasons.)
I wouldn't suggest that our sense of moral truth is 'just an error' at all. It seems to be a mechanism which, despite its obvious problems of interpretation, basically welds societies together and allows humans to function within a social setting. In this sense, it seems to be largely a useful survival mechanism, rather than an 'error'. I would suggest that the very fact that whole groups/societies have, thoughout history, tended to construct their own moral laws, especially as regards an individual's behaviour within that group, shows what I would call the moral instinct at work.
I'm afraid I don't find the idea of my explanation of morality to be 'delusional' at all. I am quite happy to accept that moral behaviour is important, whilst also accepting that moral instincts have an evolutionary source. Morals have value in my life, just as, I assume, in yours. The fact that I regard them as a human construct does not mean that I think that they are without meaning. In fact, simply because I am a human being, they are part of the way I function. I don't stop thinking I feel that this is right or this is wrong simply because I also think that when I die, my moral attitudes die with me. I would suggest that similar moral feelings will live on after my death because, for reasons already given, I see the bases of these feelings to be an integral part of human minds. I don't, however, see moral instincts or feelings having some sort of objective existence outside of humanity(unless, of course you include the proto-morality of some animal species, or consider the viabilty of unknown aliens). Therefore, I see no reason to think that the consequences of not accepting OM will be any different to those that already exist.
Finally, and in an attempt to answer your last point: The fact that I suggested that you underestimate the power of emotions was in response to your idea that the rightness/wrongness of a situation is not 'just a matter of emotional taste'. I think that our emotional feelings are extremely important when considering the rightness/wrongness of our moral views, whereas, generally, on matters of taste they are not as strongly committed.(as I have already suggested, above).
I have enjoyed reading your replies, DT, but I think that I, at least, am beginning to simply go over old ground. so, unless anything new arises, I intend to leave it there. Thanks for the obvious care and commitment you have put into your responses. These have been very much appreciated.
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I assume he’s suggesting that you are not accurately representing your moral intuitions about this, after all when we talk about our moral intuitions we aren’t just talking about our surface beliefs or a particular theory someone ascribes to about morality, but rather some very deep seated implicit assumptions that are integral to our moral practice.
Which is what you would expect from any social species of animal, much like love, which is also subjective or beauty perhaps? Funny isn't it I have no intuitions about the speed of light in a vacuum.
I suggest its you who is not being accurate or consistent. :)
Nevertheless it would be right to say (as I did earlier) that the moral argument is forceful for those who think morality is objective (as many do, including many atheists). For those who don’t it won’t be.
A confession of confirmation bias is not going serve the argument well.
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Hi DT,
Sorry I haven't replied sooner. Been quite busy over the weekend.
I never entered this discussion either in this thread or the original one to state that OM can't exist, but to show the flaws in Alan's arguments(especially the ones predicated on his TACTDJFF example) that OM must exist. Of course there are differing opinions on this, and atheists being a disparate bunch, some would take an entirely different position to me. I find that no problem at all.
I have suggested that the ideas inherent in evolution can account for our sense of morality. If you wish to go further and suggest that these moral ideas have a basis in a morality which is extraneous to human thinking, no problem at all. However, to convince me, some sort of evidence is needed that this is so. I suggest that evidence of the flavour of 'I have a strong, deep seated, intuitive feeling that X is right and Y is wrong' is not the evidence I am looking for. Perhaps I may put it this way. The fact that I live my life as if free will existed is not evidence that it actually does.
We have both agreed that any particular situation is not moral/immoral of itself. Therefore it has to be the human mind acting on such a situation that decides thus. I have suggested that it is quite reasonable to suggest that the morality/immorality of such a situation therefore exists solely in the human mind. Now, I accept that if one has a different world view, for instance that is quite feasible to think that the moral values which exist in our mind come from some sort of outside source(perhaps similar to the Platonic world of forms), then that too could be entirely possible. Unfortunately, for me, I repeat that I would have to have convincing evidence that this source actually exists. And, I don't.
My position is that in all sorts of areas(e.g. god, beauty, morality, spirituality) we often think we are right to believe that they have an existence(or not, as the case may be). My contention is that, unless there is actual solid evidence that they exist, then it is just as reasonable to suggest that they are products of the human mind. In other words, we tend to think that our views at any given moment on a myriad of situations are the right ones. And, as you say, when we disagree with another view, we tend to think that it is we who have the 'right' answer, whether we do or not. I don't see this as a problem at all. For me, this is the way nature, through evolution, has created us.
I do think that there are some similarities between questions of taste and those of morality. As I have already stated, questions of morality seem to have a much deeper emotional base, and therefore the rightness or wrongness of these is held with much greater conviction.(I would suggest, for powerful evolutionary reasons.)
I wouldn't suggest that our sense of moral truth is 'just an error' at all. It seems to be a mechanism which, despite its obvious problems of interpretation, basically welds societies together and allows humans to function within a social setting. In this sense, it seems to be largely a useful survival mechanism, rather than an 'error'. I would suggest that the very fact that whole groups/societies have, thoughout history, tended to construct their own moral laws, especially as regards an individual's behaviour within that group, shows what I would call the moral instinct at work.
I'm afraid I don't find the idea of my explanation of morality to be 'delusional' at all. I am quite happy to accept that moral behaviour is important, whilst also accepting that moral instincts have an evolutionary source. Morals have value in my life, just as, I assume, in yours. The fact that I regard them as a human construct does not mean that I think that they are without meaning. In fact, simply because I am a human being, they are part of the way I function. I don't stop thinking I feel that this is right or this is wrong simply because I also think that when I die, my moral attitudes die with me. I would suggest that similar moral feelings will live on after my death because, for reasons already given, I see the bases of these feelings to be an integral part of human minds. I don't, however, see moral instincts or feelings having some sort of objective existence outside of humanity(unless, of course you include the proto-morality of some animal species, or consider the viabilty of unknown aliens). Therefore, I see no reason to think that the consequences of not accepting OM will be any different to those that already exist.
Finally, and in an attempt to answer your last point: The fact that I suggested that you underestimate the power of emotions was in response to your idea that the rightness/wrongness of a situation is not 'just a matter of emotional taste'. I think that our emotional feelings are extremely important when considering the rightness/wrongness of our moral views, whereas, generally, on matters of taste they are not as strongly committed.(as I have already suggested, above).
I have enjoyed reading your replies, DT, but I think that I, at least, am beginning to simply go over old ground. so, unless anything new arises, I intend to leave it there. Thanks for the obvious care and commitment you have put into your responses. These have been very much appreciated.
Splendid post! I agree with all of it! Thank you.
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Thanks Len,
You are too kind. :)
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Which is what you would expect from any social species of animal, much like love, which is also subjective or beauty perhaps? Funny isn't it I have no intuitions about the speed of light in a vacuum.
Is it what we expect? Why would we expect a universal expectation of a right answer, and indeed a right answer in a strong sense if it was just like love? We don't expect that there is a universally applicable answer to the question 'who is the right person to love?' after all.
A confession of confirmation bias is not going serve the argument well.
Lol how long have you been arguing on websites? long enough to have learned that any argument is dependent on its premise I would have hoped by now, yet it seems a surprise to you! You don't seem to understand confirmation bias either, as the conclusion of the argument (God being the best explanation for OM) is not in any obvious way the same as the premise that you are referring to (OM exists) in relation to confirmation bias. If it was there would no doubt be far less atheists who are moral realists.
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Hi Enki,
Sorry I haven't replied sooner. Been quite busy over the weekend.
That's ok I often go long periods of being too busy to reply as this last gap is testament to.
I never entered this discussion either in this thread or the original one to state that OM can't exist, but to show the flaws in Alan's arguments(especially the ones predicated on his TACTDJFF example) that OM must exist. Of course there are differing opinions on this, and atheists being a disparate bunch, some would take an entirely different position to me. I find that no problem at all.
fair enough. I've also tried to give a different interpretation of what I think Alan was saying than was being represented by Ht et al but we've done that to death I think and I have mounted enough of my own defence of OM now to leave Alan's argument to rest, unless he decides to rejoin the discussion. theists are a disparate bunch to and the version of moral realisms relationship with God I have sketched is not the standard one.
I have suggested that the ideas inherent in evolution can account for our sense of morality. If you wish to go further and suggest that these moral ideas have a basis in a morality which is extraneous to human thinking, no problem at all. However, to convince me, some sort of evidence is needed that this is so. I suggest that evidence of the flavour of 'I have a strong, deep seated, intuitive feeling that X is right and Y is wrong' is not the evidence I am looking for. Perhaps I may put it this way. The fact that I live my life as if free will existed is not evidence that it actually does.
Well as per the first point I certainly think that the process of evolution is the medium for the development of our morality but if you go on to say its capable of accounting for the strong and universal sense of truth in human societies re morality then it incumbent on you to explain how. The same is true of the second bit of what you say here. Its correct that just because we think there is moral truth and just because we think there is free will, that that doesn't necessarily mean that there is, nevertheless our basic experience of the world are the starting point for any discussion on morality (or indeed free will) and if you think our deep intuitions are delusions its incumbent on you to say why and also how such illusions could have come to be so widely held. Even when this is done and if you had given a consistent account, that wouldn't give us a reason to prefer that account over a moral realist alternative unless there are compelling reasons to do so. You seem to want to place the burden of proof on the moral realist but that is the complete reverse of the case when you are claiming our core intuitions and experiences are delusions. What you are doing here is assuming a framework for interpreting the world is true (i.e. physicalism) and then speaking about some of the counter-intuitive implications of physicalism as if they are self-evident….but physicalism is itself an unprovable metaphysical perspective and not at all self evident. If physicalism is so compelling as to make us want to embrace conclusions that are hugely counter-intuitive and at odds with our experience of the world, then what evidence is so strong as to make us want to embrace such a view?
We have both agreed that any particular situation is not moral/immoral of itself. Therefore it has to be the human mind acting on such a situation that decides thus. I have suggested that it is quite reasonable to suggest that the morality/immorality of such a situation therefore exists solely in the human mind. Now, I accept that if one has a different world view, for instance that is quite feasible to think that the moral values which exist in our mind come from some sort of outside source(perhaps similar to the Platonic world of forms), then that too could be entirely possible. Unfortunately, for me, I repeat that I would have to have convincing evidence that this source actually exists. And, I don't.
No we haven't agreed that and if you think that you misunderstand. To be clear there are realists who believe moral truth is reducable to natural facts and there are realists who believe in morality existing in a platonic form but I have given a different account to either of those. I have argued that when we perceive morality in a situation its a result of our conception of the world and that this is to do with a particular way beings with particular faculties and the a particular balance of virtues will see the situation - nevertheless the moral truth isn't based just on the fact that they are perceived because of our conception (something in our minds) but because there is a right way to perceive the world. This ‘right way’ is based on teleological facts that are entirely independent of our conception - they are facts based on the flourishing of conscious beings. I introduced the idea of 'conception' in contrast to the naive view of facts and values as entirely distinct in response to Wiggs point about emotions and morality, not as the grounding for moral truth in itself.
My position is that in all sorts of areas (e.g. god, beauty, morality, spirituality) we often think we are right to believe that they have an existence(or not, as the case may be). My contention is that, unless there is actual solid evidence that they exist, then it is just as reasonable to suggest that they are products of the human mind.
The crux here is what does ‘evidence’ mean. Our perception of moral truth, God, etc are of epistemologically relevant forms of evidence for belief formation – it doesn’t mean they are necessarily true, but all of our perceptions form the evidential basis of our beliefs. Indeed if we are giving an account of morality (as we are) then the primary evidence of its correctness is its fit with morality as it exists and is experienced. If your theory can't do that adequately its a poor theory and in order to take the way we view morality is distorted then that's a pretty big claim - to make that claim you are drawing on a prior commitment to something that to you weighs more heavily than the facts about our moral experience and discourse, and it seems thats a commitment to physicalism.
Here I find myself a bit conflicted because I have tried to be fair to moral realim in a wider form than my own particular views and there are moral realists who are also physicalists and do not want to ground moral reality in God etc. nevertheless I do ground it in God and as no one else is arguing for the physicalist realist position here I'm not going to do that for them.
There's no doubt its true that the argument for morality can work the other way if you have a pre-commitment to physicalism and also believe that you can't give a physiicalist compatible account of morality:
1. Physicalism is true
2. You can't give an account of OM consistent with physicalism
3. Therefore morality is not objective.
Which is the trouble with forums like this as it almost always ends up with 2 sides with incompatible base commitments bumping heads. Nevertheless for anyone who did not start with such a prior ideological preclusion, a moral theory would be judged by its fit with our moral experience (and not with any claim to evidence that might resemble scientific evidence which is not appropriate to the subject matter) and if the implications of that contradict physicalism them that's all well and good.
In other words, we tend to think that our views at any given moment on a myriad of situations are the right ones. And, as you say, when we disagree with another view, we tend to think that it is we who have the 'right' answer, whether we do or not. I don't see this as a problem at all. For me, this is the way nature, through evolution, has created us.
Hold on, but it hasn't created this kind of error with our view of taste in music or marmite, why should it with morality? Human societies may have disagreed on the content of moral truth but they have agreed that there is a right answer. If this has been got wrong so fundamentally why on earth would that happen? Simply saying 'evolution did it' doesn't shed any light on this at all.
I do think that there are some similarities between questions of taste and those of morality. As I have already stated, questions of morality seem to have a much deeper emotional base, and therefore the rightness or wrongness of these is held with much greater conviction.(I would suggest, for powerful evolutionary reasons.)
I wouldn't suggest that our sense of moral truth is 'just an error' at all. It seems to be a mechanism which, despite its obvious problems of interpretation, basically welds societies together and allows humans to function within a social setting. In this sense, it seems to be largely a useful survival mechanism, rather than an 'error'. I would suggest that the very fact that whole groups/societies have, thoughout history, tended to construct their own moral laws, especially as regards an individual's behaviour within that group, shows what I would call the moral instinct at work.
But strength of emotion doesn't make it switch over into truth at some point...and if its still an emotional reaction without a right answer and so us implicitly thinking their is a right answer to moral questions IS a mistake however we try to dress it up. It also throws up other problems:
(1) Not all moral commitments are linked to huge emotional responses as we have seen, we can be quite dispassionate about moral decisions at times and indeed think things are morally required despite the emotional desire to do something else. Equally some of our taste preferences are incredibly strong but don't give rise to the same delusion of truth.
(2) If we had evolved emotional commitments to moral positions that are so strong that we couldn't distinguish them from truth claims, then how is it possible for other members of the same species who share our evolutionary history to have evolved a belief in conflicting moral positions? You paint our strength of commitment to morality as a 'general commitment' so powerful that it overpowers our ability to distinguish it from other forms of taste, yet apparently one society can slot into that 'X' and another 'not X' without any apparent need for the content of morality itself to be the point of commitment. This is deeply implausible.
....I don't stop thinking I feel that this is right or this is wrong simply because I also think that when I die, my moral attitudes die with me. I would suggest that similar moral feelings will live on after my death because, for reasons already given, I see the bases of these feelings to be an integral part of human minds.
Some moral realists may well agree -but they would distinguish between dependent on human minds meaning 'dependent on human perception' on one hand and 'dependent on human conception based on our shared capacities and faculties as a species' on the other. Re. the latter, these faculties are themselves facts about the universe independent of our beliefs about them and which provide a factual basis for human flourishing.
I don't, however, see moral instincts or feelings having some sort of objective existence outside of humanity(unless, of course you include the proto-morality of some animal species, or consider the viabilty of unknown aliens). Therefore, I see no reason to think that the consequences of not accepting OM will be any different to those that already exist.
well it makes a pretty big difference for the place of morality in our lives and our commitment to it to believe on one hand that what we are doing is right, and that we forge our lives in accordance with what is right.... and on the other to believe that our sense of right is after all reducible to a moral taste, however strongly held, which is neither right or wrong...a world in which, should my moral tastes have been different I would be equally 'right' to do the things I currently abhor.
I have enjoyed reading your replies, DT, but I think that I, at least, am beginning to simply go over old ground. so, unless anything new arises, I intend to leave it there. Thanks for the obvious care and commitment you have put into your responses. These have been very much appreciated.
Thanks Enki and me too its been a thoughtful exchange and no doubt we will continue to disagree about this and other matters. As your post was so considered I wanted to articulate an equally considered response.... nevertheless it may well be that you feel this provides nothing substantially new to respond to in which case thanks for the interesting discussion.
regards
DT
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The argument is that if you hold certain beliefs about morality then to be consistent you have to hold that morality is OM.
No we have covered this you are conflating objective morality and objective moral values.
Eh? Objective moral values are part of objective morality (if it exists). If you subjectively base your morality on what the Bible says then you can arrive at objective moral values, pick your axioms.
What about objectively basing my morality on what the bible teaches?
Here was Al's argument:-
objective morality is that something is morally right or wrong independent of how many people think it so.
If someone agrees with me that an act, any act, is morally wrong and that this does not depend on how many people believe it to be so, they are logically bound to believe in the existence of objective morality.
I agree some acts are morally wrong and that this does not depend on me thinking it so.
My beliefs are consistent with morality being subjective.
No, they are not. You have said that some acts are morally wrong and in the second part of the sentence say that they fit the definition of objective morality.
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Alien on July 10, 2014, 11:47:56 AM
If someone agrees with me that an act, any act, is morally wrong and that this does not depend on how many people believe it to be so, they are logically bound to believe in the existence of objective morality.
Why? They are simply giving their opinion that it is wrong no matter how many people believe it to be so, so as an opinion it can only be subjective.
They are logically bound to believe in the existence of objective morality because they believe in the existence of something which fits that definition.
This is not hard, Leonard.
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My opinion is that Alan chose that example because it would have almost universal agreement, and that would bolster his claim.
Yes, that is correct.Several people suggested other situations in the original threads, but for some reason, they didn't have the same level of agreement.
And which is irrelevant to my claim. If anyone can come up with just one example of something being objectively morally right or wrong, then that demonstrates the existence of objective morality. It really is that simple.
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Its not a matter of conflation, an objective moral value is a part of what we mean by OM and having an axiom that you hold too doesn't make it objective nor any of the values derived from it. The quotes you print from Alan's argument seem to suggest that he means it to be interpreted in exactly the way I suggested - that if you think any act (i.e. not just TACTDJFF) is morally wrong and you think it is not morally wrong dependent on anyone's opinion then (in order to be consistent) you are bound to believe in OM. If you don't believe they are independent of opinion then you won't.
Agreed.
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My opinion is that Alan chose that example because it would have almost universal agreement, and that would bolster his claim.
Yes, that is correct.Several people suggested other situations in the original threads, but for some reason, they didn't have the same level of agreement.
And which is irrelevant to my claim. If anyone can come up with just one example of something being objectively morally right or wrong, then that demonstrates the existence of objective morality. It really is that simple.
But no one has come up with an example, that is the issue.
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My opinion is that Alan chose that example because it would have almost universal agreement, and that would bolster his claim.
Yes, that is correct.Several people suggested other situations in the original threads, but for some reason, they didn't have the same level of agreement.
And which is irrelevant to my claim. If anyone can come up with just one example of something being objectively morally right or wrong, then that demonstrates the existence of objective morality. It really is that simple.
But no one has come up with an example, that is the issue.
Torturing a child to death just for fun is an example unless you think that in some circumstances it may be OK. Do you? What hellish idea of morality would that come from?
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My opinion is that Alan chose that example because it would have almost universal agreement, and that would bolster his claim.
Yes, that is correct.Several people suggested other situations in the original threads, but for some reason, they didn't have the same level of agreement.
And which is irrelevant to my claim. If anyone can come up with just one example of something being objectively morally right or wrong, then that demonstrates the existence of objective morality. It really is that simple.
But no one has come up with an example, that is the issue.
Torturing a child to death just for fun is an example unless you think that in some circumstances it may be OK. Do you? What hellish idea of morality would that come from?
Yes I think it's fine.
How do we know test which one of us is correct?
I know you are not going to suggest some sort of poll.
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My opinion is that Alan chose that example because it would have almost universal agreement, and that would bolster his claim.
Yes, that is correct.Several people suggested other situations in the original threads, but for some reason, they didn't have the same level of agreement.
And which is irrelevant to my claim. If anyone can come up with just one example of something being objectively morally right or wrong, then that demonstrates the existence of objective morality. It really is that simple.
But no one has come up with an example, that is the issue.
Torturing a child to death just for fun is an example unless you think that in some circumstances it may be OK. Do you? What hellish idea of morality would that come from?
Yes I think it's fine.
How do we know test which one of us is correct?
I know you are not going to suggest some sort of poll.
OK, that's fine. BeRational thinks it is fine to "torture a child to death just for fun."
Did you get that, folks?
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My opinion is that Alan chose that example because it would have almost universal agreement, and that would bolster his claim.
Yes, that is correct.Several people suggested other situations in the original threads, but for some reason, they didn't have the same level of agreement.
And which is irrelevant to my claim. If anyone can come up with just one example of something being objectively morally right or wrong, then that demonstrates the existence of objective morality. It really is that simple.
But no one has come up with an example, that is the issue.
Torturing a child to death just for fun is an example unless you think that in some circumstances it may be OK. Do you? What hellish idea of morality would that come from?
Yes I think it's fine.
How do we know test which one of us is correct?
I know you are not going to suggest some sort of poll.
OK, that's fine. BeRational thinks it is fine to "torture a child to death just for fun."
Did you get that, folks?
yep, he probably hates marmite, now answer his question.
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My opinion is that Alan chose that example because it would have almost universal agreement, and that would bolster his claim.
Yes, that is correct.Several people suggested other situations in the original threads, but for some reason, they didn't have the same level of agreement.
And which is irrelevant to my claim. If anyone can come up with just one example of something being objectively morally right or wrong, then that demonstrates the existence of objective morality. It really is that simple.
But no one has come up with an example, that is the issue.
Torturing a child to death just for fun is an example unless you think that in some circumstances it may be OK. Do you? What hellish idea of morality would that come from?
Yes I think it's fine.
How do we know test which one of us is correct?
I know you are not going to suggest some sort of poll.
OK, that's fine. BeRational thinks it is fine to "torture a child to death just for fun."
Did you get that, folks?
Yes, because like you, we're all "blind" to the hypothetical he is posing.
I think you'll be hard pressed to find someone who believes that you actually believe he's talking literally, so I don't really see the point of your response apart from to jus evade and gloss over the point like no one will notice.
However, perhaps if BR stated that he thought it was fine to drown new and unborn babies because the society they were part of was "evil", you'd have no problem...
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My opinion is that Alan chose that example because it would have almost universal agreement, and that would bolster his claim.
Yes, that is correct.Several people suggested other situations in the original threads, but for some reason, they didn't have the same level of agreement.
And which is irrelevant to my claim. If anyone can come up with just one example of something being objectively morally right or wrong, then that demonstrates the existence of objective morality. It really is that simple.
But no one has come up with an example, that is the issue.
Torturing a child to death just for fun is an example unless you think that in some circumstances it may be OK. Do you? What hellish idea of morality would that come from?
Yes I think it's fine.
How do we know test which one of us is correct?
I know you are not going to suggest some sort of poll.
OK, that's fine. BeRational thinks it is fine to "torture a child to death just for fun."
Did you get that, folks?
yep, he probably hates marmite, now answer his question.
I'd use the same methodology as Nearly Sane (or one of the other methods on offer). I have answered such questions in the past and we are just going over the same old ground. One reason might be that causing such suffering is not justified since the child's right to not suffer is more important than the torturer's desire for fun.
How do you work out that it is wrong or do you, like BeRational, think it is "fine"?
I know he doesn't think it is fine any more than you or I do. So, I've answered the question. Now you tell me why you think it is morally wrong, please.
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I think you'll be hard pressed to find someone who believes that you actually believe he's talking literally, so I don't really see the point of your response apart from to jus evade and gloss over the point like no one will notice.
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So how do you work out whether it is morally wrong? What is your method?
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So all methods are fine and the method that says torturing a child to death for fun is great,according to Alan
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My opinion is that Alan chose that example because it would have almost universal agreement, and that would bolster his claim.
Yes, that is correct.Several people suggested other situations in the original threads, but for some reason, they didn't have the same level of agreement.
And which is irrelevant to my claim. If anyone can come up with just one example of something being objectively morally right or wrong, then that demonstrates the existence of objective morality. It really is that simple.
But no one has come up with an example, that is the issue.
Torturing a child to death just for fun is an example unless you think that in some circumstances it may be OK. Do you? What hellish idea of morality would that come from?
"Torturing a child to death just for fun is an example unless you think that in some circumstances it may be OK"
No, it isn't; 'unless you think' is completely irrelevant.
To demonstrate that TACTDJFF is an example of OM, you need to provide a method the is, as the definition says, independent of opinion.
ht
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Alan has clarified above that he thinks that the reason anyone who accepts an example of OM has, in order to be consistent accept that OM exists. Asking for a method (independent of opinion or otherwise) is entirely tangential to that point - as Alan is not saying your opinion makes it objective he is saying you are implicitly accepting OM in what you already believe and therefore to be consistent need to accept OM. If we assume ReRational is lying and does not think TACTDJFF is ok and also further accepts that no possible opinion to the contra could ever make it ok, no matter what some sick individual might think, then you are stating that you believe in OM. Its a fair question for Alan to ask, and is also, assuming you do think that TACTDJFF is always wrong regardless of opinion, fair to ask you to justify what it is that leads you to think that. Its about examining your intuitions about morality - ones that imply morality is objective. If you disagree its wrong for everyone you are affirming something massively at odds with our moral intuitions. If you agree you are, in order to be consistent, affirming OM.
For most people who would not try and bend over backwards to avoid stating the fact that we assume OM in our morality, it is then legitimate to go on and ask 'how can we account for OM?' or 'how do we know the content of OM?' The second of these questions depends on the answer you give to the first, but its a separate question to the one Alan is quite legitimately asking and which BeRational et al are doing everything possible to avoid answering including, as everyone seems to accept, blatantly saying the opposite of what he thinks is the case.
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Alan has clarified above that he thinks that the reason anyone who accepts an example of OM has, in order to be consistent accept that OM exists.
The only problem with that is that the person doing the accepting has to ignore the fact that their belief is irrelevant to the existence of OM.
At best, they can say that they are of the opinion that OM exists - which of course is self-contradictory.
Asking for a method (independent of opinion or otherwise) is entirely tangential to that point - as Alan is not saying your opinion makes it objective he is saying you are implicitly accepting OM in what you already believe and therefore to be consistent need to accept OM.
Nope. I can accept that I may think something is wrong (anywhere, anytime, anyone), and yet realise that it's my *opinion*.
ht
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Alan has clarified above that he thinks that the reason anyone who accepts an example of OM has, in order to be consistent accept that OM exists.
That would certainly seem to be Alan's opinion - other opinions are available.
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The only problem with that is that the person doing the accepting has to ignore the fact that their belief is irrelevant to the existence of OM.
That's not a problem for the argument. The argument isn't establishing the ontological existence of OM, its establishing that if you are going to be consistent in your beliefs then you should believe in OM
At best, they can say that they are of the opinion that OM exists - which of course is self-contradictory.
In reply 209 you clarified by this that you mean:
"An opinion in itself can never establish somethings objectivity’."
Which of course is not the same thing as saying a belief is self-contradictory, as we have seen its quite easy to see how we can have an opinion about something as the target of an opinion is not affected by the opinion itself. Whatismore Alan can certainly do better than to simply say 'there are opinions that OM exists'...he can rather say that 'if you are to be consistent with other beliefs you already hold, then you should accept that OM exists'.
Nope. I can accept that I may think something is wrong (anywhere, anytime, anyone), and yet realise that it's my *opinion*.
It's the 'anyone' bit that causes the problem. If you think it is wrong for anyone, then you are implicitly accepting that your judgement that it is wrong should apply to them. If by contrast you think that the rightness or wrongness of a situation is related to someone's moral tastes, then it logically follows from that IF they think it is right then it is right (as there is no external standard of rightness to appeal to in order to contradict their views about it).
If you think that something is wrong down to moral taste and also say it is wrong for someone else who doesn't share that taste...well you can definitely have that view, but it would be a mistaken one in just the same way as someone who insisted that I was wrong for disliking marmite was making a logical error. It would be a mistake because you had misapplied the concept of externally applicable standards of truth to matters of taste. You may not like that someone is doing TACTDJFF, but if morality is not something that has an external standard of truth that applies to others despite your opinions, then you can never say 'it is wrong for X to TACTDJFF', the best you can say is 'I disapprove of X TACTDJFF'. Alan didn't ask you whether you disapproved of TACTDJFF, he asked you thought it was wrong and indeed more importantly, whether it was wrong for everyone.
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Alan didn't ask you whether you disapproved of TACTDJFF, he asked if you thought it was wrong and indeed more importantly, whether it was wrong for everyone.
And even if everybody thinks it is wrong, that is still only their personal opinion, and thus NOT evidence for OM.
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The arguement isn't that its wrong because people (someone or everyone) thinks its wrong...it's that if you think its wrong and that your judgement of its wrongness applies to everyone then, in order to be consistent, you should also accept OM
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The arguement isn't that its wrong because people (someone or everyone) thinks its wrong...it's that if you think its wrong and that your judgement of its wrongness applies to everyone then, in order to be consistent, you should also accept OM
Well that is muddled thinking. If you think that your judgement of something being wrong should apply to everybody else, that is simply to assume that YOU are the source of morality, surely. It still doesn't indicate OM.
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No it's an indication that we implicitly assume OM..which leaves. Us with a choice to accept OM or to accept that our moral discourse and practice is a distortion.
No one can prove the ontological status of OM...thats a metaphysical question so it would be foolish to expect to be able to answer that within anything that looked like a scientific proof. What we can do with metaphysical questions is draw out the implications of our core beliefs about the world and see if we can give a consistent account of them.
The arguement for OM certainly isn't irresistible. You could just accept that when someone say bullies a gay kid to the point of suicide...that when you say its wrong you only mean its wrong for you and if a red neck homophobe has different tastes about gay kids dying then its ok for him to do it. I disagree though. I think its wrong for him to do it and by saying it is wrong i mean more than just that I disapprove of it ..I mean that its wrong independent of my opinion or his for good reasons we can identify that are nothing to do with anyone's moral tastes.
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No it's an indication that we implicitly assume OM..which leaves. Us with a choice to accept OM or to accept that our moral discourse and practice is a distortion.
No one can prove the ontological status of OM...thats a metaphysical question so it would be foolish to expect to be able to answer that within anything that looked like a scientific proof. What we can do with metaphysical questions is draw out the implications of our core beliefs about the world and see if we can give a consistent account of them.
The arguement for OM certainly isn't irresistible. You could just accept that when someone say bullies a gay kid to the point of suicide...that when you say its wrong you only mean its wrong for you and if a red neck homophobe has different tastes about gay kids dying then its ok for him to do it. I disagree though. I think its wrong for him to do it and by saying it is wrong i mean more than just that I disapprove of it ..I mean that its wrong independent of my opinion or his for good reasons we can identify that are nothing to do with anyone's moral tastes.
Evolution has meant that only those species who look after their offspring survive. We therefore have a built-in need to care for our young and it has nothing to do with it being an outside agent that has set those feelings in stone.
Most animals care for their young, to a greater or lesser extent, everyone has seen the birds in their garden when a cat is after its chicks. Are you saying that it is more than evolutionary learnt behaviour?
Of course, if you believe in God you must think he has a hand in everything but first you have to show good evidence for God, not the other way around.
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I think the problem lies in that we are talking about something that is non-existent outside the human mind. We have invented morality for obvious reasons, but outside the minds of our own species there is no such thing. Some higher animals have similar instincts which we call a rudimentary morality, but there it ends.
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I think the problem lies in that we are talking about something that is non-existent outside the human mind. We have invented morality for obvious reasons, but outside the minds of our own species there is no such thing. Some higher animals have similar instincts which we call a rudimentary morality, but there it ends.
It seems fairly obvious, Len, but for those who believe in an entity that created everything, it's understandable that they should credit such things to the Almighty. If he could create universes with a sweep of his hand, objective morality must be a doddle!
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It seems fairly obvious, Len, but for those who believe in an entity that created everything, it's understandable that they should credit such things to the Almighty. If he could create universes with a sweep of his hand, objective morality must be a doddle!
Which might make sense as an argument if it wasn't for the fact that so many moral realists are also atheists.
Evolution has meant that only those species who look after their offspring survive. We therefore have a built-in need to care for our young and it has nothing to do with it being an outside agent that has set those feelings in stone.
So why do we perceive our moral judgements as involving judgements with external standards then? Appealing to evolution doesn't answer that question. Some of our strongest emotional attachments like love may equally be put down to the evolutionary process but we don't think there is an objective answer to the question 'who is the right person to love?'...its a matter of our feelings and if someone else doesn't love someone we do we don't consider them as making a mistake. No one doubts that we have evolved t care for our young, but then so has enki lions, it doesn't stop them killing other lions cubs to ensure the dominance of their line. Assumptions of moral truth aren't limited to questions of children either, any moral issue we change our mind over we do so because we think our previous believes were wrong, not just because we have had a change in taste.
Many people of an older generation would have said they have a deep seated disgust at the thought of homosexual acts, and its very easy to see how we could construct an evolutionary argument to justify this in terms of reproduction...but that's not where such a discussion would end. We can construct similar evolutionary arguments to justify rape or male violence if we tried hard enough. None of that would mean we had to accept them as rational arguments for how we live our lives and think about what is morally right.
Most animals care for their young, to a greater or lesser extent, everyone has seen the birds in their garden when a cat is after its chicks. Are you saying that it is more than evolutionary learnt behaviour?
I'm saying that evolution is an entirely neutral fact in relation to this particular point in the realism/ irrealism debate (although it has a big impact on premise 2 if we ever get to it) as whether we see evolution as the process whereby we invent morality or the process through which we discover reality depends on the baggage we bring to it.
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It seems fairly obvious, Len, but for those who believe in an entity that created everything, it's understandable that they should credit such things to the Almighty. If he could create universes with a sweep of his hand, objective morality must be a doddle!
Which might make sense as an argument if it wasn't for the fact that so many moral realists are also atheists.
Evolution has meant that only those species who look after their offspring survive. We therefore have a built-in need to care for our young and it has nothing to do with it being an outside agent that has set those feelings in stone.
So why do we perceive our moral judgements as involving judgements with external standards then? Appealing to evolution doesn't answer that question. Some of our strongest emotional attachments like love may equally be put down to the evolutionary process but we don't think there is an objective answer to the question 'who is the right person to love?'...its a matter of our feelings and if someone else doesn't love someone we do we don't consider them as making a mistake. No one doubts that we have evolved t care for our young, but then so has enki lions, it doesn't stop them killing other lions cubs to ensure the dominance of their line. Assumptions of moral truth aren't limited to questions of children either, any moral issue we change our mind over we do so because we think our previous believes were wrong, not just because we have had a change in taste.
Many people of an older generation would have said they have a deep seated disgust at the thought of homosexual acts, and its very easy to see how we could construct an evolutionary argument to justify this in terms of reproduction...but that's not where such a discussion would end. We can construct similar evolutionary arguments to justify rape or male violence if we tried hard enough. None of that would mean we had to accept them as rational arguments for how we live our lives and think about what is morally right.
Most animals care for their young, to a greater or lesser extent, everyone has seen the birds in their garden when a cat is after its chicks. Are you saying that it is more than evolutionary learnt behaviour?
I'm saying that evolution is an entirely neutral fact in relation to this particular point in the realism/ irrealism debate (although it has a big impact on premise 2 if we ever get to it) as whether we see evolution as the process whereby we invent morality or the process through which we discover reality depends on the baggage we bring to it.
IMV, morality is purely our highly developed sense of preserving our species - do as you would be done by. Yes, lions will protect their offspring's lives with their own life but then kill a different lion's cubs. But that is power - no different from the Nazis killing Jewish children by the million!
To say morality is anything other than our sophisticated brains deciding what is the right or wrong way to act is to say there is an outside agent telling our brains to breathe in and out or that we need water or food - or indeed your example of who to love.
Whether or not some atheists agree with me or not is immaterial to the argument. If I could see bringing in some higher entity to account for my morality would complicate the process even further because I would then need to know where it's morality came from.
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How is saying 'morality is a way of preserving our species' able to account for a complex moral decision like whether we should eat meat or not? Whether we should tolerate or condemn homosexuality? Whether or not we should allow the state to sentence people to death? Your statement sheds no light on why these issues should matter or how we go about making the decisions. I doubt we could imagine any plausible morality that would sanction actions which led to the destruction of our species but that doesn't mean we can make some crass reductionist account in any way adequate to explain our moral thought.
Your second paragraph is just as crass a caricature of realist morality too. Realists do not think that someone is telling their minds what is right or wrong - and that's even true of realists like me who are theists. Realists think there are moral facts which we can perceive, but its still us doing the perceiving and deciding.
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How is saying 'morality is a way of preserving our species' able to account for a complex moral decision like whether we should eat meat or not? Whether we should tolerate or condemn homosexuality? Whether or not we should allow the state to sentence people to death? Your statement sheds no light on why these issues should matter or how we go about making the decisions. I doubt we could imagine any plausible morality that would sanction actions which led to the destruction of our species but that doesn't mean we can make some crass reductionist account in any way adequate to explain our moral thought.
Your second paragraph is just as crass a caricature of realist morality too. Realists do not think that someone is telling their minds what is right or wrong - and that's even true of realists like me who are theists. Realists think there are moral facts which we can perceive, but its still us doing the perceiving and deciding.
So you think there is an objective moral answer to whether we eat meat or not and whether homosexuality is right or wrong!
Are you sure you're not confusing your moral values with objective moral values!
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How is saying 'morality is a way of preserving our species' able to account for a complex moral decision like whether we should eat meat or not? Whether we should tolerate or condemn homosexuality? Whether or not we should allow the state to sentence people to death? Your statement sheds no light on why these issues should matter or how we go about making the decisions. I doubt we could imagine any plausible morality that would sanction actions which led to the destruction of our species but that doesn't mean we can make some crass reductionist account in any way adequate to explain our moral thought.
Your second paragraph is just as crass a caricature of realist morality too. Realists do not think that someone is telling their minds what is right or wrong - and that's even true of realists like me who are theists. Realists think there are moral facts which we can perceive, but its still us doing the perceiving and deciding.
So you think there is an objective moral answer to whether we eat meat or not and whether homosexuality is right or wrong!
Are you sure you're not confusing your moral values with objective moral values!
I've not said what I think the answer to these questions is. But yes I think there is a right answer to them.
Now back to the question you avoided....how can your account of morality shed any light on how we answer these questions?
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How is saying 'morality is a way of preserving our species' able to account for a complex moral decision like whether we should eat meat or not? Whether we should tolerate or condemn homosexuality? Whether or not we should allow the state to sentence people to death? Your statement sheds no light on why these issues should matter or how we go about making the decisions. I doubt we could imagine any plausible morality that would sanction actions which led to the destruction of our species but that doesn't mean we can make some crass reductionist account in any way adequate to explain our moral thought.
Your second paragraph is just as crass a caricature of realist morality too. Realists do not think that someone is telling their minds what is right or wrong - and that's even true of realists like me who are theists. Realists think there are moral facts which we can perceive, but its still us doing the perceiving and deciding.
So you think there is an objective moral answer to whether we eat meat or not and whether homosexuality is right or wrong!
Are you sure you're not confusing your moral values with objective moral values!
I've not said what I think the answer to these questions is. But yes I think there is a right answer to them.
Now back to the question you avoided....how can your account of morality shed any light on how we answer these questions?
No, I think the question that needs answering is - if it isn't down to our evolutionary learnt behaviour what or who decides what's moral and what isn't! I imagine it would be God in your case, but you say there are atheists who take your view, what or who do you think they put it down to?
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How is saying 'morality is a way of preserving our species' able to account for a complex moral decision like whether we should eat meat or not? Whether we should tolerate or condemn homosexuality? Whether or not we should allow the state to sentence people to death? Your statement sheds no light on why these issues should matter or how we go about making the decisions. I doubt we could imagine any plausible morality that would sanction actions which led to the destruction of our species but that doesn't mean we can make some crass reductionist account in any way adequate to explain our moral thought.
Your second paragraph is just as crass a caricature of realist morality too. Realists do not think that someone is telling their minds what is right or wrong - and that's even true of realists like me who are theists. Realists think there are moral facts which we can perceive, but its still us doing the perceiving and deciding.
So you think there is an objective moral answer to whether we eat meat or not and whether homosexuality is right or wrong!
Are you sure you're not confusing your moral values with objective moral values!
I've not said what I think the answer to these questions is. But yes I think there is a right answer to them.
Now back to the question you avoided....how can your account of morality shed any light on how we answer these questions?
No, I think the question that needs answering is - if it isn't down to our evolutionary learnt behaviour what or who decides what's moral and what isn't! I imagine it would be God in your case, but you say there are atheists who take your view, what or who do you think they put it down to?
Nice evasion, refuse to answer then ask something else and hope that no one has noticed!
I have given account of how i think moral truth is grounded in reply 196 on this thread.
I'm not going to spend my time articulating a full detail of an atheistic account of moral realism as I'm a theist and part of my arguement is that God is the best explanation of moral truth, nevertheless I did give a couple of nods to examples in reply 18 of this thread....if you want more go read a book by an atheist moral realist. There are many. On the last survey that was done on this that I know of the majority of professional philosophers are moral realists even though only a minority are theists.
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How is saying 'morality is a way of preserving our species' able to account for a complex moral decision like whether we should eat meat or not? Whether we should tolerate or condemn homosexuality? Whether or not we should allow the state to sentence people to death? Your statement sheds no light on why these issues should matter or how we go about making the decisions. I doubt we could imagine any plausible morality that would sanction actions which led to the destruction of our species but that doesn't mean we can make some crass reductionist account in any way adequate to explain our moral thought.
Your second paragraph is just as crass a caricature of realist morality too. Realists do not think that someone is telling their minds what is right or wrong - and that's even true of realists like me who are theists. Realists think there are moral facts which we can perceive, but its still us doing the perceiving and deciding.
So you think there is an objective moral answer to whether we eat meat or not and whether homosexuality is right or wrong!
Are you sure you're not confusing your moral values with objective moral values!
I've not said what I think the answer to these questions is. But yes I think there is a right answer to them.
Now back to the question you avoided....how can your account of morality shed any light on how we answer these questions?
No, I think the question that needs answering is - if it isn't down to our evolutionary learnt behaviour what or who decides what's moral and what isn't! I imagine it would be God in your case, but you say there are atheists who take your view, what or who do you think they put it down to?
Nice evasion, refuse to answer then ask something else and hope that no one has noticed!
I have given account of how i think moral truth is grounded in reply 196 on this thread.
I'm not going to spend my time articulating a full detail of an atheistic account of moral realism as I'm a theist and part of my arguement is that God is the best explanation of moral truth, nevertheless I did give a couple of nods to examples in reply 18 of this thread....if you want more go read a book by an atheist moral realist. There are many. On the last survey that was done on this that I know of the majority of professional philosophers are moral realists even though only a minority are theists.
Having read through your 196 again, I agree that you have described morality very well but not the Objective Morality that Alan imagines it to be - and that is what this whole thread is about! He says that Objective Morality is a fact, whether or not anyone agrees with it, but you seem to think it's what is universally agreed to be moral.
If indeed you mean the sort of behaviour that we agree all civilised people should follow, then I am with you. If however you think some outside agent has laid down certain ways of behaviour which it/he/she wants us to follow then I think you're wrong.
It means that there could be objectively moral behaviour that none of us agree with but how would we know what it is? If we don't know what it is we would have to decide what we think it is - and that is subjective not objective!
I not only think it's wrong, I think it's dangerous! Islamic terrorists imagine God looks down on them kindly if they take the lives of unbelievers - and not just unbelievers in God or even unbelievers in Mohammad but unbelievers in their distorted view of Islam! This is what is possible when you think morality is something other than what you instinctively feel to be right.
I think we'll have to agree to disagree on this so I wll now bow out of this debate.
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Having read through your 196 again, I agree that you have described morality very well but not the Objective Morality that Alan imagines it to be - and that is what this whole thread is about! He says that Objective Morality is a fact, whether or not anyone agrees with it, but you seem to think it's what is universally agreed to be moral.
No thats entirely incorrect I think its a fact regardless of whether anyone agrees it or not and it is not dependent on anyone's or even everyone's agreement. There is nothing in my reply 196 that should make you believe otherwise if properly understood and I'd be interested to know what it is that I've said that would make you possibly think that I am advocating morality = universal agreement.
If indeed you mean the sort of behaviour that we agree all civilised people should follow, then I am with you. If however you think some outside agent has laid down certain ways of behaviour which it/he/she wants us to follow then I think you're wrong.
Very few modern theists support a classic divine command theory of how morality is related to God. Neither I or Alan have advocated this view as far as I can see.
It means that there could be objectively moral behaviour that none of us agree with but how would we know what it is? If we don't know what it is we would have to decide what we think it is - and that is subjective not objective!
How we discover OM depends on the account we give of it, but again I have addressed this in post 196 so you don't seem to have read it very carefully.
I not only think it's wrong, I think it's dangerous! Islamic terrorists imagine God looks down on them kindly if they take the lives of unbelievers - and not just unbelievers in God or even unbelievers in Mohammad but unbelievers in their distorted view of Islam! This is what is possible when you think morality is something other than what you instinctively feel to be right.
Its interesting that a couple of times in the history of anit-realist ethics, its advocates have made the mistake of thinking that anti-realism somehow gives a preference to those who are tolerant of other peoples opinions and necessarily respect the views of others - most however have quickly recognised that this is not a claim they can make and is of course totally illogical - if there is no objective standard of morality then there is no reason to suppose that toleration or respect of peoples rights is a good thing - its only good for you if you think its good if someone else doesn't then there's nothing you can say that makes them wrong - they just disagree with you about tolerance and respecting rights. The realist by contrast can say that, if toleration of peoples opinions and rights is morally correct then it is the correct thing to do irrespective of peoples opinions about them and that the Islamic terrorists are simply making a mistake if they think otherwise. The fact that someone can have a mistaken view about morality that leads them to do evil things is no more the fault of realism than the fact that people can have evil instincts under an irrealist view. The difference is that the moral realist has the resources to say 'you are wrong to do that' while the irrealist can only, at best, consistently say 'i disaprove of you doing that'.
I think we'll have to agree to disagree on this so I wll now bow out of this debate.
Ok well that's up to you but I don't think its not been so much of a disagreement as you totally misrepresenting what I and other moral realists think, but as you wish.
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So all methods are fine and the method that says torturing a child to death for fun is great,according to Alan
Nope. Misquote. Deliberate?
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Alan has clarified above that he thinks that the reason anyone who accepts an example of OM has, in order to be consistent accept that OM exists. Asking for a method (independent of opinion or otherwise) is entirely tangential to that point - as Alan is not saying your opinion makes it objective he is saying you are implicitly accepting OM in what you already believe and therefore to be consistent need to accept OM. If we assume ReRational is lying and does not think TACTDJFF is ok and also further accepts that no possible opinion to the contra could ever make it ok, no matter what some sick individual might think, then you are stating that you believe in OM. Its a fair question for Alan to ask, and is also, assuming you do think that TACTDJFF is always wrong regardless of opinion, fair to ask you to justify what it is that leads you to think that. Its about examining your intuitions about morality - ones that imply morality is objective. If you disagree its wrong for everyone you are affirming something massively at odds with our moral intuitions. If you agree you are, in order to be consistent, affirming OM.
For most people who would not try and bend over backwards to avoid stating the fact that we assume OM in our morality, it is then legitimate to go on and ask 'how can we account for OM?' or 'how do we know the content of OM?' The second of these questions depends on the answer you give to the first, but its a separate question to the one Alan is quite legitimately asking and which BeRational et al are doing everything possible to avoid answering including, as everyone seems to accept, blatantly saying the opposite of what he thinks is the case.
I'd like to apologize to everyone for not putting my posts as clearly as Dryghtons Toe has. His summary is spot on.
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At best, they can say that they are of the opinion that OM exists - which of course is self-contradictory.
Best you read that again, ht. Did you really mean to say that?
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Alan has clarified above that he thinks that the reason anyone who accepts an example of OM has, in order to be consistent accept that OM exists.
That would certainly seem to be Alan's opinion - other opinions are available.
Why do you think they would be correct though?
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At best, they can say that they are of the opinion that OM exists - which of course is self-contradictory.
Best you read that again, ht. Did you really mean to say that?
Yes.
Opinion.
OM.
Contradictory.
Within same comment.
Ergo self-contradictory.
ht
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Alan has clarified above that he thinks that the reason anyone who accepts an example of OM has, in order to be consistent accept that OM exists. Asking for a method (independent of opinion or otherwise) is entirely tangential to that point - as Alan is not saying your opinion makes it objective he is saying you are implicitly accepting OM in what you already believe and therefore to be consistent need to accept OM. If we assume ReRational is lying and does not think TACTDJFF is ok and also further accepts that no possible opinion to the contra could ever make it ok, no matter what some sick individual might think, then you are stating that you believe in OM. Its a fair question for Alan to ask, and is also, assuming you do think that TACTDJFF is always wrong regardless of opinion, fair to ask you to justify what it is that leads you to think that. Its about examining your intuitions about morality - ones that imply morality is objective. If you disagree its wrong for everyone you are affirming something massively at odds with our moral intuitions. If you agree you are, in order to be consistent, affirming OM.
For most people who would not try and bend over backwards to avoid stating the fact that we assume OM in our morality, it is then legitimate to go on and ask 'how can we account for OM?' or 'how do we know the content of OM?' The second of these questions depends on the answer you give to the first, but its a separate question to the one Alan is quite legitimately asking and which BeRational et al are doing everything possible to avoid answering including, as everyone seems to accept, blatantly saying the opposite of what he thinks is the case.
I'd like to apologize to everyone for not putting my posts as clearly as Dryghtons Toe has. His summary is spot on.
What if you don't believe X is always wrong?
What if you don't believe that our motivations live in a vacuum?
What if you don't believe you are infallible?
What if you believe that different circumstances negate the idea that X is done just for your motivation?
Can I then conclude that I don't have to accept that OM exists?
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At best, they can say that they are of the opinion that OM exists - which of course is self-contradictory.
Best you read that again, ht. Did you really mean to say that?
Yes.
Opinion.
OM.
Contradictory.
Within same comment.
Ergo self-contradictory.
ht
Try putting it logically. Not trying to be funny, but you have just asserted this. What is your actual reasoning?
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Alan has clarified above that he thinks that the reason anyone who accepts an example of OM has, in order to be consistent accept that OM exists. Asking for a method (independent of opinion or otherwise) is entirely tangential to that point - as Alan is not saying your opinion makes it objective he is saying you are implicitly accepting OM in what you already believe and therefore to be consistent need to accept OM. If we assume ReRational is lying and does not think TACTDJFF is ok and also further accepts that no possible opinion to the contra could ever make it ok, no matter what some sick individual might think, then you are stating that you believe in OM. Its a fair question for Alan to ask, and is also, assuming you do think that TACTDJFF is always wrong regardless of opinion, fair to ask you to justify what it is that leads you to think that. Its about examining your intuitions about morality - ones that imply morality is objective. If you disagree its wrong for everyone you are affirming something massively at odds with our moral intuitions. If you agree you are, in order to be consistent, affirming OM.
For most people who would not try and bend over backwards to avoid stating the fact that we assume OM in our morality, it is then legitimate to go on and ask 'how can we account for OM?' or 'how do we know the content of OM?' The second of these questions depends on the answer you give to the first, but its a separate question to the one Alan is quite legitimately asking and which BeRational et al are doing everything possible to avoid answering including, as everyone seems to accept, blatantly saying the opposite of what he thinks is the case.
I'd like to apologize to everyone for not putting my posts as clearly as Dryghtons Toe has. His summary is spot on.
What if you don't believe X is always wrong?
As in TACDJFF? You don't believe TACTDJFF is always wrong? You don't necessarily have to believe in the existence of objective morality. Do be aware of the price you are paying if that is the case. Do you really not believe it is always wrong?What if you don't believe that our motivations live in a vacuum?
I don't "believe that our motivations live in a vacuum". So what?What if you don't believe you are infallible?
I don't believe I am infallible. So what?What if you believe that different circumstances negate the idea that X is done just for your motivation?
Then it would surely fall outside it being done "just for fun" - assuming I have understood you correctly here.
Can I then conclude that I don't have to accept that OM exists?
If you answer my questions above, I'll try to answer the above. Are they meant to be linked with an "and" in each case or an "or"?
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So all methods are fine and the method that says torturing a child to death for fun is great,according to Alan
Nope. Misquote. Deliberate?
Reductio, deliberate, and meant to challenge the meaning of your post by the reductio. Did you miss that or did you just want to write 'misquote'?
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Alan has clarified above that he thinks that the reason anyone who accepts an example of OM has, in order to be consistent accept that OM exists. Asking for a method (independent of opinion or otherwise) is entirely tangential to that point - as Alan is not saying your opinion makes it objective he is saying you are implicitly accepting OM in what you already believe and therefore to be consistent need to accept OM. If we assume ReRational is lying and does not think TACTDJFF is ok and also further accepts that no possible opinion to the contra could ever make it ok, no matter what some sick individual might think, then you are stating that you believe in OM. Its a fair question for Alan to ask, and is also, assuming you do think that TACTDJFF is always wrong regardless of opinion, fair to ask you to justify what it is that leads you to think that. Its about examining your intuitions about morality - ones that imply morality is objective. If you disagree its wrong for everyone you are affirming something massively at odds with our moral intuitions. If you agree you are, in order to be consistent, affirming OM.
For most people who would not try and bend over backwards to avoid stating the fact that we assume OM in our morality, it is then legitimate to go on and ask 'how can we account for OM?' or 'how do we know the content of OM?' The second of these questions depends on the answer you give to the first, but its a separate question to the one Alan is quite legitimately asking and which BeRational et al are doing everything possible to avoid answering including, as everyone seems to accept, blatantly saying the opposite of what he thinks is the case.
I'd like to apologize to everyone for not putting my posts as clearly as Dryghtons Toe has. His summary is spot on.
What if you don't believe X is always wrong?
As in TACDJFF? You don't believe TACTDJFF is always wrong? You don't necessarily have to believe in the existence of objective morality. Do be aware of the price you are paying if that is the case. Do you really not believe it is always wrong?
As in anything where you whittle down the reason for doing it as solely for your own motivation. I'm not making exceptions here in order to appeal to emotion.
What if you don't believe that our motivations live in a vacuum?
I don't "believe that our motivations live in a vacuum". So what?
Then you don't believe that TACTDJFF as a legitimate example for OM, as the motivation has been influenced by other factors, potentially out of the control of the subject.
What if you don't believe you are infallible?
I don't believe I am infallible. So what?
So you don't think it is always wrong as you are open to the possibility that there are circumstances where TACTDJFF could be right, even though you currently can't think of any where it would be?
What if you believe that different circumstances negate the idea that X is done just for your motivation?
Then it would surely fall outside it being done "just for fun" - assuming I have understood you correctly here.
Correct. I don't believe you could invent a scenario where the motivation is the only factor. That's backed up by you asking if it's always wrong - you're asking under all circumstances. You need to be more specific and drop the "just".
Can I then conclude that I don't have to accept that OM exists?
If you answer my questions above, I'll try to answer the above. Are they meant to be linked with an "and" in each case or an "or"?
Well, it was a rhetorical question. And both.
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So all methods are fine and the method that says torturing a child to death for fun is great,according to Alan
Nope. Misquote. Deliberate?
Reductio, deliberate, and meant to challenge the meaning of your post by the reductio. Did you miss that or did you just want to write 'misquote'?
I'll settle for pointing out that it was a misquote.
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So all methods are fine and the method that says torturing a child to death for fun is great,according to Alan
Nope. Misquote. Deliberate?
Reductio, deliberate, and meant to challenge the meaning of your post by the reductio. Did you miss that or did you just want to write 'misquote'?
I'll settle for pointing out that it was a misquote.
it isn't a quote, so you would be factually wrong as well as being disingenous.
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What if you don't believe X is always wrong?
As in TACDJFF? You don't believe TACTDJFF is always wrong? You don't necessarily have to believe in the existence of objective morality. Do be aware of the price you are paying if that is the case. Do you really not believe it is always wrong?
As in anything where you whittle down the reason for doing it as solely for your own motivation. I'm not making exceptions here in order to appeal to emotion.
I don't understand your point. "Torturing a child to death just for fun" states the motivation. Would it ever be right?
What if you don't believe that our motivations live in a vacuum?
I don't "believe that our motivations live in a vacuum". So what?
Then you don't believe that TACTDJFF as a legitimate example for OM, as the motivation has been influenced by other factors, potentially out of the control of the subject.
Oh, I agree that our motivations can be influenced by other factors, but would it ever be right to torture a child to death just for fun (no matter how that person got to that point)?
What if you don't believe you are infallible?
I don't believe I am infallible. So what?
So you don't think it is always wrong as you are open to the possibility that there are circumstances where TACTDJFF could be right, even though you currently can't think of any where it would be?
That is not correct. I do think it is always wrong. I might be incorrect to believe that, but I very much doubt it. Until someone can show me a reason why torturing a child to death just for fun might be morally OK, I'll stick to think it is always morally wrong. Now please chip in with your own answer. Do you think it could ever be other than morally wrong to torture a child to death (just) for fun??
What if you believe that different circumstances negate the idea that X is done just for your motivation?
Then it would surely fall outside it being done "just for fun" - assuming I have understood you correctly here.
Correct. I don't believe you could invent a scenario where the motivation is the only factor. That's backed up by you asking if it's always wrong - you're asking under all circumstances. You need to be more specific and drop the "just".
Happy to drop the "just". Do you think it could ever be other than morally wrong to torture a child to death for fun?
Can I then conclude that I don't have to accept that OM exists?
If you answer my questions above, I'll try to answer the above. Are they meant to be linked with an "and" in each case or an "or"?
Well, it was a rhetorical question. And both.
OK.
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So all methods are fine and the method that says torturing a child to death for fun is great,according to Alan
Nope. Misquote. Deliberate?
Reductio, deliberate, and meant to challenge the meaning of your post by the reductio. Did you miss that or did you just want to write 'misquote'?
I'll settle for pointing out that it was a misquote.
it isn't a quote, so you would be factually wrong as well as being disingenous.
It isn't a quote. I have not said that all methods are fine. I have said that I would be happy to go with the methods of people like ht, jakswan et al in working out whether TACTDJFF is morally right or wrong. They (and you) are decent people who would never argue otherwise except in internet discussions where the price of accepting it as so means you would logically need to agree to the existence of objective morality.
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So all methods are fine and the method that says torturing a child to death for fun is great,according to Alan
Nope. Misquote. Deliberate?
Reductio, deliberate, and meant to challenge the meaning of your post by the reductio. Did you miss that or did you just want to write 'misquote'?
I'll settle for pointing out that it was a misquote.
it isn't a quote, so you would be factually wrong as well as being disingenous.
It isn't a quote. I have not said that all methods are fine. I have said that I would be happy to go with the methods of people like ht, jakswan et al in working out whether TACTDJFF is morally right or wrong. They (and you) are decent people who would never argue otherwise except in internet discussions where the price of accepting it as so means you would logically need to agree to the existence of objective morality.
So if it isn't a quote, then it isn't a misquote.
As to the rest of your confused and confusing reply here, what to make of it.
The first issue is that you assume that everyone has a method and it is simply explicable. There are those who go for these, obviously the classic is Bentham' s Felicific Calculus and that has its influences down through to Sam Harris today. Now while I find them simplistic and unrealistic, they are all based on an initial acceptance of dome axiom or other, which acceptance is done on a purely subjective basis, e.g
You could just as easily accept Crowley' s 'Do as thou wilt'. So on that level it might be argued that a moral action is objectively wrong based on the subjective acceptance of the axiom, but that would overall still yield a subjective position. (It's quite odd how similar I find your position on morality to bluehillside's)
I try not to answer for people who are atheists simply because of that one non belief, so I am not really bothered about what they might be saying to you, and not should you be when talking about what I think. Christianity is not a pile of mince to me because you and Sassy disagree about admin, but rather I have yet to see a position on it that makes any logical sense.
In that sense, other than your wholly witless attempt at mind reading, can I suggest that if you want to engage in what I actually think, rather than the implied idea that I am lying just to avoid loosing an argument, that you do that on the basis of something I have written? After all I always extend that courtesy to you, when I accuse you of lying.
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At best, they can say that they are of the opinion that OM exists - which of course is self-contradictory.
Best you read that again, ht. Did you really mean to say that?
Yes.
Opinion.
OM.
Contradictory.
Within same comment.
Ergo self-contradictory.
ht
Try putting it logically. Not trying to be funny, but you have just asserted this. What is your actual reasoning?
I haven't 'just asserted' this at all.
The definition of 'objective' is 'independent of opinion'.
Having an opinion is necessarily subjective.
Having an opinion that OM exists is a subjective position about an (allegedly) objective thing.
Subjective position and objective thing contradict one another.
The contradictory points are in the same statement, hence it is self-contradictory.
Subjectivity wins, as it cancels any 'objective' contained within the opinion.
ht
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So all methods are fine and the method that says torturing a child to death for fun is great,according to Alan
Nope. Misquote. Deliberate?
Reductio, deliberate, and meant to challenge the meaning of your post by the reductio. Did you miss that or did you just want to write 'misquote'?
I'll settle for pointing out that it was a misquote.
it isn't a quote, so you would be factually wrong as well as being disingenous.
It isn't a quote. I have not said that all methods are fine. I have said that I would be happy to go with the methods of people like ht, jakswan et al in working out whether TACTDJFF is morally right or wrong. They (and you) are decent people who would never argue otherwise except in internet discussions where the price of accepting it as so means you would logically need to agree to the existence of objective morality.
So if it isn't a quote, then it isn't a misquote.
As to the rest of your confused and confusing reply here, what to make of it.
The first issue is that you assume that everyone has a method and it is simply explicable. There are those who go for these, obviously the classic is Bentham' s Felicific Calculus and that has its influences down through to Sam Harris today. Now while I find them simplistic and unrealistic, they are all based on an initial acceptance of dome axiom or other, which acceptance is done on a purely subjective basis, e.g
You could just as easily accept Crowley' s 'Do as thou wilt'. So on that level it might be argued that a moral action is objectively wrong based on the subjective acceptance of the axiom, but that would overall still yield a subjective position. (It's quite odd how similar I find your position on morality to bluehillside's)
I try not to answer for people who are atheists simply because of that one non belief, so I am not really bothered about what they might be saying to you, and not should you be when talking about what I think. Christianity is not a pile of mince to me because you and Sassy disagree about admin, but rather I have yet to see a position on it that makes any logical sense.
In that sense, other than your wholly witless attempt at mind reading, can I suggest that if you want to engage in what I actually think, rather than the implied idea that I am lying just to avoid loosing an argument, that you do that on the basis of something I have written? After all I always extend that courtesy to you, when I accuse you of lying.
Do calm down. I am not implying you are lying, even though you have said on a number of occasions that I am lying. Do you know what "lying" means? A lie is an intentionally false statement.
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At best, they can say that they are of the opinion that OM exists - which of course is self-contradictory.
Best you read that again, ht. Did you really mean to say that?
Yes.
Opinion.
OM.
Contradictory.
Within same comment.
Ergo self-contradictory.
ht
Try putting it logically. Not trying to be funny, but you have just asserted this. What is your actual reasoning?
I haven't 'just asserted' this at all.
The definition of 'objective' is 'independent of opinion'.
Having an opinion is necessarily subjective.
Having an opinion that OM exists is a subjective position about an (allegedly) objective thing.
OK so far.
Subjective position and objective thing contradict one another.
Nope. Incorrect. I could have a subjective opinion about the speed of light in a vacuum. That does not thereby make the speed of light in a vacuum a subjective thing.
The contradictory points are in the same statement, hence it is self-contradictory.
Subjectivity wins, as it cancels any 'objective' contained within the opinion.
ht
Are you serious?
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...
At best, they can say that they are of the opinion that OM exists - which of course is self-contradictory.
Best you read that again, ht. Did you really mean to say that?
Yes.
Opinion.
OM.
Contradictory.
Within same comment.
Ergo self-contradictory.
ht
Try putting it logically. Not trying to be funny, but you have just asserted this. What is your actual reasoning?
I haven't 'just asserted' this at all.
The definition of 'objective' is 'independent of opinion'.
Having an opinion is necessarily subjective.
Having an opinion that OM exists is a subjective position about an (allegedly) objective thing.
Subjective position and objective thing contradict one another.
The contradictory points are in the same statement, hence it is self-contradictory.
Subjectivity wins, as it cancels any 'objective' contained within the opinion.
ht
Sorry Ht Alans right.
That's fine down to the statement
"subjective position and objective thing contradict one another"
This is of course not true as already argued. I can have the subjective belief that alternate universes exist. If they exist they exist objectively and my opinion will be correct. The fact that I have an objective opinion about them won't have any affect on whether they exist or not and neither does my opinion of OM on the existence of OM.
And as Alan isn't saying he thinks OM's existence DEPENDS on our opinion about for its existence, then your argument just doesn't work. Sorry.
In fact you can state Alan's whole argument slightly differently without even mentioning OM or moral realism as follows:
Situation S = Tom is TACTDJFF and has the instinct/opinions/emotion that its ok to TACTDJFF.
Proposition P1 = HT thinks what is morally right is determined by our instincts, opinions and emotions.
Proposition P2 = HT thinks Tom's act of TACTDFF is morally wrong and would be wrong for anyone.
S, P1 and P2 form an inconsistent triad. Therefore in situation S you have to either reject P1 (emotivist anti-realism) or reject P2. Unfortunately P2 reflects some deep seated aspects of our moral practice and discarding them would not leave our morality intact.
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Alan has clarified above that he thinks that the reason anyone who accepts an example of OM has, in order to be consistent accept that OM exists. Asking for a method (independent of opinion or otherwise) is entirely tangential to that point - as Alan is not saying your opinion makes it objective he is saying you are implicitly accepting OM in what you already believe and therefore to be consistent need to accept OM. If we assume ReRational is lying and does not think TACTDJFF is ok and also further accepts that no possible opinion to the contra could ever make it ok, no matter what some sick individual might think, then you are stating that you believe in OM. Its a fair question for Alan to ask, and is also, assuming you do think that TACTDJFF is always wrong regardless of opinion, fair to ask you to justify what it is that leads you to think that. Its about examining your intuitions about morality - ones that imply morality is objective. If you disagree its wrong for everyone you are affirming something massively at odds with our moral intuitions. If you agree you are, in order to be consistent, affirming OM.
For most people who would not try and bend over backwards to avoid stating the fact that we assume OM in our morality, it is then legitimate to go on and ask 'how can we account for OM?' or 'how do we know the content of OM?' The second of these questions depends on the answer you give to the first, but its a separate question to the one Alan is quite legitimately asking and which BeRational et al are doing everything possible to avoid answering including, as everyone seems to accept, blatantly saying the opposite of what he thinks is the case.
I'd like to apologize to everyone for not putting my posts as clearly as Dryghtons Toe has. His summary is spot on.
What if you don't believe X is always wrong?
What if you don't believe that our motivations live in a vacuum?
What if you don't believe you are infallible?
What if you believe that different circumstances negate the idea that X is done just for your motivation?
Can I then conclude that I don't have to accept that OM exists?
Andy you are assuming that moral realism means that we cannot account for different factors in a situation having an impact on what the correct thing to do is but this is not the case. Most moral realists accept that often a huge range of morally relevant factors need to be weighed up when deciding what the right thing to do is, so it might be the right thing to do to do X in one situation and the wrong thing to do in another. The difference between the moral realist and anti-realist is simply this - when all of the relevant factors have been weighed up, the moral realist thinks there is a right answer.
Not sure what you are getting at with the infallible bit though. Obviously the fact that you believe there are right answers to questions doesn't entail that people always get them right...why would we think that? We all make mistakes about other types of factual questions too don't we? I don't think the moon landings were faked, some people do...one of us is making a mistake....it doesn't prevent it being a fact that we either landed on the moon or we didn't.
Regards
DT
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So all methods are fine and the method that says torturing a child to death for fun is great,according to Alan
Nope. Misquote. Deliberate?
Reductio, deliberate, and meant to challenge the meaning of your post by the reductio. Did you miss that or did you just want to write 'misquote'?
I'll settle for pointing out that it was a misquote.
it isn't a quote, so you would be factually wrong as well as being disingenous.
It isn't a quote. I have not said that all methods are fine. I have said that I would be happy to go with the methods of people like ht, jakswan et al in working out whether TACTDJFF is morally right or wrong. They (and you) are decent people who would never argue otherwise except in internet discussions where the price of accepting it as so means you would logically need to agree to the existence of objective morality.
So if it isn't a quote, then it isn't a misquote.
As to the rest of your confused and confusing reply here, what to make of it.
The first issue is that you assume that everyone has a method and it is simply explicable. There are those who go for these, obviously the classic is Bentham' s Felicific Calculus and that has its influences down through to Sam Harris today. Now while I find them simplistic and unrealistic, they are all based on an initial acceptance of dome axiom or other, which acceptance is done on a purely subjective basis, e.g
You could just as easily accept Crowley' s 'Do as thou wilt'. So on that level it might be argued that a moral action is objectively wrong based on the subjective acceptance of the axiom, but that would overall still yield a subjective position. (It's quite odd how similar I find your position on morality to bluehillside's)
I try not to answer for people who are atheists simply because of that one non belief, so I am not really bothered about what they might be saying to you, and not should you be when talking about what I think. Christianity is not a pile of mince to me because you and Sassy disagree about admin, but rather I have yet to see a position on it that makes any logical sense.
In that sense, other than your wholly witless attempt at mind reading, can I suggest that if you want to engage in what I actually think, rather than the implied idea that I am lying just to avoid loosing an argument, that you do that on the basis of something I have written? After all I always extend that courtesy to you, when I accuse you of lying.
Hi NearlySane,
NearlySane
Sam Harris is not an example of modern moral realism, its not even a viable contribution to the debate. He's only gotten attention because of his atheist celebrity credentials but there is nothing valuable in it in terms of philosophy. Atheist/humanist philosopher Simon Blackburn summed it up very well I think, when he said "Harris..... joins the prodigious ranks of those whose claim to have transcended philosophy is just an instance of their doing it very badly."
It does seem odd though that a theist should not believe in a transcendent moral good - its unheard of as far as I know amongst theist philosophers. Certainly a classic view of God is that part of the definition of God is goodness - that God's character (as opposed to his commands) is the ground for goodness. Whether or not you accept that, if you are a theist you will presumably believe that God has a purpose for the universe and that part of that purpose is to bring into existence conscious beings whom God wants to flourish. Anyone who believes this, and who also shares the view (in common with all the major faith traditions) that in order to flourish (in the fullest sense of the world both physically, emotionally and spiritually) that we need to develop certain virtues of character, then that is a basis for OM. Its not based on abstract rules or principles, but on teleological facts of Gods purpose as manifest in the facts of what it takes for a conscious being to flourish.
Regards
DT
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I agree some acts are morally wrong and that this does not depend on me thinking it so.
My beliefs are consistent with morality being subjective.
No, they are not. You have said that some acts are morally wrong and in the second part of the sentence say that they fit the definition of objective morality.
Nope something I think something being morally wrong depends on me thinking it so. Your argument is a busted flush.
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What if you don't believe X is always wrong?
As in TACDJFF? You don't believe TACTDJFF is always wrong? You don't necessarily have to believe in the existence of objective morality. Do be aware of the price you are paying if that is the case. Do you really not believe it is always wrong?
As in anything where you whittle down the reason for doing it as solely for your own motivation. I'm not making exceptions here in order to appeal to emotion.
I don't understand your point. "Torturing a child to death just for fun" states the motivation. Would it ever be right?
I don't believe it to be right or wrong because I don't believe that it's a possible scenario. My point is that the example you use only looks at one factor, that being a motivation, to try and use as a catch all for every single possible scenario where someone tortures a child to death for fun. Just for fun isn't realistic, and using this while trying to spread it over any scenario negates the whole idea of "just". That's why I've asked you to be more specific.
Oh, I agree that our motivations can be influenced by other factors, but would it ever be right to torture a child to death just for fun (no matter how that person got to that point)?
As I've said and explained above, I don't believe doing X just for our motivation is possible or realistic.
So you don't think it is always wrong as you are open to the possibility that there are circumstances where TACTDJFF could be right, even though you currently can't think of any where it would be?
That is not correct. I do think it is always wrong. I might be incorrect to believe that, but I very much doubt it. Until someone can show me a reason why torturing a child to death just for fun might be morally OK, I'll stick to think it is always morally wrong. Now please chip in with your own answer. Do you think it could ever be other than morally wrong to torture a child to death (just) for fun??
You can't apply one rule to others and a different one for yourself. You state, and I agree, that to say something is always right/wrong is to state that it is right/wrong even if nobody was alive to believe it so - no matter what, till the end of time, forever and ever amen etc. If, however, you're leaving yourself open to the possibility that it could be the opposite, even if you currently can't even begin to conceive of a situation where it would be, then you are contradicting your belief that it is always wrong. To stay consistent and to not contradict yourself, I'd say that to the best of your knowledge, you don't know of any situation where it would be right. This keeps you away from a claim of absolute certainty as you factor in your fallibility and limitations of knowledge.
However, the above is again spreading only one factor, (or a few) to cover a multitude of different scenarios, instead of attempting to take into account any and all factors that can have an influence.
Happy to drop the "just". Do you think it could ever be other than morally wrong to torture a child to death for fun?
Right, so we're getting somewhere now with dropping the "just". To the best of my knowledge, I currently can't conceive of a situation where I would believe it to be right, but I'm under no illusions, as with anything else, that there could potentially be a situation where I would believe it to be right. What about you?
Now that the "just" has been dropped, I put it out there to anyone to try and come up with a situation where you believe it is right to torture a child to death for fun.
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Alan has clarified above that he thinks that the reason anyone who accepts an example of OM has, in order to be consistent accept that OM exists. Asking for a method (independent of opinion or otherwise) is entirely tangential to that point - as Alan is not saying your opinion makes it objective he is saying you are implicitly accepting OM in what you already believe and therefore to be consistent need to accept OM. If we assume ReRational is lying and does not think TACTDJFF is ok and also further accepts that no possible opinion to the contra could ever make it ok, no matter what some sick individual might think, then you are stating that you believe in OM. Its a fair question for Alan to ask, and is also, assuming you do think that TACTDJFF is always wrong regardless of opinion, fair to ask you to justify what it is that leads you to think that. Its about examining your intuitions about morality - ones that imply morality is objective. If you disagree its wrong for everyone you are affirming something massively at odds with our moral intuitions. If you agree you are, in order to be consistent, affirming OM.
For most people who would not try and bend over backwards to avoid stating the fact that we assume OM in our morality, it is then legitimate to go on and ask 'how can we account for OM?' or 'how do we know the content of OM?' The second of these questions depends on the answer you give to the first, but its a separate question to the one Alan is quite legitimately asking and which BeRational et al are doing everything possible to avoid answering including, as everyone seems to accept, blatantly saying the opposite of what he thinks is the case.
I'd like to apologize to everyone for not putting my posts as clearly as Dryghtons Toe has. His summary is spot on.
What if you don't believe X is always wrong?
What if you don't believe that our motivations live in a vacuum?
What if you don't believe you are infallible?
What if you believe that different circumstances negate the idea that X is done just for your motivation?
Can I then conclude that I don't have to accept that OM exists?
Andy you are assuming that moral realism means that we cannot account for different factors in a situation having an impact on what the correct thing to do is but this is not the case. Most moral realists accept that often a huge range of morally relevant factors need to be weighed up when deciding what the right thing to do is, so it might be the right thing to do to do X in one situation and the wrong thing to do in another. The difference between the moral realist and anti-realist is simply this - when all of the relevant factors have been weighed up, the moral realist thinks there is a right answer.
Actually, that's partly the point I'm trying to make when only one factor is used to cover all situations. Saying things are done just for this and just for that, is unrealistic, as there are "often a huge range of morally relevant factors need to be weighed up when deciding what the right thing to do is, so it might be the right thing to do to do X in one situation and the wrong thing to do in another". My point is if you're going to try and argue for OM, then you require to incorporate the relevant factors, and not just one. In other words, be more specific.
Not sure what you are getting at with the infallible bit though. Obviously the fact that you believe there are right answers to questions doesn't entail that people always get them right...why would we think that? We all make mistakes about other types of factual questions too don't we? I don't think the moon landings were faked, some people do...one of us is making a mistake....it doesn't prevent it being a fact that we either landed on the moon or we didn't.
I went down the infallible line to negate the belief of something always being right/wrong based on limited factors.
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So all methods are fine and the method that says torturing a child to death for fun is great,according to Alan
Nope. Misquote. Deliberate?
Reductio, deliberate, and meant to challenge the meaning of your post by the reductio. Did you miss that or did you just want to write 'misquote'?
I'll settle for pointing out that it was a misquote.
it isn't a quote, so you would be factually wrong as well as being disingenous.
It isn't a quote. I have not said that all methods are fine. I have said that I would be happy to go with the methods of people like ht, jakswan et al in working out whether TACTDJFF is morally right or wrong. They (and you) are decent people who would never argue otherwise except in internet discussions where the price of accepting it as so means you would logically need to agree to the existence of objective morality.
So if it isn't a quote, then it isn't a misquote.
As to the rest of your confused and confusing reply here, what to make of it.
The first issue is that you assume that everyone has a method and it is simply explicable. There are those who go for these, obviously the classic is Bentham' s Felicific Calculus and that has its influences down through to Sam Harris today. Now while I find them simplistic and unrealistic, they are all based on an initial acceptance of dome axiom or other, which acceptance is done on a purely subjective basis, e.g
You could just as easily accept Crowley' s 'Do as thou wilt'. So on that level it might be argued that a moral action is objectively wrong based on the subjective acceptance of the axiom, but that would overall still yield a subjective position. (It's quite odd how similar I find your position on morality to bluehillside's)
I try not to answer for people who are atheists simply because of that one non belief, so I am not really bothered about what they might be saying to you, and not should you be when talking about what I think. Christianity is not a pile of mince to me because you and Sassy disagree about admin, but rather I have yet to see a position on it that makes any logical sense.
In that sense, other than your wholly witless attempt at mind reading, can I suggest that if you want to engage in what I actually think, rather than the implied idea that I am lying just to avoid loosing an argument, that you do that on the basis of something I have written? After all I always extend that courtesy to you, when I accuse you of lying.
Do calm down. I am not implying you are lying, even though you have said on a number of occasions that I am lying. Do you know what "lying" means? A lie is an intentionally false statement.
You are quite clearly implying that I and others are not making honest statements to avoid admitting that OM exists - I.e. making intentionally false statements. So now you are lying about that as well and by that I mean making an intentionally false statement, again.
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I agree some acts are morally wrong and that this does not depend on me thinking it so.
My beliefs are consistent with morality being subjective.
No, they are not. You have said that some acts are morally wrong and in the second part of the sentence say that they fit the definition of objective morality.
Nope something I think something being morally wrong depends on me thinking it so. Your argument is a busted flush.
Put that in English and I'll reply to it.
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What if you don't believe X is always wrong?
As in TACDJFF? You don't believe TACTDJFF is always wrong? You don't necessarily have to believe in the existence of objective morality. Do be aware of the price you are paying if that is the case. Do you really not believe it is always wrong?
As in anything where you whittle down the reason for doing it as solely for your own motivation. I'm not making exceptions here in order to appeal to emotion.
I don't understand your point. "Torturing a child to death just for fun" states the motivation. Would it ever be right?
I don't believe it to be right or wrong because I don't believe that it's a possible scenario. My point is that the example you use only looks at one factor, that being a motivation, to try and use as a catch all for every single possible scenario where someone tortures a child to death for fun. Just for fun isn't realistic, and using this while trying to spread it over any scenario negates the whole idea of "just". That's why I've asked you to be more specific.
Oh, I agree that our motivations can be influenced by other factors, but would it ever be right to torture a child to death just for fun (no matter how that person got to that point)?
As I've said and explained above, I don't believe doing X just for our motivation is possible or realistic.
OK, I think it is a valid question to put to people, but let's go your way for a bit. Would that part of a person's motivation which is to do it for fun be morally wrong if they were torturing a child to death?
So you don't think it is always wrong as you are open to the possibility that there are circumstances where TACTDJFF could be right, even though you currently can't think of any where it would be?
That is not correct. I do think it is always wrong. I might be incorrect to believe that, but I very much doubt it. Until someone can show me a reason why torturing a child to death just for fun might be morally OK, I'll stick to think it is always morally wrong. Now please chip in with your own answer. Do you think it could ever be other than morally wrong to torture a child to death (just) for fun??
You can't apply one rule to others and a different one for yourself. You state, and I agree, that to say something is always right/wrong is to state that it is right/wrong even if nobody was alive to believe it so - no matter what, till the end of time, forever and ever amen etc. If, however, you're leaving yourself open to the possibility that it could be the opposite, even if you currently can't even begin to conceive of a situation where it would be, then you are contradicting your belief that it is always wrong. To stay consistent and to not contradict yourself, I'd say that to the best of your knowledge, you don't know of any situation where it would be right. This keeps you away from a claim of absolute certainty as you factor in your fallibility and limitations of knowledge.
I disagree. All I am doing is acknowledging that I may be wrong about something. I might be wrong about the speed of light in vacuo, but that does not thereby make the speed of light in vacuo subjective.
I do agree, however, that I "don't know of any situation where it (TACTDJFF) would be right". However, I am of the opinion that there are no situations where it would be morally right, particularly since I have defined the situation, i.e. (just) for fun.
However, the above is again spreading only one factor, (or a few) to cover a multitude of different scenarios, instead of attempting to take into account any and all factors that can have an influence.
Yes, we all seem to have mixed motives in just about everything we do, but if one of our motives in torturing a child to death is that of doing it for fun, would you not agree that that motive is morally wrong.
I sincerely hope you would and would expect all our regular contributors here to agree (if they were not in a discussion on the Christian Topic message board and aware of where agreeing that objective morality existing might lead them).
Happy to drop the "just". Do you think it could ever be other than morally wrong to torture a child to death for fun?
Right, so we're getting somewhere now with dropping the "just". To the best of my knowledge, I currently can't conceive of a situation where I would believe it to be right, but I'm under no illusions, as with anything else, that there could potentially be a situation where I would believe it to be right. What about you?
I think I've answered this above. Let me know if you think I have not.
Now that the "just" has been dropped, I put it out there to anyone to try and come up with a situation where you believe it is right to torture a child to death for fun.
Excellent. Good luck with that. Shall we supply a list of names and see who comes up with one? I suggest:
horsethorn
NearlySane
Gordon
BeRational
JeremyP
Edited: I'll have a think today. I think you may be right in seeing a need to drop the "just" bit in TACTD(J)FF.
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...
You are quite clearly implying that I and others are not making honest statements to avoid admitting that OM exists - I.e. making intentionally false statements. So now you are lying about that as well and by that I mean making an intentionally false statement, again.
Let me make this clear. I am not implying you or anyone else is lying. We can all blind ourselves to stuff, me included and you included. What I am saying is that you are being illogical.
Stop being so paranoid.
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You are quite clearly implying that I and others are not making honest statements to avoid admitting that OM exists - I.e. making intentionally false statements. So now you are lying about that as well and by that I mean making an intentionally false statement, again.
Let me make this clear. I am not implying you or anyone else is lying. We can all blind ourselves to stuff, me included and you included. What I am saying is that you are being illogical.
Stop being so paranoid.
You are stating that a number of people are making deliberately false statements - which by your own definition is lying.
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On reading Alan's reply to Andy, he now seems to be stating that people are or have avoided saying that TACTD(J)FF is morally wrong because they don't want to say it as it will show that they would logically have to accept OM. This is untru in that people have stated that they think this ,as indeed many other things, are wrong. In this case I don't think Alan is deliberately telling the untruth so is not lying, but it seems to me to illustrate that he is so involved in his case, that he is unable to even read what people have written without ending up misrepresenting it.
So, I will try once again to make this clear and hope that it filters through. I think TACTDJFF is wrong, as is, in my opinion, TACTDFF, TACTD and TAC, and indeed T. I also think marmite tastes good. The moral position is based on my subjective view of what is right and wrong. The taste position on what I think of as good and bad in eating.
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TACTDFF is an almost universal agreed no no, but that doesn't make it OM.
The possession of a mobile phone is now an almost universal MUST but there is nothing objective about it.
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I agree some acts are morally wrong and that this does not depend on me thinking it so.
My beliefs are consistent with morality being subjective.
No, they are not. You have said that some acts are morally wrong and in the second part of the sentence say that they fit the definition of objective morality.
Nope something I think something being morally wrong depends on me thinking it so. Your argument is a busted flush.
Put that in English and I'll reply to it.
I suggest you take a course on comprehension but I'll try to dumb it down for you.
In order for something to be objective it has to be independent of anyone's opinion. I think torture is wrong and that does depend on my opinion.
I'm being consistent, please its been over a year, this argument surely is over? Even you must be running out of obfuscation rabbit holes to run down.
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OK, I think it is a valid question to put to people, but let's go your way for a bit. Would that part of a person's motivation which is to do it for fun be morally wrong if they were torturing a child to death?
I've pretty much answered this already. I can't think of a realistic situation where I'd believe it was right, but that's not to say there can never be one and that I think it's always wrong.
You can't apply one rule to others and a different one for yourself. You state, and I agree, that to say something is always right/wrong is to state that it is right/wrong even if nobody was alive to believe it so - no matter what, till the end of time, forever and ever amen etc. If, however, you're leaving yourself open to the possibility that it could be the opposite, even if you currently can't even begin to conceive of a situation where it would be, then you are contradicting your belief that it is always wrong. To stay consistent and to not contradict yourself, I'd say that to the best of your knowledge, you don't know of any situation where it would be right. This keeps you away from a claim of absolute certainty as you factor in your fallibility and limitations of knowledge.
I disagree. All I am doing is acknowledging that I may be wrong about something. I might be wrong about the speed of light in vacuo, but that does not thereby make the speed of light in vacuo subjective.
I do agree, however, that I "don't know of any situation where it (TACTDJFF) would be right". However, I am of the opinion that there are no situations where it would be morally right, particularly since I have defined the situation, i.e. (just) for fun.
Again, I think you are contradicting yourself by acknowledging that you may be wrong about it while also being of the opinion that there are no situations where it would be right. I'm all for agreeing with the former, but the latter is an assertion that I don't see how you can back up. Perhaps I am being pedantic, but normally I would expect you to be specific, and perhaps state something along the lines of "being of the opinion that there are no situations that you can currently conceive of where it would be morally right".
However, the above is again spreading only one factor, (or a few) to cover a multitude of different scenarios, instead of attempting to take into account any and all factors that can have an influence.
Yes, we all seem to have mixed motives in just about everything we do, but if one of our motives in torturing a child to death is that of doing it for fun, would you not agree that that motive is morally wrong.
I think this has been answered enough times now.
When I mention factors, I'm not limiting that to motives. I'm talking about anything and everything, from motives to external influences beyond the control of the subjects.
There's also one big elephant in the room here that's yet to have been mentioned this time around (although I have in the past), and that's free will. You believe it and I don't, but for the sake of the hypothetical, if there is no free will, are they at fault for being motivated by fun and are they still morally wrong?
I sincerely hope you would and would expect all our regular contributors here to agree (if they were not in a discussion on the Christian Topic message board and aware of where agreeing that objective morality existing might lead them).
You need to stop trying to appeal to emotion. This is why I often change it from your TACTD(J)FF to simply X in order to cover this in general terms because the scenario and it's emotional appeal is irrelevant if we are trying to look at this objectively.
Now that the "just" has been dropped, I put it out there to anyone to try and come up with a situation where you believe it is right to torture a child to death for fun.
Excellent. Good luck with that. Shall we supply a list of names and see who comes up with one? I suggest:
horsethorn
NearlySane
Gordon
BeRational
JeremyP
Edited: I'll have a think today. I think you may be right in seeing a need to drop the "just" bit in TACTD(J)FF.
No, no list of names. I said this is for anyone. That's me, you, the list of people you mentioned and everyone else missed off. This isn't a game of who can piss the furthest.
The ironic thing is, the person (or people) I did expect an answer from was you. Now I've said I can't think of a situation where I would believe it is right, but I thought you would be able to.
Set the scene - we have a person who wants to torture a child to death for fun, but they feel reluctant to do so because as far as they understand, they are taking a young life when they feel they don't deserve it. If only this person could get a 100% guarantee that they should torture this child to death for fun because it is the morally right thing to do. God then informs them that it is the morally right thing to do...
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I would guess that there are people who think it OK to torture kids for fun, e.g. Ian Brady. Well, I can see the counter-argument immediately, that 'it is still wrong', even if someone thinks it good. What's the next step in this ghastly spiral? That opinion doesn't matter in the question of objective morality, even though we are asked for our opinion?!
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Hi Alan,
When reading through your response to Andy(mess 289) you said this:
I sincerely hope you would and would expect all our regular contributors here to agree (if they were not in a discussion on the Christian Topic message board and aware of where agreeing that objective morality existing might lead them).
This seemed to be a response to you asking whether Andy would agree that, even if there were other motives, the idea of TACTD just for fun is morally wrong.
However, for my own part, I am somwhat puzzled by the response that I have quoted above. I have already stated several times that in my opinion it is morally wrong, and that I see no reason to invoke OM, so no problem on the first part. However, I'm not at all sure what the second part actually means.
Are you suggesting that by stating that I think it is morally wrong, I accept the idea that OM definitely exists? In which case, I would disagree, and for reasons which I have made clear previously.
Or/and are you suggesting that my disagreement is predicated on the idea that belief in OM would, in some way, lead to the conclusion that a god, especially the Christian God, exists, and, consequentially therefore, I would simply reject the whole idea of OM because I don't believe in any god? Again, if this is what you meant, I would disagree. I have tried to look at the whole idea of OM in its own right. My own conclusions, such as they are, take into account the cultural influences of religions as one facet of our moral behaviour but are not based on, or even coloured by, any ideas associated with the existence/non existence of gods at all.
And, furthermore, are you suggesting that I may well have a different view of OM if I were not on 'the Christian Topic message board'? I am at a loss to make any sense of this unless you mean that I only hold to my ideas about OM in the presence of or when arguing with Christians. If this is what you meant then I would again disagree. I am always prepared to alter my views according to how convincing I find the evidence and arguments, but my views would not alter simply according to whom I am debating/discussing with.
A little clarification of your above quote would not not come amiss. Ta muchly. :)
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Actually, that's partly the point I'm trying to make when only one factor is used to cover all situations. Saying things are done just for this and just for that, is unrealistic, as there are "often a huge range of morally relevant factors need to be weighed up when deciding what the right thing to do is, so it might be the right thing to do to do X in one situation and the wrong thing to do in another". My point is if you're going to try and argue for OM, then you require to incorporate the relevant factors, and not just one. In other words, be more specific.
Hi Andy, sorry I'm afraid I'm missing what your asking for here. I don't know what the 'one' is you refer to - do you mean the TACTDJFF situation?? If so as far as i'm concerned the point of this example is just to indicate some of our intuitions about moral truth. OM, in my view is about the virtues of character necessary for our flourishing. Right action is what a virtuous person would do after weighing up al the morally relevant factors in a situation.
I went down the infallible line to negate the belief of something always being right/wrong based on limited factors.
Ok well that's a red herring in terms of understanding what moral realists are claiming. Even many philosophers who believe in principles (as opposed to particularists like me who do not) often don't believe they take the form 'X is always wrong' but rather 'x will always weigh negatively when considered in a calculation of about what the is the right thing to do'.
Regards
DT
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I would guess that there are people who think it OK to torture kids for fun, e.g. Ian Brady. Well, I can see the counter-argument immediately, that 'it is still wrong', even if someone thinks it good. What's the next step in this ghastly spiral? That opinion doesn't matter in the question of objective morality, even though we are asked for our opinion?!
+ also in reply to Enkis post:
Opinion doesn't matter in the case of objective morality. As Alan has clarified the reason he has asked for your opinion is to make the point that IF you think TACTJFF is wrong and wrong for everyone, then the fact that you think it is wrong for everyone is inconsistent with the statement 'what is morally right depends on the instincts/emotions/opinions of the person making them or social group they are part of'.
See inconsistent triad example in reply 281 above.
Regards
DT
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On reading Alan's reply to Andy, he now seems to be stating that people are or have avoided saying that TACTD(J)FF is morally wrong because they don't want to say it as it will show that they would logically have to accept OM. This is untru in that people have stated that they think this ,as indeed many other things, are wrong. In this case I don't think Alan is deliberately telling the untruth so is not lying, but it seems to me to illustrate that he is so involved in his case, that he is unable to even read what people have written without ending up misrepresenting it.
So, I will try once again to make this clear and hope that it filters through. I think TACTDJFF is wrong, as is, in my opinion, TACTDFF, TACTD and TAC, and indeed T. I also think marmite tastes good. The moral position is based on my subjective view of what is right and wrong. The taste position on what I think of as good and bad in eating.
Alan didn't just ask you whether it was wrong. Crucially he asked you whether you thought it would be wrong for everyone.
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Situation S = Tom is TACTDJFF and has the instinct/opinions/emotion that its ok to TACTDJFF.
Proposition P1 = HT thinks what is morally right is determined by our instincts, opinions and emotions.
Proposition P2 = HT thinks Tom's act of TACTDFF is morally wrong and would be wrong for anyone.
S, P1 and P2 form an inconsistent triad. Therefore in situation S you have to either reject P1 (emotivist anti-realism) or reject P2. Unfortunately P2 reflects some deep seated aspects of our moral practice and discarding them would not leave our morality intact.
Reject P2, I think S is wrong however accept Tom has a different opinion.
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Actually, that's partly the point I'm trying to make when only one factor is used to cover all situations. Saying things are done just for this and just for that, is unrealistic, as there are "often a huge range of morally relevant factors need to be weighed up when deciding what the right thing to do is, so it might be the right thing to do to do X in one situation and the wrong thing to do in another". My point is if you're going to try and argue for OM, then you require to incorporate the relevant factors, and not just one. In other words, be more specific.
Hi Andy, sorry I'm afraid I'm missing what your asking for here. I don't know what the 'one' is you refer to - do you mean the TACTDJFF situation?? If so as far as i'm concerned the point of this example is just to indicate some of our intuitions about moral truth. OM, in my view is about the virtues of character necessary for our flourishing. Right action is what a virtuous person would do after weighing up al the morally relevant factors in a situation.
The one factor I am referring to is "fun", as that is the only factor presented. As you point out, all relevant factors need weighing up, so if there is just one but it is phrased to cover all situations, then it negates there being just one factor.
I went down the infallible line to negate the belief of something always being right/wrong based on limited factors.
Ok well that's a red herring in terms of understanding what moral realists are claiming. Even many philosophers who believe in principles (as opposed to particularists like me who do not) often don't believe they take the form 'X is always wrong' but rather 'x will always weigh negatively when considered in a calculation of about what the is the right thing to do'.
Well you're kinda shooting the messenger here, as I am just responding to what has been stated thus far, that being "X is always wrong".
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This is why I don't like the Tactdjff example as it causes more confusion than clarity. The point of the example is that it reveals our moral instincts as something we would consider wrong for everyone regardless of what there views might be in all situations. However to say it is wrong even for someone who thinks it is ok is to contradict the view that what makes something 'right' is a persons emotional reaction or opinion about it(or even a societies view about it). If you took the latter (irrealist) view then the best you can consistently say is 'I disapprove of Tactdjff'. This however does not capture what we (or at least what most people as part of normal moral discourse) mean when we say something is wrong. Indeed it would significantly degrade our morality if it was reduced morality to such a weak claim.
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Situation S = Tom is TACTDJFF and has the instinct/opinions/emotion that its ok to TACTDJFF.
Proposition P1 = HT thinks what is morally right is determined by our instincts, opinions and emotions.
Proposition P2 = HT thinks Tom's act of TACTDFF is morally wrong and would be wrong for anyone.
S, P1 and P2 form an inconsistent triad. Therefore in situation S you have to either reject P1 (emotivist anti-realism) or reject P2. Unfortunately P2 reflects some deep seated aspects of our moral practice and discarding them would not leave our morality intact.
Reject P2, I think S is wrong however accept Tom has a different opinion.
Which would be entirely consistent, but would also be abandoning central elements of human morality to fit a theory rather than find a theory that accurately describes morality.
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I would guess that there are people who think it OK to torture kids for fun, e.g. Ian Brady. Well, I can see the counter-argument immediately, that 'it is still wrong', even if someone thinks it good. What's the next step in this ghastly spiral? That opinion doesn't matter in the question of objective morality, even though we are asked for our opinion?!
+ also in reply to Enkis post:
Opinion doesn't matter in the case of objective morality. As Alan has clarified the reason he has asked for your opinion is to make the point that IF you think TACTJFF is wrong and wrong for everyone, then the fact that you think it is wrong for everyone is inconsistent with the statement 'what is morally right depends on the instincts/emotions/opinions of the person making them or social group they are part of'.
See inconsistent triad example in reply 281 above.
Regards
DT
But why does 'wrong for everyone' mean that it's objective? I see it as morally wrong not because of Brady's opinions, feelings, and so on, but because of mine. I've arrived at that view via a subjective process, not impersonally.
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Situation S = Tom is TACTDJFF and has the instinct/opinions/emotion that its ok to TACTDJFF.
Proposition P1 = HT thinks what is morally right is determined by our instincts, opinions and emotions.
Proposition P2 = HT thinks Tom's act of TACTDFF is morally wrong and would be wrong for anyone.
S, P1 and P2 form an inconsistent triad. Therefore in situation S you have to either reject P1 (emotivist anti-realism) or reject P2. Unfortunately P2 reflects some deep seated aspects of our moral practice and discarding them would not leave our morality intact.
Reject P2, I think S is wrong however accept Tom has a different opinion.
Which would be entirely consistent, but would also be abandoning central elements of human morality to fit a theory rather than find a theory that accurately describes morality.
since all we have with morality is currently opinion then it is accurately describing it. Classifying strongly held it or absolutely expressed opinion as some how indicative of it not being is mere opinion.
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I would guess that there are people who think it OK to torture kids for fun, e.g. Ian Brady. Well, I can see the counter-argument immediately, that 'it is still wrong', even if someone thinks it good. What's the next step in this ghastly spiral? That opinion doesn't matter in the question of objective morality, even though we are asked for our opinion?!
+ also in reply to Enkis post:
Opinion doesn't matter in the case of objective morality. As Alan has clarified the reason he has asked for your opinion is to make the point that IF you think TACTJFF is wrong and wrong for everyone, then the fact that you think it is wrong for everyone is inconsistent with the statement 'what is morally right depends on the instincts/emotions/opinions of the person making them or social group they are part of'.
See inconsistent triad example in reply 281 above.
Regards
DT
But why does 'wrong for everyone' mean that it's objective? I see it as morally wrong not because of Brady's opinions, feelings, and so on, but because of mine. I've arrived at that view via a subjective process, not impersonally.
By subjective process you are simply meaning that you decide...but that doesn't mean the claim you are making is subjective. I go through a subjective process of deciding whether I think the moon landings really happened or where faked, but the answer i come up with is still either right or wrong and is not dependent on my opinion for its correctness.
Making a judgement about something being right is not the same as saying 'I disapprove of x'. It is inconsistent to say what is morally right depends on our opinions/emotions and also say that it is 'wrong' for someone who thinks it is ok.
Irealism equates Saying 'x is correct' means the same thing as 'p thinks x is correct'....but the statement 'p thinks x is correct' is a purely descriptive statement, one that anyone can agree with no matter what they might think about x, and so it deprives the judgement 'x is correct' of any normative content at all. It can only survive as a intelligible if it is reformulated in the 'i disapprove of x' manner i mentioned above and drops the reference to it being 'right' or 'wrong'. But to drop this sense of truth is a huge degradation of our morality as it is practiced.
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Situation S = Tom is TACTDJFF and has the instinct/opinions/emotion that its ok to TACTDJFF.
Proposition P1 = HT thinks what is morally right is determined by our instincts, opinions and emotions.
Proposition P2 = HT thinks Tom's act of TACTDFF is morally wrong and would be wrong for anyone.
S, P1 and P2 form an inconsistent triad. Therefore in situation S you have to either reject P1 (emotivist anti-realism) or reject P2. Unfortunately P2 reflects some deep seated aspects of our moral practice and discarding them would not leave our morality intact.
Reject P2, I think S is wrong however accept Tom has a different opinion.
Which would be entirely consistent, but would also be abandoning central elements of human morality to fit a theory rather than find a theory that accurately describes morality.
since all we have with morality is currently opinion then it is accurately describing it. Classifying strongly held it or absolutely expressed opinion as some how indicative of it not being is mere opinion.
That's not correct there is a difference between opinions we might have on moral issues and the implicit assumptions within our moral practice. I am referring to the latter.
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DT - are you really comparing morality to the moon landings. Oh shit. You are starting with your conclusion then.
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DT - are you really comparing morality to the moon landings. Oh shit. You are starting with your conclusion then.
No I'm just pointing out that what you refer to as 'going through a subjective process' is not an indicator of the subjective status of the subject of your deliberations..you seemed to me to be implying it was, I was giving you a counter example that isn't. Whether morality is or not is what we are trying to get to but that fact you make some personal deliberations about it is neither here nor there in reaching that conclusion.
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DT - are you really comparing morality to the moon landings. Oh shit. You are starting with your conclusion then.
No I'm just pointing out that what you refer to as 'going through a subjective process' is not an indicator of the subjective status of the subject of your deliberations..you seemed to me to be implying it was, I was giving you a counter example that isn't. Whether morality is or not is what we are trying to get to but that fact you make some personal deliberations about it is neither here nor there in reaching that conclusion.
Yeah, but the moon landings is a terrible analogy, I think. It's a kind of cheat.
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Situation S = Tom is TACTDJFF and has the instinct/opinions/emotion that its ok to TACTDJFF.
Proposition P1 = HT thinks what is morally right is determined by our instincts, opinions and emotions.
Proposition P2 = HT thinks Tom's act of TACTDFF is morally wrong and would be wrong for anyone.
S, P1 and P2 form an inconsistent triad. Therefore in situation S you have to either reject P1 (emotivist anti-realism) or reject P2. Unfortunately P2 reflects some deep seated aspects of our moral practice and discarding them would not leave our morality intact.
Reject P2, I think S is wrong however accept Tom has a different opinion.
Which would be entirely consistent, but would also be abandoning central elements of human morality to fit a theory rather than find a theory that accurately describes morality.
since all we have with morality is currently opinion then it is accurately describing it. Classifying strongly held it or absolutely expressed opinion as some how indicative of it not being is mere opinion.
That's not correct there is a difference between opinions we might have on moral issues and the implicit assumptions within our moral practice. I am referring to the latter.
you could be referring to King Dial, the best dressed man in Barbados for all it matters, calling things different names doesn' t change whether they are opinion or not. Further I would suggest you are falling into a version of the appeal to nature but is an appeal to words added to an ad populum.
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DT - are you really comparing morality to the moon landings. Oh shit. You are starting with your conclusion then.
No I'm just pointing out that what you refer to as 'going through a subjective process' is not an indicator of the subjective status of the subject of your deliberations..you seemed to me to be implying it was, I was giving you a counter example that isn't. Whether morality is or not is what we are trying to get to but that fact you make some personal deliberations about it is neither here nor there in reaching that conclusion.
Yeah, but the moon landings is a terrible analogy, I think. It's a kind of cheat.
It's just an example of how we subjectively deliberate over a factual issue. There are many examples if you don't like it pick another, but it's not a cheat
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DT - are you really comparing morality to the moon landings. Oh shit. You are starting with your conclusion then.
No I'm just pointing out that what you refer to as 'going through a subjective process' is not an indicator of the subjective status of the subject of your deliberations..you seemed to me to be implying it was, I was giving you a counter example that isn't. Whether morality is or not is what we are trying to get to but that fact you make some personal deliberations about it is neither here nor there in reaching that conclusion.
Yeah, but the moon landings is a terrible analogy, I think. It's a kind of cheat.
It's just an example of how we subjectively deliberate over a factual issue. There are many examples if you don't like it pick another, but it's not a cheat
I think it's a cheat, because you're taking something which most people would accept is factual, and then comparing morality to this, without explaining the similarities and dissimilarities, as if we're supposed to say, oh yes, morality is like the moon landings then. OK, it's not a cheat, it's a con. Show your working out.
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Situation S = Tom is TACTDJFF and has the instinct/opinions/emotion that its ok to TACTDJFF.
Proposition P1 = HT thinks what is morally right is determined by our instincts, opinions and emotions.
Proposition P2 = HT thinks Tom's act of TACTDFF is morally wrong and would be wrong for anyone.
S, P1 and P2 form an inconsistent triad. Therefore in situation S you have to either reject P1 (emotivist anti-realism) or reject P2. Unfortunately P2 reflects some deep seated aspects of our moral practice and discarding them would not leave our morality intact.
Reject P2, I think S is wrong however accept Tom has a different opinion.
Which would be entirely consistent, but would also be abandoning central elements of human morality to fit a theory rather than find a theory that accurately describes morality.
since all we have with morality is currently opinion then it is accurately describing it. Classifying strongly held it or absolutely expressed opinion as some how indicative of it not being is mere opinion.
That's not correct there is a difference between opinions we might have on moral issues and the implicit assumptions within our moral practice. I am referring to the latter.
you could be referring to King Dial, the best dressed man in Barbados for all it matters, calling things different names doesn' t change whether they are opinion or not. Further I would suggest you are falling into a version of the appeal to nature but is an appeal to words added to an ad populum.
It's not an appeal to nature..it's an argument based on our core intuitions about morality. The point of a theory that explains morality is that it does just that, explain morality as it is. If irrealism leads us to have to redefine morality to fit it then it's failing as a theory.
Also an implicit assumption embodied in a practice is not the same as an opinion. We can have an opinion that is contra to our embodied assumptions and not recognise these assumptions until they are pointed out. That happens all the time in philosophy.
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DT - are you really comparing morality to the moon landings. Oh shit. You are starting with your conclusion then.
No I'm just pointing out that what you refer to as 'going through a subjective process' is not an indicator of the subjective status of the subject of your deliberations..you seemed to me to be implying it was, I was giving you a counter example that isn't. Whether morality is or not is what we are trying to get to but that fact you make some personal deliberations about it is neither here nor there in reaching that conclusion.
Yeah, but the moon landings is a terrible analogy, I think. It's a kind of cheat.
It's just an example of how we subjectively deliberate over a factual issue. There are many examples if you don't like it pick another, but it's not a cheat
I think it's a cheat, because you're taking something which most people would accept is factual, and then comparing morality to this, without explaining the similarities and dissimilarities, as if we're supposed to say, oh yes, morality is like the moon landings then. OK, it's not a cheat, it's a con. Show your working out.
I'm not comparing morality to it ..I'm just saying that it involves subjective deliberation. YOU were implying that anything involving subjective deliberation was by virtue of this 'only' a subjective matter. I'm just pointing out thus isn't the case nothing more.
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Situation S = Tom is TACTDJFF and has the instinct/opinions/emotion that its ok to TACTDJFF.
Proposition P1 = HT thinks what is morally right is determined by our instincts, opinions and emotions.
Proposition P2 = HT thinks Tom's act of TACTDFF is morally wrong and would be wrong for anyone.
S, P1 and P2 form an inconsistent triad. Therefore in situation S you have to either reject P1 (emotivist anti-realism) or reject P2. Unfortunately P2 reflects some deep seated aspects of our moral practice and discarding them would not leave our morality intact.
Reject P2, I think S is wrong however accept Tom has a different opinion.
Which would be entirely consistent, but would also be abandoning central elements of human morality to fit a theory rather than find a theory that accurately describes morality.
since all we have with morality is currently opinion then it is accurately describing it. Classifying strongly held it or absolutely expressed opinion as some how indicative of it not being is mere opinion.
That's not correct there is a difference between opinions we might have on moral issues and the implicit assumptions within our moral practice. I am referring to the latter.
you could be referring to King Dial, the best dressed man in Barbados for all it matters, calling things different names doesn' t change whether they are opinion or not. Further I would suggest you are falling into a version of the appeal to nature but is an appeal to words added to an ad populum.
It's not an appeal to nature..it's an argument based on our core intuitions about morality. The point of a theory that explains morality is that it does just that, explain morality as it is. If irrealism leads us to have to redefine morality to fit it then it's failing as a theory.
Also an implicit assumption embodied in a practice is not the same as an opinion. We can have an opinion that is contra to our embodied assumptions and not recognise these assumptions until they are pointed out. That happens all the time in philosophy.
and yet it no more makes those implicit assumptions objective than it makes them pink and sparkly. That we might express an opinion that is not in line with some other opinion is entirely useless.
And it is exactly an appeal to nature because you are assuming there is a level of opinion, and again calling it a core value or Arthur Negus gives it no more relationship to being objective, where it is somehow not an opinion. That is simply an appeal to nature and has no validity other than assertion and, yet again opinion.
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DT - are you really comparing morality to the moon landings. Oh shit. You are starting with your conclusion then.
No I'm just pointing out that what you refer to as 'going through a subjective process' is not an indicator of the subjective status of the subject of your deliberations..you seemed to me to be implying it was, I was giving you a counter example that isn't. Whether morality is or not is what we are trying to get to but that fact you make some personal deliberations about it is neither here nor there in reaching that conclusion.
Yeah, but the moon landings is a terrible analogy, I think. It's a kind of cheat.
It's just an example of how we subjectively deliberate over a factual issue. There are many examples if you don't like it pick another, but it's not a cheat
I think it's a cheat, because you're taking something which most people would accept is factual, and then comparing morality to this, without explaining the similarities and dissimilarities, as if we're supposed to say, oh yes, morality is like the moon landings then. OK, it's not a cheat, it's a con. Show your working out.
I'm not comparing morality to it ..I'm just saying that it involves subjective deliberation. YOU were implying that anything involving subjective deliberation was by virtue of this 'only' a subjective matter. I'm just pointing out thus isn't the case nothing more.
I don't see the point in pointing this out. I mean, when do we ever escape subjective deliberation?
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DT - are you really comparing morality to the moon landings. Oh shit. You are starting with your conclusion then.
No I'm just pointing out that what you refer to as 'going through a subjective process' is not an indicator of the subjective status of the subject of your deliberations..you seemed to me to be implying it was, I was giving you a counter example that isn't. Whether morality is or not is what we are trying to get to but that fact you make some personal deliberations about it is neither here nor there in reaching that conclusion.
Yeah, but the moon landings is a terrible analogy, I think. It's a kind of cheat.
It's just an example of how we subjectively deliberate over a factual issue. There are many examples if you don't like it pick another, but it's not a cheat
I think it's a cheat, because you're taking something which most people would accept is factual, and then comparing morality to this, without explaining the similarities and dissimilarities, as if we're supposed to say, oh yes, morality is like the moon landings then. OK, it's not a cheat, it's a con. Show your working out.
I'm not comparing morality to it ..I'm just saying that it involves subjective deliberation. YOU were implying that anything involving subjective deliberation was by virtue of this 'only' a subjective matter. I'm just pointing out thus isn't the case nothing more.
I don't see the point in pointing this out. I mean, when do we ever escape subjective deliberation?
I agree we don't escape subjective deliberation, however an appeal to this seemed to be the only substantive point in Wiggs reply 305 above.
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Well I inadvertently nuked the fridge with saying that, but you agree, so I guess we're done with being able to assess whether morality is objective or not then...?
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Situation S = Tom is TACTDJFF and has the instinct/opinions/emotion that its ok to TACTDJFF.
Proposition P1 = HT thinks what is morally right is determined by our instincts, opinions and emotions.
Proposition P2 = HT thinks Tom's act of TACTDFF is morally wrong and would be wrong for anyone.
S, P1 and P2 form an inconsistent triad. Therefore in situation S you have to either reject P1 (emotivist anti-realism) or reject P2. Unfortunately P2 reflects some deep seated aspects of our moral practice and discarding them would not leave our morality intact.
Reject P2, I think S is wrong however accept Tom has a different opinion.
Which would be entirely consistent, but would also be abandoning central elements of human morality to fit a theory rather than find a theory that accurately describes morality.
since all we have with morality is currently opinion then it is accurately describing it. Classifying strongly held it or absolutely expressed opinion as some how indicative of it not being is mere opinion.
That's not correct there is a difference between opinions we might have on moral issues and the implicit assumptions within our moral practice. I am referring to the latter.
you could be referring to King Dial, the best dressed man in Barbados for all it matters, calling things different names doesn' t change whether they are opinion or not. Further I would suggest you are falling into a version of the appeal to nature but is an appeal to words added to an ad populum.
It's not an appeal to nature..it's an argument based on our core intuitions about morality. The point of a theory that explains morality is that it does just that, explain morality as it is. If irrealism leads us to have to redefine morality to fit it then it's failing as a theory.
Also an implicit assumption embodied in a practice is not the same as an opinion. We can have an opinion that is contra to our embodied assumptions and not recognise these assumptions until they are pointed out. That happens all the time in philosophy.
and yet it no more makes those implicit assumptions objective than it makes them pink and sparkly. That we might express an opinion that is not in line with some other opinion is entirely useless.
And it is exactly an appeal to nature because you are assuming there is a level of opinion, and again calling it a core value or Arthur Negus gives it no more relationship to being objective, where it is somehow not an opinion. That is simply an appeal to nature and has no validity other than assertion and, yet again opinion.
The argument from morality doesn't claim that our intuitions or implicit assumptions MAKE morality objective, they are indicators that we perceive morality in this way. If morality is objective how we make sense of that is something we have to do quite separately from our intuitions and I've given an account of that. But the objectivity of morality is a metaphysical proposition and as such it's not something we can prove, it's something we have can only examine our core intuitions about and give our best account of.
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Well I inadvertently nuked the fridge with saying that, but you agree, so I guess we're done with being able to assess whether morality is objective or not then...?
I was agreeing that we don't escape subjective deliberation. But as we often subjectively deliberate about objective things that doesn't reflect on the issue of OM one way or the other. The arguement for OM is based on OM being the best account we can give of morality that matches morality as it is practiced.
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Situation S = Tom is TACTDJFF and has the instinct/opinions/emotion that its ok to TACTDJFF.
Proposition P1 = HT thinks what is morally right is determined by our instincts, opinions and emotions.
Proposition P2 = HT thinks Tom's act of TACTDFF is morally wrong and would be wrong for anyone.
S, P1 and P2 form an inconsistent triad. Therefore in situation S you have to either reject P1 (emotivist anti-realism) or reject P2. Unfortunately P2 reflects some deep seated aspects of our moral practice and discarding them would not leave our morality intact.
Reject P2, I think S is wrong however accept Tom has a different opinion.
Which would be entirely consistent, but would also be abandoning central elements of human morality to fit a theory rather than find a theory that accurately describes morality.
since all we have with morality is currently opinion then it is accurately describing it. Classifying strongly held it or absolutely expressed opinion as some how indicative of it not being is mere opinion.
That's not correct there is a difference between opinions we might have on moral issues and the implicit assumptions within our moral practice. I am referring to the latter.
you could be referring to King Dial, the best dressed man in Barbados for all it matters, calling things different names doesn' t change whether they are opinion or not. Further I would suggest you are falling into a version of the appeal to nature but is an appeal to words added to an ad populum.
It's not an appeal to nature..it's an argument based on our core intuitions about morality. The point of a theory that explains morality is that it does just that, explain morality as it is. If irrealism leads us to have to redefine morality to fit it then it's failing as a theory.
Also an implicit assumption embodied in a practice is not the same as an opinion. We can have an opinion that is contra to our embodied assumptions and not recognise these assumptions until they are pointed out. That happens all the time in philosophy.
and yet it no more makes those implicit assumptions objective than it makes them pink and sparkly. That we might express an opinion that is not in line with some other opinion is entirely useless.
And it is exactly an appeal to nature because you are assuming there is a level of opinion, and again calling it a core value or Arthur Negus gives it no more relationship to being objective, where it is somehow not an opinion. That is simply an appeal to nature and has no validity other than assertion and, yet again opinion.
The argument from morality doesn't claim that our intuitions or implicit assumptions MAKE morality objective, they are indicators that we perceive morality in this way. If morality is objective how we make sense of that is something we have to do quite separately from our intuitions and I've given an account of that. But the objectivity of morality is a metaphysical proposition and as such it's not something we can prove, it's something we have can only examine our core intuitions about and give our best account of.
and we call them our core intuitions and use the word ' core' to smuggle an appeal to nature and an ad populum. Your argument boils down to I would like this to be true and so would some other people, maybe quite a lot of people, but we have no way to justify it other than really really wanting it and thinking that it is what we feel like so it must be true.
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Well I inadvertently nuked the fridge with saying that, but you agree, so I guess we're done with being able to assess whether morality is objective or not then...?
I was agreeing that we don't escape subjective deliberation. But as we often subjectively deliberate about objective things that doesn't reflect on the issue of OM one way or the other. The arguement for OM is based on OM being the best account we can give of morality that matches morality as it is practiced.
And I almost see that as confusing the map for the place. Even if you were correct about how morality was practiced, that's not a description of what morality is fundamentally.
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Situation S = Tom is TACTDJFF and has the instinct/opinions/emotion that its ok to TACTDJFF.
Proposition P1 = HT thinks what is morally right is determined by our instincts, opinions and emotions.
Proposition P2 = HT thinks Tom's act of TACTDFF is morally wrong and would be wrong for anyone.
S, P1 and P2 form an inconsistent triad. Therefore in situation S you have to either reject P1 (emotivist anti-realism) or reject P2. Unfortunately P2 reflects some deep seated aspects of our moral practice and discarding them would not leave our morality intact.
Reject P2, I think S is wrong however accept Tom has a different opinion.
Which would be entirely consistent,
Thanks.
but would also be abandoning central elements of human morality to fit a theory rather than find a theory that accurately describes morality.
Nope, I love my family and accept you don't.
-
Situation S = Tom is TACTDJFF and has the instinct/opinions/emotion that its ok to TACTDJFF.
Proposition P1 = HT thinks what is morally right is determined by our instincts, opinions and emotions.
Proposition P2 = HT thinks Tom's act of TACTDFF is morally wrong and would be wrong for anyone.
S, P1 and P2 form an inconsistent triad. Therefore in situation S you have to either reject P1 (emotivist anti-realism) or reject P2. Unfortunately P2 reflects some deep seated aspects of our moral practice and discarding them would not leave our morality intact.
Reject P2, I think S is wrong however accept Tom has a different opinion.
Which would be entirely consistent, but would also be abandoning central elements of human morality to fit a theory rather than find a theory that accurately describes morality.
since all we have with morality is currently opinion then it is accurately describing it. Classifying strongly held it or absolutely expressed opinion as some how indicative of it not being is mere opinion.
That's not correct there is a difference between opinions we might have on moral issues and the implicit assumptions within our moral practice. I am referring to the latter.
you could be referring to King Dial, the best dressed man in Barbados for all it matters, calling things different names doesn' t change whether they are opinion or not. Further I would suggest you are falling into a version of the appeal to nature but is an appeal to words added to an ad populum.
It's not an appeal to nature..it's an argument based on our core intuitions about morality. The point of a theory that explains morality is that it does just that, explain morality as it is. If irrealism leads us to have to redefine morality to fit it then it's failing as a theory.
Also an implicit assumption embodied in a practice is not the same as an opinion. We can have an opinion that is contra to our embodied assumptions and not recognise these assumptions until they are pointed out. That happens all the time in philosophy.
and yet it no more makes those implicit assumptions objective than it makes them pink and sparkly. That we might express an opinion that is not in line with some other opinion is entirely useless.
And it is exactly an appeal to nature because you are assuming there is a level of opinion, and again calling it a core value or Arthur Negus gives it no more relationship to being objective, where it is somehow not an opinion. That is simply an appeal to nature and has no validity other than assertion and, yet again opinion.
The argument from morality doesn't claim that our intuitions or implicit assumptions MAKE morality objective, they are indicators that we perceive morality in this way. If morality is objective how we make sense of that is something we have to do quite separately from our intuitions and I've given an account of that. But the objectivity of morality is a metaphysical proposition and as such it's not something we can prove, it's something we have can only examine our core intuitions about and give our best account of.
and we call them our core intuitions and use the word ' core' to smuggle an appeal to nature and an ad populum. Your argument boils down to I would like this to be true and so would some other people, maybe quite a lot of people, but we have no way to justify it other than really really wanting it and thinking that it is what we feel like so it must be true.
And you can repeat 'appeal to nature' and 'ad populum' as often as you like but an appeal to our core intuitions about morality is neither of these things and if you think it is you need to go back and check what they mean. We have a social practice 'morality' which makes statements which assume truth and external standards of rightness. Theists at least (and arguably others) can give an account of why this is the case. When we examine the detailed features of realist and anti realist accounts realists come off best there too, when looking at moral motivation or the relationship between motivational and cognitive states for example. Its still quite possible to be an anti realist though in the light of that, you can do this by adopting an 'error theory' about morality.... By saying that our fundamental sense of morality is mistaken in key ways and it will ultimately be down to our intuitions about morality over which route we take. (The fact that the arguement leaves open a route for anti realism andis not saying 'it is true because...' Is also one of the reasons it is neither an ad populum or an appeal to nature).
For people whose intuitions lead them to accept OM there is also a reason to believe in God (assuming for now premise 2- that God is the best explanation for OM) for those who adopt an error theory for morality then they are left to (1) give an account of how morality could have come to be so universally distorted and (2) face up to the consequences that advocating a truth-free morality would have on our moral practice and moral motivation.
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Situation S = Tom is TACTDJFF and has the instinct/opinions/emotion that its ok to TACTDJFF.
Proposition P1 = HT thinks what is morally right is determined by our instincts, opinions and emotions.
Proposition P2 = HT thinks Tom's act of TACTDFF is morally wrong and would be wrong for anyone.
S, P1 and P2 form an inconsistent triad. Therefore in situation S you have to either reject P1 (emotivist anti-realism) or reject P2. Unfortunately P2 reflects some deep seated aspects of our moral practice and discarding them would not leave our morality intact.
Reject P2, I think S is wrong however accept Tom has a different opinion.
Which would be entirely consistent,
Thanks.
but would also be abandoning central elements of human morality to fit a theory rather than find a theory that accurately describes morality.
Nope, I love my family and accept you don't.
Which is fine when we are talking about who we love or questions of taste, but when it comes to Morality saying 'i disapprove of burning people alive but accept that Islamic State don't' doesn't come close to capturing what we want to say about the wrongness of that act.
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Morality (a behaviour is right or wrong) is a concept that only exists in the mind. Where else can it exist?
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Morality (a behaviour is right or wrong) is a concept that only exists in the mind. Where else can it exist?
Looking at the various arguments on the Internet, some seem to think some of it could be genetic.
Which is basically the same thing, I think.
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Morality (a behaviour is right or wrong) is a concept that only exists in the mind. Where else can it exist?
It could exist as a consequence of facts about the flourishing of conscious beings....such an account still requires minds but it is appealing to facts about beings with certain types of mental capacities rather than being derived from those capacities.
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Morality (a behaviour is right or wrong) is a concept that only exists in the mind. Where else can it exist?
Looking at the various arguments on the Internet, some seem to think some of it could be genetic.
Which is basically the same thing, I think.
No it isnt
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Morality (a behaviour is right or wrong) is a concept that only exists in the mind. Where else can it exist?
Looking at the various arguments on the Internet, some seem to think some of it could be genetic.
Which is basically the same thing, I think.
No it isnt
Basically it is. The genes can only express themselves through the mind.
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Situation S = Tom is TACTDJFF and has the instinct/opinions/emotion that its ok to TACTDJFF.
Proposition P1 = HT thinks what is morally right is determined by our instincts, opinions and emotions.
Proposition P2 = HT thinks Tom's act of TACTDFF is morally wrong and would be wrong for anyone.
S, P1 and P2 form an inconsistent triad. Therefore in situation S you have to either reject P1 (emotivist anti-realism) or reject P2. Unfortunately P2 reflects some deep seated aspects of our moral practice and discarding them would not leave our morality intact.
Reject P2, I think S is wrong however accept Tom has a different opinion.
Which would be entirely consistent,
Thanks.
but would also be abandoning central elements of human morality to fit a theory rather than find a theory that accurately describes morality.
Nope, I love my family and accept you don't.
Which is fine when we are talking about who we love or questions of taste, but when it comes to Morality saying 'i disapprove of burning people alive but accept that Islamic State don't' doesn't come close to capturing what we want to say about the wrongness of that act.
No, I love my family but accept you do not, is exactly the same.
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And you can repeat 'appeal to nature' and 'ad populum' as often as you like but an appeal to our core intuitions about morality is neither of these things and if you think it is you need to go back and check what they mean. We have a social practice 'morality' which makes statements which assume truth and external standards of rightness. Theists at least (and arguably others) can give an account of why this is the case. When we examine the detailed features of realist and anti realist accounts realists come off best there too, when looking at moral motivation or the relationship between motivational and cognitive states for example. Its still quite possible to be an anti realist though in the light of that, you can do this by adopting an 'error theory' about morality.... By saying that our fundamental sense of morality is mistaken in key ways and it will ultimately be down to our intuitions about morality over which route we take. (The fact that the arguement leaves open a route for anti realism andis not saying 'it is true because...' Is also one of the reasons it is neither an ad populum or an appeal to nature).
For people whose intuitions lead them to accept OM there is also a reason to believe in God (assuming for now premise 2- that God is the best explanation for OM) for those who adopt an error theory for morality then they are left to (1) give an account of how morality could have come to be so universally distorted and (2) face up to the consequences that advocating a truth-free morality would have on our moral practice and moral motivation.
I am repeating them because you are merely asserting that they do not apply and continuing with them
Let's make it clearer though. The appeal to nature is a strange version of it, as I have already mentioned, in that it is using the way people talk about morality to argue that this shows there is something different about it from 'opinions'. Even if it is allowed that there is a specific difference, then that is merely an appeal to nature since it is based on what we say and how we say it rather than anything beyond it. That you then dress up opinion with some spanx and a good dye job and call core moral intuitions does not change them.
Further when it is pointed out that not all people do talk aboit morality in that way, you then appeal to numbers and society, or terms as 'universally' which is an ad populism.
And your last comment is by definition an ad consequentiam.
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DT - are you really comparing morality to the moon landings. Oh shit. You are starting with your conclusion then.
No I'm just pointing out that what you refer to as 'going through a subjective process' is not an indicator of the subjective status of the subject of your deliberations..you seemed to me to be implying it was, I was giving you a counter example that isn't. Whether morality is or not is what we are trying to get to but that fact you make some personal deliberations about it is neither here nor there in reaching that conclusion.
Yeah, but the moon landings is a terrible analogy, I think. It's a kind of cheat.
It's just an example of how we subjectively deliberate over a factual issue. There are many examples if you don't like it pick another, but it's not a cheat
I think it's a cheat, because you're taking something which most people would accept is factual, and then comparing morality to this, without explaining the similarities and dissimilarities, as if we're supposed to say, oh yes, morality is like the moon landings then. OK, it's not a cheat, it's a con. Show your working out.
On the contrary, I think the Moon Landings is a good thing to use as a comparison.
Most people think the landings happened.
Most people think TACTDJFF is wrong
A few people don't think the landings happened (conspiracy theorists)
A few people don't think TACTDJFF is wrong (sociopaths)
What people think about the landings has no impact on whether they did objectively happen or not.
What people think about TACTDJFF has no impact on whether it is objectively right or wrong.
(according to the definition of 'objective')
We have the means to determine whether the landings happened; observation through telescopes for objects on the moon; data from the event and since; and eventhe possibility to visit the Moon again and see for ourselves.
We don't have the means to determine the OM of a situation, so all we can have is our subjective opinion about it.
ht
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Situation S = Tom is TACTDJFF and has the instinct/opinions/emotion that its ok to TACTDJFF.
Proposition P1 = HT thinks what is morally right is determined by our instincts, opinions and emotions.
Proposition P2 = HT thinks Tom's act of TACTDFF is morally wrong and would be wrong for anyone.
S, P1 and P2 form an inconsistent triad. Therefore in situation S you have to either reject P1 (emotivist anti-realism) or reject P2. Unfortunately P2 reflects some deep seated aspects of our moral practice and discarding them would not leave our morality intact.
Reject P2, I think S is wrong however accept Tom has a different opinion.
Which would be entirely consistent,
Thanks.
but would also be abandoning central elements of human morality to fit a theory rather than find a theory that accurately describes morality.
Nope, I love my family and accept you don't.
Lol I think that's what they call making your practice fit the theory.
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And you can repeat 'appeal to nature' and 'ad populum' as often as you like but an appeal to our core intuitions about morality is neither of these things and if you think it is you need to go back and check what they mean. We have a social practice 'morality' which makes statements which assume truth and external standards of rightness. Theists at least (and arguably others) can give an account of why this is the case. When we examine the detailed features of realist and anti realist accounts realists come off best there too, when looking at moral motivation or the relationship between motivational and cognitive states for example. Its still quite possible to be an anti realist though in the light of that, you can do this by adopting an 'error theory' about morality.... By saying that our fundamental sense of morality is mistaken in key ways and it will ultimately be down to our intuitions about morality over which route we take. (The fact that the arguement leaves open a route for anti realism andis not saying 'it is true because...' Is also one of the reasons it is neither an ad populum or an appeal to nature).
For people whose intuitions lead them to accept OM there is also a reason to believe in God (assuming for now premise 2- that God is the best explanation for OM) for those who adopt an error theory for morality then they are left to (1) give an account of how morality could have come to be so universally distorted and (2) face up to the consequences that advocating a truth-free morality would have on our moral practice and moral motivation.
I am repeating them because you are merely asserting that they do not apply and continuing with them
Let's make it clearer though. The appeal to nature is a strange version of it, as I have already mentioned, in that it is using the way people talk about morality to argue that this shows there is something different about it from 'opinions'. Even if it is allowed that there is a specific difference, then that is merely an appeal to nature since it is based on what we say and how we say it rather than anything beyond it. That you then dress up opinion with some spanx and a good dye job and call core moral intuitions does not change them.
Further when it is pointed out that not all people do talk aboit morality in that way, you then appeal to numbers and society, or terms as 'universally' which is an ad populism.
And your last comment is by definition an ad consequentiam.
Well its not an appeal to nature because I am not saying anything like 'this is natural and therefore right' rather I am making an observation about human moral discourse drawing out its implications. saying this is not 'a strange version of it' isn't going to help you squeeze a square peg into a round hole i'm afraid.
And of course it is different from opinions, and obviously so if you can have an opinion about morality being subjective yet still conform to moral practices that explicitly assume objectivity.
Linked to this point is the second one. Its quite correct that morality in all human societies have agreed on the expectation of a right answer. This point though isn't made to make a premise in a deductive argument (as it would need to be to be an ad populum) but rather to emphasise the implausibility of the idea morality could have become so universally distorted in its form. I've said this many times now. This is the trouble with getting half baked understandings of logical fallacies banded around on internet forums. Lots of things which are fallacies when applied to formal deductive arguments might very well be legitimately relevant to other forms of arguments such as related to the assessment of broad plausibility. Consequences are a another good example of something that is fallacious in the former but not the latter.
My last comment is simply a recognition that any argument (whether the moral argument for God or any other) only works if you agree with the premise and doesn't if you don't.
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DT - are you really comparing morality to the moon landings. Oh shit. You are starting with your conclusion then.
No I'm just pointing out that what you refer to as 'going through a subjective process' is not an indicator of the subjective status of the subject of your deliberations..you seemed to me to be implying it was, I was giving you a counter example that isn't. Whether morality is or not is what we are trying to get to but that fact you make some personal deliberations about it is neither here nor there in reaching that conclusion.
Yeah, but the moon landings is a terrible analogy, I think. It's a kind of cheat.
It's just an example of how we subjectively deliberate over a factual issue. There are many examples if you don't like it pick another, but it's not a cheat
I think it's a cheat, because you're taking something which most people would accept is factual, and then comparing morality to this, without explaining the similarities and dissimilarities, as if we're supposed to say, oh yes, morality is like the moon landings then. OK, it's not a cheat, it's a con. Show your working out.
On the contrary, I think the Moon Landings is a good thing to use as a comparison.
Most people think the landings happened.
Most people think TACTDJFF is wrong
A few people don't think the landings happened (conspiracy theorists)
A few people don't think TACTDJFF is wrong (sociopaths)
What people think about the landings has no impact on whether they did objectively happen or not.
What people think about TACTDJFF has no impact on whether it is objectively right or wrong.
(according to the definition of 'objective')
We have the means to determine whether the landings happened; observation through telescopes for objects on the moon; data from the event and since; and eventhe possibility to visit the Moon again and see for ourselves.
We don't have the means to determine the OM of a situation, so all we can have is our subjective opinion about it.
ht
You are appealing to a separate criteria again to define objectivity and subjectivity ( verification) - but that's not how ontological objectivity and subjectivity (the sense we are discussion in relation to morality) is defined - it simply means it exists independently of what we believe about it, whether we can verify it or not. All we have to do to show this is replace 'moon landings' in your example with a factual question that we can't verify like 'the existence of other universes' and your whole argument collapses.
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Situation S = Tom is TACTDJFF and has the instinct/opinions/emotion that its ok to TACTDJFF.
Proposition P1 = HT thinks what is morally right is determined by our instincts, opinions and emotions.
Proposition P2 = HT thinks Tom's act of TACTDFF is morally wrong and would be wrong for anyone.
S, P1 and P2 form an inconsistent triad. Therefore in situation S you have to either reject P1 (emotivist anti-realism) or reject P2. Unfortunately P2 reflects some deep seated aspects of our moral practice and discarding them would not leave our morality intact.
Reject P2, I think S is wrong however accept Tom has a different opinion.
Which would be entirely consistent,
Thanks.
but would also be abandoning central elements of human morality to fit a theory rather than find a theory that accurately describes morality.
Nope, I love my family and accept you don't.
Lol I think that's what they call making your practice fit the theory.
LOL thanks, sorry you lost the argument by the way, better luck next time.
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Situation S = Tom is TACTDJFF and has the instinct/opinions/emotion that its ok to TACTDJFF.
Proposition P1 = HT thinks what is morally right is determined by our instincts, opinions and emotions.
Proposition P2 = HT thinks Tom's act of TACTDFF is morally wrong and would be wrong for anyone.
S, P1 and P2 form an inconsistent triad. Therefore in situation S you have to either reject P1 (emotivist anti-realism) or reject P2. Unfortunately P2 reflects some deep seated aspects of our moral practice and discarding them would not leave our morality intact.
Reject P2, I think S is wrong however accept Tom has a different opinion.
Which would be entirely consistent,
Thanks.
but would also be abandoning central elements of human morality to fit a theory rather than find a theory that accurately describes morality.
Nope, I love my family and accept you don't.
Lol I think that's what they call making your practice fit the theory.
LOL thanks, sorry you lost the argument by the way, better luck next time.
Aww bless you is that what you think! I've been arguing that the anti-realist must either abandon anti-realism or abandon core intuitions about morality. As you've had to do the latter I'm quite delighted to have been proved right ..the fact that you do so shamelessly doesn't make it any better for you!
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Aww bless you is that what you think! I've been arguing that the anti-realist must either abandon anti-realism or abandon core intuitions about morality. As you've had to do the latter I'm quite delighted to have been proved right ..the fact that you do so shamelessly doesn't make it any better for you!
Sorry bud think you've failed to do that, keep pretending though! :)
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Aww bless you is that what you think! I've been arguing that the anti-realist must either abandon anti-realism or abandon core intuitions about morality. As you've had to do the latter I'm quite delighted to have been proved right ..the fact that you do so shamelessly doesn't make it any better for you!
Sorry bud think you've failed to do that, keep pretending though! :)
I know thats what you think....I'm more concerned with reality however than what you think, and telling yourself that stating 'I love my family...' Is somehow contributing a substantial point doesn't make it so. Sorry about that.
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Aww bless you is that what you think! I've been arguing that the anti-realist must either abandon anti-realism or abandon core intuitions about morality. As you've had to do the latter I'm quite delighted to have been proved right ..the fact that you do so shamelessly doesn't make it any better for you!
Sorry bud think you've failed to do that, keep pretending though! :)
I know thats what you think....I'm more concerned with reality however than what you think, and telling yourself that stating 'I love my family...' Is somehow contributing a substantial point doesn't make it so. Sorry about that.
By using that analogy I have not abandoned core intuitions of morality, so you are refuted.
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Aww bless you is that what you think! I've been arguing that the anti-realist must either abandon anti-realism or abandon core intuitions about morality. As you've had to do the latter I'm quite delighted to have been proved right ..the fact that you do so shamelessly doesn't make it any better for you!
Sorry bud think you've failed to do that, keep pretending though! :)
I know thats what you think....I'm more concerned with reality however than what you think, and telling yourself that stating 'I love my family...' Is somehow contributing a substantial point doesn't make it so. Sorry about that.
By using that analogy I have not abandoned core intuitions of morality, so you are refuted.
It demonstrates quite the opposite. You can say 'i love my family and i accept that others don't'...so apply that to analogy to one of the moral situations we have been discussing...
"I disapprove of Tactdjff but accept that others don't"
"I disapprove of the Taliban burning people to death but i accept that the don't"
If you think either of those capture what we want to say morally about these situations you are deluding yourself to sustain your arguement...it's about as bad as analogy as you can get and well illustrates the inadequacies of the irrealist position here.
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It demonstrates quite the opposite. You can say 'i love my family and i accept that others don't'...so apply that to analogy to one of the moral situations we have been discussing...
"I disapprove of Tactdjff but accept that others don't"
"I disapprove of the Taliban burning people to death but i accept that the don't"
If you think either of those capture what we want to say morally about these situations you are deluding yourself to sustain your arguement...it's about as bad as analogy as you can get and well illustrates the inadequacies of the irrealist position here.
You'll have to explain you think I'm deluding myself , do you think the Taliban think burning people really think its wrong but do it anyway?
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DT - are you really comparing morality to the moon landings. Oh shit. You are starting with your conclusion then.
No I'm just pointing out that what you refer to as 'going through a subjective process' is not an indicator of the subjective status of the subject of your deliberations..you seemed to me to be implying it was, I was giving you a counter example that isn't. Whether morality is or not is what we are trying to get to but that fact you make some personal deliberations about it is neither here nor there in reaching that conclusion.
Yeah, but the moon landings is a terrible analogy, I think. It's a kind of cheat.
It's just an example of how we subjectively deliberate over a factual issue. There are many examples if you don't like it pick another, but it's not a cheat
I think it's a cheat, because you're taking something which most people would accept is factual, and then comparing morality to this, without explaining the similarities and dissimilarities, as if we're supposed to say, oh yes, morality is like the moon landings then. OK, it's not a cheat, it's a con. Show your working out.
On the contrary, I think the Moon Landings is a good thing to use as a comparison.
Most people think the landings happened.
Most people think TACTDJFF is wrong
A few people don't think the landings happened (conspiracy theorists)
A few people don't think TACTDJFF is wrong (sociopaths)
What people think about the landings has no impact on whether they did objectively happen or not.
What people think about TACTDJFF has no impact on whether it is objectively right or wrong.
(according to the definition of 'objective')
We have the means to determine whether the landings happened; observation through telescopes for objects on the moon; data from the event and since; and eventhe possibility to visit the Moon again and see for ourselves.
We don't have the means to determine the OM of a situation, so all we can have is our subjective opinion about it.
ht
You are appealing to a separate criteria again to define objectivity and subjectivity ( verification) - but that's not how ontological objectivity and subjectivity (the sense we are discussion in relation to morality) is defined - it simply means it exists independently of what we believe about it, whether we can verify it or not. All we have to do to show this is replace 'moon landings' in your example with a factual question that we can't verify like 'the existence of other universes' and your whole argument collapses.
In what way does 'the existence of other universes' collapse my argument?
Most people think the landings happened.
Most people think TACTDJFF is wrong
Some people think other universes exist
A few people don't think the landings happened (conspiracy theorists)
A few people don't think TACTDJFF is wrong (sociopaths)
Some people don't think other universes exist
What people think about the landings has no impact on whether they did objectively happen or not.
What people think about TACTDJFF has no impact on whether it is objectively right or wrong.
What people think about the existence of other universes has no impact on whether they objectively exist or not
(according to the definition of 'objective')
We have the means to determine whether the landings happened; observation through telescopes for objects on the moon; data from the event and since; and eventhe possibility to visit the Moon again and see for ourselves.
We don't have the means to determine the OM of a situation, so all we can have is our subjective opinion about it.
We don't (currently) have the means to determine whether other universes exist, so all we can (currently) have is our subjective opinion about it.
How has that collapsed the argument?
ht
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Hi Alan,
When reading through your response to Andy(mess 289) you said this:
I sincerely hope you would and would expect all our regular contributors here to agree (if they were not in a discussion on the Christian Topic message board and aware of where agreeing that objective morality existing might lead them).
This seemed to be a response to you asking whether Andy would agree that, even if there were other motives, the idea of TACTD just for fun is morally wrong.
However, for my own part, I am somwhat puzzled by the response that I have quoted above. I have already stated several times that in my opinion it is morally wrong, and that I see no reason to invoke OM, so no problem on the first part. However, I'm not at all sure what the second part actually means.
Are you suggesting that by stating that I think it is morally wrong, I accept the idea that OM definitely exists? In which case, I would disagree, and for reasons which I have made clear previously.
Or/and are you suggesting that my disagreement is predicated on the idea that belief in OM would, in some way, lead to the conclusion that a god, especially the Christian God, exists, and, consequentially therefore, I would simply reject the whole idea of OM because I don't believe in any god? Again, if this is what you meant, I would disagree. I have tried to look at the whole idea of OM in its own right. My own conclusions, such as they are, take into account the cultural influences of religions as one facet of our moral behaviour but are not based on, or even coloured by, any ideas associated with the existence/non existence of gods at all.
And, furthermore, are you suggesting that I may well have a different view of OM if I were not on 'the Christian Topic message board'? I am at a loss to make any sense of this unless you mean that I only hold to my ideas about OM in the presence of or when arguing with Christians. If this is what you meant then I would again disagree. I am always prepared to alter my views according to how convincing I find the evidence and arguments, but my views would not alter simply according to whom I am debating/discussing with.
A little clarification of your above quote would not not come amiss. Ta muchly. :)
Bumped for Alan(Alien) to respond to, hopefully. :)
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DT - are you really comparing morality to the moon landings. Oh shit. You are starting with your conclusion then.
No I'm just pointing out that what you refer to as 'going through a subjective process' is not an indicator of the subjective status of the subject of your deliberations..you seemed to me to be implying it was, I was giving you a counter example that isn't. Whether morality is or not is what we are trying to get to but that fact you make some personal deliberations about it is neither here nor there in reaching that conclusion.
Yeah, but the moon landings is a terrible analogy, I think. It's a kind of cheat.
It's just an example of how we subjectively deliberate over a factual issue. There are many examples if you don't like it pick another, but it's not a cheat
I think it's a cheat, because you're taking something which most people would accept is factual, and then comparing morality to this, without explaining the similarities and dissimilarities, as if we're supposed to say, oh yes, morality is like the moon landings then. OK, it's not a cheat, it's a con. Show your working out.
On the contrary, I think the Moon Landings is a good thing to use as a comparison.
Most people think the landings happened.
Most people think TACTDJFF is wrong
A few people don't think the landings happened (conspiracy theorists)
A few people don't think TACTDJFF is wrong (sociopaths)
What people think about the landings has no impact on whether they did objectively happen or not.
What people think about TACTDJFF has no impact on whether it is objectively right or wrong.
(according to the definition of 'objective')
We have the means to determine whether the landings happened; observation through telescopes for objects on the moon; data from the event and since; and eventhe possibility to visit the Moon again and see for ourselves.
We don't have the means to determine the OM of a situation, so all we can have is our subjective opinion about it.
ht
You are appealing to a separate criteria again to define objectivity and subjectivity ( verification) - but that's not how ontological objectivity and subjectivity (the sense we are discussion in relation to morality) is defined - it simply means it exists independently of what we believe about it, whether we can verify it or not. All we have to do to show this is replace 'moon landings' in your example with a factual question that we can't verify like 'the existence of other universes' and your whole argument collapses.
In what way does 'the existence of other universes' collapse my argument?
Most people think the landings happened.
Most people think TACTDJFF is wrong
Some people think other universes exist
A few people don't think the landings happened (conspiracy theorists)
A few people don't think TACTDJFF is wrong (sociopaths)
Some people don't think other universes exist
What people think about the landings has no impact on whether they did objectively happen or not.
What people think about TACTDJFF has no impact on whether it is objectively right or wrong.
What people think about the existence of other universes has no impact on whether they objectively exist or not
(according to the definition of 'objective')
We have the means to determine whether the landings happened; observation through telescopes for objects on the moon; data from the event and since; and eventhe possibility to visit the Moon again and see for ourselves.
We don't have the means to determine the OM of a situation, so all we can have is our subjective opinion about it.
We don't (currently) have the means to determine whether other universes exist, so all we can (currently) have is our subjective opinion about it.
How has that collapsed the argument?
ht
Depends what your point is.....I have nothing against saying that we can't determine the objective truth of the existence of other universes and so our beliefs about them can only be our opinions and also saying exactly the same of OM. I've said myself more than once that we can't prove OM...but if that's all you are saying then why? No one has claimed OM can be proved.
But as it happens you have said more than that - you have said that you think to have a subjective belief about OM is self contradictory, but that's clearly not true for the reasons you yourself admit...when we can't prove something, we can't prove it, but that doesn't mean it doesn't exist as an objective fact...to use your own phrase our beliefs have "no impact on whether they exist or not". That's exactly right, as Alan and I have both said. Our belief about OM (whether we believe in it or if you don't) have no impact on it...so it can't possibly be the case that our beliefs about OM existing contradicts its existence - if it did then that would be an impact and a pretty big one too. Whenever this is pointed out to you, you have just gone off talking about verification, but as soon as we come to something that can't be verified like other universes, we all have to agree that our beliefs have no impact = none at all one way or the other, and certainly not a self-contradictory one as you have claimed.
Alan has clarified (repeatedly now) that his argument is about consistency of belief, one about our beliefs making morality objective.
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It demonstrates quite the opposite. You can say 'i love my family and i accept that others don't'...so apply that to analogy to one of the moral situations we have been discussing...
"I disapprove of Tactdjff but accept that others don't"
"I disapprove of the Taliban burning people to death but i accept that the don't"
If you think either of those capture what we want to say morally about these situations you are deluding yourself to sustain your arguement...it's about as bad as analogy as you can get and well illustrates the inadequacies of the irrealist position here.
You'll have to explain you think I'm deluding myself , do you think the Taliban think burning people really think its wrong but do it anyway?
I’m quite sure the IS guy thinks his actions are ok – the problem with the statement “I disapproves of burning people alive but IS thinks its ok” isn’t that its false (as far as it goes) but rather that it doesn’t adequately express what we want to say about this situation morally. If morality was like loving your wife, and accepting that others don’t, then when people behave in ways we don’t like the best we can say is ‘I disapprove of that’. But in no society, at any point in human history has acts of moral condemnation ever just meant ‘I disapprove of you doing that’- when is meant by it is it is wrong, that the people doing it are worthy of blame...but we don't blame people for not agreeing with us about who to love or whether they should share our taste in marmite. We don't think they are wrong in having different tastes, it stops at the emotion/taste - they don't like it and that's that.
The same issue arises re my previous example of why we change our moral beliefs, including at times our core beliefs, we do so because we think our previous beliefs were mistaken and not because we have had a change of taste or emotion.
These aren't periphery elements of morality -they are absolutely central features of it.
There are other more technical problems too: If moral judgements were just emotional responses then how do we distinguish between moral and none moral domains of judgement? - Moral judgements have universally been treated as different from general preferences or ascetic judgements but there's no clear way to even demarcate these different sort of judgements if your analogy is correct. It gets worse still for your analogy, as expressions of personal preference derive their forcefulness from situational context but moral statements derive their force from articulation of rational arguments which presuppose impersonal standards.
There are also many cases in which find ourselves conflicted between what we want to do and what we feel we ought to do...in other words we pit rational standards of what is morally right against our emotions, tastes and desires. Further, as Syn pointed out on the last thread, if we analyse our use of moral language we find the use of the same semantic and pragmatic linguistic mechanisms to analyze their truth value as we do with factual claims.
I could go on the - whole assumption of fact-value division behind this view of morality is, as I discussed in an earlier post, woefully inadequate at describing our moral motivation and general cognitive processes - the way our conception of the world are simultaneously both descriptive and evaluative....
In other words comparing morality to loving your family is about as bad an analogy as you can get. When we create theories about morality their job is to explain morality...but treating morality as an emotion like loving your family fails repeatedly to explain morality as it is, and rather does exactly what I accused you of doing - trying to make morality fit your theory rather than the other way around. Your theory erodes our morality and just leaves us with a pale reflection of it.
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Thanks for explaining your argument I had no idea it would so pitifully weak. I could put it all apart but will just focus on the weakest parts of your post.
But in no society, at any point in human history has acts of moral condemnation ever just meant ‘I disapprove of you doing that’- when is meant by it is it is wrong, that the people doing it are worthy of blame...but we don't blame people for not agreeing with us about who to love or whether they should share our taste in marmite. We don't think they are wrong in having different tastes, it stops at the emotion/taste - they don't like it and that's that.
Factually incorrect there are countless examples where others morally condemn an act and meant 'I disapprove', is it moral to not pray five times a day, to smoke, to eat a lot of fatty foods, to scratch ones arse, to vote conservative. Every single action we take has a moral dimension to it.
The same issue arises re my previous example of why we change our moral beliefs, including at times our core beliefs, we do so because we think our previous beliefs were mistaken and not because we have had a change of taste or emotion.
These aren't periphery elements of morality -they are absolutely central features of it.
When I was a young adult I would have described myself as homophobic, empathy, an emotion, for homosexuals changed my view.
There are other more technical problems too: If moral judgements were just emotional responses then how do we distinguish between moral and none moral domains of judgement? - Moral judgements have universally been treated as different from general preferences or ascetic judgements but there's no clear way to even demarcate these different sort of judgements if your analogy is correct.
I never claimed moral judgements were just emotional responses. Moral judgements are a complex mix of emotions and reason. Love is a complex mix of emotion and reason. The mix of both is different but the analogy stands.
It gets worse still for your analogy, as expressions of personal preference derive their forcefulness from situational context but moral statements derive their force from articulation of rational arguments which presuppose impersonal standards.
Moral statements derive their force from emotions.
There are also many cases in which find ourselves conflicted between what we want to do and what we feel we ought to do...in other words we pit rational standards of what is morally right against our emotions, tastes and desires.
As we do sometimes with love.
In other words comparing morality to loving your family is about as bad an analogy as you can get. When we create theories about morality their job is to explain morality...but treating morality as an emotion like loving your family fails repeatedly to explain morality as it is, and rather does exactly what I accused you of doing - trying to make morality fit your theory rather than the other way around. Your theory erodes our morality and just leaves us with a pale reflection of it.
I don't think your understand what an analogy is. Treating morality as an objective like 2+2=4 erodes the value of morality and just leaves us with a pale reflection of it.
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Depends what your point is.....I have nothing against saying that we can't determine the objective truth of the existence of other universes and so our beliefs about them can only be our opinions and also saying exactly the same of OM. I've said myself more than once that we can't prove OM...but if that's all you are saying then why? No one has claimed OM can be proved.
No, they haven't. People have claimed it exists, and others have asked them for a means to determine that it does, but no-one yet has presented a method.
But as it happens you have said more than that - you have said that you think to have a subjective belief about OM is self contradictory, but that's clearly not true for the reasons you yourself admit...when we can't prove something, we can't prove it, but that doesn't mean it doesn't exist as an objective fact...to use your own phrase our beliefs have "no impact on whether they exist or not". That's exactly right, as Alan and I have both said. Our belief about OM (whether we believe in it or if you don't) have no impact on it...so it can't possibly be the case that our beliefs about OM existing contradicts its existence - if it did then that would be an impact and a pretty big one too. Whenever this is pointed out to you, you have just gone off talking about verification, but as soon as we come to something that can't be verified like other universes, we all have to agree that our beliefs have no impact = none at all one way or the other, and certainly not a self-contradictory one as you have claimed.
Not quite.
'Objective', in this case, means 'independent of opinion'.
Arguing that, because someone is of the opinion that something is OM, they should believe OM exists, is self-contradictory. How can they believe OM exists based on their *opinion* that it does?
Alan has clarified (repeatedly now) that his argument is about consistency of belief, one about our beliefs making morality objective.
Yes, I know.
ht
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No, they haven't. People have claimed it exists, and others have asked them for a means to determine that it does, but no-one yet has presented a method.
We do think it exists, just as some people think other universes exists. We’ve also said it can’t be proved many times so its daft to ask for a method to prove it any more than it makes sense to ask for a method to prove other universes. As Alan has clarified unambiguously that his argument is one about consistency asking for a method is identifying consistency seems a little silly – the method for testing consistency you simply draw out the implications of your beliefs and see if they contradict.
Not quite.
'Objective', in this case, means 'independent of opinion'.
Arguing that, because someone is of the opinion that something is OM, they should believe OM exists, is self-contradictory. How can they believe OM exists based on their *opinion* that it does?
The argument isn’t that it exists because they believe it. The argument is that if you believe things that imply OM then you should believe in OM to be consistent. That’s not self-contradictory, it’s the opposite. There is nothing self-contradictory in believing that something exists in order to be consistent with other beliefs you have – its not a proof either of course but we can virtually never prove metaphysical questions so we wouldn’t expect to find a proof anyway, all we can do is give the best account. If we believe x and also believe y, where y contradicts x, you can give up x or y (or both). There is nothing self-contradictory about arguing that.
Yes, I know.
Great hopefully no more repeats of it being self-contradictory then or asking for methods because that just wouldn’t make sense.
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Thanks for explaining your argument I had no idea it would so pitifully weak. I could put it all apart but will just focus on the weakest parts of your post.
Ohh good am I going to be faced with some brilliant insights and blinding arguments! Lets see then..
Factually incorrect there are countless examples where others morally condemn an act and meant 'I disapprove', is it moral to not pray five times a day, to smoke, to eat a lot of fatty foods, to scratch ones arse, to vote conservative. Every single action we take has a moral dimension to it.
Are you deliberately missing the point? It’s hard to believe seeing as I began the whole post by explaining that my objection to the sentence ‘I disapprove of IS burning people but accept that they don’t’ wasn’t that its false, but that it doesn’t express everything we want to say about morality, pointing out that morality has always about MORE than this such as involving judgements about the wrongness of the action including the fact that we blame them for their actions…..yet you respond to my point that morality involves more than just disapproving by giving examples of people disapproving…..It beggars belief therefore, that I have to point then the accepting the fact that morality does involves disapproval, does nothing to counter the criticism that morality involves more than JUST disapproval. Not starting well for you then, so far not so much as a failed counter argument from you as you missing the point entirely.
When I was a young adult I would have described myself as homophobic, empathy, an emotion, for homosexuals changed my view.
Empathy is a good example of how we can’t sharply separate facts and values. Empathy is not simply an emotion, it’s a capacity to feel or understand the emotions of others and then take them into account. Your example above is revealing more for what it didn’t say than what it did…it begs the question, when we use empathy to allow us insight into something (like how homosexuals feel) and change our views because of it we do so because the empathy helps us to recognise our older homophobic views had been mistaken. Empathy allows us to have insights into how other feel that we wouldn’t otherwise take into account and that therefore expand our understanding the world. How we think it feels to be the subject of homosexual prejudice or to love someone who is the same sex as you becomes a fact we take into account and it reveals to us that our older prejudiced perspective missed out this crucial fact about the situation. If we didn’t think the emotion gave us a better perspective we wouldn’t change our view – indeed we could have empathy for someone being sent to prison for a crime but still accept that it is the right thing to do despite our emotional affinity with how they may feel, so its not the emotion itself that drives the change but the wider understanding of the situation that it allows us to appreciate.
I never claimed moral judgements were just emotional responses. Moral judgements are a complex mix of emotions and reason. Love is a complex mix of emotion and reason. The mix of both is different but the analogy stands.
Good grief it gets worse…Love IS an emotion, that’s its definition! We can’t reason our way into loving someone and often love despite reason. If we feel love we love them and if we don’t we don’t that’s the beginning and end of it regardless of how we might subsequently want to invoke our emotional connections in reasoning about our actions involving people we love.
Anything we reason about can potentially involve emotion so saying ‘it’s a complex mix of emotions and reasons’ doesn’t tell us anything about that relationship. Luckily a few post back you affirmed that you accept the statement “what is morally right is determined by our instincts, opinions and emotions” so there is no point trying to back track now as your analogy collapses around you
Moral statements derive their force from emotions.
As a general statement that’s simply false. Morality CAN involve emotions but it can also be exercised dispassionately. Courts go out of their way to give dispassionate sentences to reflect the appropriate level of moral condemnation for crimes as defined in law. Luckily I haven’t had anything stolen for years and thinking of stealing evokes no emotion in me whatsoever, yet I can quite dispassionately accept that its wrong without having to empathise with a theft victim, just based on an appeal to the abstract fact that I think people’s rights to property should be respected. Indeed we often make judgements about what is right or wrong despite our emotions to the contra.
As we do sometimes with love.
When we pit rational standards of what to do against love it’s because love IS the emotion set against the rationality by contrast when we pit our emotions against the rational standards of what we think we morally should do it’s because morality IS the rational standard we are pitching emotion against!!!
Also noticed you missed out the next two points too.
I don't think your understand what an analogy is. Treating morality as an objective like 2+2=4 erodes the value of morality and just leaves us with a pale reflection of it.
Thankfully as I’ve already gone in to quite a bit of detail discussing the relationship of emotion and morality it should be clear to anyone that I don’t think morality works like abstract rules at all never mind anything analogous to a mathematical formula. Your attempt to use an analogy to capture what I think is unfortunately just as bad as your own analogy has turned out to be. Realist morality can account for morality exactly as we experience it, the fact that we praise or blame people for making right or wrong moral choices, the fact that we struggle to make the right decisions and discard our old views because they are mistaken when we gain new insights. Realism understands that facts and values are not distinct and that our rational conception of the world involves inseparable descriptive and evaluative judgements which will motivate and move the virtuous person to action.
After all your bluster and self-proclaimed ‘winning’ of the argument it turns out that every single response you have made above without exception has missed the mark. I would have thought as my arguments were apparently ‘pitifully weak’ that you might have been able to muster a viable defence against at least one of them, but apparently not.
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No, they haven't. People have claimed it exists, and others have asked them for a means to determine that it does, but no-one yet has presented a method.
We do think it exists, just as some people think other universes exists. We’ve also said it can’t be proved many times so its daft to ask for a method to prove it any more than it makes sense to ask for a method to prove other universes. As Alan has clarified unambiguously that his argument is one about consistency asking for a method is identifying consistency seems a little silly – the method for testing consistency you simply draw out the implications of your beliefs and see if they contradict.
And yet, I accept that I think TACTDJFF to be wrong, and would think it was wrong anytime, anywhere - but I see no reason why that means I should believe in OM. I see my opinion as a product of my upbringing, empathy, etc, etc. If any of those had been different, my opinion may also have been different.
Not quite.
'Objective', in this case, means 'independent of opinion'.
Arguing that, because someone is of the opinion that something is OM, they should believe OM exists, is self-contradictory. How can they believe OM exists based on their *opinion* that it does?
The argument isn’t that it exists because they believe it. The argument is that if you believe things that imply OM then you should believe in OM to be consistent. That’s not self-contradictory, it’s the opposite. There is nothing self-contradictory in believing that something exists in order to be consistent with other beliefs you have – its not a proof either of course but we can virtually never prove metaphysical questions so we wouldn’t expect to find a proof anyway, all we can do is give the best account. If we believe x and also believe y, where y contradicts x, you can give up x or y (or both). There is nothing self-contradictory about arguing that.
I'm not saying that, though.
I am saying that, as I have pointed out above, peoples' opinion on a moral issue is based on many subjective foundations. To say that because they believe something in wrong and would always be, they should also believe in OM, is to say that they should base their belief in the OM on their opinion.
Yes, I know.
Great hopefully no more repeats of it being self-contradictory then or asking for methods because that just wouldn’t make sense.
Sure, as soon as it stops being self-contradictory and/or a method is presented.
ht
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Are you deliberately missing the point? It’s hard to believe seeing as I began the whole post by explaining that my objection to the sentence ‘I disapprove of IS burning people but accept that they don’t’ wasn’t that its false, but that it doesn’t express everything we want to say about morality,
Did I claim that it expressed everything we want to say about morality?
I was responding to your comment "But in no society, at any point in human history has acts of moral condemnation ever just meant ‘I disapprove of you doing that’"
Good grief it gets worse…Love IS an emotion, that’s its definition! We can’t reason our way into loving someone and often love despite reason. If we feel love we love them and if we don’t we don’t that’s the beginning and end of it regardless of how we might subsequently want to invoke our emotional connections in reasoning about our actions involving people we love.
Sure love is an an emotion but its driven by other emotions and reasons. You can reason your way into not loving someone, I've had relationships where it became clear to me via reason we were incompatible.
Anything we reason about can potentially involve emotion so saying ‘it’s a complex mix of emotions and reasons’ doesn’t tell us anything about that relationship. Luckily a few post back you affirmed that you accept the statement “what is morally right is determined by our instincts, opinions and emotions” so there is no point trying to back track now as your analogy collapses around you
So do you know accept that love is a mixture of reason and emotion?
As a general statement that’s simply false. Morality CAN involve emotions but it can also be exercised dispassionately. Courts go out of their way to give dispassionate sentences to reflect the appropriate level of moral condemnation for crimes as defined in law. Luckily I haven’t had anything stolen for years and thinking of stealing evokes no emotion in me whatsoever, yet I can quite dispassionately accept that its wrong without having to empathise with a theft victim, just based on an appeal to the abstract fact that I think people’s rights to property should be respected. Indeed we often make judgements about what is right or wrong despite our emotions to the contra.
Courts decide what is legal not what is moral. The thought of someone stealing evokes in an emotion in me, its not that I 'have' to empathise with the victim its just that I do.
"I think peoples rights of property should be respected." Bold = emotion.
After all your bluster and self-proclaimed ‘winning’ of the argument it turns out that every single response you have made above without exception has missed the mark. I would have thought as my arguments were apparently ‘pitifully weak’ that you might have been able to muster a viable defence against at least one of them, but apparently not.
Yes I'm skip most of your drivel as well. Your position is that we decide moral positions differently to those positions that are clearly subjective like taste and love.
We don't.
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And yet, I accept that I think TACTDJFF to be wrong, and would think it was wrong anytime, anywhere - but I see no reason why that means I should believe in OM. I see my opinion as a product of my upbringing, empathy, etc, etc. If any of those had been different, my opinion may also have been different.
You missed off the last part of that I notice - the one I pointed out before was the crucial bit of Alan's argument - you know the 'being wrong for everyone' bit.. You can definitely say you think its wrong for you anytime, anywhere but as soon as you reference others you are left with the inconsistent triad I pointed out in reply 281 on this thread.
I'm not saying that, though.
I am saying that, as I have pointed out above, peoples' opinion on a moral issue is based on many subjective foundations. To say that because they believe something in wrong and would always be, they should also believe in OM, is to say that they should base their belief in the OM on their opinion.
On consistency of opinions to be precise, but that's not contradictory. If I can believe in the objectivity of other universes and accept this is based on my opinions (as it has to be seeing as it is unverifiable) I can also believe in the objectivity of morality and accept this is my opinion. Its not a proof of OM of course (but as you seem to accept that no one is claiming proof then that fine) but its definitely not self-contradictory as I'm not saying the objective existence of other universes or morality is dependent on our opinion for its objective existence.
Sure, as soon as it stops being self-contradictory and/or a method is presented.
Which should be clear now that it isn't.
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Did I claim that it expressed everything we want to say about morality?
If morality is a personal response like emotion then the best we could say about something we don't agree with is 'I disapprove of that' because, if your theory of morality is correct then there are no external standards of morality by which we can make judgements about someone else's behaviour if they have a different personal response to it than you do (as you accepted in your reply 301). If there is more to morality than expressing approval then your theory doesn't explain it!
I was responding to your comment "But in no society, at any point in human history has acts of moral condemnation ever just meant ‘I disapprove of you doing that’"
Which is correct, morality has always been able to express more than just disapproval as your comment above concedes.
Sure love is an an emotion but its driven by other emotions and reasons. You can reason your way into not loving someone, I've had relationships where it became clear to me via reason we were incompatible.
and
So do you know accept that love is a mixture of reason and emotion?
I guess no attempt to muster a defence on the changing views point....on to this one then..
All social interactions when they become complex become mixtures of emotions and reasons but that fact doesn't prevent us from asking ‘which of these things does it derive from?’ As explained before, moral realists (some at least) think that cognitive states are both motivational (emotive) and rational at the same time which fits exactly with what you are saying, nevertheless if there are facts involved in morality then we can judge the objective rightness or wrongness of the action against the external standards of those facts. If you think that you are a moral realist. If you don't think you can do that then that's because you need to claim (to sustain your theory) that the facts 'ultimately' rely on individuals/emotional responses rather than the facts, and if that's the case all the criticisms in raised in reply 351 come straight back into play.
Courts decide what is legal not what is moral.
In cases of sentencing laws try to represent the moral feelings of society, which is why when sentences for sex offenders were lengthened recently this was justified on the grounds that short sentences did not adequately reflect the level of moral condemnation that our society holds towards these crimes.
The thought of someone stealing evokes in an emotion in me, its not that I 'have' to empathise with the victim its just that I do.
"I think peoples rights of property should be respected." Bold = emotion.
And it may well do, it just doesn't have too as I can make moral judgements dispassionately. For example the idea of respect may well give rise to an emotion in you but it can just as easily not and be based on a rational understanding of what allows people to live and pursue their goals in modern societies easily and free from conflict. The emotion is neither necessary nor sufficient for the moral judgement.
Yes I'm skip most of your drivel as well. Your position is that we decide moral positions differently to those positions that are clearly subjective like taste and love.
We don't.
Its' no surprise you have retreated into assertion over argument seeing as you have now twice failed to defend your position. This is no doubt an embarrassment for you given your triumphalism a few posts back. Sorry about that.
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All social interactions when they become complex become mixtures of emotions and reasons but that fact doesn't prevent us from asking ‘which of these things does it derive from?’ As explained before, moral realists (some at least) think that cognitive states are both motivational (emotive) and rational at the same time which fits exactly with what you are saying, nevertheless if there are facts involved in morality then we can judge the objective rightness or wrongness of the action against the external standards of those facts. If you think that you are a moral realist. If you don't think you can do that then that's because you need to claim (to sustain your theory) that the facts 'ultimately' rely on individuals/emotional responses rather than the facts, and if that's the case all the criticisms in raised in reply 351 come straight back into play.
No I have moral axioms, based on emotion, reason and experience, from these I derive 'objective rightness or wrongness'. The axioms are not external to me.
I look forward to you demonstrating these moral 'facts'.
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All social interactions when they become complex become mixtures of emotions and reasons but that fact doesn't prevent us from asking ‘which of these things does it derive from?’ As explained before, moral realists (some at least) think that cognitive states are both motivational (emotive) and rational at the same time which fits exactly with what you are saying, nevertheless if there are facts involved in morality then we can judge the objective rightness or wrongness of the action against the external standards of those facts. If you think that you are a moral realist. If you don't think you can do that then that's because you need to claim (to sustain your theory) that the facts 'ultimately' rely on individuals/emotional responses rather than the facts, and if that's the case all the criticisms in raised in reply 351 come straight back into play.
No I have moral axioms, based on emotion, reason and experience, from these I derive 'objective rightness or wrongness'. The axioms are not external to me.
I look forward to you demonstrating these moral 'facts'.
so much for the 'love' analogy.
No attempt to engage in any of the arguments made at all this time then just a retreat to your axiom statement...a position that doesn't solve any of the problems raised. We change our moral beliefs including core axioms at times because we believe our previous ones were wrong, spouting on about axioms cannot help us with this. An axiom based on your own personal responses is no more a basis for setting objective standards than an analogy with love is and doesn't help with the problem of how we judge others actions right or wrong - something you have already accepted in post 301....you are not even consistent between your own posts.
As for 'demonstrating moral facts' its blindingly obvious that you are trying to divert the conversation away from your epic failure to answer any of the points raised against your position. If this wasn't clear from the context it should be clear from the fact that you have already told us that you recognise talk of proof of moral facts is a silly question to ask - remember that conversation? It was something like "who said anything about proof?" '...oh shit it was me'. If by demonstrating you don't mean prove then its not clear what you do mean as I have already explained how we would go about discovering moral facts based on the account of objective morality I have given. As this doesn't leave much scope left for interpreting your question its pretty clear that its just something you thought you'd write to try and save face. Come off it Jakswan either answer the criticisms or give it up, you are not fooling anyone.
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so much for the 'love' analogy.
Still applies I want to focus the debate though.
your axiom statement...a position that doesn't solve any of the problems raised. We change our moral beliefs including core axioms at times because we believe our previous ones were wrong, spouting on about axioms cannot help us with this.
Getting hysterical does nothing to refute the argument put against you. So if we change our core axioms it isnot because of something 'out there' then the core axioms are subjective.
An axiom based on your own personal responses is no more a basis for setting objective standards than an analogy with love is and doesn't help with the problem of how we judge others actions right or wrong - something you have already accepted in post 301....you are not even consistent between your own posts.
There is no 'problem' with how we judge others actions right or wrong. How is saying 'reject P2' saying I accept anything?
As for 'demonstrating moral facts' its blindingly obvious that you are trying to divert the conversation away from your epic failure to answer any of the points raised against your position.
Look sit down and have a nice cup of tea. Claiming something like 'moral facts' seems to me to be right at the core of the issue so lets stick to the topic at hand. Whilst you childish outbursts are mildly entertaining lets try to keep this sensible.
I have already explained how we would go about discovering moral facts based on the account of objective morality I have given.
Excellent could you just highlight the post you did this in please.
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Still applies I want to focus the debate though.
Focusing the debate, oh I see is that what you're doing. So glad you explained it because it just looked like you had tried twice to justify your analogy, failed miserably to do so then dropped any attempt at trying to defend it in the face of your failure. Unfortunately the debate is not yours to focus at whim and I equally would like to focus the debate on the inadequacy of the analogy, unless of course you are willing to admit its inadequacy so we can move on. As I've refuted everyone one of your attempts to answer the criticisms of your analogy do you have any other arguments to muster or shall we just accept that you can't because it doesn't work?
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your axiom statement...a position that doesn't solve any of the problems raised. We change our moral beliefs including core axioms at times because we believe our previous ones were wrong, spouting on about axioms cannot help us with this.
Getting hysterical does nothing to refute the argument put against you. So if we change our core axioms it is not because of something 'out there' then the core axioms are subjective.
Nice tactic - instead of answering the criticism you just restate your position but try to mask the fact that that's what your doing by accusations of 'getting hysterical'. It would have worked better perhaps if there was anything remotely in the bit from my post you quoted which was even vaguely hysterical, but as there isn't its pretty clear that its a vain attempt at fluff over substance. The fact we change or core axioms does not in itself imply an external standard of truth, but the fact we do so because we think our old ones are wrong, questions we agonize finding the right answer for, certainly does imply this. If you think our moral intuitions on this are wrong just admit it. As I've argued all along its not impossible to build a consistent anti-realist position, you just cannot do so and claim it explains our morality as it actually is.
There is no 'problem' with how we judge others actions right or wrong. How is saying 'reject P2' saying I accept anything?
The reason the triad is inconsistent is because you cannot on one hand maintain that the wrongness of something is determined by the personal responses of the individual and simultaneously also hold that someone elses answers are wrong when they have personal responses that don’t lead them to think it is. In 301 you recognised this contradiction as you felt the need to reject P2. If judging wrongness was simply reducible to meaning “my personal responses lead me to think X is wrong for me but does not provide a standard by where it is wrong for someone with a different personal response” then this means precisely what I alleged - it reduces a judgement of ‘wrong’ from its normal sense of meaning ‘making a mistake’ to simply meaning ‘I disapprove of X’.
Look sit down and have a nice cup of tea. Claiming something like 'moral facts' seems to me to be right at the core of the issue so lets stick to the topic at hand. Whilst you childish outbursts are mildly entertaining lets try to keep this sensible.
And seeing as denying them relies on you being able to give an alternative account that makes sense of our moral practice as it exists rather than just making up something else and calling it morality, your ability to defend your alternative “I.e that morality is based on personal responses like love” is right at the heart of the matter so it’s quite legitimate to expect you to be able to deals with the problems raised with your account. You clearly realised this too as you tried twice, but as both of those attempts failed it’s entirely right to ask you to put up or shut up. Can you think of a defence that works, or would alternatively are you going to give up trying and admit that it’s inadequate? It’s a central question in this debate so simply taking a tactic of ‘I’m not talking about this anymore’ really isn’t going to wash. Dressing this up in language of ‘childish outbursts’ might be a little more plausible coming from someone who’s standard posts didn’t consist of 1 line sneers and painfully premature triumphalist outbursts. The good news is you can easily show that my accusations that you are avoiding things you can't answer is wrong, all you have to do is come up with a good argument to defend it. Can you do that or will you just keep trying to change the subject?
Excellent could you just highlight the post you did this in please.
Yes in a number of posts I have made it clear that the method we go about discovering OM will depend on the account we give of it. As a theist I have given an account of OM rooted in God and I outline this in reply 196. As this account derives its understanding of OM from the flourishing of conscious beings, defined in relation to God’s purpose then we discover moral truth by improving our understanding of our flourishing. This is partly something we do through reason and observation in relation to the physical and psychological facts that allows people to live rich fulfilling lives and the virtues of character necessary to enable these, and partly by deepening our experience of God to gain an insight into his character and purposes. This, like all fields of human discovery will of course be gradual and prone to error and revision in our understanding.
So yet again I've given full answers to your questions,.,,,lets see if in reply you can finally, for once, answer the criticism of your analogy.
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You are quite clearly implying that I and others are not making honest statements to avoid admitting that OM exists - I.e. making intentionally false statements. So now you are lying about that as well and by that I mean making an intentionally false statement, again.
Let me make this clear. I am not implying you or anyone else is lying. We can all blind ourselves to stuff, me included and you included. What I am saying is that you are being illogical.
Stop being so paranoid.
You are stating that a number of people are making deliberately false statements - which by your own definition is lying.
Let me clarify this then. I am not claiming that people are making intentionally false statements. That would be lying and I am not claiming anyone is doing that.
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On reading Alan's reply to Andy, he now seems to be stating that people are or have avoided saying that TACTD(J)FF is morally wrong because they don't want to say it as it will show that they would logically have to accept OM. This is untru in that people have stated that they think this ,as indeed many other things, are wrong. In this case I don't think Alan is deliberately telling the untruth so is not lying, but it seems to me to illustrate that he is so involved in his case, that he is unable to even read what people have written without ending up misrepresenting it.
OK, have just seen this bit. Please ignore my reply just before this reply. :)
So, I will try once again to make this clear and hope that it filters through. I think TACTDJFF is wrong, as is, in my opinion, TACTDFF, TACTD and TAC, and indeed T. I also think marmite tastes good. The moral position is based on my subjective view of what is right and wrong. The taste position on what I think of as good and bad in eating.
Sticking with the Marmite analogy are you saying that it tastes good independent of how many people think it so? Do I have any obligation to think it tastes good?
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TACTDFF is an almost universal agreed no no, but that doesn't make it OM.
The possession of a mobile phone is now an almost universal MUST but there is nothing objective about it.
How does that relate to what I have claimed, i.e. that TACTDFF is morally wrong and it being so is independent of how many people think it so? How does mobile phone ownership fit into such a scheme? If it doesn't, why do you think pointing out that mobile phone possession is at all related to this question.
May I ask why you think TACTDFF is morally wrong? What do you base that conclusion on, please?
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I agree some acts are morally wrong and that this does not depend on me thinking it so.
My beliefs are consistent with morality being subjective.
No, they are not. You have said that some acts are morally wrong and in the second part of the sentence say that they fit the definition of objective morality.
Nope something I think something being morally wrong depends on me thinking it so. Your argument is a busted flush.
Put that in English and I'll reply to it.
I suggest you take a course on comprehension but I'll try to dumb it down for you.
If you think your previous post was grammatically correct or even clear, I suggest you read it again.
In order for something to be objective it has to be independent of anyone's opinion.
This is incorrect. For it to be objective its status, its veracity has to be such that it is independent of anyone's opinion. That is different from what you wrote.I think torture is wrong and that does depend on my opinion.
You have just argued that your opinion (what you think is wrong) is dependent on your opinion. Is that mean to contribute to the discussion?
I'm being consistent, please its been over a year, this argument surely is over?
Yes, consistently wrong and, apparently, confused over what is being claimed.Even you must be running out of obfuscation rabbit holes to run down.
Obfuscation as in jakswan doesn't understand the argument?
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Alan
I noticed you mentioned 'obligation' earlier, and I recall you mentioning this before.
It seems to me that I can reason my way to an opinion that TCTDJFF is always wrong, and many here have already pointed out some of the implications that support this opinion: such as why bother educating our children if it was the case that a passing sociopath torture them to death etc etc etc. I'd imagine that the consensus of opinion would agree with me, to the extent that such conduct would be illegal.
It seems to me then that there are various compelling reasons for me to hold the opinion that TACTDJFF is always wrong to the extent that I am obligated to behave in accordance with my opinion - would you agree?
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So to 'demonstrating moral facts'.
Yes in a number of posts I have made it clear that the method we go about discovering OM will depend on the account we give of it. As a theist I have given an account of OM rooted in God and I outline this in reply 196. As this account derives its understanding of OM from the flourishing of conscious beings, defined in relation to God’s purpose then we discover moral truth by improving our understanding of our flourishing. This is partly something we do through reason and observation in relation to the physical and psychological facts that allows people to live rich fulfilling lives and the virtues of character necessary to enable these, and partly by deepening our experience of God to gain an insight into his character and purposes. This, like all fields of human discovery will of course be gradual and prone to error and revision in our understanding.
So it seems to me that you 'determine moral facts' by judging an actions to see if it delivers 'flourishing of conscious beings'.
I'm still not seeing the leap to objective?
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You have just argued that your opinion (what you think is wrong) is dependent on your opinion. Is that mean to contribute to the discussion?
It refutes you:-
That is the sort of point I am trying to make on objective morality. If someone agrees with me that an act, any act, is morally wrong and that this does not depend on how many people believe it to be so, they are logically bound to believe in the existence of objective morality.
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Even if every living person agreed that something is wrong/right, it is only their individual personal opinions. It does NOT mean that there is an objective moral code floating about somewhere beyond our ken
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So to 'demonstrating moral facts'.
Yes in a number of posts I have made it clear that the method we go about discovering OM will depend on the account we give of it. As a theist I have given an account of OM rooted in God and I outline this in reply 196. As this account derives its understanding of OM from the flourishing of conscious beings, defined in relation to God’s purpose then we discover moral truth by improving our understanding of our flourishing. This is partly something we do through reason and observation in relation to the physical and psychological facts that allows people to live rich fulfilling lives and the virtues of character necessary to enable these, and partly by deepening our experience of God to gain an insight into his character and purposes. This, like all fields of human discovery will of course be gradual and prone to error and revision in our understanding.
So it seems to me that you 'determine moral facts' by judging an actions to see if it delivers 'flourishing of conscious beings'.
I'm still not seeing the leap to objective?
Ok well if you make an argument and defend your case or alternatively admit that you can't then I'll be happy to explain to too you.
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Even if every living person agreed that something is wrong/right, it is only their individual personal opinions. It does NOT mean that there is an objective moral code floating about somewhere beyond our ken
No one thinks that objective morality is dependent on people's opinions. This has been clarifies many times by both Alan and by me.
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Even if every living person agreed that something is wrong/right, it is only their individual personal opinions. It does NOT mean that there is an objective moral code floating about somewhere beyond our ken
No one thinks that objective morality is dependent on people's opinions. This has been clarifies many times by both Alan and by me.
If I give you a moral question, can you give me the objective moral answer?
Is same sex marriage objectively morrally correct?
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Even if every living person agreed that something is wrong/right, it is only their individual personal opinions. It does NOT mean that there is an objective moral code floating about somewhere beyond our ken
No one thinks that objective morality is dependent on people's opinions. This has been clarifies many times by both Alan and by me.
OK, sorry ... I must have misunderstood.
Why does anybody believe that there is an objective morality somewhere out there?
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Even if every living person agreed that something is wrong/right, it is only their individual personal opinions. It does NOT mean that there is an objective moral code floating about somewhere beyond our ken
No one thinks that objective morality is dependent on people's opinions. This has been clarifies many times by both Alan and by me.
If I give you a moral question, can you give me the objective moral answer?
Is same sex marriage objectively morrally correct?
Yes it is.
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Even if every living person agreed that something is wrong/right, it is only their individual personal opinions. It does NOT mean that there is an objective moral code floating about somewhere beyond our ken
No one thinks that objective morality is dependent on people's opinions. This has been clarifies many times by both Alan and by me.
OK, sorry ... I must have misunderstood.
Why does anybody believe that there is an objective morality somewhere out there?
Moral realists think morality is objective because core elements of our moral practice implicitly assume objective moral truth and so morality as we practice it cannot be maintained without this assumption. So those of us who do not believe our morality is distorted and want to be consistent in our beliefs accept that morality is objective – including as it happens large numbers of atheist philosophers.
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Moral realists think morality is objective because core elements of our moral practice implicitly assume objective moral truth and so morality as we practice it cannot be maintained without this assumption.
Whilst I am well aware that I am not the brightest contributor here, I can't see the sense in that statement. I have a moral code, I don't 'assume objective moral truth', and yet I can maintain my moral code. Am I misunderstanding you?
So those of us who do not believe our morality is distorted and want to be consistent in our beliefs accept that morality is objective – including as it happens large numbers of atheist philosophers.
I don't believe my morality is distorted and I think I am consistent with my belief, but why should I accept that morality is objective?
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Moral realists think morality is objective because core elements of our moral practice implicitly assume objective moral truth and so morality as we practice it cannot be maintained without this assumption.
Whilst I am well aware that I am not the brightest contributor here, I can't see the sense in that statement. I have a moral code, I don't 'assume objective moral truth', and yet I can maintain my moral code. Am I misunderstanding you?
So those of us who do not believe our morality is distorted and want to be consistent in our beliefs accept that morality is objective – including as it happens large numbers of atheist philosophers.
I don't believe my morality is distorted and I think I am consistent with my belief, but why should I accept that morality is objective?
Don't put yourself down Leonard. Compared to a certain poster, who is 20 years your junior, you are way up in the intellectual acuity stakes. The rest of us would be very fortunate if we have as many marbles as you have at the age of 90. :)
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Thank you, Roses! I know I ain't stupid, but sometimes all these philosophical terms don't seem to have a clear meaning to me.
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Even if every living person agreed that something is wrong/right, it is only their individual personal opinions. It does NOT mean that there is an objective moral code floating about somewhere beyond our ken
No one thinks that objective morality is dependent on people's opinions. This has been clarifies many times by both Alan and by me.
If I give you a moral question, can you give me the objective moral answer?
Is same sex marriage objectively morrally correct?
Yes it is.
This just shows that you imagine that anything you believe to be moral, makes it Objectively Moral!
Why on earth is objectivity even in the frame. Some things - Alien's famous example is one, are abhorrent to the vast majority of us but that is because we all have feelings and loved ones we have a need to protect - it isn't because there is some great entity somewhere that lays down the rules!
All this monotonous 'moral realist' talk is complete bollocks! It's simply a desperate way to try to bring a god into the question! If a god existed, the last thing he/she/it would be bothered about would be whether gays living together had signed a piece of paper and called themselves married or not!
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Why on earth is objectivity even in the frame. Some things - Alien's famous example is one, are abhorrent to the vast majority of us but that is because we all have feelings and loved ones we have a need to protect - it isn't because there is some great entity somewhere that lays down the rules!
All this monotonous 'moral realist' talk is complete bollocks! It's simply a desperate way to try to bring a god into the question! If a god existed, the last thing he/she/it would be bothered about would be whether gays living together had signed a piece of paper and called themselves married or not!
Woosh! A blast of clean, fresh air!
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Whilst I am well aware that I am not the brightest contributor here, I can't see the sense in that statement. I have a moral code, I don't 'assume objective moral truth', and yet I can maintain my moral code. Am I misunderstanding you?
Essentially, I think, it means that in making moral choices you are assuming that the idea of morality is valid. As so many people assume that morality as a concept is valid, it must be some sort of awareness of an actual 'real' morality, and that morality is absolute.
I don't believe my morality is distorted and I think I am consistent with my belief, but why should I accept that morality is objective?
There's no compelling reason that I've heard. Every morality has, at a basis, foundational assumptions but those assumptions differ from person to person. Not only have I not heard a compelling argument why one of these sets of assumptions 'must' be correct, I've not seen anything to suggest that such an argument is possible.
Given the massive cultural differentiations between those foundational assumptions - God's will is 'the right thing', the rights of the individual are paramount, 'good' is the benefit of the state, etc. - I can't see even a practical deduction that all moralities are a reflection of an objective one.
O.
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Thank you, Roses! I know I ain't stupid, but sometimes all these philosophical terms don't seem to have a clear meaning to me.
I wonder if they do to those who bandy them around?
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Hi Outrider,
Essentially, I think, it means that in making moral choices you are assuming that the idea of morality is valid. As so many people assume that morality as a concept is valid, it must be some sort of awareness of an actual 'real' morality, and that morality is absolute.
The fact that morality is valid simply means that as a social, intelligent species we have to live by a code, otherwise we would self-destruct.
There's no compelling reason that I've heard. Every morality has, at a basis, foundational assumptions but those assumptions differ from person to person. Not only have I not heard a compelling argument why one of these sets of assumptions 'must' be correct, I've not seen anything to suggest that such an argument is possible.
Given the massive cultural differentiations between those foundational assumptions - God's will is 'the right thing', the rights of the individual are paramount, 'good' is the benefit of the state, etc. - I can't see even a practical deduction that all moralities are a reflection of an objective one.
Indeed! Since morality is nothing more than a code derived by us to facilitate social life, how can it have an objective source?
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Hi Outrider,
Essentially, I think, it means that in making moral choices you are assuming that the idea of morality is valid. As so many people assume that morality as a concept is valid, it must be some sort of awareness of an actual 'real' morality, and that morality is absolute.
The fact that morality is valid simply means that as a social, intelligent species we have to live by a code, otherwise we would self-destruct.
There's no compelling reason that I've heard. Every morality has, at a basis, foundational assumptions but those assumptions differ from person to person. Not only have I not heard a compelling argument why one of these sets of assumptions 'must' be correct, I've not seen anything to suggest that such an argument is possible.
Given the massive cultural differentiations between those foundational assumptions - God's will is 'the right thing', the rights of the individual are paramount, 'good' is the benefit of the state, etc. - I can't see even a practical deduction that all moralities are a reflection of an objective one.
Indeed! Since morality is nothing more than a code derived by us to facilitate social life, how can it have an objective source?
And gay marriage being objectively moral is the post that must win the booby prize of the year!
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Even if every living person agreed that something is wrong/right, it is only their individual personal opinions. It does NOT mean that there is an objective moral code floating about somewhere beyond our ken
No one thinks that objective morality is dependent on people's opinions. This has been clarifies many times by both Alan and by me.
If I give you a moral question, can you give me the objective moral answer?
Is same sex marriage objectively morrally correct?
Yes it is.
Can you show your working please?
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Moral realists think morality is objective because core elements of our moral practice implicitly assume objective moral truth and so morality as we practice it cannot be maintained without this assumption.
Whilst I am well aware that I am not the brightest contributor here, I can't see the sense in that statement. I have a moral code, I don't 'assume objective moral truth', and yet I can maintain my moral code. Am I misunderstanding you?
So those of us who do not believe our morality is distorted and want to be consistent in our beliefs accept that morality is objective – including as it happens large numbers of atheist philosophers.
I don't believe my morality is distorted and I think I am consistent with my belief, but why should I accept that morality is objective?
I am quite sure you have a moral code as most of us do. Equally I would hope that you like most of us when we condemn actions like ‘bullying gay children to the point of suicide’ think that this is wrong, and that when we say that this is wrong we don’t just mean that you personally disapprove of it, but that the persons doing the bullying are making a mistake worthy of condemnation and that they are doing something that is wrong whether or not their own personal feelings about gay people might lead them to think its ok. I would imagine that like most people you occasionally change your minds about moral issues including at time quite core moral issues, and moreover, that when you do this you reject the old view not because you have a change of taste but because you have come to a better understanding of the issue that leads you to accept that your old view was mistaken. These are central features of human moral discourse and moral experience that have been consistent across time and civilisation.
Given you have a moral code, and assuming it is characteristic of morality similar to the rest of humanity, containing key central features like those described above, the question then arises about what the status of your moral code is? If it’s not objective is it relative to you? Or to society? We discussed these in the first thread and this type of relativism soon runs into serious trouble. Alternatively are they based not in truth claims at all but in our non-cognitive personal responses? If so you end up running into all the problems raised against Jakswans post which, as we have all seen, he was completely incapable of defending.
The other alternative is that moral statements are true or false just like other types of statements we consider to be true or false, ie compared to the facts of the matter. The way we use moral language certainly suggests moral statements are just like other truth-apt propositions. If this is the case then we have to look at what the best explanation is for moral facts existing. Theists can do this, but as of yet no atheist here has tried to justify moral realism without God.
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This just shows that you imagine that anything you believe to be moral, makes it Objectively Moral!
He asked me a question I gave him an answer. No one has said we think we can prove OM so if you were expecting a proof you haven't understood the nature of the argument. However I don't think its objective because I believe it. I believe it because I think its true. I'm quite open to the fact that I may be wrong about this and many of my moral beliefs; however being right or wrong is only something that makes sense if there is a right answer, whether or not I have correctly identified it.
Why on earth is objectivity even in the frame. Some things - Alien's famous example is one, are abhorrent to the vast majority of us but that is because we all have feelings and loved ones we have a need to protect - it isn't because there is some great entity somewhere that lays down the rules!
If that was true and all that morality was was our personal response then you would have thought that you could have come up with a defence to some of the problems with this I highlighted in post 351. Jakswan couldn't, can you?
All this monotonous 'moral realist' talk is complete bollocks! It's simply a desperate way to try to bring a god into the question! If a god existed, the last thing he/she/it would be bothered about would be whether gays living together had signed a piece of paper and called themselves married or not!
Whatever else you belief this is demonstrably false. There are a great many moral realists who are atheists including some renown atheists and humanist philosophers like Stephen Law. It might make u feel better to think that the only reason people accept realism is to bolster theism nevetherless the majority of academic philosophers are moral realists dispite the fact that only a minority are theists. This fact alone doesn't make it right of course, but it does prove your assertions wrong.
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There's no compelling reason that I've heard. Every morality has, at a basis, foundational assumptions but those assumptions differ from person to person. Not only have I not heard a compelling argument why one of these sets of assumptions 'must' be correct, I've not seen anything to suggest that such an argument is possible.
Given the massive cultural differentiations between those foundational assumptions - God's will is 'the right thing', the rights of the individual are paramount, 'good' is the benefit of the state, etc. - I can't see even a practical deduction that all moralities are a reflection of an objective one.
I don't know why you would think cultural disagreement is an argument for no moral truth.. historically societies have disagreed culturally about all kinds of factual questions too. Disagreement would only count against moral realism if you thought there wasn't a right answer to the matter we were disagreeing about...as this is the issue in question thats simply begging the question. It also ignores the significant point of agreement between moral systems, namely that there IS a right answer.
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Even if every living person agreed that something is wrong/right, it is only their individual personal opinions. It does NOT mean that there is an objective moral code floating about somewhere beyond our ken
No one thinks that objective morality is dependent on people's opinions. This has been clarifies many times by both Alan and by me.
If I give you a moral question, can you give me the objective moral answer?
Is same sex marriage objectively morrally correct?
Yes it is.
Can you show your working please?
Forming loving sexual relationships is an important and life enriching aspect of human life for most people, although some can be happy with a celibate life for many this isn't the case. Being gay isn't a matter of choice for people and trying to force them to be straight or celibate can be very harmful. This being the case (and all of these things are factual claims which are either true or false) then it would be difficult to see how opposing gay relationships would be conductive to the flourishing of gay people. As marriage is a key way in which people can have their relationships recognised legally, celebrate their commitment and possibly make that commitment formally in a religious setting for those of us who are theists, then this would also seem to be a good idea just like it is for straight couples. If there is a good argument while marriage should be kept as the province of straight couples I'm yet to hear it.
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Even if every living person agreed that something is wrong/right, it is only their individual personal opinions. It does NOT mean that there is an objective moral code floating about somewhere beyond our ken
No one thinks that objective morality is dependent on people's opinions. This has been clarifies many times by both Alan and by me.
If I give you a moral question, can you give me the objective moral answer?
Is same sex marriage objectively morrally correct?
Yes it is.
Can you show your working please?
Forming loving sexual relationships is an important and life enriching aspect of human life for most people, although some can be happy with a celibate life for many this isn't the case. Being gay isn't a matter of choice for people and trying to force them to be straight or celibate can be very harmful. This being the case (and all of these things are factual claims which are either true or false) then it would be difficult to see how opposing gay relationships would be conductive to the flourishing of gay people. As marriage is a key way in which people can have their relationships recognised legally, celebrate their commitment and possibly make that commitment formally in a religious setting for those of us who are theists, then this would also seem to be a good idea just like it is for straight couples. If there is a good argument while marriage should be kept as the province of straight couples I'm yet to hear it.
Thanks for your opinions.
What you need to show though is the method that you and anyone else can use to show that same sex marriage is objectively morally correct.
What is the method please?
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Exactly the same method i have used.....use reason and observation to make a case for what we should do in order to promote human flourishing. Usually this will be less direct and require us to think about the virtues we require to flourish and what the implications of these are for the situation, but it will still come down to the facts we are considering. Sure its my opinion, everything i believe is my opinion by default, but my opinion is about facts which are true or false, whether or not its easy to get at them and the method is the right one for doing that. Anyone can use it and if I've made a mistake they can point it out.
If you were expecting that moral truth was something that we could just read off or prove then you haven't understood what it means to claim morality is objective because I've been very clear we can't do that, nor do we need to in order to progress towards discovering moral truth.
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If you were expecting that moral truth was something that we could just read off or prove then you haven't understood what it means to claim morality is objective because I've been very clear we can't do that, nor do we need to in order to progress towards discovering moral truth.
So it seems that although we have a different idea of what 'objective' means, we both believe the same thing ... that morality is only a human concept.
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If you were expecting that moral truth was something that we could just read off or prove then you haven't understood what it means to claim morality is objective because I've been very clear we can't do that, nor do we need to in order to progress towards discovering moral truth.
So it seems that although we have a different idea of what 'objective' means, we both believe the same thing ... that morality is only a human concept.
No I don't think that. I think morality is grounded in facts, ultimately in facts about Gods purposes. As like most theists i think that bringing into being conscious beings and the flourishing of those beings are a key part of that purpose then our discovery of moral truth, when the questions relate to matters of human life like the ones we are discussing, will therefore centre around questions of human flourishing.
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Leonard,
I'd be interested to hear your response to my post yesterday regarding what I'm assuming about your moral views. The example I gave was bullying a gay child to the point of suicide. I know you think this is wrong because I remember you positing about an example of it with an American child. What I'd like to know is what you mean when you say its wrong. Do you just mean that you disapprove of it but accept that if the bullies personal responses lead them to not disapprove of it, maybe find it funny even or just, that it would be ok for them...or do you think acts like this are always wrong regardless of what the people doing the bullying actually think about it or regardless of whether the society they live in condones this type of behaviour towards gay people?
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Leonard,
I'd be interested to hear your response to my post yesterday regarding what I'm assuming about your moral views. The example I gave was bullying a gay child to the point of suicide. I know you think this is wrong because I remember you positing about an example of it with an American child. What I'd like to know is what you mean when you say its wrong. Do you just mean that you disapprove of it but accept that if the bullies personal responses lead them to not disapprove of it, maybe find it funny even or just, that it would be ok for them...or do you think acts like this are always wrong regardless of what the people doing the bullying actually think about it or regardless of whether the society they live in condones this type of behaviour towards gay people?
My opinion is that it is always wrong to bully a child for anything at all, regardless of whether I consider it is right or not.
Bullying (aggressive treatment of one child by a group of others) is never justified, and even less so when the child has done no wrong.
There are civilised ways of punishing antisocial behaviour, and bullying is not one of them.
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Great i agree. So as it's always wrong to bully a child, even if someone's personal responses and opinions may be different, then it can't be true to say that what is right for them (the bullies) to do is dependent on their opinions or their personal responses. And (reading between the lines of yr post) would it seem that the act would stop being wrong if the society in which the bullying happened thinks it was ok.
So what makes it wrong Leonard if its not the opinions or responses of either individuals or of societies?
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Great i agree. So as it's always wrong to bully a child, even if someone's personal responses and opinions may be different, then it can't be true to say that what is right for them (the bullies) to do is dependent on their opinions or their personal responses. And (reading between the lines of yr post) would it seem that the act would stop being wrong if the society in which the bullying happened thinks it was ok.
So what makes it wrong Leonard if its not the opinions or responses of either individuals or of societies?
You will note that my post started with "in my opinion". And in my opinion it is always wrong, no matter whether societies decide it is wrong or right.
However, nothing MAKES it wrong ... it is just wrong in my opinion.
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This just shows that you imagine that anything you believe to be moral, makes it Objectively Moral!
He asked me a question I gave him an answer. No one has said we think we can prove OM so if you were expecting a proof you haven't understood the nature of the argument. However I don't think its objective because I believe it. I believe it because I think its true. I'm quite open to the fact that I may be wrong about this and many of my moral beliefs; however being right or wrong is only something that makes sense if there is a right answer, whether or not I have correctly identified it.
Why on earth is objectivity even in the frame. Some things - Alien's famous example is one, are abhorrent to the vast majority of us but that is because we all have feelings and loved ones we have a need to protect - it isn't because there is some great entity somewhere that lays down the rules!
If that was true and all that morality was was our personal response then you would have thought that you could have come up with a defence to some of the problems with this I highlighted in post 351. Jakswan couldn't, can you?
All this monotonous 'moral realist' talk is complete bollocks! It's simply a desperate way to try to bring a god into the question! If a god existed, the last thing he/she/it would be bothered about would be whether gays living together had signed a piece of paper and called themselves married or not!
Whatever else you belief this is demonstrably false. There are a great many moral realists who are atheists including some renown atheists and humanist philosophers like Stephen Law. It might make u feel better to think that the only reason people accept realism is to bolster theism nevetherless the majority of academic philosophers are moral realists dispite the fact that only a minority are theists. This fact alone doesn't make it right of course, but it does prove your assertions wrong.
DT
You are telling us your reasons why you consider certain actions are wrong and I'm quite sure we all agree with you. You would hate to be subjected to bullying etc and would hate your loved ones or any other human or animal to suffer in that way. We all agree with that but IOV it isn't something set in stone by anyone other than us, the human race.
Likewise, marriage most of us would consider the right of any couple, gay or straight and who love each other. No argument there.
Where these deeply held feelings come from is the question. You and Alan seem to us to imagine that some thinking, intelligent entity has decided that such actions are wrong - this is where the two sides part company!
I think most atheists would say that it is a product of evolution and that without that concern for others of our species, we would have died out long ago. Most animals look after their own offspring and we have simply taken it forward to have concern for all, or most, other species too.
You, being a theist, and thinking God created everything, would obviously make morality just another 'thing' he created ... which is why I, as an atheist, believe your understanding to be wrong.
Discussing what we believe to be right or wrong is pointless, we need you to persuade us that there is someone or something that consciously decides them to be right or wrong. That is the yawning gulf between us.
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Great i agree. So as it's always wrong to bully a child, even if someone's personal responses and opinions may be different, then it can't be true to say that what is right for them (the bullies) to do is dependent on their opinions or their personal responses. And (reading between the lines of yr post) would it seem that the act would stop being wrong if the society in which the bullying happened thinks it was ok.
So what makes it wrong Leonard if its not the opinions or responses of either individuals or of societies?
You will note that my post started with "in my opinion". And in my opinion it is always wrong, no matter whether societies decide it is wrong or right.
However, nothing MAKES it wrong ... it is just wrong in my opinion.
Yes I did notice that, but that in itself isn’t particularly exciting. Everything you believe is your opinion just as everything I believe is mine. It’s my opinion that God exists and yours that he doesn’t – but either he exists or he doesn’t so one of us is right and the other is wrong, even if neither of us can prove it.
With morality the question we are discussing is whether moral questions are ones that are right or wrong. If your opinion is that bullying kids is wrong and it’s also a question with a right answer then your opinion (that I share) could also be right.
If by contrast it’s rightness means nothing more than I disapprove of it, then to be consistent we have to also accept that if someone else thinks bully gay kids to the point of suicide is ok, then it is ok for them (as there’s nothing beyond that to appeal to). You however have just expressly denied that this is the case.
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This just shows that you imagine that anything you believe to be moral, makes it Objectively Moral!
He asked me a question I gave him an answer. No one has said we think we can prove OM so if you were expecting a proof you haven't understood the nature of the argument. However I don't think its objective because I believe it. I believe it because I think its true. I'm quite open to the fact that I may be wrong about this and many of my moral beliefs; however being right or wrong is only something that makes sense if there is a right answer, whether or not I have correctly identified it.
Why on earth is objectivity even in the frame. Some things - Alien's famous example is one, are abhorrent to the vast majority of us but that is because we all have feelings and loved ones we have a need to protect - it isn't because there is some great entity somewhere that lays down the rules!
If that was true and all that morality was was our personal response then you would have thought that you could have come up with a defence to some of the problems with this I highlighted in post 351. Jakswan couldn't, can you?
All this monotonous 'moral realist' talk is complete bollocks! It's simply a desperate way to try to bring a god into the question! If a god existed, the last thing he/she/it would be bothered about would be whether gays living together had signed a piece of paper and called themselves married or not!
Whatever else you belief this is demonstrably false. There are a great many moral realists who are atheists including some renown atheists and humanist philosophers like Stephen Law. It might make u feel better to think that the only reason people accept realism is to bolster theism nevetherless the majority of academic philosophers are moral realists dispite the fact that only a minority are theists. This fact alone doesn't make it right of course, but it does prove your assertions wrong.
DT
You are telling us your reasons why you consider certain actions are wrong and I'm quite sure we all agree with you. You would hate to be subjected to bullying etc and would hate your loved ones or any other human or animal to suffer in that way. We all agree with that but IOV it isn't something set in stone by anyone other than us, the human race.
Likewise, marriage most of us would consider the right of any couple, gay or straight and who love each other. No argument there.
Where these deeply held feelings come from is the question. You and Alan seem to us to imagine that some thinking, intelligent entity has decided that such actions are wrong - this is where the two sides part company!
I think most atheists would say that it is a product of evolution and that without that concern for others of our species, we would have died out long ago. Most animals look after their own offspring and we have simply taken it forward to have concern for all, or most, other species too.
You, being a theist, and thinking God created everything, would obviously make morality just another 'thing' he created ... which is why I, as an atheist, believe your understanding to be wrong.
Discussing what we believe to be right or wrong is pointless, we need you to persuade us that there is someone or something that consciously decides them to be right or wrong. That is the yawning gulf between us.
I think you have misunderstood my case for objective morality. I have not claimed that morality is based on Gods commands he has just arbitrarily decided. God’s purposes are teleological facts embodied in the universe whether we recognise them or not. What does or does not cause us to flourish as conscious beings is down to facts about us and these facts are embodied in the way the universe is including our own physiological, psychological and spiritual natures, not a matter of anyone’s whim from moment to moment.
The reason we think morality is objective is quite independent of belief in God, based on the character of our moral belief – and the fact that these arguments are accepted as correct by so many atheists demonstrates this. Whether or not atheists can then make a convincing case for morality being objective that does not involve God is the question we are then left with. Either way the alternative cases made for understanding morality based on relative truth or personal non-cognitive responses don’t work as we have seen. If you like you can follow atheists like Alex Rosenburg and embrace nihilism but just don’t pretend a non-realist theory of ethics can explain our morality as it exists in human society. For those of us who accept the reality of our moral experience and who also, like you it seems, find atheist arguments for OM unconvincing, then we have a reason to believe in God.
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Exactly the same method i have used.....use reason and observation to make a case for what we should do in order to promote human flourishing. Usually this will be less direct and require us to think about the virtues we require to flourish and what the implications of these are for the situation, but it will still come down to the facts we are considering. Sure its my opinion, everything i believe is my opinion by default, but my opinion is about facts which are true or false, whether or not its easy to get at them and the method is the right one for doing that. Anyone can use it and if I've made a mistake they can point it out.
If you were expecting that moral truth was something that we could just read off or prove then you haven't understood what it means to claim morality is objective because I've been very clear we can't do that, nor do we need to in order to progress towards discovering moral truth.
You are wrong.
Unless and until you can provide a method to determine objective moral truths, you are like everyone else simply stating your subjective opinion.
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Why should humans flourish? Why is that objectively morally correct?
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I think you have misunderstood my case for objective morality. I have not claimed that morality is based on Gods commands he has just arbitrarily decided. God’s purposes are teleological facts embodied in the universe whether we recognise them or not. What does or does not cause us to flourish as conscious beings is down to facts about us and these facts are embodied in the way the universe is including our own physiological, psychological and spiritual natures, not a matter of anyone’s whim from moment to moment.
The reason we think morality is objective is quite independent of belief in God, based on the character of our moral belief – and the fact that these arguments are accepted as correct by so many atheists demonstrates this. Whether or not atheists can then make a convincing case for morality being objective that does not involve God is the question we are then left with. Either way the alternative cases made for understanding morality based on relative truth or personal non-cognitive responses don’t work as we have seen. If you like you can follow atheists like Alex Rosenburg and embrace nihilism but just don’t pretend a non-realist theory of ethics can explain our morality as it exists in human society. For those of us who accept the reality of our moral experience and who also, like you it seems, find atheist arguments for OM unconvincing, then we have a reason to believe in God.
I think you have misunderstood me, DT, there are NO atheist arguments for OM, simply because we see no need for morality to be objective and no evidence for it.
Over the last billion years or so, millions of species have come and gone, for all sorts of reasons. Evolution means that only those who have adapted to their environment and helped each other have survived. We have developed a very good sense of looking after our offspring, just as many other species have and that is why they and we have survived up till now. If we hadn't developed that skill, trait, whatever you call it, we would not be here to discuss this. This then is the way an atheist sees morality.
It follows then that atheists do not try to explain why OM exists, we just don't believe it does. You, on the other hand, see OM as part of God's work, which although understandable from a theist POV, makes no sense to an atheist, as we don't see any need or evidence for OM or God!
You keep quoting atheists who believe in OM but I could quote you ten times as many who do not believe in OM so please don't try to dig up the few who you think must believe in God because I can tell you now, they don't!
I think you are making a case for certain moral behaviours to be universally accepted as good or bad. I agree, but that does not make them Objective.
Alien came out with a weird idea that certain behaviour could be OM even if no one believed it! That means it could be OM to torture a child to death just for fun - how would we know? Just because none of us believe that to be so, in his view, that doesn't matter.
If you say that's ridiculous because we all know TTACTDJFF is terribly wrong, you are again basing that on our subjective opinions. This is why OM itself is a ridiculous concept!
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If by contrast it’s rightness means nothing more than I disapprove of it, then to be consistent we have to also accept that if someone else thinks bully gay kids to the point of suicide is ok, then it is ok for them (as there’s nothing beyond that to appeal to). You however have just expressly denied that this is the case.
That is why we make laws ... simply because there is no other way to control our actions. Anybody that considers antisocial actions OK must be controlled and punished for the general good and protection of humanity.
The general good of humanity is, however, nothing more than a goal we aim at for natural, selfish, evolutionary reasons. I suppose that was one of the reasons gods were invented, as an imagined, stronger incentive for people to behave themselves. :)
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If by contrast it’s rightness means nothing more than I disapprove of it, then to be consistent we have to also accept that if someone else thinks bully gay kids to the point of suicide is ok, then it is ok for them (as there’s nothing beyond that to appeal to). You however have just expressly denied that this is the case.
That is why we make laws ... simply because there is no other way to control our actions. Anybody that considers antisocial actions OK must be controlled and punished for the general good and protection of humanity.
The general good of humanity is, however, nothing more than a goal we aim at for natural, selfish, evolutionary reasons. I suppose that was one of the reasons gods were invented, as an imagined, stronger incentive for people to behave themselves. :)
The Biblical deity was probably created by its authors to be so unpleasant on the basis of, 'my god is bigger than your god'!
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The Biblical deity was probably created by its authors to be so unpleasant on the basis of, 'my god is bigger than your god'!
The way it was exported and forced down the throats of other unsuspecting nations shows that fairly clearly, Roses.
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The Biblical deity was probably created by its authors to be so unpleasant on the basis of, 'my god is bigger than your god'!
The way it was exported and forced down the throats of other unsuspecting nations shows that fairly clearly, Roses.
When I was a child some missionaries came to our Pentecostal church to give a talk about their work converting the 'heathen' in Africa. They regarded them as lesser mortals and bandied about the 'N' word throughout their talk! >:( They seemed proud of threatening those poor people with burning in hell for all eternity if they didn't submit to their abusive nonsense! >:(
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The Biblical deity was probably created by its authors to be so unpleasant on the basis of, 'my god is bigger than your god'!
The way it was exported and forced down the throats of other unsuspecting nations shows that fairly clearly, Roses.
When I was a child some missionaries coming to our Pentecostal church to give a talk about their work converting the 'heathen' in Africa. They regarded them as lesser mortals and bandied about the 'N' word throughout their talk! >:( They seemed proud of threatening those poor people with burning in hell for all eternity if they didn't submit to their abusive nonsense! >:(
Thiung is that is more a factor of the overall culture at the time and part of the change in attitudes has been brought about by members of those churches. The drivers to colonialism while having religion in the mix are more about conquering. Religion allowed it a patina of respectability.
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The Biblical deity was probably created by its authors to be so unpleasant on the basis of, 'my god is bigger than your god'!
The way it was exported and forced down the throats of other unsuspecting nations shows that fairly clearly, Roses.
When I was a child some missionaries coming to our Pentecostal church to give a talk about their work converting the 'heathen' in Africa. They regarded them as lesser mortals and bandied about the 'N' word throughout their talk! >:( They seemed proud of threatening those poor people with burning in hell for all eternity if they didn't submit to their abusive nonsense! >:(
Thiung is that is more a factor of the overall culture at the time and part of the change in attitudes has been brought about by members of those churches. The drivers to colonialism while having religion in the mix are more about conquering. Religion allowed it a patina of respectability.
What respectability?
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The Biblical deity was probably created by its authors to be so unpleasant on the basis of, 'my god is bigger than your god'!
The way it was exported and forced down the throats of other unsuspecting nations shows that fairly clearly, Roses.
When I was a child some missionaries coming to our Pentecostal church to give a talk about their work converting the 'heathen' in Africa. They regarded them as lesser mortals and bandied about the 'N' word throughout their talk! >:( They seemed proud of threatening those poor people with burning in hell for all eternity if they didn't submit to their abusive nonsense! >:(
Thiung is that is more a factor of the overall culture at the time and part of the change in attitudes has been brought about by members of those churches. The drivers to colonialism while having religion in the mix are more about conquering. Religion allowed it a patina of respectability.
What respectability?
The idea that it was done for the greater good and not just for greed.
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The Biblical deity was probably created by its authors to be so unpleasant on the basis of, 'my god is bigger than your god'!
The way it was exported and forced down the throats of other unsuspecting nations shows that fairly clearly, Roses.
When I was a child some missionaries coming to our Pentecostal church to give a talk about their work converting the 'heathen' in Africa. They regarded them as lesser mortals and bandied about the 'N' word throughout their talk! >:( They seemed proud of threatening those poor people with burning in hell for all eternity if they didn't submit to their abusive nonsense! >:(
Thiung is that is more a factor of the overall culture at the time and part of the change in attitudes has been brought about by members of those churches. The drivers to colonialism while having religion in the mix are more about conquering. Religion allowed it a patina of respectability.
What respectability?
The idea that it was done for the greater good and not just for greed.
If that was the case, their idea of the greater good was laughable!
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The idea that it was done for the greater good and not just for greed.
If that was the case, their idea of the greater good was laughable!
[/quote]Possibly, though that would be your opinion. If you thought Christianity was the right thing to promulgate, just as for example yu think your view on abortion is, then you do it.
The point that seems to currently some 3.5 km above your head is that religion in and of itself is not the driver for colonialism. it is simply used to justify it
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You are wrong.
Unless and until you can provide a method to determine objective moral truths, you are like everyone else simply stating your subjective opinion.
I am stating my subjective opinion. But I hold that opinion because I think it is also true. I have a subjective opinion about other things too that I think are true- for example that Jesus didn't do many of the things attributed to him. This is also a factual question and although I can't prove it I can provide reasons for thinking it. Moral truth is a bit like this too. We can make progress towards it but we can't read it off. But to say that something is only true unless you can read it off is just daft, it confusing truth with verification which is a basic error.
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I think you have misunderstood me, DT, there are NO atheist arguments for OM, simply because we see no need for morality to be objective and no evidence for it.
No I understand that's what you are claiming but its totally incorrect. There are lots of atheist philosophers who have argued for OM. You may disagree with them but that's no the same think as saying their are no arguments for it.
Over the last billion years or so, millions of species have come and gone, for all sorts of reasons. Evolution means that only those who have adapted to their environment and helped each other have survived. We have developed a very good sense of looking after our offspring, just as many other species have and that is why they and we have survived up till now. If we hadn't developed that skill, trait, whatever you call it, we would not be here to discuss this. This then is the way an atheist sees morality.
You've just described evolution - so what? An anti-realist would say evolution is the process through which morality is invented, the realist would say its the process through which morality is discovered. The account you give is entirely neutral unless you bring your anti-realist baggage to it. If for example objective morality is about our flourishing, then things that lead to our survival and looking after our off spring etc would be key elements of that. You are smuggling in your conclusions in your premise.
It follows then that atheists do not try to explain why OM exists, we just don't believe it does. You, on the other hand, see OM as part of God's work, which although understandable from a theist POV, makes no sense to an atheist, as we don't see any need or evidence for OM or God!
Then you agree with premise 2 of the moral argument for God! - many atheists disagree with you but that's fine I'm sure Alan will be pleased. I'm less sure of premise 2 than premise 1 but still happy God is the best explanation for OM and my account is indeed rooted in God.
You keep quoting atheists who believe in OM but I could quote you ten times as many who do not believe in OM so please don't try to dig up the few who you think must believe in God because I can tell you now, they don't!
Well I'm talking about atheist philosophers with specialise in moral philosophy not random anybodies who aren't in this area. You only have to look at Sam Harris book on ethics to see why an assumed expertise in philosophy from those who have no such expertise just leads to bad philosophy. But I'm quite sure you are right about the numbers, I'm just not sure where this gets you. Lots of informed atheist philosopher, whether a minority of overall atheists or otherwise, accept OM for reasons about morality without belief in God. This makes your argument false and the numbers are neither here nor there. Whatismore, it doesn't mean you can just ignore the criticisms of antirealist models of morality. Even if you were where right about there being no OM our morality still implicitly assumes it - you have to at least face up to the consequences of your atheism - atheists like Rosenburg do this and embrace nihilism....trouble is with lots of your fellow atheists here is they can't defend their irrealist model of morality but they also want to hold on to the idea that we can do away with any concept of OM and think that this doesn't change fundamentally the implications for our moral practice. Its one thing to say our sense of moral truth is an illusion created by evolution, its quite another to think we can realise this and still go on thinking about morality In the same way or expecting it to have the same hold over people once they have recognised this.
I think you are making a case for certain moral behaviours to be universally accepted as good or bad. I agree, but that does not make them Objective.
That's not what atheist moral realists believe by OM at all. They believe like I do that moral statements are true or false independent of opinion.
Alien came out with a weird idea that certain behaviour could be OM even if no one believed it! That means it could be OM to torture a child to death just for fun - how would we know? Just because none of us believe that to be so, in his view, that doesn't matter.
He was making the point that its not dependent on anyone's opinion. As long as we can understand the concept of what it means to be a human child and what it means to torture for fun then we can understand that this is wrong. If there is no one to understand this then it simply means there's no one to understand it, not that it wouldn't be true if human children were still around.
If you say that's ridiculous because we all know TTACTDJFF is terribly wrong, you are again basing that on our subjective opinions. This is why OM itself is a ridiculous concept!
The argument, as Alan has clarified, isn't that TACTDJFF is wrong because we think it is, but rather that if we think it is wrong for everyone, anywhere, whatever their opinions or response are to TACTDJFF then you can't also maintain that morality is dependent on subjective factors if you want to be consistent in your beliefs.
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That is why we make laws ... simply because there is no other way to control our actions. Anybody that considers antisocial actions OK must be controlled and punished for the general good and protection of humanity.
The general good of humanity is, however, nothing more than a goal we aim at for natural, selfish, evolutionary reasons. I suppose that was one of the reasons gods were invented, as an imagined, stronger incentive for people to behave themselves.
Now that's an evasion Leonard not an answer to the question asked... don't go doing a Jakswan on me! There are evil people and we do need law to control them, but good people are good despite of law not because of it - indeed good people sometimes have to behave contra to bad law if they want to be good.
Homosexuality is a good example here - there are societies even now where you can be killed for being gay. I could imagine bullying someone to suicide for being gay in such a society wouldn't meet any condemnation from the likes of IS at all or from their law keepers. Do you think that if they bullied someone to death for being gay that it would be ok? I mean their opinion says its ok, their personal feelings do and their laws do too...You might disapprove of it but before you said it was always wrong and that by saying it was wrong you meant something more than just that you disapprove of it. Are you going back on that now?
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You are wrong.
Unless and until you can provide a method to determine objective moral truths, you are like everyone else simply stating your subjective opinion.
I am stating my subjective opinion. But I hold that opinion because I think it is also true.
And so, of course, do they DT, Good to see you in action again.
They want it to be an opinion AND right and wrong.
Moral realists are committed beyond opinion to these being truths.
Moral non realists have no basis for such a commitment.
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Hi Vlad, totally agree and good to see you here too..you've been missing all the fun. You might enjoy jjohnjil throwing the term evolution around shamanicly above as if it somehow meant he didn't have to make an arguement or if you really want a laugh scroll back through the last couple of pages...Jakswan hilariously declared himself as winning the arguement then soon found he couldn't answer a single point made against him and flailed around desperately trying to change the subject. Enjoy :)
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Now that's an evasion Leonard not an answer to the question asked... don't go doing a Jakswan on me!
Then I didn't understand the question. I never evade questions, and always give my answer, even though you think otherwise.
There are evil people and we do need law to control them, but good people are good despite of law not because of it - indeed good people sometimes have to behave contra to bad law if they want to be good.
You are omitting a whole swathe of people who would like to behave badly but don't BECAUSE OF the law.
Homosexuality is a good example here - there are societies even now where you can be killed for being gay. I could imagine bullying someone to suicide for being gay in such a society wouldn't meet any condemnation from the likes of IS at all or from their law keepers. Do you think that if they bullied someone to death for being gay that it would be ok?
Why do you keep repeating the same question to me, when I have already answered that it is never ok.
I mean their opinion says its ok, their personal feelings do and their laws do too...You might disapprove of it but before you said it was always wrong and that by saying it was wrong you meant something more than just that you disapprove of it.
Another repeat! I don't just disapprove of it, I consider it wrong. That is my personal opinion, and it won't change no matter how many people disagree with me.
Are you going back on that now?
If you translate any of my posts as going back on my opinion on this subject, then either you haven't understood me or I haven't expressed myself well.
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Hi Vlad, totally agree and good to see you here too..you've been missing all the fun. You might enjoy jjohnjil throwing the term evolution around shamanicly above as if it somehow meant he didn't have to make an arguement or if you really want a laugh scroll back through the last couple of pages...Jakswan hilariously declared himself as winning the arguement then soon found he couldn't answer a single point made against him and flailed around desperately trying to change the subject. Enjoy :)
I have been considering the ''I like Marmite'' business as a 'true for you'' statement.
Is it both ''true for you'' and a true statement rather than a mere opinion.
In other words, would it be neurologically confirmable that some are wired up to like Marmite?
But of course we recognise that the same might also be true of Not liking marmite but give equal honour to both. This is not true of morality where we say either people who are different cannot perceive or act in opposition to the truth of the matter.
You cannot both give equal honour to an opposing moral stance and be right or wrong yourself.
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Now that's an evasion Leonard not an answer to the question asked... don't go doing a Jakswan on me!
Then I didn't understand the question. I never evade questions, and always give my answer, even though you think otherwise.
There are evil people and we do need law to control them, but good people are good despite of law not because of it - indeed good people sometimes have to behave contra to bad law if they want to be good.
You are omitting a whole swathe of people who would like to behave badly but don't BECAUSE OF the law.
Homosexuality is a good example here - there are societies even now where you can be killed for being gay. I could imagine bullying someone to suicide for being gay in such a society wouldn't meet any condemnation from the likes of IS at all or from their law keepers. Do you think that if they bullied someone to death for being gay that it would be ok?
Why do you keep repeating the same question to me, when I have already answered that it is never ok.
I mean their opinion says its ok, their personal feelings do and their laws do too...You might disapprove of it but before you said it was always wrong and that by saying it was wrong you meant something more than just that you disapprove of it.
Another repeat! I don't just disapprove of it, I consider it wrong. That is my personal opinion, and it won't change no matter how many people disagree with me.
Are you going back on that now?
If you translate any of my posts as going back on my opinion on this subject, then either you haven't understood me or I haven't expressed myself well.
I'm not ignoring the law importance Leonard I just don't think its relevant to what we awe discussing one way or the other.
The reason I've asked you the same question is because you seem to be missing the contradiction in wha you are saying. The situation we are discussing is that someone is bully a gay child to the point of suicide and that the person doing it thinks its ok (he may hate people and think its a good thing)
You said (1) that what makes something right are our opinions about it or personal responses to it
And (2) that bullying the child is always wrong no matter what the person doing it thinks about it.
(1) and (2) are contradictions because if (1) is correct and if the person doing it thinks its right, then it IS right for him as it's his opinion that makes it right. You might disprove of what he is doing but you can't say he is wrong as he has met the only criteria you have that makes an action right..namely his personal opinions about it. All you have left is personal disapproval.
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Hi Vlad, totally agree and good to see you here too..you've been missing all the fun. You might enjoy jjohnjil throwing the term evolution around shamanicly above as if it somehow meant he didn't have to make an arguement or if you really want a laugh scroll back through the last couple of pages...Jakswan hilariously declared himself as winning the arguement then soon found he couldn't answer a single point made against him and flailed around desperately trying to change the subject. Enjoy :)
I have been considering the ''I like Marmite'' business as a 'true for you'' statement.
Is it both ''true for you'' and a true statement rather than a mere opinion.
In other words, would it be neurologically confirmable that some are wired up to like Marmite?
But of course we recognise that the same might also be true of Not liking marmite but give equal honour to both. This is not true of morality where we say either people who are different cannot perceive or act in opposition to the truth of the matter.
You cannot both give equal honour to an opposing moral stance and be right or wrong yourself.
Yes the idea that introducing some kind of thin true for you notion of truth for morality can get us anywhere close to the form of truth implicit in our sense of morality is a none starter. The anti realists here seem to be running out of steam which we can see in jjohnjils attempts now to give up any discussion about morality at all and just have a generic conversation about God...a retreat if Ever there was one. Leonard is doing a great job of illustrating exactly the kind of assumptions of truth we do make all the time in moral judgements without realising that if his views about morality being dependent on our individual tastes was right, he just can't consistently make.
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'We can see in jjohnjils attempts now to give up any discussion about morality at all and just have a generic conversation about God...a retreat if Ever there was one.'
You, DT, are a joke! Your whole argument is based on God existing and crediting him with OM! If this isn't your stance, what is?
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I'm not ignoring the law importance Leonard I just don't think its relevant to what we awe discussing one way or the other.
The reason I've asked you the same question is because you seem to be missing the contradiction in wha you are saying. The situation we are discussing is that someone is bully a gay child to the point of suicide and that the person doing it thinks its ok (he may hate people and think its a good thing)
You said (1) that what makes something right are our opinions about it or personal responses to it
Right in the oinion of the person concerned.
And (2) that bullying the child is always wrong no matter what the person doing it thinks about it.
Yes, that is my opinion.
(1) and (2) are contradictions because if (1) is correct and if the person doing it thinks its right, then it IS right for him as it's his opinion that makes it right. You might disprove of what he is doing but you can't say he is wrong as he has met the only criteria you have that makes an action right..namely his personal opinions about it. All you have left is personal disapproval.
Which in no way alters the fact that the right and the wrong are personal opinions. That is why I keep mentioning the law. People who think that it is right to do things like TACTDFF have to be controlled for obvious reasons.
Once again I must tell you that right and wrong are just human concepts, and do not exist outside the human mind. The universe, nature and everything non-human are entirely indifferent to our "right and wrong".
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I'm not ignoring the law importance Leonard I just don't think its relevant to what we awe discussing one way or the other.
The reason I've asked you the same question is because you seem to be missing the contradiction in wha you are saying. The situation we are discussing is that someone is bully a gay child to the point of suicide and that the person doing it thinks its ok (he may hate people and think its a good thing)
You said (1) that what makes something right are our opinions about it or personal responses to it
Right in the oinion of the person concerned.
And (2) that bullying the child is always wrong no matter what the person doing it thinks about it.
Yes, that is my opinion.
(1) and (2) are contradictions because if (1) is correct and if the person doing it thinks its right, then it IS right for him as it's his opinion that makes it right. You might disprove of what he is doing but you can't say he is wrong as he has met the only criteria you have that makes an action right..namely his personal opinions about it. All you have left is personal disapproval.
Which in no way alters the fact that the right and the wrong are personal opinions. That is why I keep mentioning the law. People who think that it is right to do things like TACTDFF have to be controlled for obvious reasons.
Once again I must tell you that right and wrong are just human concepts, and do not exist outside the human mind. The universe, nature and everything non-human are entirely indifferent to our "right and wrong".
Yes Len but there are different sets of laws which govern differing levels of complexity.
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Yes Len but there are different sets of laws which govern differing levels of complexity.
Yes, depending on which country you are in. You then make a personal choice as to whether or not you are going to abide by them, and accept the consequences if you don't.
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Yes Len but there are different sets of laws which govern differing levels of complexity.
Yes, depending on which country you are in. You then make a personal choice as to whether or not you are going to abide by them, and accept the consequences if you don't.
Yes, keep away from Saudi, Len, OM is different over there!
Funny fella, ol' God, ain't he!
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Yes, keep away from Saudi, Len, OM is different over there!
Which is a pity ... some of those Arab types are very dishy! ::)
Funny fella, ol' God, ain't he!
Indeed he would be, if he existed. :)
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Yes, keep away from Saudi, Len, OM is different over there!
Which is a pity ... some of those Arab types are very dishy! ::)
Funny fella, ol' God, ain't he!
Indeed he would be, if he existed. :)
Can you doubt it, after all the convincing arguments we've heard over the years! I mean, Vlad thinks he exists so there can be no ifs or buts, surely?
And don't keep calling me Shirley!
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Yes Len but there are different sets of laws which govern differing levels of complexity.
Yes, depending on which country you are in. You then make a personal choice as to whether or not you are going to abide by them, and accept the consequences if you don't.
That's not the kind of Law i'm talking about Len.
When you get to being intelligent and conscious and free from automatic reflex behaviour a Moral law kicks in because of the truth of the nature of your existence.
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Yes Len but there are different sets of laws which govern differing levels of complexity.
Yes, depending on which country you are in. You then make a personal choice as to whether or not you are going to abide by them, and accept the consequences if you don't.
That's not the kind of Law i'm talking about Len.
When you get to being intelligent and conscious and free from automatic reflex behaviour a Moral law kicks in because of the truth of the nature of your existence.
DT says gay marriage is OM, but it hasn't kicked in for millions of Christians the world over who say it's wrong ... nor did it for the tens of millions who said it was wrong until quite recently!
Still, you know best, oh Wise One!
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That's not the kind of Law i'm talking about Len.
When you get to being intelligent and conscious and free from automatic reflex behaviour a Moral law kicks in because of the truth of the nature of your existence.
Nonsense! Nothing "kicks in". You simply use your intelligence and decide what is morally right in your opinion. That's all.
However, if you are happier believing that something "out there" is pulling your puppet strings, go for it. :)
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'We can see in jjohnjils attempts now to give up any discussion about morality at all and just have a generic conversation about God...a retreat if Ever there was one.'
You, DT, are a joke! Your whole argument is based on God existing and crediting him with OM! If this isn't your stance, what is?
This whole thread started with Alan advocating the moral argument for God, namely that
(1) Morality is objective
(2) That God is the best explanation of objective morality
(3) therefore our moral experience provides a good reason to believe in God
Actually Alan's version is stronger than mine as he seems to agree with you that "God is the only possible explanation for OM".
Since then the main point of argument is whether or not we have any independent reason to believe that morality is objective and Alan and I have been arguing that we do - I have been arguing consistently that the character of our moral experience implicitly assumes objective morality and that if we reject OM we cannot maintain morality as it actually exists in human society and as we experience it. I have said therefore that we have a choice between accepting OM or accepting that morality as it exists is distorted and illusionary in some of its core elements.
Various posters who are anti-realist about morality have been trying to argue that this is not true and that we can make sense of morality in a way that makes sense of morality as it exists. Every time this has been done they have not been able to deal with any of the criticisms of the anti-realist models they have advocated.
None of this discussion about whether or not it is possible to be an anti-realist about morality and maintain the core structures of morality requires any reference to God whatsoever - it is entirely about whether we can match a sense of morality being relative or based on personal non-cognitive responses to our normal moral discourse. You however, possibly due to the public failure of the arguments from your fellow anti-realists or possibly because you just haven't been keeping up, seem to want to ignore this entire, very long debate and pretend it has happened. As the whole point of this discussion is that I am claiming their ARE reasons to think morality is objective independent from our belief in God, then you simply stating that whether or not OM exists is only something motivated by belief in God is getting this whole discussion backwards and entirely missing the point. The fact that some of the most eminent philosophers in the world are both atheists and moral realists simply adds to the silliness of your claim, as they clearly also, like me, think there are independent reasons to think that morality is objective.
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I'm not ignoring the law importance Leonard I just don't think its relevant to what we awe discussing one way or the other.
The reason I've asked you the same question is because you seem to be missing the contradiction in wha you are saying. The situation we are discussing is that someone is bully a gay child to the point of suicide and that the person doing it thinks its ok (he may hate people and think its a good thing)
You said (1) that what makes something right are our opinions about it or personal responses to it
Right in the oinion of the person concerned.
And (2) that bullying the child is always wrong no matter what the person doing it thinks about it.
Yes, that is my opinion.
(1) and (2) are contradictions because if (1) is correct and if the person doing it thinks its right, then it IS right for him as it's his opinion that makes it right. You might disprove of what he is doing but you can't say he is wrong as he has met the only criteria you have that makes an action right..namely his personal opinions about it. All you have left is personal disapproval.
Which in no way alters the fact that the right and the wrong are personal opinions. That is why I keep mentioning the law. People who think that it is right to do things like TACTDFF have to be controlled for obvious reasons.
Once again I must tell you that right and wrong are just human concepts, and do not exist outside the human mind. The universe, nature and everything non-human are entirely indifferent to our "right and wrong".
No one disagrees that immoral people exists and the law protects us from them. The question I am concerned about is whether, when we say it is wrong we mean something more than 'I disapprove of it'. This question is quite distinct from any question about laws. As pointed our there are places were the law is to stone gay people to death, the fact that this is the law doesn't stop us asking whether or not it is an immoral law. you said before that bully a gay child is wrong everywhere, so if you still believe this, it follows that it will also be true in places where the law allow such things. Law then cannot be identical with what is morally right.
What I'm bothered about is that you have made it very clear you think saying something is wrong means more than just 'I disapprove of it'. The problem is you haven't addressed the contradiction I highlighted in my last post between wanting to say other people are wrong and also wanting to say that it is their personal responses that make it wrong. Simply asserting that its a 'human concept' doesn't help with this. I know thats what you think, I'm interested in the implications of this for what you want to say concerning ascribing wrongness to the actions of other people who do not think their actions are wrong.
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'We can see in jjohnjils attempts now to give up any discussion about morality at all and just have a generic conversation about God...a retreat if Ever there was one.'
You, DT, are a joke! Your whole argument is based on God existing and crediting him with OM! If this isn't your stance, what is?
This whole thread started with Alan advocating the moral argument for God, namely that
(1) Morality is objective
(2) That God is the best explanation of objective morality
(3) therefore our moral experience provides a good reason to believe in God
Actually Alan's version is stronger than mine as he seems to agree with you that "God is the only possible explanation for OM".
Since then the main point of argument is whether or not we have any independent reason to believe that morality is objective and Alan and I have been arguing that we do - I have been arguing consistently that the character of our moral experience implicitly assumes objective morality and that if we reject OM we cannot maintain morality as it actually exists in human society and as we experience it. I have said therefore that we have a choice between accepting OM or accepting that morality as it exists is distorted and illusionary in some of its core elements.
Various posters who are anti-realist about morality have been trying to argue that this is not true and that we can make sense of morality in a way that makes sense of morality as it exists. Every time this has been done they have not been able to deal with any of the criticisms of the anti-realist models they have advocated.
None of this discussion about whether or not it is possible to be an anti-realist about morality and maintain the core structures of morality requires any reference to God whatsoever - it is entirely about whether we can match a sense of morality being relative or based on personal non-cognitive responses to our normal moral discourse. You however, possibly due to the public failure of the arguments from your fellow anti-realists or possibly because you just haven't been keeping up, seem to want to ignore this entire, very long debate and pretend it has happened. As the whole point of this discussion is that I am claiming their ARE reasons to think morality is objective independent from our belief in God, then you simply stating that whether or not OM exists is only something motivated by belief in God is getting this whole discussion backwards and entirely missing the point. The fact that some of the most eminent philosophers in the world are both atheists and moral realists simply adds to the silliness of your claim, as they clearly also, like me, think there are independent reasons to think that morality is objective.
What moral realists fail to take into account are the values our morality is based on. You talk about it being truth-apt that there are ways which are best for human flourishing.. and then stop there. I said this earlier on and I'll say it again now, you are confusing the map for the place. If morality is objective, you should be able to find whether it's morally right or wrong to value human flourishing, and if you can't, which is what I think, then your objective deck based on that foundational value comes crashing down.
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'We can see in jjohnjils attempts now to give up any discussion about morality at all and just have a generic conversation about God...a retreat if Ever there was one.'
You, DT, are a joke! Your whole argument is based on God existing and crediting him with OM! If this isn't your stance, what is?
This whole thread started with Alan advocating the moral argument for God, namely that
(1) Morality is objective
(2) That God is the best explanation of objective morality
(3) therefore our moral experience provides a good reason to believe in God
Actually Alan's version is stronger than mine as he seems to agree with you that "God is the only possible explanation for OM".
Since then the main point of argument is whether or not we have any independent reason to believe that morality is objective and Alan and I have been arguing that we do - I have been arguing consistently that the character of our moral experience implicitly assumes objective morality and that if we reject OM we cannot maintain morality as it actually exists in human society and as we experience it. I have said therefore that we have a choice between accepting OM or accepting that morality as it exists is distorted and illusionary in some of its core elements.
Various posters who are anti-realist about morality have been trying to argue that this is not true and that we can make sense of morality in a way that makes sense of morality as it exists. Every time this has been done they have not been able to deal with any of the criticisms of the anti-realist models they have advocated.
None of this discussion about whether or not it is possible to be an anti-realist about morality and maintain the core structures of morality requires any reference to God whatsoever - it is entirely about whether we can match a sense of morality being relative or based on personal non-cognitive responses to our normal moral discourse. You however, possibly due to the public failure of the arguments from your fellow anti-realists or possibly because you just haven't been keeping up, seem to want to ignore this entire, very long debate and pretend it has happened. As the whole point of this discussion is that I am claiming their ARE reasons to think morality is objective independent from our belief in God, then you simply stating that whether or not OM exists is only something motivated by belief in God is getting this whole discussion backwards and entirely missing the point. The fact that some of the most eminent philosophers in the world are both atheists and moral realists simply adds to the silliness of your claim, as they clearly also, like me, think there are independent reasons to think that morality is objective.
What moral realists fail to take into account are the values our morality is based on. You talk about it being truth-apt that there are ways which are best for human flourishing.. and then stop there. I said this earlier on and I'll say it again now, you are confusing the map for the place. If morality is objective, you should be able to find whether it's morally right or wrong to value human flourishing, and if you can't, which is what I think, then your objective deck based on that foundational value comes crashing down.
No I don't stop there not at all - I have gone way beyond there and given an account of why it is that I think human flourishing is objectively important. I have said this is based on teleological facts grounded in God's purposes. I have been entirely up front about the importance of God in grounding morality rather than leaving this account of human flourishing floating as you claim. Atheist realists may have the problem you refer to but theists don't.
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'We can see in jjohnjils attempts now to give up any discussion about morality at all and just have a generic conversation about God...a retreat if Ever there was one.'
You, DT, are a joke! Your whole argument is based on God existing and crediting him with OM! If this isn't your stance, what is?
This whole thread started with Alan advocating the moral argument for God, namely that
(1) Morality is objective
(2) That God is the best explanation of objective morality
(3) therefore our moral experience provides a good reason to believe in God
Actually Alan's version is stronger than mine as he seems to agree with you that "God is the only possible explanation for OM".
Since then the main point of argument is whether or not we have any independent reason to believe that morality is objective and Alan and I have been arguing that we do - I have been arguing consistently that the character of our moral experience implicitly assumes objective morality and that if we reject OM we cannot maintain morality as it actually exists in human society and as we experience it. I have said therefore that we have a choice between accepting OM or accepting that morality as it exists is distorted and illusionary in some of its core elements.
Various posters who are anti-realist about morality have been trying to argue that this is not true and that we can make sense of morality in a way that makes sense of morality as it exists. Every time this has been done they have not been able to deal with any of the criticisms of the anti-realist models they have advocated.
None of this discussion about whether or not it is possible to be an anti-realist about morality and maintain the core structures of morality requires any reference to God whatsoever - it is entirely about whether we can match a sense of morality being relative or based on personal non-cognitive responses to our normal moral discourse. You however, possibly due to the public failure of the arguments from your fellow anti-realists or possibly because you just haven't been keeping up, seem to want to ignore this entire, very long debate and pretend it has happened. As the whole point of this discussion is that I am claiming their ARE reasons to think morality is objective independent from our belief in God, then you simply stating that whether or not OM exists is only something motivated by belief in God is getting this whole discussion backwards and entirely missing the point. The fact that some of the most eminent philosophers in the world are both atheists and moral realists simply adds to the silliness of your claim, as they clearly also, like me, think there are independent reasons to think that morality is objective.
What moral realists fail to take into account are the values our morality is based on. You talk about it being truth-apt that there are ways which are best for human flourishing.. and then stop there. I said this earlier on and I'll say it again now, you are confusing the map for the place. If morality is objective, you should be able to find whether it's morally right or wrong to value human flourishing, and if you can't, which is what I think, then your objective deck based on that foundational value comes crashing down.
No I don't stop there not at all - I have gone way beyond there and given an account of why it is that I think human flourishing is objectively important. I have said this is based on teleological facts grounded in God's purposes. I have been entirely up front about the importance of God in grounding morality rather than leaving this account of human flourishing floating as you claim. Atheist realists may have the problem you refer to but theists don't.
Yes, exactly, you have to invoke god, but god is defined as more than just the grounder of teleological facts, so you have to work to establish the other attributes of god can first at least hold logically. I don't think invoking a god who can only do what is morally right gets you anywhere anyway, but that's perhaps for another discussion.
As for atheist realists, I agree, they have the problem too.
Also, this is another area where you differ from Alan. Alan tries to use the existence of OM as a sure fire way of showing god exists, but if he invoked god like you have here, his argument would be circular.
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'We can see in jjohnjils attempts now to give up any discussion about morality at all and just have a generic conversation about God...a retreat if Ever there was one.'
You, DT, are a joke! Your whole argument is based on God existing and crediting him with OM! If this isn't your stance, what is?
This whole thread started with Alan advocating the moral argument for God, namely that
(1) Morality is objective
(2) That God is the best explanation of objective morality
(3) therefore our moral experience provides a good reason to believe in God
Actually Alan's version is stronger than mine as he seems to agree with you that "God is the only possible explanation for OM".
Since then the main point of argument is whether or not we have any independent reason to believe that morality is objective and Alan and I have been arguing that we do - I have been arguing consistently that the character of our moral experience implicitly assumes objective morality and that if we reject OM we cannot maintain morality as it actually exists in human society and as we experience it. I have said therefore that we have a choice between accepting OM or accepting that morality as it exists is distorted and illusionary in some of its core elements.
Various posters who are anti-realist about morality have been trying to argue that this is not true and that we can make sense of morality in a way that makes sense of morality as it exists. Every time this has been done they have not been able to deal with any of the criticisms of the anti-realist models they have advocated.
None of this discussion about whether or not it is possible to be an anti-realist about morality and maintain the core structures of morality requires any reference to God whatsoever - it is entirely about whether we can match a sense of morality being relative or based on personal non-cognitive responses to our normal moral discourse. You however, possibly due to the public failure of the arguments from your fellow anti-realists or possibly because you just haven't been keeping up, seem to want to ignore this entire, very long debate and pretend it has happened. As the whole point of this discussion is that I am claiming their ARE reasons to think morality is objective independent from our belief in God, then you simply stating that whether or not OM exists is only something motivated by belief in God is getting this whole discussion backwards and entirely missing the point. The fact that some of the most eminent philosophers in the world are both atheists and moral realists simply adds to the silliness of your claim, as they clearly also, like me, think there are independent reasons to think that morality is objective.
What moral realists fail to take into account are the values our morality is based on. You talk about it being truth-apt that there are ways which are best for human flourishing.. and then stop there. I said this earlier on and I'll say it again now, you are confusing the map for the place. If morality is objective, you should be able to find whether it's morally right or wrong to value human flourishing, and if you can't, which is what I think, then your objective deck based on that foundational value comes crashing down.
No I don't stop there not at all - I have gone way beyond there and given an account of why it is that I think human flourishing is objectively important. I have said this is based on teleological facts grounded in God's purposes. I have been entirely up front about the importance of God in grounding morality rather than leaving this account of human flourishing floating as you claim. Atheist realists may have the problem you refer to but theists don't.
Yes, exactly, you have to invoke god, but god is defined as more than just the grounder of teleological facts, so you have to work to establish the other attributes of god can first at least hold logically. I don't think invoking a god who can only do what is morally right gets you anywhere anyway, but that's perhaps for another discussion.
As for atheist realists, I agree, they have the problem too.
Also, this is another area where you differ from Alan. Alan tries to use the existence of OM as a sure fire way of showing god exists, but if he invoked god like you have here, his argument would be circular.
I don't have to detail a full theology of Gods attributes into order to maintain that God can be the grounder of teleological facts, and if I did want to go into that the place for it certainly wouldn't be on this forum! But I'm not sure thats the right interpretation of what Alan is saying, you may be right about his position but he did earlier on this threat explicitly endorse my account of this arguement being one of consistency with our moral intuitions as the basis for believing OM. I don't think he has ever gone into detail on premise 2.
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I don't have to detail a full theology of Gods attributes into order to maintain that God can be the grounder of teleological facts, and if I did want to go into that the place for it certainly wouldn't be on this forum!
Actually, you kinda do. It doesn't have to be in any order, but if one attribute of god can be found to be logically wanting, then it isn't god that is the grounder of morality. Solely on that, that doesn't mean there isn't an entity that grounds morality, only it's not the god you originally thought.
Regardless, I wouldn't want you or expect you to do it on this forum either!
But I'm not sure thats the right interpretation of what Alan is saying, you may be right about his position but he did earlier on this threat explicitly endorse my account of this arguement being one of consistency with our moral intuitions as the basis for believing OM.
Except now you've agreed that there is a problem with this, which you solve with god, but atheist realists still flounder with it. Well, they do if they hold to OM.
I don't think he has ever gone into detail on premise 2.
Alan doesn't formulate the argument how you have above. He pretty much goes with how WLC formulates it:
1. If God does not exist, objective morality does not exist.
2. Objective morality does exist.
3. Therefore, God exists.
So with premise 2 here, invoking god as the grounder of morality to show that OM exists is to have a circular argument. As you probably know, that doesn't make it invalid, it's just that we learn nothing new and the whole argument is a waste of everyone's time.
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Alan doesn't formulate the argument how you have above. He pretty much goes with how WLC formulates it:
1. If God does not exist, objective morality does not exist.
2. Objective morality does exist.
3. Therefore, God exists.
So with premise 2 here, invoking god as the grounder of morality to show that OM exists is to have a circular argument. As you probably know, that doesn't make it invalid, it's just that we learn nothing new and the whole argument is a waste of everyone's time.
Even I can see that such an argument is stupid. :)
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Actually, you kinda do. It doesn't have to be in any order, but if one attribute of god can be found to be logically wanting, then it isn't god that is the grounder of morality. Solely on that, that doesn't mean there isn't an entity that grounds morality, only it's not the god you originally thought.
Regardless, I wouldn't want you or expect you to do it on this forum either!
That’s going to be true of anything we argue about on here about God though isn’t it? It’s just saying our idea of God has to be consistent – well sure but if we just said that about every topic we’d never discuss anything else….besides which there is a tonne of theology done on this. Still we seem to agree that that’s were the discussion should be not here so I’ll move on.
Except now you've agreed that there is a problem with this, which you solve with god, but atheist realists still flounder with it. Well, they do if they hold to OM.
You’d expect me to be happy to endorse that God provides the best explanation on a thread where I’m supporting the moral argument for God right? I do think there are different moves a non-theistic realist can make though and I would probably argue for realism even if I wasn’t a theist – but obviously this would be constructed quite differently from the way I have done it here. I’m not going to do the atheists job for them though and there are some very well-known and capable atheist moral-realists who have made this case.
Alan doesn't formulate the argument how you have above. He pretty much goes with how WLC formulates it:
1. If God does not exist, objective morality does not exist.
2. Objective morality does exist.
3. Therefore, God exists.
So with premise 2 here, invoking god as the grounder of morality to show that OM exists is to have a circular argument. As you probably know, that doesn't make it invalid, it's just that we learn nothing new and the whole argument is a waste of everyone's time.
Well God as the grounder of morality is part of premise 1. If Alan agrees with me that there are completely independent reasons for thinking OM exists as I do then the argument even formulised like Craig does above does not have to be circular, as premise 2 is held for reasons entirely independent of God. It depends on whether you take premise 2 of needing to be an entirely self-contained account of OM or simply being that we have reason to believe it is objective. If it’s that former then it would be circular but then you also wouldn’t need premise 1 so the fact that it’s there implies that it isn’t. alan has argued for his premise 2 without any reference to God based on our moral intuitions about TACTDJFF so the second interpretation would seem right. Either way this is Alan’s version not mine so there is a limit to how far I want to spend my time on an exegesis of other peoples arguments.
Regards
DT
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Even I can see that such an argument is stupid.
Great, can you also now recognise the contradiction in your previous responses I’ve pointed out above? Just wondered if you were planning to explain that any time soon?
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Even I can see that such an argument is stupid.
Great, can you also now recognise the contradiction in your previous responses I’ve pointed out above? Just wondered if you were planning to explain that any time soon?
Can you show your objective method to work out the objective morality of same sex marriage for example.
Please remember not to use any personal opinions when doing so.
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Even I can see that such an argument is stupid.
Great, can you also now recognise the contradiction in your previous responses I’ve pointed out above? Just wondered if you were planning to explain that any time soon?
I'm afraid I can't follow your argument that OM exists. There are no grounds for such a belief.
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Can you show your objective method to work out the objective morality of same sex marriage for example.
Please remember not to use any personal opinions when doing so.
I’ve done that – I’ve explained that we’d do so by looking at its implications for human flourishing and justifying this in turn by deepening our understanding of Gods purposes, God being the objective ground of moral truth.
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Even I can see that such an argument is stupid.
Great, can you also now recognise the contradiction in your previous responses I’ve pointed out above? Just wondered if you were planning to explain that any time soon?
I'm afraid I can't follow your argument that OM exists. There are no grounds for such a belief.
So you keep asserting Leonard but if you can’t follow the argument then I suppose you wouldn’t be able to say that would you. Anyhow I’m more interested in you explaining the contradiction in your responses here..
To repeat:
The situation we are discussing is that someone is bully a gay child to the point of suicide and that the person doing it thinks its ok (he may hate people and think its a good thing)
You said (1) that what makes something right are our opinions about it or personal responses to it
And (2) that bullying the child is always wrong no matter what the person doing it thinks about it.
(1) and (2) are contradictions because if (1) is correct and if the person doing it thinks its right, then it IS right for him as it's his opinion that makes it right. You might disprove of what he is doing but you can't say he is wrong as he has met the only criteria you have that makes an action right..namely his personal opinions about it. All you have left is personal disapproval. Yet you have also been very clear that you think, like most people, than saying “its wrong to bully a child” means more than just “I disapprove of it.”
Putting it simply Leonard you need to either reject (1) or reject (2). Which is it?
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Can you show your objective method to work out the objective morality of same sex marriage for example.
Please remember not to use any personal opinions when doing so.
I’ve done that – I’ve explained that we’d do so by looking at its implications for human flourishing and justifying this in turn by deepening our understanding of Gods purposes, God being the objective ground of moral truth.
No as this relies on your opinions and is NOT objective.
You say god is the objective ground of moral truth. This you need to demonstrate not just assert.
So your claim fails.
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I wonder if Alan considers KALJFF to be objectively wrong?
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Can you show your objective method to work out the objective morality of same sex marriage for example.
Please remember not to use any personal opinions when doing so.
I’ve done that – I’ve explained that we’d do so by looking at its implications for human flourishing and justifying this in turn by deepening our understanding of Gods purposes, God being the objective ground of moral truth.
No as this relies on your opinions and is NOT objective.
You say god is the objective ground of moral truth. This you need to demonstrate not just assert.
So your claim fails.
It may be my opinion but it doesn’t RELY on the fact that it’s my opinion to be true or false, it relies on facts of the matter, which is why it is objective.
God being the basis of morality is an ontologically basic claim in the same way that claiming everything that exists is matter or that physical causality is the only possible types of causality are ontologically basis claims. Like many metaphysical claims they cannot be verifiably demonstrated nevertheless they remain statements that are either factually true or false. As with all metaphysics the aim is not to prove but to give a consistent account that makes sense of our experience. This is exactly what I’ve done in relation to morality while the anti-realists cannot do that. All you keep doing is making confused claims boiling down to ‘I you can’t prove OM it doesn’t exist,’ just stated in different ways to obscure the fact that its just the same old error…but just as previous times you have tried this it’s nothing more than a confusion of truth and verification on your part.
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You keep failing to demonstrate any objective moral values, and simply assert stuff instead.
I do not accept that god exists let alone is responsible for any moral grounding.
If you rely on this and cannot demonstrate it to be true, then you fail.
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You keep failing to demonstrate any objective moral values, and simply assert stuff instead.
I do not accept that god exists let alone is responsible for any moral grounding.
If you rely on this and cannot demonstrate it to be true, then you fail.
As usual your posts just rely entirely on ambiguity and misunderstanding for their force and once that's cleared up they become vacuous.
You talk of 'Failing to demonstrate' The key is understanding what you think it means to 'demonstrate' it. If you think it means to prove it then I certainly haven't failed in my argument because you can't fail if you don't do something I've never set out to do. I've made it very clear that you can't prove OM and the moral argument for God doesn't require us to prove it. Its an argument with force for those who think morality is objective.
If by contrast by demonstrate you mean provide reason to believe morality is objective I certainly have argued that and not via assertion, I've made a clear case of why objectivity is implicit in our moral practice and how anti-realist accounts can't cope with this. This critique of anti-realism remains unanswered.
Unless you can answer it you are left with either accepting God exists, articulating a none-theistic grounds for OM or accepting that our morality is fundamentally distorted. As you don't want to do the first and not been able to provide the second you are left logically with admitting the third....and yet every time I ask the atheists here to just admit this they shy away from it. All I'm asking you to do is be honest about the implications of your beliefs...that has consistently been my argument throughout both threads and so far it seems I have entirely succeeded in making my case....unless you've got something more to offer?
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So you keep asserting Leonard but if you can’t follow the argument then I suppose you wouldn’t be able to say that would you. Anyhow I’m more interested in you explaining the contradiction in your responses here..
To repeat:
The situation we are discussing is that someone is bully a gay child to the point of suicide and that the person doing it thinks its ok (he may hate people and think its a good thing)
You said (1) that what makes something right are our opinions about it or personal responses to it
I don't believe I have ever said such a thing, but if I have I was having a senior moment. I have always tried to say quite the opposite. If I believe something is right, that is just my opinion ... it doesn't make it right.
And (2) that bullying the child is always wrong no matter what the person doing it thinks about it.
Once again I have always said that that is my opinion, but once again that doesn't mean I am right, it is simply my belief.
(1) and (2) are contradictions because if (1) is correct and if the person doing it thinks its right, then it IS right for him as it's his opinion that makes it right. You might disprove of what he is doing but you can't say he is wrong as he has met the only criteria you have that makes an action right..namely his personal opinions about it. All you have left is personal disapproval. Yet you have also been very clear that you think, like most people, than saying “its wrong to bully a child” means more than just “I disapprove of it.”
Yes, of course, I believe it is wrong, but once again that is just my opinion, which doesn't make it corect.
Putting it simply Leonard you need to either reject (1) or reject (2). Which is it?
As you can see, I reject both. Personal opinions about right and wrong are just that, they can never be shown to be anything more than subjective personal opinion.
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The situation we are discussing is that someone is bully a gay child to the point of suicide and that the person doing it thinks its ok (he may hate people and think its a good thing)
You said (1) that what makes something right are our opinions about it or personal responses to it
I don't believe I have ever said such a thing, but if I have I was having a senior moment. I have always tried to say quite the opposite. If I believe something is right, that is just my opinion ... it doesn't make it right.
!?!?!?!?Are you having a senior moment now Leonard? If you are saying that 'bullying children is wrong is just your opinion' then you ARE saying that the only thing that makes it wrong IS your opinion - which is exactly what I said in (1)!!! If you are not saying this then the word 'wrong' has no meaning at all - its either based on your opinions or based on facts. If its just based on your opinions then the wrongness is just something that relies on personal opinion for its wrongness. That is exactly what (1) means. and (1) contradicts "(2) that bullying the child is always wrong no matter what the person doing it thinks about it." It contradicts 2 because in the situation we are discussing the person doing the bullying doesn't think it is wrong. For you to say that it is wrong for HIM to do it begs the question 'what does wrong mean?' The answer is either that he's making a mistake or simply that you disapprove of it. If its the former you need an external standard, but if its the latter you are contradicting yourself as you have clearly said that it means more than just that you disapprove of it.
Yes, of course, I believe it is wrong, but once again that is just my opinion, which doesn't make it corect.
And thats sort of the point Leonard. Look to make it simple let me illustrate with 2 of my opinions.
Opinion 1: DT thinks that islamic terrorists were responsible for the 9/11 attacks.
Opinion 2: DT thinks that listening to New Model Army is more enjoyable than listening to any other music.
Both of these are my opinions, but opinion 1 is either right or wrong depending on facts about the event my opinion is about. It is made right (or wrong) by facts entirely independent of my opinion. If someone else believes that a conspiracy within the American government was responsible, I can say you are wrong and (even if I can't prove it) either me or they are making a mistake.
By contrast opinion 2 is purely subjective my enjoyment of New Model Army over other bands is entirely down to my personal tastes. If someone else prefers One Direction and I say they are wrong, then we are not really disagreeing about any facts at all only our tastes. If I was to say "I think listening to New Model Army is more enjoyable than listening to anyone else and that this is always true for everyone anywhere", then you would think I was balmy - it just doesn't make sense that I should try and say that matters of personal taste are true for other people because the only think that makes it true for me IS my personal response.
So Leonard, when you say your opinion is that bullying children is wrong, is it an opinion like my opinion 1 based on facts or an opinion like my opinion 2 based on personal responses? You have said it is not based on facts so I assume you think it is like opinion 2.....but as we can see it doesn't make any sense to say that opinions of this type apply to other people - they can't as they are only your responses. That's why its a contradiction to think moral opinions are like opinion 2 but also say that it is wrong for someone who is bullying a child when the person doing the bullying thinks its ok.
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Hi DT,
I'm sorry but we just seem to be going round in circles.
Thinking an action is right or wrong, doesn't make it so. It is just the opinion of the thinker.
If you talk about provable facts, then of course there is a right and a wrong, regardless of opinion.
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Hi DT,
I'm sorry but we just seem to be going round in circles.
Thinking an action is right or wrong, doesn't make it so. It is just the opinion of the thinker.
If you talk about provable facts, then of course there is a right and a wrong, regardless of opinion.
Len
Where DT is misreading our posts is the word 'opinion'. He takes it that we mean it isn't particularly important to us whether anyone else thinks TACTDJFF is wrong or not.
I'm sure, like me, you think TACTDJFF is an abominable act that everyone should THINK abominable and anyone who doesn't THINK it should be condemned as despicably immoral.
Where he goes wrong is to imagine morality is somewhere other than in the human brain - and also (to a lesser extent) in a large number of other species brains too. Theists just can't seem to grasp the fact.
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Hi DT,
I'm sorry but we just seem to be going round in circles.
Thinking an action is right or wrong, doesn't make it so. It is just the opinion of the thinker.
If you talk about provable facts, then of course there is a right and a wrong, regardless of opinion.
Len
Where DT is misreading our posts is the word 'opinion'. He takes it that we mean it isn't particularly important to us whether anyone else thinks TACTDJFF is wrong or not.
I'm sure, like me, you think TACTDJFF is an abominable act that everyone should THINK abominable and anyone who doesn't THINK it should be condemned as despicably immoral.
Where he goes wrong is to imagine morality is somewhere other than in the human brain - and also (to a lesser extent) in a large number of other species brains too. Theists just can't seem to grasp the fact.
Come now jjohnjil, Leonard may be able to get away with pulling the 'I'm having a senior moment so I can't follow the argument' trick but you can't and in which case your post is simply dishonest. I've not claimed that Leonard's moral opinions aren't important to him - quite the opposite actually I'm quite sure his sense of morality is quite normal and that he IS very moved by gay kids being bullied to death and that he DOES think it is wrong for everyone anywhere...these are all very normal features of moral discourse.
The point I have made to Leonard is that if his opinion is like my opinion 2 in form, no matter how much I may be moved by my personal responses or how important they are, then as long as it is just an opinion based on personal responses then I cannot consistently apply it to other people who do not share that response. It becomes as silly as me saying 'listen to New Model Army is more enjoyable than listening to other bands' is something that applies to you too whether you agree with it or not.
I'm sorry but we just seem to be going round in circles.
Thinking an action is right or wrong, doesn't make it so. It is just the opinion of the thinker.
Well the circle Leonard is down to the fact that you keep saying its your opinion without saying what type of opinion it is. Is it an opinion like my Opinion 1 or is it like my opinion 2. If 2 then you have contradicted yourself I'm afraid for exactly the reason I've just explained in my reply to jjohnjil above. I'm sorry if you have a problem grasping that but simply restating 'its just the opinion of the thinker' doesn't get you out of the contradiction.
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Well the circle Leonard is down to the fact that you keep saying its your opinion without saying what type of opinion it is. Is it an opinion like my Opinion 1 or is it like my opinion 2. If 2 then you have contradicted yourself I'm afraid for exactly the reason I've just explained in my reply to jjohnjil above. I'm sorry if you have a problem grasping that but simply restating 'its just the opinion of the thinker' doesn't get you out of the contradiction.
"Opinion one" is not an opinion, it is a provable fact, and you can't call a provable fact an opinion.
Opinion two is true for you but not necessarily so for anybody else.
You are trying to equate reality to opinion, and it can't be done.
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Hi DT,
I'm sorry but we just seem to be going round in circles.
Thinking an action is right or wrong, doesn't make it so. It is just the opinion of the thinker.
If you talk about provable facts, then of course there is a right and a wrong, regardless of opinion.
Len
Where DT is misreading our posts is the word 'opinion'. He takes it that we mean it isn't particularly important to us whether anyone else thinks TACTDJFF is wrong or not.
I'm sure, like me, you think TACTDJFF is an abominable act that everyone should THINK abominable and anyone who doesn't THINK it should be condemned as despicably immoral.
Where he goes wrong is to imagine morality is somewhere other than in the human brain - and also (to a lesser extent) in a large number of other species brains too. Theists just can't seem to grasp the fact.
Come now jjohnjil, Leonard may be able to get away with pulling the 'I'm having a senior moment so I can't follow the argument' trick but you can't and in which case your post is simply dishonest. I've not claimed that Leonard's moral opinions aren't important to him - quite the opposite actually I'm quite sure his sense of morality is quite normal and that he IS very moved by gay kids being bullied to death and that he DOES think it is wrong for everyone anywhere...these are all very normal features of moral discourse.
The point I have made to Leonard is that if his opinion is like my opinion 2 in form, no matter how much I may be moved by my personal responses or how important they are, then as long as it is just an opinion based on personal responses then I cannot consistently apply it to other people who do not share that response. It becomes as silly as me saying 'listen to New Model Army is more enjoyable than listening to other bands' is something that applies to you too whether you agree with it or not.
I'm sorry but we just seem to be going round in circles.
Thinking an action is right or wrong, doesn't make it so. It is just the opinion of the thinker.
Well the circle Leonard is down to the fact that you keep saying its your opinion without saying what type of opinion it is. Is it an opinion like my Opinion 1 or is it like my opinion 2. If 2 then you have contradicted yourself I'm afraid for exactly the reason I've just explained in my reply to jjohnjil above. I'm sorry if you have a problem grasping that but simply restating 'its just the opinion of the thinker' doesn't get you out of the contradiction.
I'm please you don't think Len is some sort of uncaring ogre, but it's certainly the way it comes across, DT.
Your opinion 1 ... In this case you are simply saying what you think the fact of the matter is - you may be right, you may be wrong, but which is which, you have no way of knowing.
Your opinion 2 is simply what we call taste.
The assertion you make that objective morality exists and is somewhere other than in the mind is an opinion 1 - it may or it may not. Len and I and the majority of atheists do not think it exists at all but is an inevitable consequence of evolution (without us acquiring this sense, we would have died out a few million years ago).
You, along with all other theists, have the need to have something/someone/somewhere who decides these things and it warps your mind into ignoring the logical conclusion that we are all here by complete chance and in a million years time the Universe will carry on without any trace of us ever having been here.
TACTJDFF is wrong because we have an evolutionary need to rear our offspring and nature has made us think of such an act as unquestionably wrong! If mice had our brains they would think killing baby mice just for fun was objectively immoral and that killing the offspring of those dangerous cats who do it as no worse than us putting down mouse traps because we have a dislike of mice!
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"Opinion one" is not an opinion, it is a provable fact, and you can't call a provable fact an opinion.
That's rubbish everything we believe is by definition our opinion and with regard to this specific example you can go on youtube and watch conspiracy theory videos about 9/11 full of people making all kinds of claims. These seem ridiculous and far fetched and in my opinion the best explanation is that Islamic fundamentalist bombers were responsible.... But I can't prove it - I don't have access to the facts to be that sure. Same is true of many of my opinions - whether or not other universes exist, whether or not Jesus said many of the things attributed to him in the Gospel of John - all of these are factual questions I can't prove definitively one way or the other but which I can have an opinion about. You are simply trying to redefine terms to suit your argument.
regardless of this though....
Opinion two is true for you but not necessarily so for anybody else.
I agree and if morality is also like this then you making a moral statement and saying that it is wrong for everyone everywhere wouldn't be correct would it? Which is why saying that it is with regards to bullying children is contradicts the account you give of morality.
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I'm please you don't think Len is some sort of uncaring ogre, but it's certainly the way it comes across, DT.
You don't seem to be reading my posts very carefully then. I've appealed to the very fact that when we change our core moral opinions it DOES matter to us so tremendously as a fact in support of realism as the reason we care so much about which moral views to adopt is that we care about adopting the RIGHT answer.
Your opinion 1 ... In this case you are simply saying what you think the fact of the matter is - you may be right, you may be wrong, but which is which, you have no way of knowing.
Your opinion 2 is simply what we call taste.
The assertion you make that objective morality exists and is somewhere other than in the mind is an opinion 1 - it may or it may not.
I'm not asserting that in my argument with Len although that is what I believe....what I'm pointing out in my argument with Len is that IF you think moral opinions are just based on personal tastes -the product of our own minds rather than on facts about the world, then we have no grounds whatsoever for saying that when we think something is wrong it is wrong for everyone including people who do not share those personal responses. Len however also wants to say that bullying gay kids is wrong for everyone whatever they may think. Clearly this is does not fit with his account of morality. I pointed this out to you before but like Len, you don't seem to want to grasp this nettle but rather want to talk about evolution instead which is entirely tangential to this point and in no way removes the contradiction.
Len and I and the majority of atheists do not think it exists at all but is an inevitable consequence of evolution (without us acquiring this sense, we would have died out a few million years ago).
You, along with all other theists, have the need to have something/someone/somewhere who decides these things and it warps your mind into ignoring the logical conclusion that we are all here by complete chance and in a million years time the Universe will carry on without any trace of us ever having been here.
TACTJDFF is wrong because we have an evolutionary need to rear our offspring and nature has made us think of such an act as unquestionably wrong! If mice had our brains they would think killing baby mice just for fun was objectively immoral and that killing the offspring of those dangerous cats who do it as no worse than us putting down mouse traps because we have a dislike of mice!
What you now seem to be saying is that we are programmed by evolution to think things are wrong and indeed it is so fundamental that it is wrong for everyone even though it doesn't exist anywhere but in our minds. Len and I were discussing the example of bully gay kids so if this was so engrained it raises a number of problems:
(1) if it was so deeply programmed that it was irresistible for us to think that it was ok to bully gay kids to death, then we wouldn't expect anyone who was human to be able to think it. But some people do seem to think its ok to bully gay kids to death as we have seen, indeed its even been socially acceptable and law in certain places and times to kill gay people so its not even a minor phenomenon common only to a few psychopaths. Doesn't seem to be much case for it being an irresistible programme of evolution here then does it?
(2) People have given very similar explanations that you provide of morality, to religion - they have looked at the functional role that God has played in human society throughout our evolution and talked about our brains being 'hard-wired' to believe in God. If this were true though I'd doubt that you or many of your atheist buddies would simply say "oh well if its a product of evolution we better start believing in God then, its just the way we are wired"...I have no doubt you'd rather think that our realisation about evolution has helped us to 'see beyond' these natural delusions of evolution. In exactly the same way it begs the question of why on earth, if we come to realise that our tendency to treat moral statements as being universally applicable like other factual statements is just a mechanism of evolution that is useful, rather than an indicator of truth, that we should possibly expect it to have the same hold over us as it did without that realisation. It might be useful to go about being moral most of the time but hell there are plenty of times we all know we can probably get away with this or that immoral act so why not right??? Moral truth after all is just an illusion right? As I said before, it is one thing to say our sense of moral truth is an illusion created by evolution, its quite another to think we can realise this and still go on thinking about morality In the same way or expecting it to have the same hold over people once they have recognised this.
(3) Even if your claim was true, it would not remove the contradiction between Len's view of his moral views being only a subjective opinion and him wanting to say that his judgement is applicable to people who disagree with him.
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I do not put forward the following view of my sense of morality as anything but my opinions on said subject. However I do suggest that I am being internally consistent by having such views.
1) I see morality as having an evolutionary basis.
2) I see no reason to think that the idea of evolution needs an outside agency such as a god for the process of evolution to work. Hence, I see no reason to think that morality needs any outside agency.
3) I accept that there is a 'potential' for morality, if it aids survival. However I see this as no different to any other 'potentials' such as the eye, movement, ability to breed, speed, strength, selfishness and a myriad of other characteristics of living things. I do not see these 'potentials' as having any outside existence in their own right, and, therefore do not regard them as objective in the sense of having an existence separate from the creatures which exhibit these characteristics.
4) I have a morality which I try to adhere to. For me, this is probably driven by such traits as empathy and natural feelings of co-operation and responsibility towards others. Culture, environment, experience, upbringing, and a rational approach, for me, superimpose upon those feelings, so that I attempt to give the most constructive outcome which would satisfy my original motivations. I do not see this as some 'distortion' of morality in any way. My morality seems entirely consistent with certain evolutionary motivations rather than reflecting some sort of morality which has an objective existence. Thus my sense of moral wrongness/rightness depends upon my own unique characteristics wedded to group characteristics via evolution.
5) I generally think and feel that I am correct in my moral thoughts and decisions, because that is the way in which I have evolved to think and feel. That is not to say that I can't make immoral decisions, but it would be odd, indeed, if I went around thinking that my moral thoughts and decisions were inherently wrong. However If it was demonstrated to me that some particular moral thought or action of mine was wrong, then I would try to analyse why it might be wrong, and if then I was convinced of this wrongness, I would try to adjust accordingly.
6) Moral thoughts and decisions can involve deep seated and natural emotions, often in relation to the extreme nature of a situation. Hence, in general terms, I would consider a brutal murder or a savage rape to be much more extreme than a small theft, for instance. Thus I would have a greater sense of condemnation for murder than theft. I find this to be entirely consistent with the evolutionary characteristics I referred to in point 4.
7) Because I am a member of an extremely social species, I see the need for group decisions as well as for valuing my own. Therefore, and especially, when I see social cohesion being threatened or undermined, I also understand the impulse for curtailing antisocial behaviour in myself and others. Conflict often arises from this attempt at balancing social/individual behaviour. I see this as entirely consistent with point 1 and point 4.
8 ) Once I die, my own motivations and feelings are no longer in existence. I might well hope that others may have the same sense of morality that I had, but it would be of no relevance to me as I no longer exist. In other words my sense of morality has died with me.
9) If all human beings died(and leaving aside the evidence for proto-morality in certain other animals) then, as I see it, there would be no such thing as morality actually existing, although the 'potential' for morality would not cease, given that evolution continues and that morality aids survival.
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DT
Firstly, Len is not basing his opinion on personal tastes, he cares about gay kids being bullied just as much as you or I do, probably a good deal more! Your opinion/assertion that that is how he feels about it is what I meant about you treating him like some sort of monster!
Atheists care about the wrongs of this world because they think things are wrong, NOT as theists seem to think - because it's some sort of law that they have to obey in case God sends them to Hell!
Secondly, evolution does not work in the way you state. Some people thinking gay bashing is not immoral is no different to kids being born with Downs Syndrome, we are not all endowed with the same standard/quality of genes! In fact it is exactly how evolution works!
Objective morality is nothing more than a way of making God responsible for the way we think. It's circular because one cannot exist without the other! Your argument that some atheists believe in OM is flawed, they believe morality to be a universally held POV, albeit different in other societies and in other times. For instance, your God seemed to be quite content for slave owners to keep people in life-long servitude, so where was OM in those days?
The best of the laughs though was your assertion that gay marriage is OM! Marriage itself was purely a way of men getting their sex legally and a housekeeper - or for gaining other peoples wealth and lands by marrying their daughters to other rich men. Love didn't enter into it until Victorian times. Love between gays was looked on as a cardinal sin by Christians for millennia and marriage between them unthinkable and yet you seem to think it is set in stone somewhere as OM! Ludicrous!
I can see you are as deeply impaled as the Alien and nothing anyone can say will prise you out of that, but it's quite enjoyable to have decent debate instead of TW type mutterings, so thanks for that.
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Hi DT,
"Even if your claim was true, it would not remove the contradiction between Len's view of his moral views being only a subjective opinion and him wanting to say that his judgement is applicable to people who disagree with him."
I have never said that. MY OPINION IS THAT bullying a child to the point of suicide is always wrong, but I do not say that everybody must accept that opinion, because clearly some don't.
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Hi DT,
"Even if your claim was true, it would not remove the contradiction between Len's view of his moral views being only a subjective opinion and him wanting to say that his judgement is applicable to people who disagree with him."
I have never said that. MY OPINION IS THAT bullying a child to the point of suicide is always wrong, but I do not say that everybody must accept that opinion, because clearly some don't.
Hi Len,
Sure no one can be compelled to accept anything, but you have told us that by YOUR OPINION you mean its just based on your own personal responses and not on anything external. Ok, well if that's right and morality has no other basis to derive its judgements about what is right or wrong other than peoples personal responses then we aren't able to say that someone who doesn't share your response is doing something that is 'wrong' as, as your theory of morality implies, things are only wrong because of our personal responses to them. You might not like what they do, but as you can't appeal to any standard you both share the most you can actually say about it is that you 'disapprove of their actions'.
Now that's all well and good, but the trouble is Leonard you said very clearly that morality does mean more than simply 'disapproval'. I think you are right and being entirely honest in saying this - no society anywhere has simply meant 'we disapprove' when we say something is morally wrong and most people would agree with you that reducing the statement 'it is wrong to bully children' to only meaning ' disapprove of bullying children' is an appalling weakening of morality. Yet IF your theory of morality is true and IF you have nothing to appeal to other than your personal responses, you have no resources at all to be able to say that morality is anything other than simply your disapproval, no matter how much you may want to.
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I do not put forward the following view of my sense of morality as anything but my opinions on said subject. However I do suggest that I am being internally consistent by having such views.
1) I see morality as having an evolutionary basis.
2) I see no reason to think that the idea of evolution needs an outside agency such as a god for the process of evolution to work. Hence, I see no reason to think that morality needs any outside agency.
3) I accept that there is a 'potential' for morality, if it aids survival. However I see this as no different to any other 'potentials' such as the eye, movement, ability to breed, speed, strength, selfishness and a myriad of other characteristics of living things. I do not see these 'potentials' as having any outside existence in their own right, and, therefore do not regard them as objective in the sense of having an existence separate from the creatures which exhibit these characteristics.
4) I have a morality which I try to adhere to. For me, this is probably driven by such traits as empathy and natural feelings of co-operation and responsibility towards others. Culture, environment, experience, upbringing, and a rational approach, for me, superimpose upon those feelings, so that I attempt to give the most constructive outcome which would satisfy my original motivations. I do not see this as some 'distortion' of morality in any way. My morality seems entirely consistent with certain evolutionary motivations rather than reflecting some sort of morality which has an objective existence. Thus my sense of moral wrongness/rightness depends upon my own unique characteristics wedded to group characteristics via evolution.
5) I generally think and feel that I am correct in my moral thoughts and decisions, because that is the way in which I have evolved to think and feel. That is not to say that I can't make immoral decisions, but it would be odd, indeed, if I went around thinking that my moral thoughts and decisions were inherently wrong. However If it was demonstrated to me that some particular moral thought or action of mine was wrong, then I would try to analyse why it might be wrong, and if then I was convinced of this wrongness, I would try to adjust accordingly.
6) Moral thoughts and decisions can involve deep seated and natural emotions, often in relation to the extreme nature of a situation. Hence, in general terms, I would consider a brutal murder or a savage rape to be much more extreme than a small theft, for instance. Thus I would have a greater sense of condemnation for murder than theft. I find this to be entirely consistent with the evolutionary characteristics I referred to in point 4.
7) Because I am a member of an extremely social species, I see the need for group decisions as well as for valuing my own. Therefore, and especially, when I see social cohesion being threatened or undermined, I also understand the impulse for curtailing antisocial behaviour in myself and others. Conflict often arises from this attempt at balancing social/individual behaviour. I see this as entirely consistent with point 1 and point 4.
8 ) Once I die, my own motivations and feelings are no longer in existence. I might well hope that others may have the same sense of morality that I had, but it would be of no relevance to me as I no longer exist. In other words my sense of morality has died with me.
9) If all human beings died(and leaving aside the evidence for proto-morality in certain other animals) then, as I see it, there would be no such thing as morality actually existing, although the 'potential' for morality would not cease, given that evolution continues and that morality aids survival.
Nice to see you again Enki. You have given an account above of morality emerging through the process of evolution and its importance to us as a social species. As I see a key aspect of morality being about what promotes our flourishing as conscious beings and given that this involves us flourishing in a social context as social beings a don't have any problem with the evolutionary account you give at all, except were you spin it add in your own assumptions about there not being a spiritual dimension to our being. You may well believe this and I may not, but besides these assumptions we bring to it the actual facts of the process you describe don't worry my realist account at all - they provide the context in which we discover moral truth. As moral truth is in part defined by our flourishing its no surprise at all that our core instincts about right or wrong will also often tie in with evolutionary traits promoting our survival.
The really interesting bit in your account though is here:
I generally think and feel that I am correct in my moral thoughts and decisions, because that is the way in which I have evolved to think and feel.
You are quite rightly acknowledging here that our moral thought DOES assume that our moral reasoning is a question of right or wrong, its honest of you to admit this fairly obvious truth while so many of your atheist buddies have been squirming round it. However you then say that this is "the way in which I have evolved." The key take away for me here is that giving an evolutionary account as you and jjohnjil do does not in anyway sidestep the question I am asking about whether moral statements really are questions that are true or false (as you admit they seem to be) or whether they are in fact just based on our personal responses. As you can see, I can give an evolutionary account that is also realist too, but when you say that we think of moral statements as correct or wrong because "this the way we have evolved" begs the question of whether its (1) evolved like that because we are discovering truth in the world through the process of our evolution and social interaction or (2) whether it just seems that way but in fact its just our personal responses.
If its (2) then your broader evolutionary account doesn't help you one bit with the problem - when I say that atheists should except that morality is 'distorted' if their account were true it means exactly what you seem to be describing - that it seems to be that moral questions are ones with right or wrong answers but actually in reality they can't really be at all if morality is rooted in our personal responses. That I'm afraid is what distortion means. Further, your evolutionary account doesn't get you our of the dilemma of how we go about thinking about morality now once this is realised: if you are right and if we have now got to such a point in our evolution that we can reflect on the process and recognise that these moral questions we think of as right or wrong can't really be that at all, but rather can only be our preferences. As I said in my reply to jjohnjil, we can give an evolutionary/social account of religion but I doubt that will make you convert to belief in God simply because it may be 'hard wired' into us. Same is true of morality once we understand that the structure of our moral experience is in fact pointing to a truth that on your account doesn't really exist.
Your whole post is another good example of exactly what Vlad has highlighted before - a tendency among atheists to invoke evolutionary accounts as if they somehow answered the underlying questions when in reality they simply beg those very questions they attempt to answer.
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Firstly, Len is not basing his opinion on personal tastes, he cares about gay kids being bullied just as much as you or I do, probably a good deal more! Your opinion/assertion that that is how he feels about it is what I meant about you treating him like some sort of monster!
What are you talking about? Our personal responses include our emotional response such as what we care about. The question is are moral judgements questions about facts about the world or are they grounded in personal responses such as how we respond emotionally to something. Clearly if I'm saying Len's morality is based on the fact he cares about it I am not saying he is uncaring. I have no idea what else yo think personal responses may mean.
Atheists care about the wrongs of this world because they think things are wrong, NOT as theists seem to think - because it's some sort of law that they have to obey in case God sends them to Hell!
I don't believe in hell and my account of moral truth isn't based on divine commands. You are flailing.
Secondly, evolution does not work in the way you state. Some people thinking gay bashing is not immoral is no different to kids being born with Downs Syndrome, we are not all endowed with the same standard/quality of genes! In fact it is exactly how evolution works!
In which case trying to explain morality in terms of being programmed to think of something as right or wrong is a none starter then isn't it? Best not get distracted by it then!
Objective morality is nothing more than a way of making God responsible for the way we think. It's circular because one cannot exist without the other! Your argument that some atheists believe in OM is flawed, they believe morality to be a universally held POV, albeit different in other societies and in other times.
No one has given an atheist account of OM here and as I have explained our reason for believing in OM is rooted in our moral experience and does not reference God. I can understand why you don't want to address the actual argument though seeing as all your athiest buddies have failed so far.
For instance, your God seemed to be quite content for slave owners to keep people in life-long servitude, so where was OM in those days?
Sorry when was this? You seem to be taking me for a Christian inerrantist, I am not a Christian at all.
The best of the laughs though was your assertion that gay marriage is OM! Marriage itself was purely a way of men getting their sex legally and a housekeeper - or for gaining other peoples wealth and lands by marrying their daughters to other rich men. Love didn't enter into it until Victorian times. Love between gays was looked on as a cardinal sin by Christians for millennia and marriage between them unthinkable and yet you seem to think it is set in stone somewhere as OM! Ludicrous!
If you think that you don't understand what morality is. I don't believe in moral principles at all certainly not unchanging ones. What is the right moral answer to a question is always dependent on the morally relevant variables. A question about the moral rightness or wrongness of Gay Marriage is one that we take understanding the social context and meanings it has in our society. To say it is right doesn't mean the answer is the same in all places and times, just that when we take all these variables into account there IS a right answer.
I can see you are as deeply impaled as the Alien and nothing anyone can say will prise you out of that, but it's quite enjoyable to have decent debate instead of TW type mutterings, so thanks for that.
Well a good argument to the contra might help, unfortunately for you, you haven't provided one - indeed you have only demonstrated repeatedly you don't understand the argument.
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Yet IF your theory of morality is true and IF you have nothing to appeal to other than your personal responses, you have no resources at all to be able to say that morality is anything other than simply your disapproval, no matter how much you may want to.
Exactly! And since so many of us are like-minded about some things, and because we are a social species, we have to arrive at a moral code to live by ... the law. Members who transgress that code and act antisocially must be punished and controlled.
-
I do not put forward the following view of my sense of morality as anything but my opinions on said subject. However I do suggest that I am being internally consistent by having such views.
1) I see morality as having an evolutionary basis.
2) I see no reason to think that the idea of evolution needs an outside agency such as a god for the process of evolution to work. Hence, I see no reason to think that morality needs any outside agency.
3) I accept that there is a 'potential' for morality, if it aids survival. However I see this as no different to any other 'potentials' such as the eye, movement, ability to breed, speed, strength, selfishness and a myriad of other characteristics of living things. I do not see these 'potentials' as having any outside existence in their own right, and, therefore do not regard them as objective in the sense of having an existence separate from the creatures which exhibit these characteristics.
4) I have a morality which I try to adhere to. For me, this is probably driven by such traits as empathy and natural feelings of co-operation and responsibility towards others. Culture, environment, experience, upbringing, and a rational approach, for me, superimpose upon those feelings, so that I attempt to give the most constructive outcome which would satisfy my original motivations. I do not see this as some 'distortion' of morality in any way. My morality seems entirely consistent with certain evolutionary motivations rather than reflecting some sort of morality which has an objective existence. Thus my sense of moral wrongness/rightness depends upon my own unique characteristics wedded to group characteristics via evolution.
5) I generally think and feel that I am correct in my moral thoughts and decisions, because that is the way in which I have evolved to think and feel. That is not to say that I can't make immoral decisions, but it would be odd, indeed, if I went around thinking that my moral thoughts and decisions were inherently wrong. However If it was demonstrated to me that some particular moral thought or action of mine was wrong, then I would try to analyse why it might be wrong, and if then I was convinced of this wrongness, I would try to adjust accordingly.
6) Moral thoughts and decisions can involve deep seated and natural emotions, often in relation to the extreme nature of a situation. Hence, in general terms, I would consider a brutal murder or a savage rape to be much more extreme than a small theft, for instance. Thus I would have a greater sense of condemnation for murder than theft. I find this to be entirely consistent with the evolutionary characteristics I referred to in point 4.
7) Because I am a member of an extremely social species, I see the need for group decisions as well as for valuing my own. Therefore, and especially, when I see social cohesion being threatened or undermined, I also understand the impulse for curtailing antisocial behaviour in myself and others. Conflict often arises from this attempt at balancing social/individual behaviour. I see this as entirely consistent with point 1 and point 4.
8 ) Once I die, my own motivations and feelings are no longer in existence. I might well hope that others may have the same sense of morality that I had, but it would be of no relevance to me as I no longer exist. In other words my sense of morality has died with me.
9) If all human beings died(and leaving aside the evidence for proto-morality in certain other animals) then, as I see it, there would be no such thing as morality actually existing, although the 'potential' for morality would not cease, given that evolution continues and that morality aids survival.
Nice to see you again Enki. You have given an account above of morality emerging through the process of evolution and its importance to us as a social species. As I see a key aspect of morality being about what promotes our flourishing as conscious beings and given that this involves us flourishing in a social context as social beings a don't have any problem with the evolutionary account you give at all, except were you spin it add in your own assumptions about there not being a spiritual dimension to our being. You may well believe this and I may not, but besides these assumptions we bring to it the actual facts of the process you describe don't worry my realist account at all - they provide the context in which we discover moral truth. As moral truth is in part defined by our flourishing its no surprise at all that our core instincts about right or wrong will also often tie in with evolutionary traits promoting our survival.
The really interesting bit in your account though is here:
I generally think and feel that I am correct in my moral thoughts and decisions, because that is the way in which I have evolved to think and feel.
You are quite rightly acknowledging here that our moral thought DOES assume that our moral reasoning is a question of right or wrong, its honest of you to admit this fairly obvious truth while so many of your atheist buddies have been squirming round it. However you then say that this is "the way in which I have evolved." The key take away for me here is that giving an evolutionary account as you and jjohnjil do does not in anyway sidestep the question I am asking about whether moral statements really are questions that are true or false (as you admit they seem to be) or whether they are in fact just based on our personal responses. As you can see, I can give an evolutionary account that is also realist too, but when you say that we think of moral statements as correct or wrong because "this the way we have evolved" begs the question of whether its (1) evolved like that because we are discovering truth in the world through the process of our evolution and social interaction or (2) whether it just seems that way but in fact its just our personal responses.
If its (2) then your broader evolutionary account doesn't help you one bit with the problem - when I say that atheists should except that morality is 'distorted' if their account were true it means exactly what you seem to be describing - that it seems to be that moral questions are ones with right or wrong answers but actually in reality they can't really be at all if morality is rooted in our personal responses. That I'm afraid is what distortion means. Further, your evolutionary account doesn't get you our of the dilemma of how we go about thinking about morality now once this is realised: if you are right and if we have now got to such a point in our evolution that we can reflect on the process and recognise that these moral questions we think of as right or wrong can't really be that at all, but rather can only be our preferences. As I said in my reply to jjohnjil, we can give an evolutionary/social account of religion but I doubt that will make you convert to belief in God simply because it may be 'hard wired' into us. Same is true of morality once we understand that the structure of our moral experience is in fact pointing to a truth that on your account doesn't really exist.
Your whole post is another good example of exactly what Vlad has highlighted before - a tendency among atheists to invoke evolutionary accounts as if they somehow answered the underlying questions when in reality they simply beg those very questions they attempt to answer.
Hi DT,
Just a few points in response to Your Mess. 466:
I have already stated that, for me, moral questions are not a question of true or false, but of my personal interpretation given the factors that I have already mentioned. I had hoped that my point 4 had made this point clear, when I stated that " my sense of moral wrongness/rightness depends upon my own unique characteristics wedded to group characteristics via evolution.". This does not suggest that I see moral questions as being true or false in any objective way.
If I considered that morality was something extraneous to us, then my arguments could well be taken to show that I am expounding some sort of distortion to that morality. But I don't think this. For me, the whole idea of morality is a human construct. If you see this as a 'distortion' of morality, that would surely have to be based upon the idea that there is an extraneous 'morality' to distort from. However, as I have no reason to think that there is this extraneous morality, then the idea of distortion does not arise.
The question that I ask myself is where does our moral sense come from. I 'invoke' evolution only because it genuinely seems to me to be the best explanation for our moral feelings, thoughts and actions.
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Yet IF your theory of morality is true and IF you have nothing to appeal to other than your personal responses, you have no resources at all to be able to say that morality is anything other than simply your disapproval, no matter how much you may want to.
Exactly! And since so many of us are like-minded about some things, and because we are a social species, we have to arrive at a moral code to live by ... the law. Members who transgress that code and act antisocially must be punished and controlled.
So you do agree - great! so when you said before (and I quote) "Another repeat! I don't just disapprove of it, I consider it wrong" then seeing as you have now agreed that saying it is wrong can, for you, mean nothing more than disapproval you are contradicting yourself.
No wonder I have to repeat myself Leonard its like wading through treacle getting you to see the implications of your own position. Nevertheless there was very good reason when you originally said "I don't just disapprove of it, I consider it wrong" because this is exactly what anyone expressing a normal moral view would also want to say - that morality is certainly much more than just disapproval. The fact that you have finally had to admit this is all your theory is capable of delivering proves my point very well - namely that an anti-realist morality is nothing like morality as we experience it. It is a thin counterfeit.
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Hi DT,
Just a few points in response to Your Mess. 466:
I have already stated that, for me, moral questions are not a question of true or false, but of my personal interpretation given the factors that I have already mentioned. I had hoped that my point 4 had made this point clear, when I stated that " my sense of moral wrongness/rightness depends upon my own unique characteristics wedded to group characteristics via evolution.". This does not suggest that I see moral questions as being true or false in any objective way.
If I considered that morality was something extraneous to us, then my arguments could well be taken to show that I am expounding some sort of distortion to that morality. But I don't think this. For me, the whole idea of morality is a human construct. If you see this as a 'distortion' of morality, that would surely have to be based upon the idea that there is an extraneous 'morality' to distort from. However, as I have no reason to think that there is this extraneous morality, then the idea of distortion does not arise.
The question that I ask myself is where does our moral sense come from. I 'invoke' evolution only because it genuinely seems to me to be the best explanation for our moral feelings, thoughts and actions.
Hi Enki,
I understand that your "sense of moral wrongness/rightness depends upon my own unique characteristics wedded to group characteristics via evolution". The point I made in my post though is that when you appeal to evolution it doesn't do the job of getting past the question of whether moral questions are derived from facts or personal responses - I illustrated this by giving a realist account which sees evolution as the method via we discover moral truth. To understand your post then I have to interpret your statement "via evolution" to mean something like 'an interpretation of evolution whereby the process of evolution causes us to invent concepts of right and wrong to survive.' Now that's all well and good but it doesn't prevent us from asking the question:
"when I make a judgement that bullying gay children to death is wrong, am I doing so because based on moral facts or is it ultimately based on the way I personally respond to the situation".
If its ultimately on facts, even if physical, social and evolutionary adaptive facts form part of those facts, then there is a right answer to moral questions independent of what we believe. If though we are saying that evolution and our status as social animals causes us to have certain sort of personal responses to things like bully children that can be explained with reference to our evolutionary needs, this doesn't change the answer from being 'its ultimately based on a personal response'. In other words the question of evolutions role in EITHER setting the context for the relevant facts OR setting the context for our personal responses doesn't in any way stop us asking the question of whether it is ultimately about facts or about personal responses.
If its about facts then it is the facts that determine moral truth and moral questions are objectively right or wrong dependent on those facts. If it is based on personal responses then all the same problems come back - any moral questions that are only matters of personal response can at best only be expressions of approval or disapproval... and if that is the case then they cannot be questions that are correct or incorrect in anything but a very thin and trivial sense. Yet as you yourself correctly admit, we do generally think we are correct and other people incorrect with regard to moral questions: this leaves the anti-realists with little room to manoeuvre accept to admit that the way we experience morality is an illusion in the same way an atheist might thing our evolution has left humans as a species 'hard wired' to be religious.
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Hi DT,
I don't know whether morality is an illusion that we necessarily subject ourselves to or a reality that we see but dimly, that is true. But the fact that we think we are correct/incorrect about all sorts of things doesn't necessarily mean that we have some sort of truth in any objective sense, unless it can be demonstrated one way or the other.
Hence I am left with my own best explanation of the moral sense...which I have given.
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Yet IF your theory of morality is true and IF you have nothing to appeal to other than your personal responses, you have no resources at all to be able to say that morality is anything other than simply your disapproval, no matter how much you may want to.
Exactly! And since so many of us are like-minded about some things, and because we are a social species, we have to arrive at a moral code to live by ... the law. Members who transgress that code and act antisocially must be punished and controlled.
So you do agree - great! so when you said before (and I quote) "Another repeat! I don't just disapprove of it, I consider it wrong" then seeing as you have now agreed that saying it is wrong can, for you, mean nothing more than disapproval you are contradicting yourself.
No wonder I have to repeat myself Leonard its like wading through treacle getting you to see the implications of your own position. Nevertheless there was very good reason when you originally said "I don't just disapprove of it, I consider it wrong" because this is exactly what anyone expressing a normal moral view would also want to say - that morality is certainly much more than just disapproval. The fact that you have finally had to admit this is all your theory is capable of delivering proves my point very well - namely that an anti-realist morality is nothing like morality as we experience it. It is a thin counterfeit.
I have always maintained the same thing. If you have gathered otherwise, then either you have misinterpreted my post, or I have failed to explain myself clearly.
None of this, however, shows that an objective morality exists ... and I maintain it doesn't.
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Yet IF your theory of morality is true and IF you have nothing to appeal to other than your personal responses, you have no resources at all to be able to say that morality is anything other than simply your disapproval, no matter how much you may want to.
Exactly! And since so many of us are like-minded about some things, and because we are a social species, we have to arrive at a moral code to live by ... the law. Members who transgress that code and act antisocially must be punished and controlled.
So you do agree - great! so when you said before (and I quote) "Another repeat! I don't just disapprove of it, I consider it wrong" then seeing as you have now agreed that saying it is wrong can, for you, mean nothing more than disapproval you are contradicting yourself.
No wonder I have to repeat myself Leonard its like wading through treacle getting you to see the implications of your own position. Nevertheless there was very good reason when you originally said "I don't just disapprove of it, I consider it wrong" because this is exactly what anyone expressing a normal moral view would also want to say - that morality is certainly much more than just disapproval. The fact that you have finally had to admit this is all your theory is capable of delivering proves my point very well - namely that an anti-realist morality is nothing like morality as we experience it. It is a thin counterfeit.
I have always maintained the same thing. If you have gathered otherwise, then either you have misinterpreted my post, or I have failed to explain myself clearly.
None of this, however, shows that an objective morality exists ... and I maintain it doesn't.
You have always maintained the same thing Leonard, you have always maintained that morality DOES mean more than just disapproval and at the same time you have also always maintained a theory of morality that despite your protestations doesn't allow it to be anything other than just disapproval. In this way you have illustrated my point beautifully by showing that while you recognise that morality has to be more than saying 'I don't like that' you weren't able to articulate anything that made sense of it being so. Thank you.
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Hi DT,
I don't know whether morality is an illusion that we necessarily subject ourselves to or a reality that we see but dimly, that is true. But the fact that we think we are correct/incorrect about all sorts of things doesn't necessarily mean that we have some sort of truth in any objective sense, unless it can be demonstrated one way or the other.
Hence I am left with my own best explanation of the moral sense...which I have given.
You have, but as per my last post your explanation isn't an explanation that I disagree with, at least not in the facts of evolution stripped of extra interpretation - evolution is neutral to the whole question we are discussing, open to both realist and anti-realist interpretations. In that sense 'evolution did it' isn't actually an explanation at all if the question is 'is morality objective or not'. To answer that we DO have to look at the question of whether its illusion or whether its a reality, however dimly we see it, and the interpretation you bring to the evolution account will depend on your preconceptions about the answer to that.
Still it doesn't stop us asking the questions we have been posing, e.g. How is it that we go about making decisions about whether, for instance, whether bully a gay child is wrong?'. Saying "evolution did it" doesn't help us answer that at all - I still need to know whether I'm appealing to facts (even if evolutionary determined) or personal responses (even if evolutionary determined). As that's the question that makes the difference here and as your explanation seems by your own admittance unable to help us deal with it one way or the other (after all you do say you 'don't know') what we need to get back to is looking at the character of our moral reasoning as opposed to speculations about how that character arose in an evolutionary context.
Regards
DT
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You have always maintained the same thing Leonard, you have always maintained that morality DOES mean more than just disapproval and at the same time you have also always maintained a theory of morality that despite your protestations doesn't allow it to be anything other than just disapproval.
That is a lie! I have never maintained it is just a matter of disapproval. I have said quite categorically that it is wrong TTACTDFF. You continue to ignore the fact that I have also said that is my opinion, since there is no objective morality to refer to.
In this way you have illustrated my point beautifully by showing that while you recognise that morality has to be more than saying 'I don't like that' you weren't able to articulate anything that made sense of it being so. Thank you.
Smug, but as usual untrue.
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You have always maintained the same thing Leonard, you have always maintained that morality DOES mean more than just disapproval and at the same time you have also always maintained a theory of morality that despite your protestations doesn't allow it to be anything other than just disapproval.
That is a lie! I have never maintained it is just a matter of disapproval. I have said quite categorically that it is wrong TTACTDFF. You continue to ignore the fact that I have also said that is my opinion, since there is no objective morality to refer to.
In this way you have illustrated my point beautifully by showing that while you recognise that morality has to be more than saying 'I don't like that' you weren't able to articulate anything that made sense of it being so. Thank you.
Smug, but as usual untrue.
Did you read my post before replying Leonard? I said "you have always maintained that morality DOES mean more than just disapproval"...you even quote me saying this....have a look! That's why your post illustrates my point so well. You, like most people recognise morality does involve more than disaproval ....it's just that you also support an account of morality that can't allow it to mean anything more than this. While the other atheists have tiptoed round this you, while being honest but also clearly not quite following the implications of your moral theory have demonstrated exactly the point I have been arguing for.
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You have always maintained the same thing Leonard, you have always maintained that morality DOES mean more than just disapproval and at the same time you have also always maintained a theory of morality that despite your protestations doesn't allow it to be anything other than just disapproval.
That is a lie! I have never maintained it is just a matter of disapproval. I have said quite categorically that it is wrong TTACTDFF. You continue to ignore the fact that I have also said that is my opinion, since there is no objective morality to refer to.
In this way you have illustrated my point beautifully by showing that while you recognise that morality has to be more than saying 'I don't like that' you weren't able to articulate anything that made sense of it being so. Thank you.
Smug, but as usual untrue.
Did you read my post before replying Leonard? I said "you have always maintained that morality DOES mean more than just disapproval"...you even quote me saying this....have a look! That's why your post illustrates my point so well. You, like most people recognise morality does involve more than disaproval ....it's just that you also support an account of morality that can't allow it to mean anything more than this. While the other atheists have tiptoed round this you, while being honest but also clearly not quite following the implications of your moral theory have demonstrated exactly the point I have been arguing for.
I give up! We clearly have different understandings of the English language, so our communication is impaired. :(
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I give up! We clearly have different understandings of the English language, so our communication is impaired.
Seems so if you are quoting me saying you feel morality is more than disapproval but then say exactly the opposite. I think the point of disagreement is that you seem to think that saying ‘its my opinion that its wrong’ gets you out of the contradiction, while what I am asking is ‘what does ‘wrong’ mean when you say ‘it my opinion that its wrong’. If morality is derived from nothing other than our personal responses then there simply isn’t anything else the term ‘wrong’ can possibly mean other than just disapproval no matter how much you would like there to be…..thats’ what I mean when I say your theory doesn’t have the resources for anything else.
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I give up! We clearly have different understandings of the English language, so our communication is impaired.
Seems so if you are quoting me saying you feel morality is more than disapproval but then say exactly the opposite. I think the point of disagreement is that you seem to think that saying ‘its my opinion that its wrong’ gets you out of the contradiction, while what I am asking is ‘what does ‘wrong’ mean when you say ‘it my opinion that its wrong’. If morality is derived from nothing other than our personal responses then there simply isn’t anything else the term ‘wrong’ can possibly mean other than just disapproval no matter how much you would like there to be…..thats’ what I mean when I say your theory doesn’t have the resources for anything else.
The reason is quite simple. There is no such thing as right or wrong. They are just words we have invented to cover behaviour in our social system. Outside our brains, there is no such thing as morality.
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I give up! We clearly have different understandings of the English language, so our communication is impaired.
Seems so if you are quoting me saying you feel morality is more than disapproval but then say exactly the opposite. I think the point of disagreement is that you seem to think that saying ‘its my opinion that its wrong’ gets you out of the contradiction, while what I am asking is ‘what does ‘wrong’ mean when you say ‘it my opinion that its wrong’. If morality is derived from nothing other than our personal responses then there simply isn’t anything else the term ‘wrong’ can possibly mean other than just disapproval no matter how much you would like there to be…..thats’ what I mean when I say your theory doesn’t have the resources for anything else.
The reason is quite simple. There is no such thing as right or wrong. They are just words we have invented to cover behaviour in our social system. Outside our brains, there is no such thing as morality.
Yes thats exactly what I understand you as believing. And as there is no such thing as right or wrong in your view then it follows logically that you saying 'bullying a child is wrong' cannot possible mean anything else than that you disapprove of it...as no other sense of wrong, as you put it, exists ..and yet you are getting very upset above to insist that you DO want to mean more than just this. That Leonard is the contradiction.
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I give up! We clearly have different understandings of the English language, so our communication is impaired.
Seems so if you are quoting me saying you feel morality is more than disapproval but then say exactly the opposite. I think the point of disagreement is that you seem to think that saying ‘its my opinion that its wrong’ gets you out of the contradiction, while what I am asking is ‘what does ‘wrong’ mean when you say ‘it my opinion that its wrong’. If morality is derived from nothing other than our personal responses then there simply isn’t anything else the term ‘wrong’ can possibly mean other than just disapproval no matter how much you would like there to be…..thats’ what I mean when I say your theory doesn’t have the resources for anything else.
The reason is quite simple. There is no such thing as right or wrong. They are just words we have invented to cover behaviour in our social system. Outside our brains, there is no such thing as morality.
Yes thats exactly what I understand you as believing. And as there is no such thing as right or wrong in your view then it follows logically that you saying 'bullying a child is wrong' cannot possible mean anything else than that you disapprove of it...as no other sense of wrong, as you put it, exists ..and yet you are getting very upset above to insist that you DO want to mean more than just this. That Leonard is the contradiction.
Can you demonstrate that it does mean more?
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I give up! We clearly have different understandings of the English language, so our communication is impaired.
Seems so if you are quoting me saying you feel morality is more than disapproval but then say exactly the opposite. I think the point of disagreement is that you seem to think that saying ‘its my opinion that its wrong’ gets you out of the contradiction, while what I am asking is ‘what does ‘wrong’ mean when you say ‘it my opinion that its wrong’. If morality is derived from nothing other than our personal responses then there simply isn’t anything else the term ‘wrong’ can possibly mean other than just disapproval no matter how much you would like there to be…..thats’ what I mean when I say your theory doesn’t have the resources for anything else.
The reason is quite simple. There is no such thing as right or wrong. They are just words we have invented to cover behaviour in our social system. Outside our brains, there is no such thing as morality.
Yes thats exactly what I understand you as believing. And as there is no such thing as right or wrong in your view then it follows logically that you saying 'bullying a child is wrong' cannot possible mean anything else than that you disapprove of it...as no other sense of wrong, as you put it, exists ..and yet you are getting very upset above to insist that you DO want to mean more than just this. That Leonard is the contradiction.
Listen carefully.
Wrong, to me, means something much stronger than disapproval.
Is that clear?
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Alan
I noticed you mentioned 'obligation' earlier, and I recall you mentioning this before.
It seems to me that I can reason my way to an opinion that TCTDJFF is always wrong, and many here have already pointed out some of the implications that support this opinion: such as why bother educating our children if it was the case that a passing sociopath torture them to death etc etc etc. I'd imagine that the consensus of opinion would agree with me, to the extent that such conduct would be illegal.
OK so far.
It seems to me then that there are various compelling reasons for me to hold the opinion that TACTDJFF is always wrong
OK so far. to the extent that I am obligated to behave in accordance with my opinion - would you agree?
I'm not sure what you are getting at here. What would it not mean to not be obligated to behave in accordance with your own opinion.
This opinion thing is surely a red herring. You have said that you have come to the opinion that TACTDJFF is always wrong. On what basis though. How would you argue against a sociopath who said it is morally OK?
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So to 'demonstrating moral facts'.
Yes in a number of posts I have made it clear that the method we go about discovering OM will depend on the account we give of it. As a theist I have given an account of OM rooted in God and I outline this in reply 196. As this account derives its understanding of OM from the flourishing of conscious beings, defined in relation to God’s purpose then we discover moral truth by improving our understanding of our flourishing. This is partly something we do through reason and observation in relation to the physical and psychological facts that allows people to live rich fulfilling lives and the virtues of character necessary to enable these, and partly by deepening our experience of God to gain an insight into his character and purposes. This, like all fields of human discovery will of course be gradual and prone to error and revision in our understanding.
So it seems to me that you 'determine moral facts' by judging an actions to see if it delivers 'flourishing of conscious beings'.
I'm still not seeing the leap to objective?
So why is "flourishing of conscious beings" good? Are you a vegetarian?
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You have just argued that your opinion (what you think is wrong) is dependent on your opinion. Is that mean to contribute to the discussion?
It refutes you:-
That is the sort of point I am trying to make on objective morality. If someone agrees with me that an act, any act, is morally wrong and that this does not depend on how many people believe it to be so, they are logically bound to believe in the existence of objective morality.
No, it doesn't. Saying your opinion is dependent on your opinion is just plain nonsense.
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Even if every living person agreed that something is wrong/right, it is only their individual personal opinions. It does NOT mean that there is an objective moral code floating about somewhere beyond our ken
Agreed. Who is arguing for that? I'm not.
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Even if every living person agreed that something is wrong/right, it is only their individual personal opinions. It does NOT mean that there is an objective moral code floating about somewhere beyond our ken
No one thinks that objective morality is dependent on people's opinions. This has been clarifies many times by both Alan and by me.
Frustrating, isn't it?
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Even if every living person agreed that something is wrong/right, it is only their individual personal opinions. It does NOT mean that there is an objective moral code floating about somewhere beyond our ken
Agreed. Who is arguing for that? I'm not.
Then I have misunderstood you. My apologies.
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Why on earth is objectivity even in the frame. Some things - Alien's famous example is one, are abhorrent to the vast majority of us but that is because we all have feelings and loved ones we have a need to protect - it isn't because there is some great entity somewhere that lays down the rules!
All this monotonous 'moral realist' talk is complete bollocks! It's simply a desperate way to try to bring a god into the question! If a god existed, the last thing he/she/it would be bothered about would be whether gays living together had signed a piece of paper and called themselves married or not!
Woosh! A blast of clean, fresh air!
Incorrect. jjohnjil is speaking about feelings, i.e. a feeling of abhorrence. I'm talking about whether something is morally right or wrong.
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‘there is no such thing as right or wrong’
I just remembered the last time I heard someone say that Leonard – it was Lord Voldermort In the first Harry Potter book – ‘There is no good or evil, there is only power and those too weak to wield it!”
Fabulous!
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Why on earth is objectivity even in the frame. Some things - Alien's famous example is one, are abhorrent to the vast majority of us but that is because we all have feelings and loved ones we have a need to protect - it isn't because there is some great entity somewhere that lays down the rules!
All this monotonous 'moral realist' talk is complete bollocks! It's simply a desperate way to try to bring a god into the question! If a god existed, the last thing he/she/it would be bothered about would be whether gays living together had signed a piece of paper and called themselves married or not!
Woosh! A blast of clean, fresh air!
Incorrect. jjohnjil is speaking about feelings, i.e. a feeling of abhorrence. I'm talking about whether something is morally right or wrong.
Well, morally right or wrong would need there to be some sort of objective code written up somewhere. As there is no such thing, it is down to our opinion.
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Even if every living person agreed that something is wrong/right, it is only their individual personal opinions. It does NOT mean that there is an objective moral code floating about somewhere beyond our ken
No one thinks that objective morality is dependent on people's opinions. This has been clarifies many times by both Alan and by me.
Frustrating, isn't it?
What is frustrating is that a method for determining an objective moral value has never been presented.
You simply assert it.
Is same sex marriage objectively morally right?
Please show the method by which you determine this.
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‘there is no such thing as right or wrong’
I just remembered the last time I heard someone say that Leonard – it was Lord Voldermort In the first Harry Potter book – ‘There is no good or evil, there is only power and those too weak to wield it!”
Fabulous!
Precisely. Humans have invented morality to prevent the powerful preying on the weak.
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‘there is no such thing as right or wrong’
I just remembered the last time I heard someone say that Leonard – it was Lord Voldermort In the first Harry Potter book – ‘There is no good or evil, there is only power and those too weak to wield it!”
Fabulous!
Precisely. Humans have invented morality to prevent the powerful preying on the weak.
Shhh! Don;t tell the powerful or we're all screwed!
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‘there is no such thing as right or wrong’
I just remembered the last time I heard someone say that Leonard – it was Lord Voldermort In the first Harry Potter book – ‘There is no good or evil, there is only power and those too weak to wield it!”
Fabulous!
Precisely. Humans have invented morality to prevent the powerful preying on the weak.
Shhh! Don;t tell the powerful or we're all screwed!
They all know it, but like eels they discover the chinks and slither through. It's a never-ending war.
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Actually, you kinda do. It doesn't have to be in any order, but if one attribute of god can be found to be logically wanting, then it isn't god that is the grounder of morality. Solely on that, that doesn't mean there isn't an entity that grounds morality, only it's not the god you originally thought.
Regardless, I wouldn't want you or expect you to do it on this forum either!
That’s going to be true of anything we argue about on here about God though isn’t it? It’s just saying our idea of God has to be consistent – well sure but if we just said that about every topic we’d never discuss anything else….besides which there is a tonne of theology done on this. Still we seem to agree that that’s were the discussion should be not here so I’ll move on.
The problem is that even if I came to agree with you that morality has a grounder, that wouldn't lead me to conclude that it was some god. You have to make that leap as the argument alone can't conclude it.
Except now you've agreed that there is a problem with this, which you solve with god, but atheist realists still flounder with it. Well, they do if they hold to OM.
You’d expect me to be happy to endorse that God provides the best explanation on a thread where I’m supporting the moral argument for God right? I do think there are different moves a non-theistic realist can make though and I would probably argue for realism even if I wasn’t a theist – but obviously this would be constructed quite differently from the way I have done it here. I’m not going to do the atheists job for them though and there are some very well-known and capable atheist moral-realists who have made this case.
You're not supporting a moral argument for god. You're supporting an argument for moral realism. I really don't see what you are hoping to achieve by doing this, and I'd say the same thing to any atheist arguing the same. Moral realism doesn't deal with the core value/s of what moral judgements are based on - being as you state in your case the flourishing of humanity. If morality is objective, then to value human flourishing would have objective worth. You say that comes from god, where the atheist moral realists I've come across blankly ignore it, stick to moral realism and state that our moral judgements based on the value of human flourishing/well being are at the mercy of the reality we inhabit and not culture.
But that is where this discussion should be at - the objectivity of valuing human flourishing, and not this incessant arguing for moral realism. I would like to see it explained as to why we should value human flourishing - I want to see that is/ought bridge gapped, but if all you can do is invoke a god to do that, then the discussion moves to that god.
Alan doesn't formulate the argument how you have above. He pretty much goes with how WLC formulates it:
1. If God does not exist, objective morality does not exist.
2. Objective morality does exist.
3. Therefore, God exists.
So with premise 2 here, invoking god as the grounder of morality to show that OM exists is to have a circular argument. As you probably know, that doesn't make it invalid, it's just that we learn nothing new and the whole argument is a waste of everyone's time.
Well God as the grounder of morality is part of premise 1. If Alan agrees with me that there are completely independent reasons for thinking OM exists as I do then the argument even formulised like Craig does above does not have to be circular, as premise 2 is held for reasons entirely independent of God. It depends on whether you take premise 2 of needing to be an entirely self-contained account of OM or simply being that we have reason to believe it is objective. If it’s that former then it would be circular but then you also wouldn’t need premise 1 so the fact that it’s there implies that it isn’t. alan has argued for his premise 2 without any reference to God based on our moral intuitions about TACTDJFF so the second interpretation would seem right. Either way this is Alan’s version not mine so there is a limit to how far I want to spend my time on an exegesis of other peoples arguments.
But you don't think there are "completely independent reasons" for thinking OM exists, because when we get down to the actual foundation of it, you invoke god. Moral realism doesn't show that morality is objective, but that your actions/judgements should be dictated by reality depending on what it is you value. If you really thought that all morality was was the way in which it is practiced (as I have said a couple of times now, this is you confusing the map for the place), then using god as the grounder of what you should morally value would be meaningless. That's you being contradictory.
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So to 'demonstrating moral facts'.
Yes in a number of posts I have made it clear that the method we go about discovering OM will depend on the account we give of it. As a theist I have given an account of OM rooted in God and I outline this in reply 196. As this account derives its understanding of OM from the flourishing of conscious beings, defined in relation to God’s purpose then we discover moral truth by improving our understanding of our flourishing. This is partly something we do through reason and observation in relation to the physical and psychological facts that allows people to live rich fulfilling lives and the virtues of character necessary to enable these, and partly by deepening our experience of God to gain an insight into his character and purposes. This, like all fields of human discovery will of course be gradual and prone to error and revision in our understanding.
So it seems to me that you 'determine moral facts' by judging an actions to see if it delivers 'flourishing of conscious beings'.
I'm still not seeing the leap to objective?
So why is "flourishing of conscious beings" good? Are you a vegetarian?
Yes, why is it good? DT said it's because it's rooted in god - defined in relation to god's purpose, but you should be able to show that it's good without invoking god because you try and use the existence of OM to conclude god, not the other way around.
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Yes, why is it good? DT said it's because it's rooted in god - defined in relation to god's purpose, but you should be able to show that it's good without invoking god because you try and use the existence of OM to conclude god, not the other way around.
More to the point, if it's dependent upon a god it's not objective, it's a subjective morality: if the god changes, the morality which is subject to that god also changes.
O.
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Yes, why is it good? DT said it's because it's rooted in god - defined in relation to god's purpose, but you should be able to show that it's good without invoking god because you try and use the existence of OM to conclude god, not the other way around.
More to the point, if it's dependent upon a god it's not objective, it's a subjective morality: if the god changes, the morality which is subject to that god also changes.
O.
Yes, that's where this could lead, and staying relative to this thread, morality still wouldn't be independent of opinion.
However, I'm confident that it'll be seen as part of god's nature rather than god's opinion, but that brings up a whole host of problems itself.
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So to 'demonstrating moral facts'.
Yes in a number of posts I have made it clear that the method we go about discovering OM will depend on the account we give of it. As a theist I have given an account of OM rooted in God and I outline this in reply 196. As this account derives its understanding of OM from the flourishing of conscious beings, defined in relation to God’s purpose then we discover moral truth by improving our understanding of our flourishing. This is partly something we do through reason and observation in relation to the physical and psychological facts that allows people to live rich fulfilling lives and the virtues of character necessary to enable these, and partly by deepening our experience of God to gain an insight into his character and purposes. This, like all fields of human discovery will of course be gradual and prone to error and revision in our understanding.
So it seems to me that you 'determine moral facts' by judging an actions to see if it delivers 'flourishing of conscious beings'.
I'm still not seeing the leap to objective?
So why is "flourishing of conscious beings" good? Are you a vegetarian?
Yes, why is it good? DT said it's because it's rooted in god - defined in relation to god's purpose, but you should be able to show that it's good without invoking god because you try and use the existence of OM to conclude god, not the other way around.
I've not read through all of DT's posts since I have not been around so much as usual, so I will leave him to come back to you on that. I would sort of agree with you, but would rather put it that we should be able to determine that it is good without invoking God rather than to show that it is good. There are things I know / have determined to be true, but I am unable to show this to you. Examples include there being a set of earphones on my desk, me having no shoes on, my having gone for a walk with my wife, son and daughter-in-law last night. I don't need to be able to show anyone else that those are true before I am able to believe them myself.
That might be what you meant in the first place though, perhaps.
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Yes, why is it good? DT said it's because it's rooted in god - defined in relation to god's purpose, but you should be able to show that it's good without invoking god because you try and use the existence of OM to conclude god, not the other way around.
More to the point, if it's dependent upon a god it's not objective, it's a subjective morality: if the god changes, the morality which is subject to that god also changes.
O.
What if God doesn't change?
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Yes, why is it good? DT said it's because it's rooted in god - defined in relation to god's purpose, but you should be able to show that it's good without invoking god because you try and use the existence of OM to conclude god, not the other way around.
More to the point, if it's dependent upon a god it's not objective, it's a subjective morality: if the god changes, the morality which is subject to that god also changes.
O.
Yes, that's where this could lead, and staying relative to this thread, morality still wouldn't be independent of opinion.
However, I'm confident that it'll be seen as part of god's nature rather than god's opinion, but that brings up a whole host of problems itself.
I'd go with it being part of God's (unchanging) nature. Which problems does that bring up?
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Yes, why is it good? DT said it's because it's rooted in god - defined in relation to god's purpose, but you should be able to show that it's good without invoking god because you try and use the existence of OM to conclude god, not the other way around.
More to the point, if it's dependent upon a god it's not objective, it's a subjective morality: if the god changes, the morality which is subject to that god also changes.
O.
What if God doesn't change?
Rather depends. If a god chooses not to change then it's still dependent upon that change.
If the god is not capable of change then: a) it's questionable if it's actually a god, given limits to its capacity (a different argument, I appreciate) and b) that doesn't change the morality's dependence upon the god.
If I have a sensor that reacts to green light but not to red, it's state is still dependent upon what light I shine upon it, even if I only have green light bulbs.
O.
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So to 'demonstrating moral facts'.
Yes in a number of posts I have made it clear that the method we go about discovering OM will depend on the account we give of it. As a theist I have given an account of OM rooted in God and I outline this in reply 196. As this account derives its understanding of OM from the flourishing of conscious beings, defined in relation to God’s purpose then we discover moral truth by improving our understanding of our flourishing. This is partly something we do through reason and observation in relation to the physical and psychological facts that allows people to live rich fulfilling lives and the virtues of character necessary to enable these, and partly by deepening our experience of God to gain an insight into his character and purposes. This, like all fields of human discovery will of course be gradual and prone to error and revision in our understanding.
So it seems to me that you 'determine moral facts' by judging an actions to see if it delivers 'flourishing of conscious beings'.
I'm still not seeing the leap to objective?
So why is "flourishing of conscious beings" good? Are you a vegetarian?
Yes, why is it good? DT said it's because it's rooted in god - defined in relation to god's purpose, but you should be able to show that it's good without invoking god because you try and use the existence of OM to conclude god, not the other way around.
I've not read through all of DT's posts since I have not been around so much as usual, so I will leave him to come back to you on that.
You only had to read what he's stated in the nest of quotes. I've put it in bold.
I would sort of agree with you, but would rather put it that we should be able to determine that it is good without invoking God rather than to show that it is good.
Horses for courses. Whichever.
There are things I know / have determined to be true, but I am unable to show this to you. Examples include there being a set of earphones on my desk, me having no shoes on, my having gone for a walk with my wife, son and daughter-in-law last night. I don't need to be able to show anyone else that those are true before I am able to believe them myself.
All the things you mention have the potential to be shown, but we've moved to determine now anyway.
So let's go there. Tell me how you determine that your core values (human/conscious flourishing/well being/whatever it is etc.) should be valued without invoking god. Turn the is into an ought.
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Yes, why is it good? DT said it's because it's rooted in god - defined in relation to god's purpose, but you should be able to show that it's good without invoking god because you try and use the existence of OM to conclude god, not the other way around.
More to the point, if it's dependent upon a god it's not objective, it's a subjective morality: if the god changes, the morality which is subject to that god also changes.
O.
What if God doesn't change?
Rather depends. If a god chooses not to change then it's still dependent upon that change.
If the god is not capable of change then: a) it's questionable if it's actually a god, given limits to its capacity (a different argument, I appreciate).
Why, if his nature is perfect, would it not being able to change from perfect be seen a problem? and b) that doesn't change the morality's dependence upon the god.
I wasn't claiming otherwise.
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Surely any action is change? If something is perfect than actions are impossible
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Yes, why is it good? DT said it's because it's rooted in god - defined in relation to god's purpose, but you should be able to show that it's good without invoking god because you try and use the existence of OM to conclude god, not the other way around.
More to the point, if it's dependent upon a god it's not objective, it's a subjective morality: if the god changes, the morality which is subject to that god also changes.
O.
Yes, that's where this could lead, and staying relative to this thread, morality still wouldn't be independent of opinion.
However, I'm confident that it'll be seen as part of god's nature rather than god's opinion, but that brings up a whole host of problems itself.
I'd go with it being part of God's (unchanging) nature. Which problems does that bring up?
We went there before with god having no free will, something you made a right pigs ear of. This isn't a case of god choosing to do what is morally right, it's having no option but to do what is morally right, meaning that there is nothing that god does that isn't morally right. This means this universe should exist, that it should exist exactly as it does, that it's the best possible one to exist, that there is nothing that happens in it that shouldn't and that there is nothing that happens that is morally wrong. Consequently, all contrast is removed between right and wrong as only right exists and morality becomes meaningless.
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So to 'demonstrating moral facts'.
Yes in a number of posts I have made it clear that the method we go about discovering OM will depend on the account we give of it. As a theist I have given an account of OM rooted in God and I outline this in reply 196. As this account derives its understanding of OM from the flourishing of conscious beings, defined in relation to God’s purpose then we discover moral truth by improving our understanding of our flourishing. This is partly something we do through reason and observation in relation to the physical and psychological facts that allows people to live rich fulfilling lives and the virtues of character necessary to enable these, and partly by deepening our experience of God to gain an insight into his character and purposes. This, like all fields of human discovery will of course be gradual and prone to error and revision in our understanding.
So it seems to me that you 'determine moral facts' by judging an actions to see if it delivers 'flourishing of conscious beings'.
I'm still not seeing the leap to objective?
So why is "flourishing of conscious beings" good? Are you a vegetarian?
Yes, why is it good? DT said it's because it's rooted in god - defined in relation to god's purpose, but you should be able to show that it's good without invoking god because you try and use the existence of OM to conclude god, not the other way around.
I've not read through all of DT's posts since I have not been around so much as usual, so I will leave him to come back to you on that.
You only had to read what he's stated in the nest of quotes. I've put it in bold.
Ah right, got you. If I have understood DT correctly, he is saying that OM can only be rooted in God's purpose (nature?). I agree. If we recognise that OM exists, then the only valid explanation is that it is rooted in God's nature. It has to be something transcendent and the only valid transcendent thing which fits the bill is God. If you can think of anything else, please say.
I would sort of agree with you, but would rather put it that we should be able to determine that it is good without invoking God rather than to show that it is good.
Horses for courses. Whichever.
OK. Just trying to be accurate.
There are things I know / have determined to be true, but I am unable to show this to you. Examples include there being a set of earphones on my desk, me having no shoes on, my having gone for a walk with my wife, son and daughter-in-law last night. I don't need to be able to show anyone else that those are true before I am able to believe them myself.
All the things you mention have the potential to be shown, but we've moved to determine now anyway.
So let's go there. Tell me how you determine that your core values (human/conscious flourishing/well being/whatever it is etc.) should be valued without invoking god. Turn the is into an ought.
I'd go with William Lane Craig and say that our apprehension of objective morality is akin to our apprehension of things like minds outside our own. We can't prove it all the way (since, unless there is an original cause/ground) it is an infinite regress, yet there seems to be no good reason to think otherwise. We do here seem to be in general agreement that human flourishing, at least in a general sense, is good. Some of our atheist friends seem to be saying this here (or, at least, the flourishing of sentient beings), but they would seem to have no firm grounds for this apart from really, really liking the idea or wanting it to be true. For the Christian theist, the general flourishing of human beings being good finds its source in us being in the image of God and loved by him.
I'd be interested to know why our atheist friends think that human flourishing is morally good (apart from wanting it to be so). What do you think?
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Surely any action is change? If something is perfect than actions are impossible
Does that not depend on what is changing?
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Yes, why is it good? DT said it's because it's rooted in god - defined in relation to god's purpose, but you should be able to show that it's good without invoking god because you try and use the existence of OM to conclude god, not the other way around.
More to the point, if it's dependent upon a god it's not objective, it's a subjective morality: if the god changes, the morality which is subject to that god also changes.
O.
What if God doesn't change?
Rather depends. If a god chooses not to change then it's still dependent upon that change.
If the god is not capable of change then: a) it's questionable if it's actually a god, given limits to its capacity (a different argument, I appreciate).
Why, if his nature is perfect, would it not being able to change from perfect be seen a problem? and b) that doesn't change the morality's dependence upon the god.
I wasn't claiming otherwise.
So as not to derail this topic I've transferred the other question to http://www.religionethics.co.uk/index.php?topic=10675.0
O.
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Alien
I'd be interested to know why our atheist friends think that human flourishing is morally good (apart from wanting it to be so). What do you think?
Simple, evolution has found this idea useful in keeping us alive to pass on our genes.
There is no more to it than that.
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Surely any action is change? If something is perfect than actions are impossible
Does that not depend on what is changing?
Don't see how. X has acted then it has changed. If you think there is a way where action does not lead to change explain how.
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Yes, why is it good? DT said it's because it's rooted in god - defined in relation to god's purpose, but you should be able to show that it's good without invoking god because you try and use the existence of OM to conclude god, not the other way around.
More to the point, if it's dependent upon a god it's not objective, it's a subjective morality: if the god changes, the morality which is subject to that god also changes.
O.
Yes, that's where this could lead, and staying relative to this thread, morality still wouldn't be independent of opinion.
However, I'm confident that it'll be seen as part of god's nature rather than god's opinion, but that brings up a whole host of problems itself.
I'd go with it being part of God's (unchanging) nature. Which problems does that bring up?
We went there before with god having no free will, something you made a right pigs ear of. This isn't a case of god choosing to do what is morally right, it's having no option but to do what is morally right, meaning that there is nothing that god does that isn't morally right. This means this universe should exist, that it should exist exactly as it does, that it's the best possible one to exist, that there is nothing that happens in it that shouldn't and that there is nothing that happens that is morally wrong. Consequently, all contrast is removed between right and wrong as only right exists and morality becomes meaningless.
Hold your horses. Firstly, we need to define what free will is. Nothing external to God, in the Christian understanding of things, forces him to do anything. Therefore, he is totally free.
If mankind has some sort of freedom as well, then, yes, this universe can be the best possible one which could exist, but what do we mean by "best". Measured how? If best means "the universe which leads the optimal number of people into a saving relationship with God", then, yes, I could go with that. It would still mean that some things are evil though, wouldn't it. Such acts might be ones which, if people didn't do them, would have increased the number of people coming into a saving relationship with God.
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Alien
I'd be interested to know why our atheist friends think that human flourishing is morally good (apart from wanting it to be so). What do you think?
Simple, evolution has found this idea useful in keeping us alive to pass on our genes.
There is no more to it than that.
I was asking about it being good, not just useful.
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Surely any action is change? If something is perfect than actions are impossible
Does that not depend on what is changing?
Don't see how. X has acted then it has changed. If you think there is a way where action does not lead to change explain how.
Hang on. If God acts, how does that thereby make him morally inferior to what he was before?
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So let's go there. Tell me how you determine that your core values (human/conscious flourishing/well being/whatever it is etc.) should be valued without invoking god. Turn the is into an ought.
I'd go with William Lane Craig and say that our apprehension of objective morality is akin to our apprehension of things like minds outside our own. We can't prove it all the way (since, unless there is an original cause/ground) it is an infinite regress, yet there seems to be no good reason to think otherwise. We do here seem to be in general agreement that human flourishing, at least in a general sense, is good. Some of our atheist friends seem to be saying this here (or, at least, the flourishing of sentient beings), but they would seem to have no firm grounds for this apart from really, really liking the idea or wanting it to be true. For the Christian theist, the general flourishing of human beings being good finds its source in us being in the image of God and loved by him.
So basically, when I asked you to do it without invoking god, you can't? So as I've said aplenty, your argument for OM has only ever been circular.
I'd be interested to know why our atheist friends think that human flourishing is morally good (apart from wanting it to be so). What do you think?
Well isn't that the whole point of the subjective view, that it's from their own standpoint and that they can't point to anything external to themselves to conclude that it's morally good? It's their value and there's no evidence to point to that value having objective worth. Personally, I don't think it's right or wrong for humans to flourish, I just want them to, probably most simply because I am one. I'm under no pretence that I can turn my is into an ought.
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Alien
I'd be interested to know why our atheist friends think that human flourishing is morally good (apart from wanting it to be so). What do you think?
Simple, evolution has found this idea useful in keeping us alive to pass on our genes.
There is no more to it than that.
I was asking about it being good, not just useful.
It is good because that is the label that we give to useful things.
It is not in some way objectively good, just good because we place a value on survival.
It's that simple.
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Alien
I'd be interested to know why our atheist friends think that human flourishing is morally good (apart from wanting it to be so). What do you think?
Simple, evolution has found this idea useful in keeping us alive to pass on our genes.
There is no more to it than that.
I was asking about it being good, not just useful.
It also isn't what all atheists are saying. Indeed, the flourishing of conscious beings as it was originally phrased is in DT's post, and I am sure you have managed to read enough to know he is a theist. I suggest you reread the thread because jakswan, an atheist btw challenged it as being mere opinion.
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Surely any action is change? If something is perfect than actions are impossible
Does that not depend on what is changing?
Don't see how. X has acted then it has changed. If you think there is a way where action does not lead to change explain how.
Hang on. If God acts, how does that thereby make him morally inferior to what he was before?
I haven't said anything about morally inferior, merely about changing. You were positing an unchanging god, I am saying action leads to change. Given you seem to think you have a perfect entity, I am suggesting the concept of change is alien to the concept of perfection.
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Yes, why is it good? DT said it's because it's rooted in god - defined in relation to god's purpose, but you should be able to show that it's good without invoking god because you try and use the existence of OM to conclude god, not the other way around.
More to the point, if it's dependent upon a god it's not objective, it's a subjective morality: if the god changes, the morality which is subject to that god also changes.
O.
Yes, that's where this could lead, and staying relative to this thread, morality still wouldn't be independent of opinion.
However, I'm confident that it'll be seen as part of god's nature rather than god's opinion, but that brings up a whole host of problems itself.
I'd go with it being part of God's (unchanging) nature. Which problems does that bring up?
We went there before with god having no free will, something you made a right pigs ear of. This isn't a case of god choosing to do what is morally right, it's having no option but to do what is morally right, meaning that there is nothing that god does that isn't morally right. This means this universe should exist, that it should exist exactly as it does, that it's the best possible one to exist, that there is nothing that happens in it that shouldn't and that there is nothing that happens that is morally wrong. Consequently, all contrast is removed between right and wrong as only right exists and morality becomes meaningless.
Hold your horses. Firstly, we need to define what free will is. Nothing external to God, in the Christian understanding of things, forces him to do anything. Therefore, he is totally free.
We did, we went over it. You went and pulled out the OED, was found wanting as god is constrained by the necessity of doing what is morally right.
EDIT: Oh, and from what I remember of the discussion (might have been purged now) is that you had to ignore what you normally mean by free will and invent a different one make it so that god could be said to have it. As you've said above, you think god has free will because nothing external to god forces him to do anything, yet us humans do have things external to us that can... but we apparently still have free will, just a different sort. So really, it's redundant that god has no external constraints because he could still have free will with them. So which is it?
If mankind has some sort of freedom as well, then, yes, this universe can be the best possible one which could exist,
Mankind doesn't if god doesn't.
but what do we mean by "best". Measured how?
Well we're discussing morality, and you think it's objective, so you should have some inkling as to how to measure that.
If best means "the universe which leads the optimal number of people into a saving relationship with God", then, yes, I could go with that. It would still mean that some things are evil though, wouldn't it. Such acts might be ones which, if people didn't do them, would have increased the number of people coming into a saving relationship with God.
We're discussing morality. If god can only do what's right, then it's morally the best it can be.
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One caveat to Andy's post, it is the best possible universe if god is also omnipotent and omniscient, though it would have to be to be acting morally correctly by nature.
For an omni god this is the only universe that can exist and all actions are bound to happen. Which makes free will and right and wrong entirely meaningless.
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For an omni god this is the only universe that can exist and all actions are bound to happen. Which makes free will and right and wrong entirely meaningless.
Nut, meet shell.
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So let's go there. Tell me how you determine that your core values (human/conscious flourishing/well being/whatever it is etc.) should be valued without invoking god. Turn the is into an ought.
I'd go with William Lane Craig and say that our apprehension of objective morality is akin to our apprehension of things like minds outside our own. We can't prove it all the way (since, unless there is an original cause/ground) it is an infinite regress, yet there seems to be no good reason to think otherwise. We do here seem to be in general agreement that human flourishing, at least in a general sense, is good. Some of our atheist friends seem to be saying this here (or, at least, the flourishing of sentient beings), but they would seem to have no firm grounds for this apart from really, really liking the idea or wanting it to be true. For the Christian theist, the general flourishing of human beings being good finds its source in us being in the image of God and loved by him.
So basically, when I asked you to do it without invoking god, you can't? So as I've said aplenty, your argument for OM has only ever been circular.
No, you missed my, "We can't prove it all the way (since, unless there is an original cause/ground) it is an infinite regress, yet there seems to be no good reason to think otherwise." You have also missed/ignored the definition of objective morality, i.e. that OM exists if there is at least one example of something being morally right or morally wrong independent of how many people think it so. A number of people here, not just Christians, have said that TACTDJFF is (always) morally wrong, though they then go on to be much more open to the possibility of their being wrong than on any other moral question I have seen. If they do indeed think that torturing a child to death just for fun (that being the complete motivation) then they are thereby agreeing that OM does indeed exist (since it is the one example we need), though they they go on to contradict themselves by saying that OM does not exist.
I'd be interested to know why our atheist friends think that human flourishing is morally good (apart from wanting it to be so). What do you think?
Well isn't that the whole point of the subjective view, that it's from their own standpoint and that they can't point to anything external to themselves to conclude that it's morally good? It's their value and there's no evidence to point to that value having objective worth. Personally, I don't think it's right or wrong for humans to flourish, I just want them to, probably most simply because I am one. I'm under no pretence that I can turn my is into an ought.
I continue to look forward to hearing from those who think that the flourishing of humans/sentient beings is morally good why they think it so.
I'd be interested in your thoughts about whether there is any "ought" in life. Do you think I ought not use the term "ought"? If you think that the term "ought" has some meaning, please do explain why you think it has.
Thanks for the interesting discussion.
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For an omni god this is the only universe that can exist and all actions are bound to happen. Which makes free will and right and wrong entirely meaningless.
Nut, meet shell.
Note, one could still have some kind of god thing that did not have teh omnis but I think that cuases other problems in that then it would be impossible for that god to be linked to objective morality.
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Alien
I'd be interested to know why our atheist friends think that human flourishing is morally good (apart from wanting it to be so). What do you think?
Simple, evolution has found this idea useful in keeping us alive to pass on our genes.
There is no more to it than that.
I was asking about it being good, not just useful.
It is good because that is the label that we give to useful things.
It is not in some way objectively good, just good because we place a value on survival.
It's that simple.
So defeating the Nazis was merely "useful"? In your opinion "gay marriage" is merely "useful". Avoidance of unnecessary pain in patients dying of cancer is merely "useful"? Stopping the physical abuse of children is merely "useful"?
Seriously?
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Alien
I'd be interested to know why our atheist friends think that human flourishing is morally good (apart from wanting it to be so). What do you think?
Simple, evolution has found this idea useful in keeping us alive to pass on our genes.
There is no more to it than that.
I was asking about it being good, not just useful.
It is good because that is the label that we give to useful things.
It is not in some way objectively good, just good because we place a value on survival.
It's that simple.
So defeating the Nazis was merely "useful"? In your opinion "gay marriage" is merely "useful". Avoidance of unnecessary pain in patients dying of cancer is merely "useful"? Stopping the physical abuse of children is merely "useful"?
Seriously?
Yes.
Do you not think it useful?
Seriously?
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So basically, when I asked you to do it without invoking god, you can't? So as I've said aplenty, your argument for OM has only ever been circular.
No, you missed my, "We can't prove it all the way (since, unless there is an original cause/ground) it is an infinite regress, yet there seems to be no good reason to think otherwise." You have also missed/ignored the definition of objective morality, i.e. that OM exists if there is at least one example of something being morally right or morally wrong independent of how many people think it so. A number of people here, not just Christians, have said that TACTDJFF is (always) morally wrong, though they then go on to be much more open to the possibility of their being wrong than on any other moral question I have seen. If they do indeed think that torturing a child to death just for fun (that being the complete motivation) then they are thereby agreeing that OM does indeed exist (since it is the one example we need), though they they go on to contradict themselves by saying that OM does not exist.
Again, the same misidentification of what morality is. You, like DT, are just arguing here for moral realism. Anyone, theist or atheist, who is basing TACTDJFF always being wrong are basing that on a fundamental, core value of human flourishing, well being or whatever. If I valued the flourishing of ants, lithium, the fluffiness of mash, or (insert whatever you like) more than anything else, then you could find ways of achieving those goals that are better than other ways, to the point where you could potentially scale them so you have one way as "the best", dictated by the reality in which all of this is happening. But all of that means nothing if you can't get passed your own subjective valuation.
Well isn't that the whole point of the subjective view, that it's from their own standpoint and that they can't point to anything external to themselves to conclude that it's morally good? It's their value and there's no evidence to point to that value having objective worth. Personally, I don't think it's right or wrong for humans to flourish, I just want them to, probably most simply because I am one. I'm under no pretence that I can turn my is into an ought.
I continue to look forward to hearing from those who think that the flourishing of humans/sentient beings is morally good why they think it so.
I'd be interested in your thoughts about whether there is any "ought" in life. Do you think I ought not use the term "ought"? If you think that the term "ought" has some meaning, please do explain why you think it has.
Thanks for the interesting discussion.
Yes, I think there are oughts, but they're based on valuations. You ought to score more goals than the other team if you value the three points. You ought to eat marmite (keep the theme going) sandwiches instead of battery acid if you value your health. Now whether I ought to value what I value is a different thing.
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Yes, Andy, as usual, has teased out something which has always baffled me. Some moral schemes seem to be based on a notion of human flourishing, as if this offered an objective base. I just don't get that, so maybe I have a screw missing in my brain. As Andy said again, I want human flourishing, because I am human. If I was a shark, I might want human bodies in large chunks, yum yum. The oughts are fine, but they are no more than flourishes, for me at any rate. I mean, it all seems so irrevocably subjective to me.
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I was listening to the latest Podcast in the series 'Philosophy Bites', and although the topic was 'Speciesism' (and well worth a listen) the interviewee, Shelly Kagan, was outlining that many views on this were best thought of as being moral intuitions.
When listening it occurred to me that my view that 'TACTDJFF is wrong' might well be a moral intuition, albeit I can also think of practical reasons why it would be a bad thing for society at large, and I also recognise that my view is part of a near universal consensus. Even so, it seems to me that my moral intuition alone provides a sound basis to guide my behaviour.
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I was listening to the latest Podcast in the series 'Philosophy Bites', and although the topic was 'Speciesism' (and well worth a listen) the interviewee, Shelly Kagan, was outlining that many views on this were best thought of as being moral intuitions.
When listening it occurred to me that my view that 'TACTDJFF is wrong' might well be a moral intuition, albeit I can also think of practical reasons why it would be a bad thing for society at large, and I also recognise that my view is part of a near universal consensus. Even so, it seems to me that my moral intuition alone provides a sound basis to guide my behaviour.
Where Alien and co go wrong is in thinking having a near universal agreement that TACTDJFF is wrong means something more than a near universal agreement. It doesn't.
The case for gay marriage being OM is far more interesting as that has far less of a consensus - the theists would find it very hard to come to an agreement with that.
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I was listening to the latest Podcast in the series 'Philosophy Bites', and although the topic was 'Speciesism' (and well worth a listen) the interviewee, Shelly Kagan, was outlining that many views on this were best thought of as being moral intuitions.
When listening it occurred to me that my view that 'TACTDJFF is wrong' might well be a moral intuition, albeit I can also think of practical reasons why it would be a bad thing for society at large, and I also recognise that my view is part of a near universal consensus. Even so, it seems to me that my moral intuition alone provides a sound basis to guide my behaviour.
Where Alien and co go wrong is in thinking having a near universal agreement that TACTDJFF is wrong means something more than a near universal agreement. It doesn't.
The case for gay marriage being OM is far more interesting as that has far less of a consensus - the theists would find it very hard to come to an agreement with that.
Which is why Alan has studiously avoided other suggested examples, such as SSM or euthanasia, claiming that TACTDJFF alone is sufficient to demonstrate OM: it clearly isn't, and it is so obviously contrived as to be laughable as a meaningful example of a pressing moral issue (as expected, since WLC is its chief proponent).
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Well, killing is the classic wobbly, since there are so many different contexts where killing is praised, condemned, demanded, and so on. So saying that killing is wrong demands a context, unless you are a pacifist. Hence the just war theory shows how killing was always being contextualized (and still is). Now it has happened with torture.
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Apologies - I've been out of the loop for a while, and when I looked back through the thread the opening post has the acronym without an explanation: TACTDJFF?
O.
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Torturing A Child To Death Just For Fun
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You're not supporting a moral argument for god. You're supporting an argument for moral realism.
I've actually been doing both although my version of the moral argument perhaps makes less ambitious than Alans.
I really don't see what you are hoping to achieve by doing this, and I'd say the same thing to any atheist arguing the same. Moral realism doesn't deal with the core value/s of what moral judgements are based on - being as you state in your case the flourishing of humanity. If morality is objective, then to value human flourishing would have objective worth. You say that comes from god, where the atheist moral realists I've come across blankly ignore it, stick to moral realism and state that our moral judgements based on the value of human flourishing/well being are at the mercy of the reality we inhabit and not culture.
But that is where this discussion should be at - the objectivity of valuing human flourishing, and not this incessant arguing for moral realism. I would like to see it explained as to why we should value human flourishing - I want to see that is/ought bridge gapped, but if all you can do is invoke a god to do that, then the discussion moves to that god.
Well what I'm doing it for is because its a premise of the moral argument for God which is why your first statement is wrong...but I'm not invoking God as the reason we first believe in OM, I'm appealing to the nature of our moral experience and moral phenomenology to do that, I am appealing to God as premise 2, namely that God is the best explanation for morality for some of the reasons you have mentioned. I'm not going to do the atheist realist job for them and I do both want and am happy to rely on God.
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So to 'demonstrating moral facts'.
Yes in a number of posts I have made it clear that the method we go about discovering OM will depend on the account we give of it. As a theist I have given an account of OM rooted in God and I outline this in reply 196. As this account derives its understanding of OM from the flourishing of conscious beings, defined in relation to God’s purpose then we discover moral truth by improving our understanding of our flourishing. This is partly something we do through reason and observation in relation to the physical and psychological facts that allows people to live rich fulfilling lives and the virtues of character necessary to enable these, and partly by deepening our experience of God to gain an insight into his character and purposes. This, like all fields of human discovery will of course be gradual and prone to error and revision in our understanding.
So it seems to me that you 'determine moral facts' by judging an actions to see if it delivers 'flourishing of conscious beings'.
I'm still not seeing the leap to objective?
So why is "flourishing of conscious beings" good? Are you a vegetarian?
Yes, why is it good? DT said it's because it's rooted in god - defined in relation to god's purpose, but you should be able to show that it's good without invoking god because you try and use the existence of OM to conclude god, not the other way around.
That's just getting the argument backwards - if there was no dependence of OM on God I couldn't conclude God. However my argument for believing in OM is based on our core intuitions about morality and our moral phenomenology not by reference to God. You are putting the cart before the horse in the argument to try to create a circularity that does not exist.
But you don't think there are "completely independent reasons" for thinking OM exists, because when we get down to the actual foundation of it, you invoke god.
I think there are independent reasons for thinking our morality is objective (premise 1) but that when we examine the idea of OM (premise 2) God provides the best explanation.
Moral realism doesn't show that morality is objective, but that your actions/judgements should be dictated by reality depending on what it is you value. If you really thought that all morality was was the way in which it is practiced (as I have said a couple of times now, this is you confusing the map for the place), then using god as the grounder of what you should morally value would be meaningless. That's you being contradictory.
Not so, if the good for conscious beings is a teleological fact then regardless of what I might choose to value there is a truth to the good whether or not I accept it and this does not alter if I rely on God as the source of that teleology as Gods nature is still a fact.
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More to the point, if it's dependent upon a god it's not objective, it's a subjective morality: if the god changes, the morality which is subject to that god also changes.
O.
Yes, that's where this could lead, and staying relative to this thread, morality still wouldn't be independent of opinion.
However, I'm confident that it'll be seen as part of god's nature rather than god's opinion, but that brings up a whole host of problems itself.
Yes it is seen as part of Gods nature but no that only brings up problems for atheists who sit around dreaming up contradictory definitions of God and then congratulate themselves at having 'disproved' him.
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Again, the same misidentification of what morality is. You, like DT, are just arguing here for moral realism. Anyone, theist or atheist, who is basing TACTDJFF always being wrong are basing that on a fundamental, core value of human flourishing, well being or whatever. If I valued the flourishing of ants, lithium, the fluffiness of mash, or (insert whatever you like) more than anything else, then you could find ways of achieving those goals that are better than other ways, to the point where you could potentially scale them so you have one way as "the best", dictated by the reality in which all of this is happening. But all of that means nothing if you can't get passed your own subjective valuation.
Which is all well and good if you are not a theist, but neither Alan or I are arguing for an atheistic realism, we are both arguing that God is the explanation for moral realism and so anyone who accepts that our morality is objective should also believe in God. As a theist and also an aristotelian I do not think Gods purposes stand apart from the universe but are teleogical facts within the universe, which its processes aim to realise. As the flourishing of conscious beings is a key fact of this nature (if not THE key fact) I may consciously choose to value whatever else I wish but then I would be wrong, and my wrongness would be based on me being at odds with the (teleological) facts.
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Well what I'm doing it for is because its a premise of the moral argument for God which is why your first statement is wrong...but I'm not invoking God as the reason we first believe in OM, I'm appealing to the nature of our moral experience and moral phenomenology to do that, I am appealing to God as premise 2, namely that God is the best explanation for morality for some of the reasons you have mentioned. I'm not going to do the atheist realist job for them and I do both want and am happy to rely on God.
The nature of our experience/phenomenology/practice of morality is not morality itself. You are taking our "core intuitions" (the values which you base your moral realism on) to be axiomatically objectively morally right, basically because god says so. This is the epitome of you invoking god to first believe in OM. Moral realism doesn't get you to OM, never mind get you there first, if you understand that the values you base moral judgements on first need to be shown to be objectively morally right themselves.
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So to 'demonstrating moral facts'.
Yes in a number of posts I have made it clear that the method we go about discovering OM will depend on the account we give of it. As a theist I have given an account of OM rooted in God and I outline this in reply 196. As this account derives its understanding of OM from the flourishing of conscious beings, defined in relation to God’s purpose then we discover moral truth by improving our understanding of our flourishing. This is partly something we do through reason and observation in relation to the physical and psychological facts that allows people to live rich fulfilling lives and the virtues of character necessary to enable these, and partly by deepening our experience of God to gain an insight into his character and purposes. This, like all fields of human discovery will of course be gradual and prone to error and revision in our understanding.
So it seems to me that you 'determine moral facts' by judging an actions to see if it delivers 'flourishing of conscious beings'.
I'm still not seeing the leap to objective?
So why is "flourishing of conscious beings" good? Are you a vegetarian?
Yes, why is it good? DT said it's because it's rooted in god - defined in relation to god's purpose, but you should be able to show that it's good without invoking god because you try and use the existence of OM to conclude god, not the other way around.
That's just getting the argument backwards - if there was no dependence of OM on God I couldn't conclude God.
Then tell Alan and WLC it's backwards, not me.
However my argument for believing in OM is based on our core intuitions about morality and our moral phenomenology not by reference to God. You are putting the cart before the horse in the argument to try to create a circularity that does not exist.
I was talking about Alan's argument, not yours.
But you don't think there are "completely independent reasons" for thinking OM exists, because when we get down to the actual foundation of it, you invoke god.
I think there are independent reasons for thinking our morality is objective (premise 1) but that when we examine the idea of OM (premise 2) God provides the best explanation.
No, it would seem after analysing your position, you conclude that god is the explanation because god is the grounder of what is moral, which includes the foundational values - the "core intuitions" by which you make judgements. You have failed to show that these values are objective morals without invoking god.
Moral realism doesn't show that morality is objective, but that your actions/judgements should be dictated by reality depending on what it is you value. If you really thought that all morality was was the way in which it is practiced (as I have said a couple of times now, this is you confusing the map for the place), then using god as the grounder of what you should morally value would be meaningless. That's you being contradictory.
Not so, if the good for conscious beings is a teleological fact then regardless of what I might choose to value there is a truth to the good whether or not I accept it and this does not alter if I rely on God as the source of that teleology as Gods nature is still a fact.
Yea, if it is a fact. Now it's your job to turn that "if" into an is. If god is your only ginnel for doing that, then you're not at god being the best explanation, but the explanation.
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Again, the same misidentification of what morality is. You, like DT, are just arguing here for moral realism. Anyone, theist or atheist, who is basing TACTDJFF always being wrong are basing that on a fundamental, core value of human flourishing, well being or whatever. If I valued the flourishing of ants, lithium, the fluffiness of mash, or (insert whatever you like) more than anything else, then you could find ways of achieving those goals that are better than other ways, to the point where you could potentially scale them so you have one way as "the best", dictated by the reality in which all of this is happening. But all of that means nothing if you can't get passed your own subjective valuation.
Which is all well and good if you are not a theist, but neither Alan or I are arguing for an atheistic realism, we are both arguing that God is the explanation for moral realism and so anyone who accepts that our morality is objective should also believe in God. As a theist and also an aristotelian I do not think Gods purposes stand apart from the universe but are teleogical facts within the universe, which its processes aim to realise. As the flourishing of conscious beings is a key fact of this nature (if not THE key fact) I may consciously choose to value whatever else I wish but then I would be wrong, and my wrongness would be based on me being at odds with the (teleological) facts.
Yes, I get it about your moral realism. An atheist moral realist would state something along the lines of (to paraphrase Matt Dillahunty), we are physical being in a physical universe with physical laws, and our judgements are at the mercy of this physical reality. Basically, they are science-apt - they are truth-apt. The atheist will stop there but you go that step further and state that these truths have been put there by the creator of this physical reality, or something along those simplified lines.
Now we've got that out of the way, I say so fucking what? I bold your assertion and ask you to demonstrate it, to which I again just expect you to leap to god. I don't see it as a fact that it should be valued, only that it is valued.
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More to the point, if it's dependent upon a god it's not objective, it's a subjective morality: if the god changes, the morality which is subject to that god also changes.
O.
Yes, that's where this could lead, and staying relative to this thread, morality still wouldn't be independent of opinion.
However, I'm confident that it'll be seen as part of god's nature rather than god's opinion, but that brings up a whole host of problems itself.
Yes it is seen as part of Gods nature but no that only brings up problems for atheists who sit around dreaming up contradictory definitions of God and then congratulate themselves at having 'disproved' him.
How about you say what these problems are instead of poisoning the well?
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The nature of our experience/phenomenology/practice of morality is not morality itself. You are taking our "core intuitions" (the values which you base your moral realism on) to be axiomatically objectively morally right, basically because god says so. This is the epitome of you invoking god to first believe in OM. Moral realism doesn't get you to OM, never mind get you there first, if you understand that the values you base moral judgements on first need to be shown to be objectively morally right themselves.
I've not presented our experience/phenomenology etc as morality itself which is why my argument has never been 'morality assumes objectivity therefore its objective' but rather 'morality assumes objectivity therefore either our moral intuitions are correct and it is objective Or morality is distorted'. I have been abundantly clear about this and stated it many times. For those of us who do feel the strength and centrality of moral truth as being fundamental to the human condition then God provides the best explanation for those intuitions as the grounds for objective moral truth. Its an argument to God from our intuitions not the other way around.
Yes, why is it good? DT said it's because it's rooted in god - defined in relation to god's purpose, but you should be able to show that it's good without invoking god because you try and use the existence of OM to conclude god, not the other way around.
No I don't. If I showed it was good without God then the second part of the moral argument doesn't work. The reason I think it is good is because I reason from my moral intuitions.
Then tell Alan and WLC it's backwards, not me.
The order of the premises is unimportant, its the direction of travel from our intuitions to God rather than the other way around.
No, it would seem after analysing your position, you conclude that god is the explanation because god is the grounder of what is moral, which includes the foundational values - the "core intuitions" by which you make judgements. You have failed to show that these values are objective morals without invoking god.
I don't want to show them without invoking God. Gods sort of the point of the moral argument for God! But you are trying to claim that I have to invoke God in order to establish that our core intuitions about morality implicitly assume objectivity - but I don't and I haven't, I have relied entirely on examples from our moral reasoning and moral phenomenology, giving the dissenter an alternative route to take from this if they prefer and are willing to be consistent about its implications.
Yea, if it is a fact. Now it's your job to turn that "if" into an is. If god is your only ginnel for doing that, then you're not at god being the best explanation, but the explanation.
Well as I'm arguing for God I'd be quite happy with that however there are different constructions of an argument for OM that an atheist could take I think although I do think these become problematic at key points which is why God is the best explanation. I'm not going to spend my time giving an atheist argument for OM though that I don't support and I don't need to despite your mischaracterisation of the argument.
Yes, I get it about your moral realism. An atheist moral realist would state something along the lines of (to paraphrase Matt Dillahunty), we are physical being in a physical universe with physical laws, and our judgements are at the mercy of this physical reality. Basically, they are science-apt - they are truth-apt. The atheist will stop there but you go that step further and state that these truths have been put there by the creator of this physical reality, or something along those simplified lines.
Now we've got that out of the way, I say so fucking what? I bold your assertion and ask you to demonstrate it, to which I again just expect you to leap to god. I don't see it as a fact that it should be valued, only that it is valued.
There are other ways the atheist could go I think than the route you suggest. But to defend my argument and not theirs, the answer to how I argue to it is given above and is argued to from our moral intuitions, the 'so fucking what' of the bit you highlighted is that if my account is correct then the fact/value gap is something we breach this side of God, even though its explanation is grounded in God as, on the account I have given, teleological facts ARE facts that exist in contingent reality. I've also never claimed we can prove OM but I do think we can demonstrate that it is implicit within our morality as practiced and that this leaves us with a choice of either accepting God as the grounds or viewing morality as fundamentally distorted and accepting the consequences of this. For those of us who trust our moral intuitions and also reason that God is the best explanation of OM then we have reason to believe in God.
How about you say what these problems are instead of poisoning the well?
I don't think there are any to worry a serious and sensible theology.
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For those of us who do feel the strength and centrality of moral truth as being fundamental to the human condition then God provides the best explanation for those intuitions as the grounds for objective moral truth.
Depends what you mean by "God". If you are referring to some nebulous supernatural power which can't even be shown to exist, then it is definitely NOT the best explanation. The best explanation is in the process which produced us, evolution.
Always in my opinion, of course! :)
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Yes, I get it about your moral realism. An atheist moral realist would state something along the lines of (to paraphrase Matt Dillahunty), we...
Interesting when I read your supposed summary of an Atheist moral realism I didn’t recognise it as anything any of the leading realist philosophers would say and to be honest I’d never heard of Marr Dillahunty. Having had a google of him there is no wonder he’s some atheist micro-celeb, not one of the many serious atheists philosophers who have championed moral realism.
I have no idea if he is a realist or not and its quite right to say that simply because many atheists are realists doesn’t makes realism right, what it does demonstrate however is that the motivation for realism is not God – the reason these atheist moral realists are moral realists is exactly the same as the reason I am - it’s our core intuitions about morality and the implicit assumptions embedded in our moral experience. Whether or not they are right, their existence and motivation for realism demonstrates your assertion that belief in OM starts from God is wholly incorrect.
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Hi DT,
In response to your post 475:
You have, but as per my last post your explanation isn't an explanation that I disagree with, at least not in the facts of evolution stripped of extra interpretation - evolution is neutral to the whole question we are discussing, open to both realist and anti-realist interpretations. In that sense 'evolution did it' isn't actually an explanation at all if the question is 'is morality objective or not'. To answer that we DO have to look at the question of whether its illusion or whether its a reality, however dimly we see it, and the interpretation you bring to the evolution account will depend on your preconceptions about the answer to that.
It is quite possible to see our moral sense as having an evolutionary tie up whilst accepting that this is the medium through which some sort of objective morality works, I quite agree.
However, as you know, this isn't my position. For me, evolutionary factors actually help my understanding of why we have a moral sense. I do not see the need to introduce a further layer, at least until it has been demonstrated that it actually exists.
I think that your last sentence here is extremely apposite. Much of what we say here depends on our preconceptions. For myself, I see the impulse for morality as a product of our brains. For you, if I have understood you correctly, you see our moral sense as indicative of something much more permanent, a quality which you would ascribe as originating from a theist god.
Still it doesn't stop us asking the questions we have been posing, e.g. How is it that we go about making decisions about whether, for instance, whether bully a gay child is wrong?'. Saying "evolution did it" doesn't help us answer that at all - I still need to know whether I'm appealing to facts (even if evolutionary determined) or personal responses (even if evolutionary determined). As that's the question that makes the difference here and as your explanation seems by your own admittance unable to help us deal with it one way or the other (after all you do say you 'don't know') what we need to get back to is looking at the character of our moral reasoning as opposed to speculations about how that character arose in an evolutionary context.
Indeed it doesn't stop us asking questions. I find the whole idea of morality to be an extremely awlward one to come to terms with, perhaps because on questions of moral significance I find it difficult not to become personally involved. I think that it is also true that many moral situations are not conducive to straightforward answers, probably because they contain complex issues that appeal to different(and often contrary) strains of our moral feeling and thinking.
Yes, quite right, I don't know. I made this clear back in Mess 164. None of us know. That, for me, makes it a fascinating area for debate. I offer my own slant on morality, and listen to the views of others, hopefully to become better informed.
Cheers
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It is quite possible to see our moral sense as having an evolutionary tie up whilst accepting that this is the medium through which some sort of objective morality works, I quite agree.
However, as you know, this isn't my position. For me, evolutionary factors actually help my understanding of why we have a moral sense. I do not see the need to introduce a further layer, at least until it has been demonstrated that it actually exists.
There is no need to introduce a further layer, unless you are trying to shoehorn some hypothetical power into the discussion.
Morality is a man-made concept which we are trying to fit into the non-moral process of evolution.
Never the twain...
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Hi DT,
In response to your post 475:
You have, but as per my last post your explanation isn't an explanation that I disagree with, at least not in the facts of evolution stripped of extra interpretation - evolution is neutral to the whole question we are discussing, open to both realist and anti-realist interpretations. In that sense 'evolution did it' isn't actually an explanation at all if the question is 'is morality objective or not'. To answer that we DO have to look at the question of whether its illusion or whether its a reality, however dimly we see it, and the interpretation you bring to the evolution account will depend on your preconceptions about the answer to that.
It is quite possible to see our moral sense as having an evolutionary tie up whilst accepting that this is the medium through which some sort of objective morality works, I quite agree.
However, as you know, this isn't my position. For me, evolutionary factors actually help my understanding of why we have a moral sense. I do not see the need to introduce a further layer, at least until it has been demonstrated that it actually exists.
I think that your last sentence here is extremely apposite. Much of what we say here depends on our preconceptions. For myself, I see the impulse for morality as a product of our brains. For you, if I have understood you correctly, you see our moral sense as indicative of something much more permanent, a quality which you would ascribe as originating from a theist god.
Still it doesn't stop us asking the questions we have been posing, e.g. How is it that we go about making decisions about whether, for instance, whether bully a gay child is wrong?'. Saying "evolution did it" doesn't help us answer that at all - I still need to know whether I'm appealing to facts (even if evolutionary determined) or personal responses (even if evolutionary determined). As that's the question that makes the difference here and as your explanation seems by your own admittance unable to help us deal with it one way or the other (after all you do say you 'don't know') what we need to get back to is looking at the character of our moral reasoning as opposed to speculations about how that character arose in an evolutionary context.
Indeed it doesn't stop us asking questions. I find the whole idea of morality to be an extremely awlward one to come to terms with, perhaps because on questions of moral significance I find it difficult not to become personally involved. I think that it is also true that many moral situations are not conducive to straightforward answers, probably because they contain complex issues that appeal to different(and often contrary) strains of our moral feeling and thinking.
Yes, quite right, I don't know. I made this clear back in Mess 164. None of us know. That, for me, makes it a fascinating area for debate. I offer my own slant on morality, and listen to the views of others, hopefully to become better informed.
Cheers
ok and fair enough. :)
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So to 'demonstrating moral facts'.
Yes in a number of posts I have made it clear that the method we go about discovering OM will depend on the account we give of it. As a theist I have given an account of OM rooted in God and I outline this in reply 196. As this account derives its understanding of OM from the flourishing of conscious beings, defined in relation to God’s purpose then we discover moral truth by improving our understanding of our flourishing. This is partly something we do through reason and observation in relation to the physical and psychological facts that allows people to live rich fulfilling lives and the virtues of character necessary to enable these, and partly by deepening our experience of God to gain an insight into his character and purposes. This, like all fields of human discovery will of course be gradual and prone to error and revision in our understanding.
So it seems to me that you 'determine moral facts' by judging an actions to see if it delivers 'flourishing of conscious beings'.
I'm still not seeing the leap to objective?
Ok well if you make an argument and defend your case or alternatively admit that you can't then I'll be happy to explain to too you.
You are asserting morality is objective you have the burden of proof.
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You are asserting morality is objective you have the burden of proof.
Sadly for him, there isn't any. Moral laws only exist in the brains of the individuals subscribing to them ... nowhere else.
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You are asserting morality is objective you have the burden of proof.
Oh I’m happy to explain it, I’m just not going to engage if you aren’t. You don’t get to dictate the terms of the debate, cower off when you can’t support your argument and expect me to keep jumping to your tune. I’ve gone into detail about my position while you are asserting morality is subjective which is no less of an assertion and if it is at odds with our moral intuitions certainly requires an explanation. As its this ‘add odds with our intuitions’ bit you have failed to answer then this is entirely a reasonable ask
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You are asserting morality is objective you have the burden of proof.
Sadly for him, there isn't any. Moral laws only exist in the brains of the individuals subscribing to them ... nowhere else.
Oh Leonard you are over compensating now. I understand you are a bit embarrassed that you were so adamant that morality was ‘more that just disapproval’ yet couldn’t justify why this was thus perfectly illustrating my point and ended up endorsing the lord Voldermort position on morality… but simply repeating what you think over and over with no argument isn’t establishing anything. We know you don’t believe in God or moral truth etc. Go and find some uninspired fundamentalist Christian you can start a thread repeating God doesn’t exist, yes he does, no he doesn’t, yes he does,, ad infinitum ….it’ll keep you both happy for ages.
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You are asserting morality is objective you have the burden of proof.
Sadly for him, there isn't any. Moral laws only exist in the brains of the individuals subscribing to them ... nowhere else.
Oh Leonard you are over compensating now. I understand you are a bit embarrassed that you were so adamant that morality was ‘more that just disapproval’ yet couldn’t justify why this was thus perfectly illustrating my point and ended up endorsing the lord Voldermort position on morality… but simply repeating what you think over and over with no argument isn’t establishing anything. We know you don’t believe in God or moral truth etc. Go and find some uninspired fundamentalist Christian you can start a thread repeating God doesn’t exist, yes he does, no he doesn’t, yes he does,, ad infinitum ….it’ll keep you both happy for ages.
What's up, DT? Feeling neglected? Nobody taking any notice of you?
Never mind dear, in JC's words ... have a cookie! :)
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You are asserting morality is objective you have the burden of proof.
Oh I’m happy to explain it, I’m just not going to engage if you aren’t. You don’t get to dictate the terms of the debate, cower off when you can’t support your argument and expect me to keep jumping to your tune. I’ve gone into detail about my position while you are asserting morality is subjective which is no less of an assertion and if it is at odds with our moral intuitions certainly requires an explanation. As its this ‘add odds with our intuitions’ bit you have failed to answer then this is entirely a reasonable ask
Our moral intuitions are subjective, evidence for this is not two people agree 100% on every moral question.
I'm going to ignore your more hysterical ramblings.
I'm just not buying buying the whole 'its not like taste therefore morality is objective' thing. Take me through it again, without the rhetoric, by means of an example perhaps same sex sex.
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You are asserting morality is objective you have the burden of proof.
Sadly for him, there isn't any. Moral laws only exist in the brains of the individuals subscribing to them ... nowhere else.
Oh Leonard you are over compensating now. I understand you are a bit embarrassed that you were so adamant that morality was ‘more that just disapproval’ yet couldn’t justify why this was thus perfectly illustrating my point and ended up endorsing the lord Voldermort position on morality… but simply repeating what you think over and over with no argument isn’t establishing anything. We know you don’t believe in God or moral truth etc. Go and find some uninspired fundamentalist Christian you can start a thread repeating God doesn’t exist, yes he does, no he doesn’t, yes he does,, ad infinitum ….it’ll keep you both happy for ages.
What's up, DT? Feeling neglected? Nobody taking any notice of you?
Never mind dear, in JC's words ... have a cookie! :)
Ohh never neglected there's something here for me every day ... Still more interesting if its an actual arguement than some snipe from someone who's attempt to make one ended up as an embarrassment to his own position. I'm happy to engage with you again Leonard if thats what you want, just that every other time you retreat into 'i don't understand the arguement'. Would you like me to get back to the detail of what you were saying or not? I thought I was giving you a break after your position imploded before by not munching on your Jugular but I will if you really want me too??
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You are asserting morality is objective you have the burden of proof.
Oh I’m happy to explain it, I’m just not going to engage if you aren’t. You don’t get to dictate the terms of the debate, cower off when you can’t support your argument and expect me to keep jumping to your tune. I’ve gone into detail about my position while you are asserting morality is subjective which is no less of an assertion and if it is at odds with our moral intuitions certainly requires an explanation. As its this ‘add odds with our intuitions’ bit you have failed to answer then this is entirely a reasonable ask
Our moral intuitions are subjective, evidence for this is not two people agree 100% on every moral question.
I'm going to ignore your more hysterical ramblings.
I'm just not buying buying the whole 'its not like taste therefore morality is objective' thing. Take me through it again, without the rhetoric, by means of an example perhaps same sex sex.
This is the worst argument yet..disagreement is proof of subjectivity ..i see right because people never disagree about factual stuff . ::)
Happy to take you through it again once you've tackled the argument s you ignored. Let me know when you do that right :)
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Since this thread is very long and was the second one for Al to offer a defence of his position maybe new thread time.
Several people have refuted Al's position and since he isn't able to defend his position we just as well leave this thread die.
http://www.religionethics.co.uk/index.php?topic=10684.0
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The nature of our experience/phenomenology/practice of morality is not morality itself. You are taking our "core intuitions" (the values which you base your moral realism on) to be axiomatically objectively morally right, basically because god says so. This is the epitome of you invoking god to first believe in OM. Moral realism doesn't get you to OM, never mind get you there first, if you understand that the values you base moral judgements on first need to be shown to be objectively morally right themselves.
I've not presented our experience/phenomenology etc as morality itself which is why my argument has never been 'morality assumes objectivity therefore its objective' but rather 'morality assumes objectivity therefore either our moral intuitions are correct and it is objective Or morality is distorted'. I have been abundantly clear about this and stated it many times. For those of us who do feel the strength and centrality of moral truth as being fundamental to the human condition then God provides the best explanation for those intuitions as the grounds for objective moral truth. Its an argument to God from our intuitions not the other way around.
Yes, why is it good? DT said it's because it's rooted in god - defined in relation to god's purpose, but you should be able to show that it's good without invoking god because you try and use the existence of OM to conclude god, not the other way around.
No I don't. If I showed it was good without God then the second part of the moral argument doesn't work. The reason I think it is good is because I reason from my moral intuitions.
Then tell Alan and WLC it's backwards, not me.
The order of the premises is unimportant, its the direction of travel from our intuitions to God rather than the other way around.
No, it would seem after analysing your position, you conclude that god is the explanation because god is the grounder of what is moral, which includes the foundational values - the "core intuitions" by which you make judgements. You have failed to show that these values are objective morals without invoking god.
I don't want to show them without invoking God. Gods sort of the point of the moral argument for God! But you are trying to claim that I have to invoke God in order to establish that our core intuitions about morality implicitly assume objectivity - but I don't and I haven't, I have relied entirely on examples from our moral reasoning and moral phenomenology, giving the dissenter an alternative route to take from this if they prefer and are willing to be consistent about its implications.
Yea, if it is a fact. Now it's your job to turn that "if" into an is. If god is your only ginnel for doing that, then you're not at god being the best explanation, but the explanation.
Well as I'm arguing for God I'd be quite happy with that however there are different constructions of an argument for OM that an atheist could take I think although I do think these become problematic at key points which is why God is the best explanation. I'm not going to spend my time giving an atheist argument for OM though that I don't support and I don't need to despite your mischaracterisation of the argument.
Yes, I get it about your moral realism. An atheist moral realist would state something along the lines of (to paraphrase Matt Dillahunty), we are physical being in a physical universe with physical laws, and our judgements are at the mercy of this physical reality. Basically, they are science-apt - they are truth-apt. The atheist will stop there but you go that step further and state that these truths have been put there by the creator of this physical reality, or something along those simplified lines.
Now we've got that out of the way, I say so fucking what? I bold your assertion and ask you to demonstrate it, to which I again just expect you to leap to god. I don't see it as a fact that it should be valued, only that it is valued.
There are other ways the atheist could go I think than the route you suggest. But to defend my argument and not theirs, the answer to how I argue to it is given above and is argued to from our moral intuitions, the 'so fucking what' of the bit you highlighted is that if my account is correct then the fact/value gap is something we breach this side of God, even though its explanation is grounded in God as, on the account I have given, teleological facts ARE facts that exist in contingent reality. I've also never claimed we can prove OM but I do think we can demonstrate that it is implicit within our morality as practiced and that this leaves us with a choice of either accepting God as the grounds or viewing morality as fundamentally distorted and accepting the consequences of this. For those of us who trust our moral intuitions and also reason that God is the best explanation of OM then we have reason to believe in God.
How about you say what these problems are instead of poisoning the well?
I don't think there are any to worry a serious and sensible theology.
Seems we are getting to the point where we are repeating ourselves and almost talking past one another. I'd rather just respond to your next post to move things along than go over old ground again, unless there is something you would like me to respond to here.
The only thing I will say is that you said there are problems for atheists with morality being grounded in god. I wanted you to say what they were.
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Yes, I get it about your moral realism. An atheist moral realist would state something along the lines of (to paraphrase Matt Dillahunty), we...
Interesting when I read your supposed summary of an Atheist moral realism I didn’t recognise it as anything any of the leading realist philosophers would say and to be honest I’d never heard of Marr Dillahunty. Having had a google of him there is no wonder he’s some atheist micro-celeb, not one of the many serious atheists philosophers who have championed moral realism.
I don't think it matters who said what, leading realist philosopher or not, it's just something I vaguely remember being said.
I have no idea if he is a realist or not and its quite right to say that simply because many atheists are realists doesn’t makes realism right, what it does demonstrate however is that the motivation for realism is not God – the reason these atheist moral realists are moral realists is exactly the same as the reason I am - it’s our core intuitions about morality and the implicit assumptions embedded in our moral experience. Whether or not they are right, their existence and motivation for realism demonstrates your assertion that belief in OM starts from God is wholly incorrect.
Which is to misunderstand my point that moral realism doesn't equal OM. I think they're just as wrong as you are in claiming morality is objective based on moral realism. My argument is that I could quite easily be a moral realist yet conclude that the moral values/intuitions it's based on are subjective.
Yes, your argument is that your intuitions point to god - it's more than just having those intuitions, but that you should also have them. I don't see how you make that conclusion without first invoking god to give you that assurance, as no pandering to moral realism will get you there.
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Seems we are getting to the point where we are repeating ourselves and almost talking past one another. I'd rather just respond to your next post to move things along than go over old ground again, unless there is something you would like me to respond to here.
As you wish
I don't think it matters who said what, leading realist philosopher or not, it's just something I vaguely remember being said.
I think it matters if you are presenting this as a prime example of atheist realism to a degree that this is 'out of the way' in the discussion....as some of the most prominent contributors to the debate on meta-ethics in the last half century have been both realists and atheists it is remiss to present something said by some inconsequential randomer as the embodiment of that position. As neither you or I support the position anyway I'm not sure why you feel the need to go there at all.
Which is to misunderstand my point that moral realism doesn't equal OM. I think they're just as wrong as you are in claiming morality is objective based on moral realism. My argument is that I could quite easily be a moral realist yet conclude that the moral values/intuitions it's based on are subjective.
No idea what you mean here. Moral realism is moral objectivism - they mean the same thing and are interchangeable terms. Some versions of moral realism problematise the concept of objectivity but they all still hold that there morality is still a form of objectivity and deny that moral values are subjective.
Yes, your argument is that your intuitions point to god - it's more than just having those intuitions, but that you should also have them. I don't see how you make that conclusion without first invoking god to give you that assurance, as no pandering to moral realism will get you there.
I don't argue that you should have them if by 'should' you mean some kind of irresistible conclusion that you derive from the fact of having those intuitions (and if you don't mean this I don't know what you mean). I have argued that people have a choice of either trusting their intuitions or accepting that their morality is distorted. People may well want to trust their intuitions as they that the feel the force of moral truth and understand its centrality to the human condition. When we do philosophy many of the positions we take come down to our intuitions particularly in relation to metaphysical issues. One of the task of philosophy is to articulate the implications of our intuitions and draw out their implications. The moral argument for God is like every argument, powerful for those who accept the premise not for those who don't. For people who trust their moral intuitions then they should follow the logic of this and embrace the conclusion. Alan too has stated clearly that his version of the argument is also about consistency of belief in the same way.
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I don't think it matters who said what, leading realist philosopher or not, it's just something I vaguely remember being said.
I think it matters if you are presenting this as a prime example of atheist realism to a degree that this is 'out of the way' in the discussion....as some of the most prominent contributors to the debate on meta-ethics in the last half century have been both realists and atheists it is remiss to present something said by some inconsequential randomer as the embodiment of that position. As neither you or I support the position anyway I'm not sure why you feel the need to go there at all.
It was a phrase stuck in my mind that I think concisely draws to the point you have yourself made - that morality is truth-apt. Who says it doesn't matter as claims stand and fall on their own merits. If you want to go down the route of only being able to quote and reference people who you think are worthy to talk about and make points about morality/moral realism, then perhaps you shouldn't be bothering discussing it on this forum. Am I not some "inconsequential randomer" too? I suppose you could fall under that category to me, but Matt D doesn't.
Which is to misunderstand my point that moral realism doesn't equal OM. I think they're just as wrong as you are in claiming morality is objective based on moral realism. My argument is that I could quite easily be a moral realist yet conclude that the moral values/intuitions it's based on are subjective.
No idea what you mean here. Moral realism is moral objectivism - they mean the same thing and are interchangeable terms. Some versions of moral realism problematise the concept of objectivity but they all still hold that there morality is still a form of objectivity and deny that moral values are subjective.
Then they should have no problem in discovering the objective moral truth that exists external to themselves that shows that they should value what they value. If not, then it's unreasonable to believe that morality is objective because the foundation can only be taken back to their subjectivity.
Yes, your argument is that your intuitions point to god - it's more than just having those intuitions, but that you should also have them. I don't see how you make that conclusion without first invoking god to give you that assurance, as no pandering to moral realism will get you there.
I don't argue that you should have them if by 'should' you mean some kind of irresistible conclusion that you derive from the fact of having those intuitions (and if you don't mean this I don't know what you mean). I have argued that people have a choice of either trusting their intuitions or accepting that their morality is distorted. People may well want to trust their intuitions as they that the feel the force of moral truth and understand its centrality to the human condition. When we do philosophy many of the positions we take come down to our intuitions particularly in relation to metaphysical issues. One of the task of philosophy is to articulate the implications of our intuitions and draw out their implications. The moral argument for God is like every argument, powerful for those who accept the premise not for those who don't. For people who trust their moral intuitions then they should follow the logic of this and embrace the conclusion. Alan too has stated clearly that his version of the argument is also about consistency of belief in the same way.
Those who take the axiomatic approach by first trusting that their moral intuitions are themselves morally right to be held, are invoking OM from the off and not concluding it. Just because someone trusts their values/intuitions, it doesn't automatically follow that they regard those values/intuitions to be objectively right. You can argue how those values/intuitions came to be what they are, which is where god comes in for you as the best explanation, but to me that's a conversation ender.
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It was a phrase stuck in my mind that I think concisely draws to the point you have yourself made - that morality is truth-apt. Who says it doesn't matter as claims stand and fall on their own merits. If you want to go down the route of only being able to quote and reference people who you think are worthy to talk about and make points about morality/moral realism, then perhaps you shouldn't be bothering discussing it on this forum. Am I not some "inconsequential randomer" too? I suppose you could fall under that category to me, but Matt D doesn't.
I see… so you are equating my point that to represent atheist moral realism to the point that it is (in your words) “out of the way” by quoting a view that is not remotely representative of the most accomplished thinkers who represent that view as problematic, with the view that only the most accomplished thinkers are worthy to discuss ideas at all….hmm how to describe that..erm disingenuous maybe? Wilfully dishonest? Perhaps a misunderstanding on your part is the most charitable interpretation….
Then they should have no problem in discovering the objective moral truth that exists external to themselves that shows that they should value what they value. If not, then it's unreasonable to believe that morality is objective because the foundation can only be taken back to their subjectivity.
All moral realists as far as I know think it is possible to discover moral truth. That doesn’t mean of course this is just a process like reading off a list of course, or a verifiable one or one easy to do without error…but why should it be? There are many other objective questions to which this is also the case.
Those who take the axiomatic approach by first trusting that their moral intuitions are themselves morally right to be held, are invoking OM from the off and not concluding it.
Again you want to jump to the conclusion to force an imagined circularity that does not exist. When we’ve talked of our moral intuitions I’ve given examples of the way we reason about morality, look for the right answer when we change our moral views and are willing to assign judgements of right or wrong to others who do not share our feelings. The objective implications of our moral practice are implicit in it – something we draw out by examining it. We don’t say ‘I intuit OM therefore OM’ and we think about what this would mean for in the broader understanding of our lives.
Just because someone trusts their values/intuitions, it doesn't automatically follow that they regard those values/intuitions to be objectively right.
No its possible that they aren't hence option B to accept our morality as a distortion. However its also important to be clear that you are not confusing practical intuitions (like it’s wrong to cheat) with structural/theoretical intuitions such as how we go about making our moral decisions or the status of those decisions which is what I am talking about here. As those intuitions are just that moral questions have right answers that’s exactly what it means unless we can give an account that makes sense of moral truth other than it being objective. This is what the debate has been about and none of the accounts that have been given have been able to make sense of morality as we practice it in anti-realist terms – they are all quite happy to discuss it until it gets to bits they can’t answer then it turns into a ‘lets not talk about this anymore, lets talk about the foundations of moral truth instead’. That’s ok if you want to be consistent and say that morality as we practice it is a distortion and that these key elements are illusions but it’s a step most here seem to shy away from taking,.. certainly one they are silent on when it is put to them.
You can argue how those values/intuitions came to be what they are, which is where god comes in for you as the best explanation, but to me that's a conversation ender.
And for someone who is committed to atheism that’s understandable as long as you are prepared to be consistent about what the consequences of saying our moral practice and phenomenology is distorted, with key elements of it being illusions. For someone who isn’t committed to atheism though, the recognition of the implicit assumption of objectivity within our morality coupled with an understanding of the centrality of this in defining key aspects of our humanity is good reason to consider how such objectivity might be possible. As God is the best way to do this (or apparently the only way to do this in your view) then such considerations can quite validly form part of a cumulative case for belief in God.
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You are asserting morality is objective you have the burden of proof.
Oh I’m happy to explain it, I’m just not going to engage if you aren’t. You don’t get to dictate the terms of the debate, cower off when you can’t support your argument and expect me to keep jumping to your tune. I’ve gone into detail about my position while you are asserting morality is subjective which is no less of an assertion and if it is at odds with our moral intuitions certainly requires an explanation. As its this ‘add odds with our intuitions’ bit you have failed to answer then this is entirely a reasonable ask
Our moral intuitions are subjective, evidence for this is not two people agree 100% on every moral question.
I'm going to ignore your more hysterical ramblings.
I'm just not buying buying the whole 'its not like taste therefore morality is objective' thing. Take me through it again, without the rhetoric, by means of an example perhaps same sex sex.
This is the worst argument yet..disagreement is proof of subjectivity ..i see right because people never disagree about factual stuff . ::)
Happy to take you through it again once you've tackled the argument s you ignored. Let me know when you do that right :)
In case you missed ti I started a new thread for you.
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It was a phrase stuck in my mind that I think concisely draws to the point you have yourself made - that morality is truth-apt. Who says it doesn't matter as claims stand and fall on their own merits. If you want to go down the route of only being able to quote and reference people who you think are worthy to talk about and make points about morality/moral realism, then perhaps you shouldn't be bothering discussing it on this forum. Am I not some "inconsequential randomer" too? I suppose you could fall under that category to me, but Matt D doesn't.
I see… so you are equating my point that to represent atheist moral realism to the point that it is (in your words) “out of the way” by quoting a view that is not remotely representative of the most accomplished thinkers who represent that view as problematic, with the view that only the most accomplished thinkers are worthy to discuss ideas at all….hmm how to describe that..erm disingenuous maybe? Wilfully dishonest? Perhaps a misunderstanding on your part is the most charitable interpretation….
This is perfectly simple - I paraphrased someone to get to the conclusion that moral realism declares that morality is truth-apt. You agree with that, so that should be that. You seem to want pick over an insignificance for what I can only gauge to be for the sake of being argumentative.
All moral realists as far as I know think it is possible to discover moral truth. That doesn’t mean of course this is just a process like reading off a list of course, or a verifiable one or one easy to do without error…but why should it be? There are many other objective questions to which this is also the case.
Then if I'm to be convinced that morality is objective, then I require the objective facts behind the morality of our foundational values. Really, this has nothing to do with moral realism, only that moral realism would have to lead you to conclude that your foundational values have objective worth. I want to know why I should value human flourishing, not just understand that I do and take it as given as objective.
Again you want to jump to the conclusion to force an imagined circularity that does not exist. When we’ve talked of our moral intuitions I’ve given examples of the way we reason about morality, look for the right answer when we change our moral views and are willing to assign judgements of right or wrong to others who do not share our feelings. The objective implications of our moral practice are implicit in it – something we draw out by examining it. We don’t say ‘I intuit OM therefore OM’ and we think about what this would mean for in the broader understanding of our lives.
The way we reason about morality isn't morality, though. You keep doing this. Perhaps this is a fundamental disagreement and why we're getting nowhere, because you see morality as how it's used and applied and I don't. We can apply objective standards to anything we apply values or rules to, but that doesn't make those values and rules objective.
Just because someone trusts their values/intuitions, it doesn't automatically follow that they regard those values/intuitions to be objectively right.
No its possible that they aren't hence option B to accept our morality as a distortion. However its also important to be clear that you are not confusing practical intuitions (like it’s wrong to cheat) with structural/theoretical intuitions such as how we go about making our moral decisions or the status of those decisions which is what I am talking about here. As those intuitions are just that moral questions have right answers that’s exactly what it means unless we can give an account that makes sense of moral truth other than it being objective. This is what the debate has been about and none of the accounts that have been given have been able to make sense of morality as we practice it in anti-realist terms – they are all quite happy to discuss it until it gets to bits they can’t answer then it turns into a ‘lets not talk about this anymore, lets talk about the foundations of moral truth instead’. That’s ok if you want to be consistent and say that morality as we practice it is a distortion and that these key elements are illusions but it’s a step most here seem to shy away from taking,.. certainly one they are silent on when it is put to them.
It's not a distortion, but an acknowledgement that their values are the only thing they can base moral judgements on. That there are objective ways to best achieve those values has no bearing whatsoever on the nature of morality if their foundation can only be taken back as far as something subjective. There's nothing inconsistent about that, nothing distorted, no illusion, not even for a moral realist, because the practice of morality isn't morality itself.
You can argue how those values/intuitions came to be what they are, which is where god comes in for you as the best explanation, but to me that's a conversation ender.
And for someone who is committed to atheism that’s understandable as long as you are prepared to be consistent about what the consequences of saying our moral practice and phenomenology is distorted, with key elements of it being illusions. For someone who isn’t committed to atheism though, the recognition of the implicit assumption of objectivity within our morality coupled with an understanding of the centrality of this in defining key aspects of our humanity is good reason to consider how such objectivity might be possible. As God is the best way to do this (or apparently the only way to do this in your view) then such considerations can quite validly form part of a cumulative case for belief in God.
"Committed to atheism"? No, I'm committed to explanation, as regardless of whether or not one could come up with a naturalistic explanation for objective morality, you can always plonk god on the end to explain how/why that naturalistic explanation exists.
And if you think I see a god as the only way in which moral objectivity is plausible, then you're under some serious misunderstanding.
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This is perfectly simple - I paraphrased someone to get to the conclusion that moral realism declares that morality is truth-apt. You agree with that, so that should be that. You seem to want pick over an insignificance for what I can only gauge to be for the sake of being argumentative.
And you also staw man-ed my objection into being something about no one but experts being able to say anything. My concern was the way you presented the argument as getting atheist realism “out of the way” by reference to a random statement that is not representative of atheist realism.
Then if I'm to be convinced that morality is objective, then I require the objective facts behind the morality of our foundational values. Really, this has nothing to do with moral realism, only that moral realism would have to lead you to conclude that your foundational values have objective worth. I want to know why I should value human flourishing, not just understand that I do and take it as given as objective.
Actually from an Aristotelian perspective it is not required that you value human flourishing per se but simply your own, although an Aristotelian concept of flourishing is not the thin idea that you find utilised in some accounts. Nevertheless I digress, to respond to the above and also this:
"Committed to atheism"? No, I'm committed to explanation, as regardless of whether or not one could come up with a naturalistic explanation for objective morality, you can always plonk god on the end to explain how/why that naturalistic explanation exists.
You seem to be missing the point of the role of God in grounding moral truth. When realists point to the flourishing of moral beings as a moral fact they are claiming it as a basic moral truth, not derived from anything else. I may argue that gay marriage is right based on contingent truths which have importance that is derived from basic moral facts but the move from a basic moral fact like human flourishing to God is a different kind of explanation than a derivative. Realists, including many atheist realists don't think basic moral facts are derived from anything else -they are just true. Everyone including the most ardent reductionist-atheist-materialist believes there are things in the universe that are ‘just true’ in that they are not derived from anything else - the laws of quantum physics or basic particles for example. Moral realists of all stripes think that basic moral truths are part of the basic things of the universe that are just true - we don't try to deduce them from God by saying something like “its true because God said so"...its a claim that values are the sorts of thing that form part of the basic facts about the universe. God’s role in the explanation isn't that he is a final step in a line of derived facts, he isn't - the basic moral facts are the end of the line of derived facts - for theists God is rather the explanation for why values are the sort of things that form part of the basic facts of the universe.
The way we reason about morality isn't morality, though. You keep doing this. Perhaps this is a fundamental disagreement and why we're getting nowhere, because you see morality as how it's used and applied and I don't. We can apply objective standards to anything we apply values or rules to, but that doesn't make those values and rules objective.
If you mean morality as a social practice can be distorted in its assumptions from what is possibly true in relation to metaphysical claims, that's not impossible as I have said it’s a choice the anti-realist has to face up too...but if you mean morality isn't our moral practices and moral reasoning then that's not true, that's exactly what morality is - what else do you think it is beyond the way we reason and make decisions about right and wrong? That's the definition of morality! As for second bit, I have no idea what you mean - if a standard is objective it precludes the fact that it is arbitrarily applied by definition. If you think morality is something over and above the way we reason and make decisions about right and wrong then please tell…. Any account of morality that you can give which does not explain key features of morality like how we reason or our moral phenomenology is not a theory of morality (at least not a good one) it’s a theory of something else you are calling morality.
It's not a distortion, but an acknowledgement that their values are the only thing they can base moral judgements on. That there are objective ways to best achieve those values has no bearing whatsoever on the nature of morality if their foundation can only be taken back as far as something subjective. There's nothing inconsistent about that, nothing distorted, no illusion, not even for a moral realist, because the practice of morality isn't morality itself.
There is something distorted if moral values are subjective if by subjective you mean cognitive judgements that are subjectively true. Truth is not something that can be relativised in the same way motion can and still have a meaning. For example, if Dan says "eating meat is wrong" is subjectively true then this means that this sentence means exactly the same thing as "Dan thinks eating meat is wrong". But this second sentence is a purely descriptive sentence that anyone can agree with no matter what their views about eating meat - by relativising the notion of truth we rob it of any normative content at all....not a subjective version that is still morality - its bleached of any moral content.
If alternatively you are saying it is derived from a non-cognitive affective state then it absolutely is a distortion as a key element of our moral reasoning is that when we alter our moral opinions (including at times our core opinions) we do so because we think our old views were incorrect. If a moral theory can't account for such core elements of morality then that is exactly what it means to say it is distorted.
Realists aren’t claiming that it goes back to something subjective. We are claiming that it goes back to something that is objective which makes perfect sense of our moral reasoning and phenomenology.
And if you think I see a god as the only way in which moral objectivity is plausible, then you're under some serious misunderstanding.
You yourself have argued this against my weaker claim of god being the best explanation - its only because you are now misappropriating the term objective to derivatives from subjective opinions that you are now claiming this last point, but this is just semantic sleight-of-hand.
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Alien
I'd be interested to know why our atheist friends think that human flourishing is morally good (apart from wanting it to be so). What do you think?
Simple, evolution has found this idea useful in keeping us alive to pass on our genes.
There is no more to it than that.
I was asking about it being good, not just useful.
It is good because that is the label that we give to useful things.
It is not in some way objectively good, just good because we place a value on survival.
It's that simple.
So defeating the Nazis was merely "useful"? In your opinion "gay marriage" is merely "useful". Avoidance of unnecessary pain in patients dying of cancer is merely "useful"? Stopping the physical abuse of children is merely "useful"?
Seriously?
Yes.
Do you not think it useful?
Seriously?
Yes, it is useful, but that is not what I asked. As I said above, I was asking about it being good, not just useful. The Nazis found it useful to kill Jews. Does that mean that what the Nazis did was good?
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So basically, when I asked you to do it without invoking god, you can't? So as I've said aplenty, your argument for OM has only ever been circular.
No, you missed my, "We can't prove it all the way (since, unless there is an original cause/ground) it is an infinite regress, yet there seems to be no good reason to think otherwise." You have also missed/ignored the definition of objective morality, i.e. that OM exists if there is at least one example of something being morally right or morally wrong independent of how many people think it so. A number of people here, not just Christians, have said that TACTDJFF is (always) morally wrong, though they then go on to be much more open to the possibility of their being wrong than on any other moral question I have seen. If they do indeed think that torturing a child to death just for fun (that being the complete motivation) then they are thereby agreeing that OM does indeed exist (since it is the one example we need), though they they go on to contradict themselves by saying that OM does not exist.
Again, the same misidentification of what morality is. You, like DT, are just arguing here for moral realism. Anyone, theist or atheist, who is basing TACTDJFF always being wrong are basing that on a fundamental, core value of human flourishing, well being or whatever. If I valued the flourishing of ants, lithium, the fluffiness of mash, or (insert whatever you like) more than anything else, then you could find ways of achieving those goals that are better than other ways, to the point where you could potentially scale them so you have one way as "the best", dictated by the reality in which all of this is happening. But all of that means nothing if you can't get passed your own subjective valuation.
My valuation of the morality of something might well be subjective, though that would be a failure on my part, I would think (or at least partial failure). However, the point is whether there is anything which is morally wrong/right and whose moral wrongness/rightness does not depend on how many people think it so. That is the definition of objective morality which is under discussion.
Well isn't that the whole point of the subjective view, that it's from their own standpoint and that they can't point to anything external to themselves to conclude that it's morally good? It's their value and there's no evidence to point to that value having objective worth. Personally, I don't think it's right or wrong for humans to flourish, I just want them to, probably most simply because I am one. I'm under no pretence that I can turn my is into an ought.
I continue to look forward to hearing from those who think that the flourishing of humans/sentient beings is morally good why they think it so.
I'd be interested in your thoughts about whether there is any "ought" in life. Do you think I ought not use the term "ought"? If you think that the term "ought" has some meaning, please do explain why you think it has.
Thanks for the interesting discussion.
Yes, I think there are oughts, but they're based on valuations. You ought to score more goals than the other team if you value the three points. You ought to eat marmite (keep the theme going) sandwiches instead of battery acid if you value your health. Now whether I ought to value what I value is a different thing.
Yes and thus I ask you whether you should value the wellbeing of a child being tortured to death just for fun more than any right the torturer might have to have fun. I would suggest that it is. Do you agree?
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Yes, Andy, as usual, has teased out something which has always baffled me. Some moral schemes seem to be based on a notion of human flourishing, as if this offered an objective base. I just don't get that, so maybe I have a screw missing in my brain. As Andy said again, I want human flourishing, because I am human. If I was a shark, I might want human bodies in large chunks, yum yum. The oughts are fine, but they are no more than flourishes, for me at any rate. I mean, it all seems so irrevocably subjective to me.
Would you have any problem with making your mind up if you saw a child being tortured to death just for fun? Would you think, "Well, this seems so irrevocably subjective to me that I can't make my mind up whether what he is doing is morally right or wrong or amoral"? I don't think you would. At least I hope not.
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I was listening to the latest Podcast in the series 'Philosophy Bites', and although the topic was 'Speciesism' (and well worth a listen) the interviewee, Shelly Kagan, was outlining that many views on this were best thought of as being moral intuitions.
When listening it occurred to me that my view that 'TACTDJFF is wrong' might well be a moral intuition, albeit I can also think of practical reasons why it would be a bad thing for society at large, and I also recognise that my view is part of a near universal consensus. Even so, it seems to me that my moral intuition alone provides a sound basis to guide my behaviour.
Where Alien and co go wrong is in thinking having a near universal agreement that TACTDJFF is wrong means something more than a near universal agreement. It doesn't.
Yes, it does, as has been explained by people other than me. If you and I agree that TACTDJFF is morally wrong and that that wrongness does not depend on how many people think it so (you and I might be the only people in the world who think it wrong and stuff the rest if they think is OK) then you and I are logically bound to believe in the existence of objective morality.
The case for gay marriage being OM is far more interesting as that has far less of a consensus - the theists would find it very hard to come to an agreement with that.
Maybe, but the thread is about whether objective morality exists or not; it is not whether action A, B or C are examples of it.
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Which is why Alan has studiously avoided other suggested examples, such as SSM or euthanasia, claiming that TACTDJFF alone is sufficient to demonstrate OM:
Correct. it clearly isn't,
Except that some have said that TACTDJFF is morally wrong and does not depend on how many people think it so. That means they logically ought to agree that OM exists.and it is so obviously contrived as to be laughable as a meaningful example of a pressing moral issue (as expected, since WLC is its chief proponent).
That's a cop out. Even if something is contrived, it is still an example of OM. Something does not have to be "a meaningful example of a pressing moral issue" to be objectively morally wrong. I would have thought you would have understood that (seriously).
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If you and I agree that TACTDJFF is morally wrong and that that wrongness does not depend on how many people think it so (you and I might be the only people in the world who think it wrong and stuff the rest if they think is OK) then you and I are logically bound to believe in the existence of objective morality.
Non sequitur. That you believe it is wrong is a subjective belief that it is morally wrong, which in no way proves that objective morality exists.
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Yes, it does, as has been explained by people other than me. If you and I agree that TACTDJFF is morally wrong and that that wrongness does not depend on how many people think it so (you and I might be the only people in the world who think it wrong and stuff the rest if they think is OK) then you and I are logically bound to believe in the existence of objective morality.
This is where you are getting derailed, Alan: the 'wrongness' of TACTDJFF is inherent because the vast majority of people hold moral intuitions that TACTDJFF is wrong, supported by a range of practical concerns if it were otherwise: for all the flummery of OM it really isn't any more complicated than what people think!
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Since this thread is very long and was the second one for Al to offer a defence of his position maybe new thread time.
Several people have refuted Al's position and since he isn't able to defend his position we just as well leave this thread die.
http://www.religionethics.co.uk/index.php?topic=10684.0
Since jakswan has failed (along with Gordon and Leonard) to understand the argument despite looking at it on and off for several years and therefore isn't able to defend his position etc. I am happy to leave this thread to die (unless DT et al wish to continue their part). It looks like I am going to be significantly short of time for the foreseeable future so will have to restrict myself to threads where there seems to be a point in discussing stuff. Thus if anyone wants to reply to my final posts on this thread, please do, but I will now take my leave of this thread.
Hare yer goo.
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Which is why Alan has studiously avoided other suggested examples, such as SSM or euthanasia, claiming that TACTDJFF alone is sufficient to demonstrate OM:
Correct. it clearly isn't,
Except that some have said that TACTDJFF is morally wrong and does not depend on how many people think it so. That means they logically ought to agree that OM exists.and it is so obviously contrived as to be laughable as a meaningful example of a pressing moral issue (as expected, since WLC is its chief proponent).
That's a cop out. Even if something is contrived, it is still an example of OM. Something does not have to be "a meaningful example of a pressing moral issue" to be objectively morally wrong. I would have thought you would have understood that (seriously).
Then you'd be wrong, Alan. Your position on this issue (which it seems is limited to, and revolves around, TACTDTJFF) reeks of desperation.
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Since this thread is very long and was the second one for Al to offer a defence of his position maybe new thread time.
Several people have refuted Al's position and since he isn't able to defend his position we just as well leave this thread die.
http://www.religionethics.co.uk/index.php?topic=10684.0
Since jakswan has failed (along with Gordon and Leonard) to understand the argument despite looking at it on and off for several years and therefore isn't able to defend his position etc. I am happy to leave this thread to die (unless DT et al wish to continue their part). It looks like I am going to be significantly short of time for the foreseeable future so will have to restrict myself to threads where there seems to be a point in discussing stuff. Thus if anyone wants to reply to my final posts on this thread, please do, but I will now take my leave of this thread.
Hare yer goo.
If I remember the challenge was for to show OM not that anyone else could be stated as having to think it existed or else adjust their position? Unless I have missed it, you have failed to do that. So if you want to run away with that failure, off you go.
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Quote from Alien's Mess. 571:
Except that some have said that TACTDJFF is morally wrong and does not depend on how many people think it so. That means they logically ought to agree that OM exists.
Well, in my case, I have always said that I consider TACTDJFF to be morally wrong and this does not depend on how many people (as long as this is greater than zero, of course) think it so. However I have always maintained that if there were no human beings, and because I view morality as a human construct, then I can see no reason for the continued existence of morality. I find that position to be quite logical.
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So basically, when I asked you to do it without invoking god, you can't? So as I've said aplenty, your argument for OM has only ever been circular.
No, you missed my, "We can't prove it all the way (since, unless there is an original cause/ground) it is an infinite regress, yet there seems to be no good reason to think otherwise." You have also missed/ignored the definition of objective morality, i.e. that OM exists if there is at least one example of something being morally right or morally wrong independent of how many people think it so. A number of people here, not just Christians, have said that TACTDJFF is (always) morally wrong, though they then go on to be much more open to the possibility of their being wrong than on any other moral question I have seen. If they do indeed think that torturing a child to death just for fun (that being the complete motivation) then they are thereby agreeing that OM does indeed exist (since it is the one example we need), though they they go on to contradict themselves by saying that OM does not exist.
Again, the same misidentification of what morality is. You, like DT, are just arguing here for moral realism. Anyone, theist or atheist, who is basing TACTDJFF always being wrong are basing that on a fundamental, core value of human flourishing, well being or whatever. If I valued the flourishing of ants, lithium, the fluffiness of mash, or (insert whatever you like) more than anything else, then you could find ways of achieving those goals that are better than other ways, to the point where you could potentially scale them so you have one way as "the best", dictated by the reality in which all of this is happening. But all of that means nothing if you can't get passed your own subjective valuation.
My valuation of the morality of something might well be subjective, though that would be a failure on my part, I would think (or at least partial failure).
I think you should re-familiarise yourself with WLC's moral argument at this point. All I'll say is I made an incorrect reference to it myself earlier in the thread.
However, the point is whether there is anything which is morally wrong/right and whose moral wrongness/rightness does not depend on how many people think it so. That is the definition of objective morality which is under discussion.
But this definition holds it's foundation in the intrinsic values we hold. If I value human well being above all else, then I'll put saving a child's life over the joy of someone wanting to torture them to death. However, if I value human suffering above all else, then I'd probably do the opposite. These are the things that are right, that I should do, if I want to achieve either value and stay consistent to them. This is why the question of objective morality is at the level of value and not judgements that use objective, truth-apt facts that can show us the best way(s) to achieve those values.
Yes, I think there are oughts, but they're based on valuations. You ought to score more goals than the other team if you value the three points. You ought to eat marmite (keep the theme going) sandwiches instead of battery acid if you value your health. Now whether I ought to value what I value is a different thing.
Yes and thus I ask you whether you should value the wellbeing of a child being tortured to death just for fun more than any right the torturer might have to have fun. I would suggest that it is. Do you agree?
Do I agree that I should value well being more than any right a torturer might have to have fun? I've not a clue because I can only take that valuation as far back as myself. I haven't come across some objectiveness that goes beyond depending on what I think. That I do value well being over the torturer is where it starts, but that says nothing about whether I should value that. I'm under no illusions that this isn't easy to reconcile, as you often play the emotive card here yourself with an "I hope so" or some such, but this is just how it appears to be - that there currently is no reason to think there is a should.
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Well, in my case, I have always said that I consider TACTDJFF to be morally wrong and this does not depend on how many people (as long as this is greater than zero, of course) think it so. However I have always maintained that if there were no human beings, and because I view morality as a human construct, then I can see no reason for the continued existence of morality. I find that position to be quite logical.
Whether its logical or not depends on what you mean by wrong and how it is ascribed. If you simply mean that you disapprove of it then that would be consistent, it would also be at odds with our morality as it is practiced.
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If I remember the challenge was for to show OM not that anyone else could be stated as having to think it existed or else adjust their position?
And was there an intelligible challenge to go with this?
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Again, the same misidentification of what morality is. You, like DT, are just arguing here for moral realism.
I think morality is the way we think and reason about what is right or wrong and so examples of our reasoning about what is right or wrong is entirely integral to this. If you think morality is something else then tell us.
Anyone, theist or atheist, who is basing TACTDJFF always being wrong are basing that on a fundamental, core value of human flourishing, well being or whatever. If I valued the flourishing of ants, lithium, the fluffiness of mash, or (insert whatever you like) more than anything else, then you could find ways of achieving those goals that are better than other ways, to the point where you could potentially scale them so you have one way as "the best", dictated by the reality in which all of this is happening. But all of that means nothing if you can't get passed your own subjective valuation.
Again you seem to be missing the point. Moral realists think core moral truths are facts and not subjective. They don't derive from anything else including our subjective experiences and are right independently of whether we think they are right.
But this definition holds it's foundation in the intrinsic values we hold. If I value human well being above all else, then I'll put saving a child's life over the joy of someone wanting to torture them to death. However, if I value human suffering above all else, then I'd probably do the opposite. These are the things that are right, that I should do, if I want to achieve either value and stay consistent to them. This is why the question of objective morality is at the level of value and not judgements that use objective, truth-apt facts that can show us the best way(s) to achieve those values.
I have been talking about values as objective all along.
Do I agree that I should value well being more than any right a torturer might have to have fun? I've not a clue because I can only take that valuation as far back as myself. I haven't come across some objectiveness that goes beyond depending on what I think. That I do value well being over the torturer is where it starts, but that says nothing about whether I should value that.
It amazes me that you can't see how entirely question-begging this is. Saying "I can only take the valuation as far back as myself" is assuming the very question at issue. If we paralleled this discussion to one about the existence of a real external world it would be like saying I can only take the evidence of 'a bird flying by' back to my subjective perceptions of the bird flying by, therefore it is only my subjective perception and has no external truth. Moral realists think that our subjective judgements of basic value are aimed at perceiving moral truth so simply stating that the valuation only goes back to yourself is exactly what is in dispute. This is not to say that you don't have to form a judgement about it for it to be your judgement...that is of course the case just as you have to perceive the bird in order for you to have had that perception. Neither though imply that it is only your perception without any external truth to the matter.
I'm under no illusions that this isn't easy to reconcile, as you often play the emotive card here yourself with an "I hope so" or some such, but this is just how it appears to be - that there currently is no reason to think there is a should.
There is a reason to think there is a should, the should is implicit in our moral reasoning. If there is no 'should' then our moral reasoning is distorted and so it is not wonder that this is hard for you to reconcile this with morality as it exists.
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It amazes me that you can't see how entirely question-begging this is. Saying "I can only take the valuation as far back as myself" is assuming the very question at issue. If we paralleled this discussion to one about the existence of a real external world it would be like saying I can only take the evidence of 'a bird flying by' back to my subjective perceptions of the bird flying by, therefore it is only my subjective perception and has no external truth.
All perceptions are subjective but it is obvious some perceptions relate to things "out there", that appear to exist independent of any mind.
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Quote from Alien's Mess.
Try using a different abbreviation.
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Quote from Alien's Mess.
Try using a different abbreviation.
;D
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Hi DT,
Well, in my case, I have always said that I consider TACTDJFF to be morally wrong and this does not depend on how many people (as long as this is greater than zero, of course) think it so. However I have always maintained that if there were no human beings, and because I view morality as a human construct, then I can see no reason for the continued existence of morality. I find that position to be quite logical.
Whether its logical or not depends on what you mean by wrong and how it is ascribed. If you simply mean that you disapprove of it then that would be consistent, it would also be at odds with our morality as it is practiced.
My idea of 'wrong' comes from a combination of factors as I have previously explained, and this includes my feelings, one of which is certainly disapproval.
That other people may also practise their morality according to their subjective viewpoint comes as no surprise to me. The bottom line, however, is that if there were no people to practise morality, I cannot see any reason for morality to be anything more than an evolutionary potential. I find that position to be entirely logical, in contrast to what Alan seemed to be suggesting. That, of course, does not mean that other logical views aren't available.
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All perceptions are subjective but it is obvious some perceptions relate to things "out there", that appear to exist independent of any mind.
'appear' being the key word. Morals appear to be out there too in the way we perceive them, reason about them and apply them. Whether they are or not is the question at issue which is why Andy's post is question begging.
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My idea of 'wrong' comes from a combination of factors as I have previously explained, and this includes my feelings, one of which is certainly disapproval.
If you have i've missed it. your explanation was largely a historical one about evolution and morality I want to know what 'wrong' means in a sentence when you say something is wrong. Disapproval is PART of my idea of wrong too, but its not all there is which is crucial. What more you think it means is exactly what I'd like to know, its what you have omitted to say here and before too if I remember (although apologies if I missed it) This is the crux of the matter.
That other people may also practise their morality according to their subjective viewpoint comes as no surprise to me. The bottom line, however, is that if there were no people to practise morality, I cannot see any reason for morality to be anything more than an evolutionary potential. I find that position to be entirely logical, in contrast to what Alan seemed to be suggesting. That, of course, does not mean that other logical views aren't available.
And a realist would say that consciousness is a prerequisite for being able to recognise and response to moral truth.
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All perceptions are subjective but it is obvious some perceptions relate to things "out there", that appear to exist independent of any mind.
'appear' being the key word. Morals appear to be out there too in the way we perceive them, reason about them and apply them. Whether they are or not is the question at issue which is why Andy's post is question begging.
Morals don't appear to be out there.
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Hi DT,
My idea of 'wrong' comes from a combination of factors as I have previously explained, and this includes my feelings, one of which is certainly disapproval.
If you have i've missed it. your explanation was largely a historical one about evolution and morality I want to know what 'wrong' means in a sentence when you say something is wrong. Disapproval is PART of my idea of wrong too, but its not all there is which is crucial. What more you think it means is exactly what I'd like to know, its what you have omitted to say here and before too if I remember (although apologies if I missed it) This is the crux of the matter.
That other people may also practise their morality according to their subjective viewpoint comes as no surprise to me. The bottom line, however, is that if there were no people to practise morality, I cannot see any reason for morality to be anything more than an evolutionary potential. I find that position to be entirely logical, in contrast to what Alan seemed to be suggesting. That, of course, does not mean that other logical views aren't available.
And a realist would say that consciousness is a prerequisite for being able to recognise and response to moral truth.
In response to your first part, see post 462, especially my points 4 and 5.
When I say to myself something is wrong, my first reaction is of something which offends my nature. The wrongness I feel might take the form of disapproval, disgust, abhorrence, even fear, depending upon the situation. I then try to assess the wrongness of a situation according to my values in as constructive a way possible(e.g. by trying to ascertain as many facts regarding the situation as possible.) I'm sure I often fail of course, but at least I try.
None of this, to me, negates the point that morality is a product of the human brain.
As regards your last sentence, "And a realist would say that consciousness is a prerequisite for being able to recognise and response to moral truth. ". fair enough. A moral realist is quite entitled to his/her views. For me to accept them, however, I repeat, I need to see the existence of this extra layer demonstrated.
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We all seem to have given or views on where Morality lies - in the brain due to an evolutionary process which has caused a gradual development towards us caring for our offspring and other human and even other Animal welfare. DT however argues that we are al wrong and it is somewhere else.
Where? Come on DT, let's hear where you think it lies - preferably without one Realist or Anti-realist being mentioned.
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We all seem to have given or views on where Morality lies - in the brain due to an evolutionary process which has caused a gradual development towards us caring for our offspring and other human and even other Animal welfare. DT however argues that we are al wrong and it is somewhere else.
Where? Come on DT, let's hear where you think it lies - preferably without one Realist or Anti-realist being mentioned.
If it has to be anywhere it has to be in lots of brains. But I don't think it needs to be anywhere but everywhere like maths, since I am not a materialist.
Still is morality the same as altruism? Wouldn't we be better of looking at say, immorality as morality's evil twin.
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We all seem to have given or views on where Morality lies - in the brain due to an evolutionary process which has caused a gradual development towards us caring for our offspring and other human and even other Animal welfare. DT however argues that we are al wrong and it is somewhere else.
Where? Come on DT, let's hear where you think it lies - preferably without one Realist or Anti-realist being mentioned.
If it has to be anywhere it has to be in lots of brains. But I don't think it needs to be anywhere but everywhere like maths, since I am not a materialist.
Still is morality the same as altruism? Wouldn't we be better of looking at say, immorality as morality's evil twin.
I thought TACTDJFF was immoral = or have I missed something?
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We all seem to have given or views on where Morality lies - in the brain due to an evolutionary process which has caused a gradual development towards us caring for our offspring and other human and even other Animal welfare. DT however argues that we are al wrong and it is somewhere else.
Where? Come on DT, let's hear where you think it lies - preferably without one Realist or Anti-realist being mentioned.
If it has to be anywhere it has to be in lots of brains. But I don't think it needs to be anywhere but everywhere like maths, since I am not a materialist.
Still is morality the same as altruism? Wouldn't we be better of looking at say, immorality as morality's evil twin.
I thought TACTDJFF was immoral = or have I missed something?
WTFITACTDJFF......DAAK?
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We all seem to have given or views on where Morality lies - in the brain due to an evolutionary process which has caused a gradual development towards us caring for our offspring and other human and even other Animal welfare. DT however argues that we are al wrong and it is somewhere else.
Where? Come on DT, let's hear where you think it lies - preferably without one Realist or Anti-realist being mentioned.
If it has to be anywhere it has to be in lots of brains. But I don't think it needs to be anywhere but everywhere like maths, since I am not a materialist.
Still is morality the same as altruism? Wouldn't we be better of looking at say, immorality as morality's evil twin.
I thought TACTDJFF was immoral = or have I missed something?
WTFITACTDJFF......DAAK?
Not been following the Alien's argument then, Vlad? I don't blame you, it's all a load of hot air about nothing at all!
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We all seem to have given or views on where Morality lies - in the brain due to an evolutionary process which has caused a gradual development towards us caring for our offspring and other human and even other Animal welfare. DT however argues that we are al wrong and it is somewhere else.
Where? Come on DT, let's hear where you think it lies - preferably without one Realist or Anti-realist being mentioned.
If it has to be anywhere it has to be in lots of brains. But I don't think it needs to be anywhere but everywhere like maths, since I am not a materialist.
Still is morality the same as altruism? Wouldn't we be better of looking at say, immorality as morality's evil twin.
I thought TACTDJFF was immoral = or have I missed something?
WTFITACTDJFF......DAAK?
Not been following the Alien's argument then, Vlad? I don't blame you, it's all a load of hot air about nothing at all!
yes that's all very nice for you,but what is TACTDJFF?
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torturing a child to death just for fun
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torturing a child to death just for fun
I think/hope that most of us know that is wrong but of course we wouldn't ''know'' it in the same way as knowing who won the Grand National in 1968.
The one thing we can all be certain off is that opposing assisted suicide is absolutely and objectively wrong....anybody care to disagree?
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What is this other sense of 'know'?
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What is this other sense of 'know'?
Probably a deeper one since it commands a more extensive reaction of the person.
Ask a neurologist.
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What is this other sense of 'know'?
Probably a deeper one since it commands a more extensive reaction of the person.
Ask a neurologist.
What is 'a more extensive reaction of the person'?
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What is this other sense of 'know'?
Probably a deeper one since it commands a more extensive reaction of the person.
Ask a neurologist.
What is 'a more extensive reaction of the person'?
More parts of the brain light up on the brainoscope?
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What is this other sense of 'know'?
Probably a deeper one since it commands a more extensive reaction of the person.
Ask a neurologist.
What is 'a more extensive reaction of the person'?
More parts of the brain light up on the brainoscope?
I bow to your obviously expert knowledge of brainology
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What is this other sense of 'know'?
Probably a deeper one since it commands a more extensive reaction of the person.
Ask a neurologist.
What is 'a more extensive reaction of the person'?
More parts of the brain light up on the brainoscope?
I bow to your obviously expert knowledge of brainology
You're welcome.
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All perceptions are subjective but it is obvious some perceptions relate to things "out there", that appear to exist independent of any mind.
'appear' being the key word. Morals appear to be out there too in the way we perceive them, reason about them and apply them. Whether they are or not is the question at issue which is why Andy's post is question begging.
Morals don't appear to be out there.
I disagree for all the reasons I’ve given, however the fact that we disagree is a good illustration of the point – namely that what Andy is assuming is the very matter at issue between realists and irrealists and so is question begging.
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Hi DT,
My idea of 'wrong' comes from a combination of factors as I have previously explained, and this includes my feelings, one of which is certainly disapproval.
If you have i've missed it. your explanation was largely a historical one about evolution and morality I want to know what 'wrong' means in a sentence when you say something is wrong. Disapproval is PART of my idea of wrong too, but its not all there is which is crucial. What more you think it means is exactly what I'd like to know, its what you have omitted to say here and before too if I remember (although apologies if I missed it) This is the crux of the matter.
That other people may also practise their morality according to their subjective viewpoint comes as no surprise to me. The bottom line, however, is that if there were no people to practise morality, I cannot see any reason for morality to be anything more than an evolutionary potential. I find that position to be entirely logical, in contrast to what Alan seemed to be suggesting. That, of course, does not mean that other logical views aren't available.
And a realist would say that consciousness is a prerequisite for being able to recognise and response to moral truth.
In response to your first part, see post 462, especially my points 4 and 5.
When I say to myself something is wrong, my first reaction is of something which offends my nature. The wrongness I feel might take the form of disapproval, disgust, abhorrence, even fear, depending upon the situation. I then try to assess the wrongness of a situation according to my values in as constructive a way possible(e.g. by trying to ascertain as many facts regarding the situation as possible.) I'm sure I often fail of course, but at least I try.
None of this, to me, negates the point that morality is a product of the human brain.
As regards your last sentence, "And a realist would say that consciousness is a prerequisite for being able to recognise and response to moral truth. ". fair enough. A moral realist is quite entitled to his/her views. For me to accept them, however, I repeat, I need to see the existence of this extra layer demonstrated.
Ah I see – “disgust, abhorrence, even fear” some are arguably synonyms of disapproval, but all personal reactions of yours. Unfortunately this puts us in the same situation of not having anything I that applies to another person who doesn’t share my reactions (which has been my point all along)…and seeing as being able to do this is true of morality in every human society that we know of then the label of ‘distorted’ entirely appropriate.
Don’t get me wrong I’m not arguing for an inconsistency in your approach as far as you go, I just want you to finish off the logic. If we accept your personal response account based grounded in your evolutionary account then we have to discard all the bits of morality that don’t fit with this. That’s the choice we are faced with. Be an honest anti-realist or accept moral truth and give an account of this.
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We all seem to have given or views on where Morality lies - in the brain due to an evolutionary process which has caused a gradual development towards us caring for our offspring and other human and even other Animal welfare. DT however argues that we are al wrong and it is somewhere else.
Where? Come on DT, let's hear where you think it lies - preferably without one Realist or Anti-realist being mentioned.
Ohhh what a disappointment…..I thought that you were going to tell me what morality was other than ‘the way we reason and make decisions about right and wrong’….seeing it was you who pointed out this is a clear difference between us (which I agree it is) it’s odd that you’ve gone quiet on it now. Your argument that the way we actually think about right and wrong is not relevant to morality (the way we think about right and wrong!) has gone the same way as your imagined circularities no doubt - in fact those circularities were dependent on this argument which explains why.
Instead you ask a question which you know my answer to. I think we live in a universe that is more than simply material reality, one that is dependent on God and which is imbued with value and purpose because of its grounding in God. It doesn’t have to be physically anywhere as I, like Vlad, am not a materialist.
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I think we live in a universe that is more than simply material reality, one that is dependent on God and which is imbued with value and purpose because of its grounding in God.
Wonderful..... me too, DT.
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We all seem to have given or views on where Morality lies - in the brain due to an evolutionary process which has caused a gradual development towards us caring for our offspring and other human and even other Animal welfare. DT however argues that we are al wrong and it is somewhere else.
Where? Come on DT, let's hear where you think it lies - preferably without one Realist or Anti-realist being mentioned.
Ohhh what a disappointment…..I thought that you were going to tell me what morality was other than ‘the way we reason and make decisions about right and wrong’….seeing it was you who pointed out this is a clear difference between us (which I agree it is) it’s odd that you’ve gone quiet on it now. Your argument that the way we actually think about right and wrong is not relevant to morality (the way we think about right and wrong!) has gone the same way as your imagined circularities no doubt - in fact those circularities were dependent on this argument which explains why.
Instead you ask a question which you know my answer to. I think we live in a universe that is more than simply material reality, one that is dependent on God and which is imbued with value and purpose because of its grounding in God. It doesn’t have to be physically anywhere as I, like Vlad, am not a materialist.
I can see why you think morality must be objective, as a theist you have to believe it, like everything else, stems from God. As an atheist though, you must understand why I cannot see how morality is anything other than a function of the brain.
And as I'm bored with the whole subject anyway, I'll just say so goodbye and good luck with your quest.
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Hi DT,
Hi DT,
My idea of 'wrong' comes from a combination of factors as I have previously explained, and this includes my feelings, one of which is certainly disapproval.
If you have i've missed it. your explanation was largely a historical one about evolution and morality I want to know what 'wrong' means in a sentence when you say something is wrong. Disapproval is PART of my idea of wrong too, but its not all there is which is crucial. What more you think it means is exactly what I'd like to know, its what you have omitted to say here and before too if I remember (although apologies if I missed it) This is the crux of the matter.
That other people may also practise their morality according to their subjective viewpoint comes as no surprise to me. The bottom line, however, is that if there were no people to practise morality, I cannot see any reason for morality to be anything more than an evolutionary potential. I find that position to be entirely logical, in contrast to what Alan seemed to be suggesting. That, of course, does not mean that other logical views aren't available.
And a realist would say that consciousness is a prerequisite for being able to recognise and response to moral truth.
In response to your first part, see post 462, especially my points 4 and 5.
When I say to myself something is wrong, my first reaction is of something which offends my nature. The wrongness I feel might take the form of disapproval, disgust, abhorrence, even fear, depending upon the situation. I then try to assess the wrongness of a situation according to my values in as constructive a way possible(e.g. by trying to ascertain as many facts regarding the situation as possible.) I'm sure I often fail of course, but at least I try.
None of this, to me, negates the point that morality is a product of the human brain.
As regards your last sentence, "And a realist would say that consciousness is a prerequisite for being able to recognise and response to moral truth. ". fair enough. A moral realist is quite entitled to his/her views. For me to accept them, however, I repeat, I need to see the existence of this extra layer demonstrated.
Ah I see – “disgust, abhorrence, even fear” some are arguably synonyms of disapproval, but all personal reactions of yours. Unfortunately this puts us in the same situation of not having anything I that applies to another person who doesn’t share my reactions (which has been my point all along)…and seeing as being able to do this is true of morality in every human society that we know of then the label of ‘distorted’ entirely appropriate.
Don’t get me wrong I’m not arguing for an inconsistency in your approach as far as you go, I just want you to finish off the logic. If we accept your personal response account based grounded in your evolutionary account then we have to discard all the bits of morality that don’t fit with this. That’s the choice we are faced with. Be an honest anti-realist or accept moral truth and give an account of this.
Yes, personal reactions indeed, although hopefully informed by circumstances etc. as I have already explained. Of course another person may well have different reactions. I have never disagreed with that. Indeed, the differing and changing moral attitudes of people to all sorts of moral circumstances is testament to that fact. The fact that I can feel compassion, for example towards another individual doesn't necessarily mean that a third person feels the same compassion.
As far as distortion goes, my moral actions would be distorted if they went against my own moral nature and values. However, I cannot see that my moral values are 'distorted' against some sort of objective moral truths, as I have no reason to think that they exist. The fact that there are general moral tenets in societies to which most people conform and support, I put down to the importance of cohesiveness in a social species such as ours. There are of course other evolutionary pressures, such as a tendency towards selfishness, which can conspire against this social aspect of society. This, for me, is one of the reasons that makes moral decisions such a complex business.
Finally, I try to be honest in my appraisal of this subject. If you don't think I am, then so be it. There's no more to be said.
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I think we live in a universe that is more than simply material reality, one that is dependent on God and which is imbued with value and purpose because of its grounding in God.
Wonderful..... me too, DT.
I knew you would agree, we usually do, we are sweetpeas from the same pod it seems lol :)
And as I'm bored with the whole subject anyway, I'll just say so goodbye and good luck with your quest.
I’m quite happy for this thread to end now I think, once this last exchange with Enki draws to a close (assuming it does). It’s been fun and I’m pleased with the way this has gone. Time to talk about other things in other places.
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Hi DT,
Hi DT,
My idea of 'wrong' comes from a combination of factors as I have previously explained, and this includes my feelings, one of which is certainly disapproval.
If you have i've missed it. your explanation was largely a historical one about evolution and morality I want to know what 'wrong' means in a sentence when you say something is wrong. Disapproval is PART of my idea of wrong too, but its not all there is which is crucial. What more you think it means is exactly what I'd like to know, its what you have omitted to say here and before too if I remember (although apologies if I missed it) This is the crux of the matter.
That other people may also practise their morality according to their subjective viewpoint comes as no surprise to me. The bottom line, however, is that if there were no people to practise morality, I cannot see any reason for morality to be anything more than an evolutionary potential. I find that position to be entirely logical, in contrast to what Alan seemed to be suggesting. That, of course, does not mean that other logical views aren't available.
And a realist would say that consciousness is a prerequisite for being able to recognise and response to moral truth.
In response to your first part, see post 462, especially my points 4 and 5.
When I say to myself something is wrong, my first reaction is of something which offends my nature. The wrongness I feel might take the form of disapproval, disgust, abhorrence, even fear, depending upon the situation. I then try to assess the wrongness of a situation according to my values in as constructive a way possible(e.g. by trying to ascertain as many facts regarding the situation as possible.) I'm sure I often fail of course, but at least I try.
None of this, to me, negates the point that morality is a product of the human brain.
As regards your last sentence, "And a realist would say that consciousness is a prerequisite for being able to recognise and response to moral truth. ". fair enough. A moral realist is quite entitled to his/her views. For me to accept them, however, I repeat, I need to see the existence of this extra layer demonstrated.
Ah I see – “disgust, abhorrence, even fear” some are arguably synonyms of disapproval, but all personal reactions of yours. Unfortunately this puts us in the same situation of not having anything I that applies to another person who doesn’t share my reactions (which has been my point all along)…and seeing as being able to do this is true of morality in every human society that we know of then the label of ‘distorted’ entirely appropriate.
Don’t get me wrong I’m not arguing for an inconsistency in your approach as far as you go, I just want you to finish off the logic. If we accept your personal response account based grounded in your evolutionary account then we have to discard all the bits of morality that don’t fit with this. That’s the choice we are faced with. Be an honest anti-realist or accept moral truth and give an account of this.
Yes, personal reactions indeed, although hopefully informed by circumstances etc. as I have already explained. Of course another person may well have different reactions. I have never disagreed with that. Indeed, the differing and changing moral attitudes of people to all sorts of moral circumstances is testament to that fact. The fact that I can feel compassion, for example towards another individual doesn't necessarily mean that a third person feels the same compassion.
As far as distortion goes, my moral actions would be distorted if they went against my own moral nature and values. However, I cannot see that my moral values are 'distorted' against some sort of objective moral truths, as I have no reason to think that they exist. The fact that there are general moral tenets in societies to which most people conform and support, I put down to the importance of cohesiveness in a social species such as ours. There are of course other evolutionary pressures, such as a tendency towards selfishness, which can conspire against this social aspect of society. This, for me, is one of the reasons that makes moral decisions such a complex business.
Finally, I try to be honest in my appraisal of this subject. If you don't think I am, then so be it. There's no more to be said.
Hi enki
Well you've framed honesty and distortion as if it’s all in line with your "own moral nature and values" but that's not what I'm talking about. Whether you accept OM or not there is one thing about morality that is undeniably external to you and your own values and reactions and that's how morality is practiced in human societies; the implicit assumptions, the way we make and apply judgements, the types of reference we make when we change our moral views, etc. The question of distortion I am talking about is not whether you feel you are being true to yourself but whether your theory of ‘morality as personal responses’ is true to moral discourse as it is practiced. It’s precisely because it isn’t that leading atheist anti-realists Mackie called his theory of morality 'error theory'. Mackie, like you and other atheists here thought that it didn't make sense for materialists to believe in moral truth and yet he saw (like realists) that morality is full of assumptions of moral truth that non-cognitive theories, no matter how sophisticated simply can't account for. So he accepted that morality as we practice it was, in his words, "infested with error".
This is the type of honesty I'm talking about, not whether you are true to your feelings, but that you like Mackie take an honest look at the features of moral practice I have talked about and recognise that if morality can't really be anything more than how we apply our personal responses in a social context then these features cannot be accounted for. Either the moral theory is wrong or the moral practice is distorted.
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Cheers, DT.
Like you, I've enjoyed this discussion. I think it's probably come to its natural conclusion. :)
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I disagree for all the reasons I’ve given, however the fact that we disagree is a good illustration of the point – namely that what Andy is assuming is the very matter at issue between realists and irrealists and so is question begging.
I would describe myself as a moral realist, we are talking moral fascists or objectivists.
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Hello DT
I'd pretty much given up on this board - partly for pressure of work reasons, partly because the same old mutual incomprehension between the "sides" was becoming fruitless and dull (at least for me). I did have some hopes that you'd bring more intellectual rigour to the theistic position but when you so egregiously misrepresented what I'd said to you (about statements needing to be proven to be true or some such) I decided to step away.
I was just browsing though for old time's sake and noticed your last post here so thought I'd chip in.
Well you've framed honesty and distortion as if it’s all in line with your "own moral nature and values" but that's not what I'm talking about. Whether you accept OM or not there is one thing about morality that is undeniably external to you and your own values and reactions and that's how morality is practiced in human societies; ...the implicit assumptions, the way we make and apply judgements, the types of reference we make when we change our moral views, etc.
Well yes, much as music appreciation for example is practised in human societies with a large degree of consistency. Most (though not all) find harmonious sounds to be more pleasing than jarring ones, just as most (though not all) find TACTDJFF to be morally wrong.
The question of distortion I am talking about is not whether you feel you are being true to yourself but whether your theory of ‘morality as personal responses’ is true to moral discourse as it is practiced. It’s precisely because it isn’t...
In what way isn't it? We're all made of the same stuff, and it's hardly surprising therefore that our moral responses should show a high degree of consistency. I'm as likely to find torturing a baby to be morally wrong as would an Amazonian tribesman - these things have been embedded in the limbic system over millennia, as has for example our common response of disgust at the smell of rotting meat. We also though have pre-frontal cortexes that allow us to consider and reason our way to moral (and to music appreciation) conclusions when we want to, albeit often along culturally influenced lines.
..that leading atheist anti-realists Mackie called his theory of morality 'error theory'.
Then he's overreaching. "Error" implies a yardstick, an absolute against which to determine whether we are in fact in "error" - and that's begging the OM question.
Mackie, like you and other atheists here thought that it didn't make sense for materialists to believe in moral truth and yet he saw (like realists) that morality is full of assumptions of moral truth that non-cognitive theories, no matter how sophisticated simply can't account for. So he accepted that morality as we practice it was, in his words, "infested with error".
"Materialists" don't "believe in moral truth", at least not in the sense that you imply. Rather we "believe" in "moral true enoughs", which is a different thing that requires no appeal to OM or similar, for the same reason that you (presumably) think the late Beethoven quartets to be great art with no appeal to objectivity, to a universal standard for what "great" means.
This is the type of honesty I'm talking about, not whether you are true to your feelings, but that you like Mackie take an honest look at the features of moral practice I have talked about and recognise that if morality can't really be anything more than how we apply our personal responses in a social context then these features cannot be accounted for.
Yes they can. These features are entirely explicable in physiological and evolutionary terms.
Either the moral theory is wrong or the moral practice is distorted.
That's a false dichotomy - morality as practised is exactly what you'd expect to see if morality is in fact a combination of the innate and the reasoned, neither requiring the existence of OM. A thought experiment for you: imagine no OM, and instead morality practised according only to our "own moral nature and values": what differences would you expect to see from the practise of morality you currently observe?
All best.
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It's great to see you back, bluey - I hope this means you'll stick around :)
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It's great to see you back, bluey - I hope this means you'll stick around :)
Thank you Shakes. I plan just to dip in occasionally, much as a recovering alcoholic will have the occasional glass of Bordeaux...
...what could possibly go wrong with that? ;)
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Elvis is back in the building, folks.
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Elvis is back in the building, folks.
Indeed, though somewhat alarmingly that building appears to have become Vlad Towers while I've been away.
Clearly my people need me!
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I look forward to more of your deep analysis of the Daily Mail content Blue.
I smile every time I see it in any newsagent's shop, it reminds me of the comments made by its 'number one fan' from a while back, still a fan, no doubt.
ippy
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Hi Ippy,
I look forward to more of your deep analysis of the Daily Mail content Blue.
I smile every time I see it in any newsagent's shop, it reminds me of the comments made by its 'number one fan' from a while back, still a fan, no doubt.
Thanks for the reminder pal - oh the shame, the shame... :-[