Religion and Ethics Forum
Religion and Ethics Discussion => Christian Topic => Topic started by: Steve H on July 23, 2017, 06:08:13 PM
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I'm a practising anglican Christian, although a very liberal one, but ethically I side most of the time with humanists, and have considered joining the British Humanist Association (I think they're called "Humanists UK" now). I may yet do so. I have just joined a Facebook group called 'Humanists for a better world". Are Christianity and humanism inevitably opposed, or not?
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I'm a practising anglican Christian, although a very liberal one, but ethically I side most of the time with humanists, and have considered joining the British Humanist Association (I think they're called "Humanists UK" now). I may yet do so. I have just joined a Facebook group called 'Humanists for a better world". Are Christianity and humanism inevitably opposed, or not?
Yes - being a humanism and being religious are not mutually exclusive (despite what Vlad may have you believe).
Humanism is a philosophical and ethical world-view that is based on people as moral agents. As such it doesn't require god, but that isn't the same as requiring humanists to be atheist or non religious.
Indeed there is a very long tradition of humanist thinking aligned with a range of religions.
There are some people on both 'sides' who try to see humanism and religion as enemies, but that isn't really the case. Actually one of the things I like about humanism is its inclusiveness - everyone, regardless of their religious belief of lack thereof can accept the people and humanity exists and that people can (and probably should) act as moral agents. So unlike religions which tend to require belief in a god, which necessarily makes them exclusive, we can all subscribe to humanism at its most basic level as we all surely share a belief in people.
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If himanusm is merely a belief in people, then it's essentially so wide as to be meaningless.
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If himanusm is merely a belief in people, then it's essentially so wide as to be meaningless.
Hmm. I think Prof. Davey's analysis was a bit too ecumenical in scope. For example, the Humanists UK website says:
Bringing non-religious people together to develop their own views and an understanding of the world around them
Humanists are people who shape their own lives in the here and now, because we believe it's the only life we have. We make sense of the world through logic, reason, and evidence, and always seek to treat those around us with warmth, understanding, and respect.[...] Throughout recorded history there have been non-religious people who have believed that this life is the only life we have, that the universe is a natural phenomenon with no supernatural side, and that we can live ethical and fulfilling lives on the basis of reason and humanity [...] Roughly speaking, the word humanist has come to mean someone who trusts to the scientific method when it comes to understanding how the universe works and rejects the idea of the supernatural (and is therefore an atheist or agnostic)
I can't see how that's compatible with adherence to a religious worldview. Without explicitly mentioning the term this is very much secular humanism rather than the small-h humanism ("human welfare and happiness [are] at the centre of their ethical decision making") which can of course be bought into by anyone of any religion - hopefully is, sadly often isn't.
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If himanusm is merely a belief in people, then it's essentially so wide as to be meaningless.
It isn't - it is a ethical philosophical position that sees people as the key moral agent, thereby negating the need for a deity. The point is that unlike theism, which requires a belief in something (god or gods) that many don't believe in, we can all accept that people exist and therefore anyone can be a humanist while not anyone can ascribe to a theistic moral philosophy.
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Hmm. I think Prof. Davey's analysis was a bit too ecumenical in scope. For example, the Humanists UK website says:I can't see how that's compatible with adherence to a religious worldview. Without explicitly mentioning the term this is very much secular humanism rather than the small-h humanism ("human welfare and happiness [are] at the centre of their ethical decision making") which can of course be bought into by anyone of any religion - hopefully is, sadly often isn't.
The BHA have taken a view that humanism is necessarily non religious - I don't actually agree with them, and a quick glance at history reveals a rich history of humanism amongst the religious.
The point about humanism is that it doesn't require a deity - that isn't the same as only being applicable to people who don't believe in a deity.
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The BHA have taken a view that humanism is necessarily non religious - I don't actually agree with them, and a quick glance at history reveals a rich history of humanism amongst the religious.
The point about humanism is that it doesn't require a deity - that isn't the same as only being applicable to people who don't believe in a deity.
Certainly what's still standardly known as Renaissance humanism was held by deeply devout people such as Erasmus and what have you; but over time humanism has come to be associated with secular humanism - rightly or wrongly, agree or disagree, but that seems to be the way it's gone.
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I find the BHA's insistence on non-religion irritating.
There's a long history of Christian humanism (a google will bring up a lot of scholarly articles on modern Christian humanism) and also liberal Christianity. I have a huge amount of sympathy for the 'radical' Christianity of John Spong and his like. No idea why they describe it as 'radical' when it means something very different than when describing radicals of most beliefs. And it sounds a bit arsey too tbh.
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I have a huge amount of sympathy for the 'radical' Christianity of John Spong and his like.
Me too - I've been reading around it for donkey's years. I don't know whether it really flies as a viable approach, but it's certainly interesting and appealing.
No idea why they describe it as 'radical' when it means something very different than when describing radicals of most beliefs. And it sounds a bit arsey too tbh.
Well, etymologically 'radical' comes from radix or root, so to be radical is to dig down to the roots :)
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Me too - I've been reading around it for donkey's years. I don't know whether it really flies as a viable approach, but it's certainly interesting and appealing.
Well, etymologically 'radical' comes from radix or root, so to be radical is to dig down to the roots :)
Yeah, it works for them, but for me you get to the point where there's not really much left. Still, there's a clear-eyed honesty to it.
Whatever its root, 'radical' now means 'fundie nutter', which doesn't really apply to Spong.
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I find the BHA's insistence on non-religion irritating.
There's a long history of Christian humanism (a google will bring up a lot of scholarly articles on modern Christian humanism) and also liberal Christianity. I have a huge amount of sympathy for the 'radical' Christianity of John Spong and his like. No idea why they describe it as 'radical' when it means something very different than when describing radicals of most beliefs. And it sounds a bit arsey too tbh.
That's true and the BHA's particular slant is very much a product of its origins.
For those that are interested the history of modern humanism in the UK is rather interesting - with the South Place Religious Society in London being distinct from the Union of Ethical Societies - from this organisation grew two new movements - the Conway Hall Ethical Society and the BHA. Both still exist today although the BHA is much better know.
Point being at the outset humanism was seen very much as working hand in hand with religion, and certainly not being a philosophy exclusively for the non religious.
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It isn't - it is a ethical philosophical position that sees people as the key moral agent, thereby negating the need for a deity. The point is that unlike theism, which requires a belief in something (god or gods) that many don't believe in, we can all accept that people exist and therefore anyone can be a humanist while not anyone can ascribe to a theistic moral philosophy.
Ah so you have solved the problem of hard solipsism? And again you have reduced the demand for acceptance down to 'belief that people exist' which makes it essentially meaningless. You are trying to do a pas de deux between two of Vlad's polished turds, and on the one side emphasising the universalist property but then on the other slipping in the extra demands as of they were nothing in addition. Given seeing humans as the moral agents is true of many many 'isms', you just end go with it encompassing too much to be meaningful.
As you have noted elsewhere, the Humanists UK position does ignore the development of humanism but that itself is surely part of a theological position in the time of Reformation between those arguing the need for works as well as grace? Even then there is a hint in the writings of those arguing the 'humanist' position that the god they accepted was closer to deist than theist.
Given the question asked by SteveH in the OP, I think though we can both agree that he can, though in my opinion humanism in this wide sense is not that useful. BUT it doesn't seem as he questioned that joining Humanists UK is an option.
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Ah so you have solved the problem of hard solipsism? And again you have reduced the demand for acceptance down to 'belief that people exist' which makes it essentially meaningless. You are trying to do a pas de deux between two of Vlad's polished turds, and on the one side emphasising the universalist property but then on the other slipping in the extra demands as of they were nothing in addition. Given seeing humans as the moral agents is true of many many 'isms', you just end go with it encompassing too much to be meaningful.
I think you are missing my point somewhat.
My point is that everyone can be a humanist as the starting point assumptions are pretty well universal - that people/humanity exists and that people are moral agents (i.e. able to do good or bad). Sure, not everyone is a humanist, but everyone can get off the starting blocks of having the fundamental underlying beliefs necessary.
That isn't the case with a theistic moral philosophy, where the starting point assumption (that there is a god) is far from universally accepted. So not everyone can be an adherent of a theistic moral philosophy, because many people can't get off the starting blocks because they don't believe in god.
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I think you are missing my point somewhat.
My point is that everyone can be a humanist as the starting point assumptions are pretty well universal - that people/humanity exists and that people are moral agents (i.e. able to do good or bad). Sure, not everyone is a humanist, but everyone can get off the starting blocks of having the fundamental underlying beliefs necessary.
That isn't the case with a theistic moral philosophy, where the starting point assumption (that there is a god) is far from universally accepted. So not everyone can be an adherent of a theistic moral philosophy, because many people can't get off the starting blocks because they don't believe in god.
No, I got that. I just think (a) as I pointed out it ignores the problem of hard solipsism and (b) is vacuous in its approach since it isn't all that is required to be a humanist. The definitional parts are the exclusionary parts not the generic ones. To be a theist, I think you can get started by believing that people exist so at that level there is no barrier. That others are added on subsequent to that in both humanism and theism makes no difference to that.
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No, I got that. I just think (a) as I pointed out it ignores the problem of hard solipsism
I get where you are coming from, but not sure I agree - I don't you need to prove that other people exist, merely believe that they do and act a moral agents. While it is an interesting philosophical 'trolley problem' I don't think there are many people who actively do not believe in the existence of other people.
(b) is vacuous in its approach since it isn't all that is required to be a humanist.
True - hence everyone can be a humanist as the get off the starting blocks, but not everyone will be as they may disagree with the deeper requirements.
The definitional parts are the exclusionary parts not the generic ones. To be a theist, I think you can get started by believing that people exist so at that level there is no barrier. That others are added on subsequent to that in both humanism and theism makes no difference to that.
Sure, but if you are atheist you cannot get as far with a theistic moral philosophy as you fail to get off the starting blocks, unlike the theist who is likely to also believe in the most basic assumptions of humanism.
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I know nothing about humanism, so I have joined a humanist forum to find out a little more about the topic.
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I get where you are coming from, but not sure I agree - I don't you need to prove that other people exist, merely believe that they do and act a moral agents. While it is an interesting philosophical 'trolley problem' I don't think there are many people who actively do not believe in the existence of other people.
True - hence everyone can be a humanist as the get off the starting blocks, but not everyone will be as they may disagree with the deeper requirements.
Sure, but if you are atheist you cannot get as far with a theistic moral philosophy as you fail to get off the starting blocks, unlike the theist who is likely to also believe in the most basic assumptions of humanism.
But your definition of the starting blocks is useless here, and partial, sin a theist can start at precisely the same place I.e. there are humans, the idea tha t theism is somehow exclusionary and humanism isn't, is wrong. If both can start at the same place but both then add on beliefs that are exclusionary, then both are exclusionary and it would seem to be you special pleading that what YOU can accept is not exclusionary, and what YOU cannot accept is. Everyone can be a theist because they can start from the idea that there are humans.
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But your definition of the starting blocks is useless here, and partial, sin a theist can start at precisely the same place I.e. there are humans, the idea tha t theism is somehow exclusionary and humanism isn't, is wrong. If both can start at the same place but both then add on beliefs that are exclusionary, then both are exclusionary and it would seem to be you special pleading that what YOU can accept is not exclusionary, and what YOU cannot accept is. Everyone can be a theist because they can start from the idea that there are humans.
I'm not sure this is really worth arguing over.
My point is that the starting point assumptions for humanism are ones that are almost universally inclusive, while the starting point assumptions for a theistic moral philosophy are significantly exclusive.
In both cases as you delve deeper into the layering of belief and morality therein there will be points at which people will say 'I'm out' (in a Dragon's Den kind of way) to either humanism or theistic moral philosophies. The difference being that for humanism pretty well everyone is in at the start (as the basic assumptions are pretty well universal and non controversial). For a theistic moral philosophies many people have already said 'I'm out' at the very first assumption - that there is a god.
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Just to note that, while the usefulness of humanism may be debatable, humanists can be very useful. I speak as someone who organised a humanist funeral for my father-in-law a few years ago, and the humanist "celebrant" who officiated was excellent.
For info:
https://humanism.org.uk/ceremonies/non-religious-funerals/
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Just to note that, while the usefulness of humanism may be debatable, humanists can be very useful. I speak as someone who organised a humanist funeral for my father-in-law a few years ago, and the humanist "celebrant" who officiated was excellent.
For info:
https://humanism.org.uk/ceremonies/non-religious-funerals/
That's true.
I went to a funeral conducted by a humanist celebrant a few weeks ago for a colleague who died tragically young. What stuck me was how sensitive the celebrant was to the range of views in the room. Rather than conduct the funeral in a overtly 'humanist' manner, he provided space to allow each person to reflect as they would wish to.
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I'm not sure this is really worth arguing over.
My point is that the starting point assumptions for humanism are ones that are almost universally inclusive, while the starting point assumptions for a theistic moral philosophy are significantly exclusive.
In both cases as you delve deeper into the layering of belief and morality therein there will be points at which people will say 'I'm out' (in a Dragon's Den kind of way) to either humanism or theistic moral philosophies. The difference being that for humanism pretty well everyone is in at the start (as the basic assumptions are pretty well universal and non controversial). For a theistic moral philosophies many people have already said 'I'm out' at the very first assumption - that there is a god.
That's your problem though. You assume the non exclusionary there are humans for humanism, and the exclusionary there us a god for theism. Leaving aside any hard solipsists who are excluded by the humans existing idea, then the humanist and theist start in the same place.
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Just to note that, while the usefulness of humanism may be debatable, humanists can be very useful. I speak as someone who organised a humanist funeral for my father-in-law a few years ago, and the humanist "celebrant" who officiated was excellent.
For info:
https://humanism.org.uk/ceremonies/non-religious-funerals/
If you replace humanism and humanist there with theists that would be just as valid.
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I'm not sure this is really worth arguing over.
My point is that the starting point assumptions for humanism are ones that are almost universally inclusive, while the starting point assumptions for a theistic moral philosophy are significantly exclusive.
In both cases as you delve deeper into the layering of belief and morality therein there will be points at which people will say 'I'm out' (in a Dragon's Den kind of way) to either humanism or theistic moral philosophies. The difference being that for humanism pretty well everyone is in at the start (as the basic assumptions are pretty well universal and non controversial). For a theistic moral philosophies many people have already said 'I'm out' at the very first assumption - that there is a god.
This is a very good point - unless you have a card-carrying IS member on board then pretty much everyone, theist and atheist alike, can start a dialogue from the same few broad tenets of humanism, whereas if you start with two lots of theists of different brands, or start arguing from a theistic p.o.v. with an atheist, you'll knit sawdust before you reach a consensus.
Richard Holloway, recently mentioned on here, wrote an entire book called Godless Morality about keeping religious assertions and assumptions out of civil discourse on things such as abortion, euthanasia, marriage equality and so forth. It'll never happen of course and he may be thought foolhardy even to float the idea, but he was to me self-evidently right.
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That's your problem though. You assume the non exclusionary there are humans for humanism, and the exclusionary there us a god for theism. Leaving aside any hard solipsists who are excluded by the humans existing idea, then the humanist and theist start in the same place.
I don't think they do start in the same place - the key starting point assumption for humanism is a belief in the existence of other people and that people are moral agents. The key starting point assumption for a theistic moral philosophy is a belief in the existence of a god or gods. They aren't the same at all.
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NS,
That's your problem though. You assume the non exclusionary there are humans for humanism, and the exclusionary there us a god for theism. Leaving aside any hard solipsists who are excluded by the humans existing idea, then the humanist and theist start in the same place.
Doesn't the humanist start with morality coming from us, whereas the theist starts with morality coming from god(s)?
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This is a very good point - unless you have a card-carrying IS member on board then pretty much everyone, theist and atheist alike, can start a dialogue from the same few broad tenets of humanism, whereas if you start with two lots of theists of different brands, or start arguing from a theistic p.o.v. with an atheist, you'll knit sawdust before you reach a consensus.
Richard Holloway, recently mentioned on here, wrote an entire book called Godless Morality about keeping religious assertions and assumptions out of civil discourse on things such as abortion, euthanasia, marriage equality and so forth. It'll never happen of course and he may be thought foolhardy even to float the idea, but he was to me self-evidently right.
Except as already pointed out, tgeaxiom we have started with is that there are humans, if you don't then add on the precepts that are exclusionary for one set of beliefs but do for other beliefs in judging things then you are being inconsistent.
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NS,
Doesn't the humanist start with morality coming from us, whereas the theist starts with morality coming from god(s)?
That would appear to be the case.
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NS,
If you replace humanism and humanist there with theists that would be just as valid.
Not on the occasion I mentioned it wouldn't – or at least not unless the theist left his theism at the door.
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NS,
Doesn't the humanist start with morality coming from us, whereas the theist starts with morality coming from god(s)?
Prof D was suggesting we start with a position that there are humans, nothing about morality in that.
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Leaving aside any hard solipsists who are excluded by the humans existing idea, then the humanist and theist start in the same place.
That's registering a 10.5 on my 1 to 10 scale of wrongness.
I assume that for the theist the bottom line moral standard is his or her god, who is typically deemed to be the source of all good. The Good itself, let's say. On the other side, the humanist would presumably say that the weal and woe of humans is the ne plus ultra, the gold standard of morality.
There may be overlap in many respects on specifics, but as foundational assumptions these things can't be reconciled.
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NS,
Not on the occasion I mentioned it wouldn't – or at least not unless the theist left his theism at the door.
And I'm sure a humanist wouldn't have worked for my father's funeral but that doesn't mean that a theist wasn't useful in that circumstance.
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NS,
Prof D was suggesting we start with a position that there are humans, nothing about morality in that.
From the Prof (Reply 23):
"...the key starting point assumption for humanism is a belief in the existence of other people and that people are moral agents..." (emphasis added).
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That's registering a 10.5 on my 1 to 10 scale of wrongness.
I assume that for the theist the bottom line moral standard is his or her god, who is typically deemed to be the source of all good. The Good itself, let's say. On the other side, the humanist would presumably say that the weal and woe of humans is the ne plus ultra, the gold standard of morality.
There may be overlap in many respects on specifics, but as foundational assumptions these things can't be reconciled.
These don't seem to be the equivalent starting points to Prof D's idea that we start with 'humans exists' note I see he has then adapted this in a later post to which I will reply directly.
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Well, given its central tenet I don't really think any discussion starting from a p.o.v. of solipsism is much of a goer ...
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NS,
From the Prof (Reply 23):
"...the key starting point assumption for humanism is a belief in the existence of other people and that people are moral agents..." (emphasis added).
Which in part is additional to his start of the start being a belief humans exists but will pick him up directly on what I see as the confusion there. However since he is also arguing that the above are universal then these must by definition also apply to theists as well so if they are the base beliefs then at that stage theism isn't exclusionary.
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NS,
And I'm sure a humanist wouldn't have worked for my father's funeral but that doesn't mean that a theist wasn't useful in that circumstance.
You're straying into Vlad-style straw man territory. All I said was: "Just to note that, while the usefulness of humanism may be debatable, humanists can be very useful."
I made no comment about the usefulness of theists - for those who like that kind of thing, no doubt a theist officiating at a religious funeral would have been just as useful for his audience. Horses for courses and all that.
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Well, given its central tenet I don't really think any discussion starting from a p.o.v. of solipsism is much of a goer ...
Doesn't mean that in one sense a tenet that disagrees with of isn't exclusionary to that viewpoint. But it's a minor point.
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NS,
You're straying into Vlad-style straw man territory. All I said was: "Just to note that, while the usefulness of humanism may be debatable, humanists can be very useful."
I made no comment about the usefulness of theists - for those who like that kind of thing, no doubt a theist officiating at a religious funeral would have been just as useful for his audience. Horses for courses and all that.
And all I said was that it applied to theists too. I didn't say you had denied that.
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NS,
Which in part is additional to his start of the start being a belief humans exists but will pick him up directly on what I see as the confusion there. However since he is also arguing that the above are universal then these must by definition also apply to theists as well so if they are the base beliefs then at that stage theism isn't exclusionary.
You’re a bit jumbled this morning. I don’t think humanism is distinguishable from other approaches because it believes that humans exist, but rather because it believes humans rather than gods are the agents of morality. This seems to me to be a meaningful and significant difference, whereas “humans exist” is universally believed I’d have thought.
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I don't think they do start in the same place - the key starting point assumption for humanism is a belief in the existence of other people and that people are moral agents. The key starting point assumption for a theistic moral philosophy is a belief in the existence of a god or gods. They aren't the same at all.
. You seem confused, at one and the same time you have said that the key starting point for humanism is universal, and now you are saying that it is exclusionary to theists. Let's first of all deal with the 'existence of humans', I think that leaving aside any solipsist out there we can agree this is universal and that on that level humanists and theists of whatever brands start from the same place as do any non solipsists. Now moving on from that it may be a different oath for different people, but it seems many, if not most, theists would agree that humans are moral agents. Some non solipsists were they to not be compatibilists in a free will sense would disagree. These could either be theists or non theists. So that additional aspect excludes both theists and non theists, so is not universal to either.
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NS,
You’re a bit jumbled this morning. I don’t think humanism is distinguishable from other approaches because it believes that humans exist, but rather because it believes humans rather than gods are the agents of morality. This seems to me to be a meaningful and significant difference, whereas “humans exist” is universally believed I’d have thought.
Bertrand Russell once wrote that he received a lengthy, detailed and utterly muddled letter from a lady mounting a staunch defence of solipsism - that only her mind truly and actually existed.
He said that he was most amused by the fact that she went to such lengths to write a letter to him about it.
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NS,
You’re a bit jumbled this morning. I don’t think humanism is distinguishable from other approaches because it believes that humans exist, but rather because it believes humans rather than gods are the agents of morality. This seems to me to be a meaningful and significant difference, whereas “humans exist” is universally believed I’d have thought.
No, it"s Prof D who introduced the idea of humans existing as being the starting point,he also talks about the idea as humans as moral agents as well and this being universal. If it is universal then it's a starting point for theists too. Any jumbling is due to his confusion.
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NS,
And all I said was that it applied to theists too. I didn't say you had denied that.
The it seems unecessary to tell me, "...but that doesn't mean that a theist wasn't useful in that circumstance" I'd have thought but ok.
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NS,
You’re a bit jumbled this morning. I don’t think humanism is distinguishable from other approaches because it believes that humans exist, but rather because it believes humans rather than gods are the agents of morality. This seems to me to be a meaningful and significant difference, whereas “humans exist” is universally believed I’d have thought.
Hence my use of the assumption that people are moral agents.
But that, of itself, doesn't preclude god and those that believe in god. So there is a strong history of theistic humanism that accepts that humans are moral agents, but thinks this is due to a belief that humans are made in the image of god.
So the only group (beyond the hardest of hard solipsists) would be people who think that god is a moral agent, but humans aren't. I think this is a rather unusual view, even within theism.
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No, it"s Prof D who introduced the idea of humans existing as being the starting point,he also talks about the idea as humans as moral agents as well and this being universal. If it is universal then it's a starting point for theists too. Any jumbling is due to his confusion.
You are getting confused about my starting point.
My starting point is the basic assumptions required by the philosophy, NOT the basic assumptions required by the individual.
Humanism and theistic moral philosophies have different starting point assumptions - the former that humans exist and are moral agents, the latter that god or god exists (and is/are moral agents I guess).
The former is inclusive, the latter much more exclusive.
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Hence my use of the assumption that people are moral agents.
But that, of itself, doesn't preclude god and those that believe in god. So there is a strong history of theistic humanism that accepts that humans are moral agents, but thinks this is due to a belief that humans are made in the image of god.
So the only group (beyond the hardest of hard solipsists) would be people who think that'd is a moral agent, but humans aren't. I think this is a rather unusual view, even within theism.
Pretty much agree with this. I think there are others who might not see humans as moral agents, such as people who see humans as lacking any definition of free will.
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NS,
No, it"s Prof D who introduced the idea of humans existing as being the starting point…
But not as a distinguishing feature of humanism I’d have thought.
…he also talks about the idea as humans as moral agents as well and this being universal. If it is universal then it's a starting point for theists too.
That’s not how I read “moral agents”: rather it seemed to me he was saying that humanists think morality comes from people, whereas theists think it comes from deities. That seems like a useful differentiator to me.
Any jumbling is due to his confusion.
I meant your use of language rather than the thought you intended – it lacked your usual fluidity.
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You are getting confused about my starting point.
My starting point is the basic assumptions required by the philosophy, NOT the basic assumptions required by the individual.
Humanism and theistic moral philosophies have different starting point assumptions - the former that humans exist and are moral agents, the latter that god or god exists (and is/are moral agents I guess).
The former is inclusive, the latter much more exclusive.
I think part of the problem here is that you are comparing apples and oranges, and secondly treating them entirely differently. Since the two tenets of humanism you put up are universal (or universal enough for us to ignore the few that disagree for the purposes of argument), then it seems to me they form the base of any set of beliefs that they are incorporated into. Note I think at that level, and not the additional areas highlighted by Shaker in Humanists UK, we are talking about what base axioms you include and in themselves they are not a philosophy.
You then compare that to the exclusionary aspects of theism which in itself is not a philosophy but a position on one thing, theoretically factual.
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NS,
But not as a distinguishing feature of humanism I’d have thought.
That’s not how I read “moral agents”: rather it seemed to me he was saying that humanists think morality comes from people, whereas theists think it comes from deities. That seems like a useful differentiator to me.
I meant your use of language rather than the thought you intended – it lacked your usual fluidity.
To be distinguishing , it would need to be something true surely of humanism and not other views. I think humans exist and am not a humanist. Ergo it isn't a distinguishing feature. Indeed Prof D thinks it is universal so how could it be 'distinguishing'?
I will leave Prof D to expand on what he meant by moral agents but if it is as you define it, then that then seems to be exclusionary of a belief in a god as you point out so therefore cannot be universal as Prof D claimed.
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You then compare that to the exclusionary aspects of theism which in itself is not a philosophy but a position on one thing, theoretically factual.
I didn't compare humanism with theism, I compared it with theistic moral philosophy - I'm sure you recognise the difference.
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To be distinguishing , it would need to be something true surely of humanism and not other views. I think humans exist and am not a humanist. Ergo it isn't a distinguishing feature. Indeed Prof D thinks it is universal so how could it be 'distinguishing'?
You need to understand the difference with necessary and sufficient.
Believing that humans exist and are moral agents is necessary for humanism, it is not sufficient - but most people will buy into those starting necessary assumptions.
Believing that god or gods exist is necessary for a theistic moral philosophy, but again it is not sufficient - however many people wont be able to buy into that starting necessary assumption.
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I didn't compare humanism with theism, I compared it with theistic moral philosophy - I'm sure you recognise the difference.
This makes your position even less clear. If the axioms are universal then they are part of the starting point of any theistic moral philosophy and as you have been making clear throughout the thread then is along tradition of theistic moral philosophy which holds the basic precepts of humanism.
This then means that any exclusionary aspects of theistic moral philosophy are questionable by your own arguments, since that seems to relate much more to the belief system in terms of facts.
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I will leave Prof D to expand on what he meant by moral agents but if it is as you define it, then that then seems to be exclusionary of a belief in a god as you point out so therefore cannot be universal as Prof D claimed.
I think the concept of moral agency is pretty well established - for example:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_agency
'Moral agency is an individual's ability to make moral judgments based on some notion of right and wrong and to be held accountable for these actions. A moral agent is "a being who is capable of acting with reference to right and wrong."'
The concept doesn't define where the notion of right or wrong comes from, but is based on an assumption that the individual is responsible for their actions, and accountable for those actions in moral terms. That isn't inconsistent with being a theist.
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This makes your position even less clear. If the axioms are universal then they are part of the starting point of any theistic moral philosophy and as you have been making clear throughout the thread then is along tradition of theistic moral philosophy which holds the basic precepts of humanism.
This then means that any exclusionary aspects of theistic moral philosophy are questionable by your own arguments, since that seems to relate much more to the belief system in terms of facts.
No because the key assumption for a theistic moral philosophy is a believe that god or gods exist - otherwise we would simply call is a moral philosophy.
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You need to understand the difference with necessary and sufficient.
Believing that humans exist and are moral agents is necessary for humanism, it is not sufficient - but most people will buy into those starting necessary assumptions.
Believing that god or gods exist is necessary for a theistic moral philosophy, but again it is not sufficient - however many people wont be able to buy into that starting necessary assumption.
I do understand the difference, but they don't relate to someone's using the term 'distinguishing', which seems to me to be acclaim to sufficiency. What sufficiency cannot mean is being universal which was what you made the claim for. It would help if you didn't use different terms at different stages in different ways.
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No because the key assumption for a theistic moral philosophy is a believe that god or gods exist - otherwise we would simply call is a moral philosophy.
As a means of being sufficient/distinguishing/key to identifying it,yes but it tells you nothing more than that. The issue is that you gave already stated that your axioms that humans exist and are moral agents ate universal so they too form part of this base of a set of beliefs.
If you define humanism as a way that it forms the base of a universal system, then we are back at it being meaningless to compare humanism with a subset of itself and say that the subset is more exclusionary.
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What sufficiency cannot mean is being universal which was what you made the claim for.
No I didn't - I was very clear that as we progress should the further assumptions required for sufficiency for humanism there will be plenty of people who will get to a point and go 'I'm out'. See reply 17.
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As a means of being sufficient/distinguishing/key to identifying it,yes but it tells you nothing more than that. The issue is that you gave already stated that your axioms that humans exist and are moral agents ate universal so they too form part of this base of a set of beliefs.
Believing in the existence of god or gods is a necessary requirement for agreement with a theistic moral philosophy, it is not a sufficient requirement.
Believing in the existence of humans and that they are moral agents are necessary requirement for agreement with humanism, again they are not sufficient.
The difference being that those initial necessary requirements for humanism are almost universal, the necessary requirements for a theistic moral philosophy are far from universal.
And while humanism is currently (particularly in the UK) seen as being non religious, this is a narrow interpretation and throughout history, and today, there are those who clearly see themselves as Christian humanists, Buddhist humanists, Muslim humanists etc.
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No I didn't - I was very clear that as we progress should the further assumptions required for sufficiency for humanism there will be plenty of people who will get to a point and go 'I'm out'. See reply 17.
which puts it back as another subset, if possibly, a larger subset of the universal set as theistic moral philosophy. Indeed it may be that the two subsets have a rather large overlap.
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Indeed it may be that the two subsets have a rather large overlap.
Obviously as you can be a Christian humanist.
However you can't be an atheist adherent of a theistic moral philosophy - because you'd have to be an atheist theist, which I think is impossible.
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Believing in the existence of god or gods is a necessary requirement for agreement with a theistic moral philosophy, it is not a sufficient requirement.
Believing in the existence of humans and that they are moral agents are necessary requirement for agreement with humanism, again they are not sufficient.
The difference being that those initial necessary requirements for humanism are almost universal, the necessary requirements for a theistic moral philosophy are far from universal.
And while humanism is currently (particularly in the UK) seen as being non religious, this is a narrow interpretation and throughout history, and today, there are those who clearly see themselves as Christian humanists, Buddhist humanists, Muslim humanists etc.
Seems to me in the sense of your approach here, believing in god or does amounts to both a necessary and sufficient requirement for a theistic moral philosophy. And it is that additional use of the sufficient requirement in one but not the other that is your inconsistency.
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Obviously as you can be a Christian humanist.
However you can't be an atheist adherent of a theistic moral philosophy - because you'd have to be an atheist theist, which I think is impossible.
Has someone suggested that one could be an atheist theist?
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Prof,
The concept doesn't define where the notion of right or wrong comes from, but is based on an assumption that the individual is responsible for their actions, and accountable for those actions in moral terms. That isn't inconsistent with being a theist.
Is that true though? Some of the theists here for example will tell you that their theism isn't a choice, but rather that they "experienced "God"", "met Jesus" etc and that various moral rules in a "holy" text must therefore be correct. How then are those individuals responsible for their moral actions when in fact they're just following the rules provided for them?
That seems to me to be quite a big difference between humanism and theism.
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Seems to me in the sense of your approach here, believing in god or does amounts to both a necessary and sufficient requirement for a theistic moral philosophy. And it is that additional use of the sufficient requirement in one but not the other that is your inconsistency.
No believing in god or gods is not sufficient. So if you believe in Thor is that sufficient to agree with Christianity as a theistic moral philosophy?
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Prof,
Is that true though? Some of the theists here for example will tell you that their theism isn't a choice, but rather that they "experienced "God"", "met Jesus" etc and that various moral rules in a "holy" text must therefore be correct. How then are those individuals responsible for their moral actions when in fact they're just following the rules provided for them?
That seems to me to be quite a big difference between humanism and theism.
The two aren't mutually exclusive - you can be a theist humanist - loads are and there is a longstanding history of Christian humanism, Islamic humanism etc etc.
That isn't to say that all theists are humanist - many aren't.
But you seem to be implying that you cannot be both a theist and a humanism - I don't think that is true.
What you cannot be is an atheist theist - and therefore you cannot be both an atheist and agree with a theistic moral philosophy.
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No believing in god or gods is not sufficient. So if you believe in Thor is that sufficient to agree with Christianity as a theistic moral philosophy?
I think in the sense of there being a theistic moral philosophy, and that seems to the way you have been using beliefs here.
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I think in the sense of there being a theistic moral philosophy, and that seems to the way you have been using beliefs here.
There are, of course, many many theistic moral philosophies.
A belief in god or gods is necessary for agreement but not sufficient.
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The two aren't mutually exclusive - you can be a theist humanist - loads are and there is a longstanding history of Christian humanism, Islamic humanism etc etc.
That isn't to say that all theists are humanist - many aren't.
But you seem to be implying that you cannot be both a theist and a humanism - I don't think that is true.
What you cannot be is an atheist theist - and therefore you cannot be both an atheist and agree with a theistic moral philosophy.
for the theists who are not humanist, what is it that makes them not humanist?
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There are, of course, many many theistic moral philosophies.
A belief in god or gods is necessary for agreement but not sufficient.
But sufficient for agreement t that there is such a thing as a theistic moral philosophy. I think if you want further agreement then that is merely sufficient conditions for further subsets.
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Prof,
The two aren't mutually exclusive - you can be a theist humanist - loads are and there is a longstanding history of Christian humanism, Islamic humanism etc etc.
That isn't to say that all theists are humanist - many aren't.
But you seem to be implying that you cannot be both a theist and a humanism - I don't think that is true.
What you cannot be is an atheist theist - and therefore you cannot be both an atheist and agree with a theistic moral philosophy.
Yes I know there's a long tradition of theistic humanism, but I merely flag the difference between "I the individual am responsible for my moral actions" and "a god is responsible for my moral actions". They seem to me to be fundamentally different – and potentially at least mutually exclusive – approaches to morality.
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Prof,
Yes I know there's a long tradition of theistic humanism, but I merely flag the difference between "I the individual am responsible for my moral actions" and "a god is responsible for my moral actions". They seem to me to be fundamentally different – and potentially at least mutually exclusive – approaches to morality.
There are very few theists who take the position that god is responsible for their moral actions. There are a number where you might argue that that would be consistent with some of their ideas but it seems wrong to suggest that that is their actual position. Indeed I think that the tradition of theistic humanism is there precisely to state that it is not just by grace or the choice of a god that you are saved. And again, that tension is apparent in many posters on here who put their 'saving' down to the 'grace' of their god but most of those would be amongst the most vehement that we are responsible for our actions.
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Prof,
Yes I know there's a long tradition of theistic humanism, but I merely flag the difference between "I the individual am responsible for my moral actions" and "a god is responsible for my moral actions". They seem to me to be fundamentally different – and potentially at least mutually exclusive – approaches to morality.
I don't see many theists claiming that god is responsible for their moral actions - a more common view is that the individual is responsible for their own actions, but are accountable to god. So an atheist humanist may see themselves as accountable to their conscience, other people and society. A Christian humanist (for example) may see themselves as accountable to their conscience, other people, society and (most significantly) to god.
But in both cases I think they'd accept they are responsible for their own actions.
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NS/Prof,
You surprise me a little - "God makes the rules so I have no choice but to follow them" is fairly common I'd have thought, but perhaps we should allow the theists here to tell us what they do think.
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NS/Prof,
You surprise me a little - "God makes the rules so I have no choice but to follow them" is fairly common I'd have thought, but perhaps we should allow the theists here to tell us what they do think.
We should certainly hear from the theists, but that isn't the impression I get.
I think the typical view is that god makes the rules, it is a matter of our free will whether we choose to follow god's rules, but we will be accountable to god for our choices.
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NS/Prof,
You surprise me a little - "God makes the rules so I have no choice but to follow them" is fairly common I'd have thought, but perhaps we should allow the theists here to tell us what they do think.
You seem to be defining 'moral responsibility' as being about making the rules. What I would suggest is that the Prof and I are taking the more traditional view that the person is responsible, and should be held responsible, for their own actions.
Most theists might agree that god makes the rules, buy that they have a specific choice as to following them. The idea of sin points out that they accept failure is an option here, and the moral agency and responsibility lies there.
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On radio we hear enough Christians asserting firmly that our morality is based on Christian principles. When challenged - not nearly often enough in my opinion - they seem surprised.
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We should certainly hear from the theists, but that isn't the impression I get.
I think the typical view is that god makes the rules, it is a matter of our free will whether we choose to follow god's rules, but we will be accountable to god for our choices.
Surely we have heard from theists continually here and elsewhere on this? And it's not just a theist question, bluehillside's idea seems to be that belief in moral agency is about setting the rules. Now to an extent we do set up some moral standards for internal matters but I would have thought most of us regard moral agency also in relation to external rules e.g. do not murder people and if you do you are the moral agent held responsible and sent to the big house, even if you say that you thought it was perfectly OK because the person had been being annoying.
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On radio we hear enough Christians asserting firmly that our morality is based on Christian principles. When challenged - not nearly often enough in my opinion - they seem surprised.
I think the question there is whether the principles are in some way only derivable from Christianity.
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NS,
You seem to be defining 'moral responsibility' as being about making the rules.
No, about following them. See below.
What I would suggest is that the Prof and I are taking the more traditional view that the person is responsible, and should be held responsible, for their own actions.
But there’s a circularity in that. If you’re convinced that a morally unimpeachable god exists and has put his rules in a book then, no matter what your opinions may be, if you contravene them then necessarily you must be behaving immorally (or at best amorally).
How then if such a person thinks himself to be morally good could he act other than as the book tells him to?
Most theists might agree that god makes the rules, buy that they have a specific choice as to following them.
Not if they want to be morally good they don’t. Indeed, often they will go further when they do contravene them and absolve themselves of responsibility for that too because “the devil” made them do it or some such.
The idea of sin points out that they accept failure is an option here, and the moral agency and responsibility lies there.
Yes, but it is failure. If you want to be morally good though, then you have no choice but to follow the rules. Essentially, the deal is that God makes them morally good and Satan makes them morally bad. Where then is the space for persona responsibility in that?
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I think the question there is whether the principles are in some way only derivable from Christianity.
I think the answer to that one is kinda obvious - given that all sorts of societies have come up with very similar basic moral philosophies regardless of whether they had an underlying Christian tradition.
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NS,
No, about following them. See below.
But there’s a circularity in that. If you’re convinced that a morally unimpeachable god exists and has put his rules in a book then, no matter what your opinions may be, if you contravene them then necessarily you must be behaving immorally.
How then if such a person thinks himself to be morally good could he act other than as the book tells him to?
Not if they want to be morally good they don’t. Indeed, often they will go further when they do contravene them and absolve themselves of responsibility for that too because “the devil” made them do it or some such.
Yes, but it is failure. If you want to be morally good though, then you have no choice but to follow the rules. Essentially, the deal is that God makes them morally good and Satan makes them morally bad. Where then is the space for persona responsibility in that?
This doesn't seem to address the question of moral agency being the choice of action and not the idea that you set up the rules. I don't have to be a theist to accept a set of rules not set up by me that I am immoral if I don't follow. There are people out there who will argue that following the law of the country at the time is the moral thing to do. Even though they might break them, they would think any punishment is morally correct because theyare the moral agent.
The space for personal responsibility is in the choice of action.
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I think the answer to that one is kinda obvious - given that all sorts of societies have come up with very similar basic moral philosophies regardless of whether they had an underlying Christian tradition.
Indeed, but if it isn't asked then it isn't surprising for people to think that we have a largely Christian based morality. We are back to your point that most of these judgements are close to universal but in a society which has been nominally Christian for as long as we were then the progress on issues were such as slavery or education were obviously noticeably lead by and opposed by) Christians.
As we recognise, correlation does not mean causation but it's an easy and frequent mistake, particularly in relation to complex flows of history.
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NS,
This doesn't seem to address the question of moral agency being the choice of action and not the idea that you set up the rules.
It does because the only “choice” available is between a pre-determined morally good and morally bad.
I don't have to be a theist to accept a set of rules not set up by me that I am immoral if I don't follow. There are people out there who will argue that following the law of the country at the time is the moral thing to do. Even though they might break them, they would think any punishment is morally correct because theyare the moral agent.
Yes, but you might think yourself to be morally correct nonetheless. That’s the difference – very few people in my experience set out to behave morally badly, so often when someone breaks the law deliberately it’s because he hold himself to what he thinks to be a higher moral standard.
By contrast, if you believe that the absolute moral exemplar is written down for you then you cannot break those rules and at the same time think yourself to be behaving morally well. After all, who are you to know better than “God”?
What choice then do you have if you want to be morally good except to follow the rules?
The space for personal responsibility is in the choice of action.
Not if you want to be morally good it isn’t.
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It does because the only “choice” available is between a pre-determined morally good and morally bad.
But that fits fine with the standard definition of moral agency that I posted earlier, namely:
Moral agency is an individual's ability to make moral judgments based on some notion of right and wrong and to be held accountable for these actions. A moral agent is "a being who is capable of acting with reference to right and wrong."
It doesn't require that the moral agent is the arbiter of right and wrong, merely that they make judgements based on some notion of right and wrong. That notion can be entirely external (god decides what is right and wrong) or entirely internal (morality is entirely relative and personal) or some combination of both.
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NS,
It does because the only “choice” available is between a pre-determined morally good and morally bad.
Yes, but you might think yourself to be morally correct nonetheless. That’s the difference – very few people in my experience set out to behave morally badly, so often when someone breaks the law it’s because he hold himself to what he thinks to be a higher moral standard.
By contrast, if you believe that the absolute moral exemplar is written down for you then you cannot break those rules and at the same time think yourself to be behaving morally well. After all, who are you to know bettier than “God”?
What choice then do you have if you want to be morally good except to follow the rules?
Not if you want to be morally good it isn’t.
If you have a set of morals that you judge your actions by then an action will between something that those rules determine bad or good, and people act in ways they consider bad no matter what the rule is. Further if you think that people just in general act in a way that they think is morally good then attributing that set of rules to a good doesn't change the moral responsibility. It's just their choice to accept those rules.
The thread started by SteveH on the idea that what he thinks are the rules are very liberal, others of a theistic bent can and do disagree. So thinking the rules are from a god, even the very same one, doesn't seen to restrict a choice in what that person thinks of as right. So even in your rather idiosyncratic dea of moral agency that the action is relatively unimportant, people are still choosing what they think is right morally.
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In the humanist group to which I belong there is a unitarian who sees no real conflict between his humanist values and his liberal religious values. He is quite at ease in both camps. It seems to work for him.
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PD,
But that fits fine with the standard definition of moral agency that I posted earlier, namely:
Moral agency is an individual's ability to make moral judgments based on some notion of right and wrong and to be held accountable for these actions. A moral agent is "a being who is capable of acting with reference to right and wrong."
It doesn't require that the moral agent is the arbiter of right and wrong, merely that they make judgements based on some notion of right and wrong. That notion can be entirely external (god decides what is right and wrong) or entirely internal (morality is entirely relative and personal) or some combination of both.
But an individual who thinks the inerrantly correct moral rules are in a book cannot “make moral judgments” at all. The judgments have been made for him already. All he can do is to decide whether to be morally good (ie, follow the rules) or morally bad (ie, don’t follow the rules) – a much more restrictive, and binary paradigm.
How then can he be held accountable for his actions when he would say that he had no choice when, say, he set fire to an abortion clinic in order to be morally good?
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NS,
If you have a set of morals that you judge your actions by then an action will between something that those rules determine bad or good, and people act in ways they consider bad no matter what the rule is.
Yes, and when you think, “God decided on the rules and I have no defence if I break them because those rules were written down for me” your only choice is between good (follow the rules) and bad (don’t follow the rules).
What you cannot do though is break the rules and still think yourself to be morally good – which I think is a qualitatively different from your earlier example of breaking the law vs disobeying an inerrant rule book, and between humanism and theism.
Further if you think that people just in general act in a way that they think is morally good then attributing that set of rules to a good doesn't change the moral responsibility. It's just their choice to accept those rules.
How is it “their choice to accept those rules” when the only way to be good is to follow them (because a morally inerrant god wrote or “inspired” them)? “They” might well think that a different moral action is a good one, but they cannot exercise that choice and still think themselves to be morally good when a supervening rule book applies.
In other words, “moral responsibility” here seems to me to be a rigged game.
The thread started by SteveH on the idea that what he thinks are the rules are very liberal, others of a theistic bent can and do disagree. So thinking the rules are from a god, even the very same one, doesn't seen to restrict a choice in what that person thinks of as right.
Yes it does – unless that is the theist thinks himself to be a better moral judge than his god.
So even in your rather idiosyncratic dea of moral agency that the action is relatively unimportant, people are still choosing what they think is right morally.
No they’re not. They already “know” what’s morally right because it’s written down for them.
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But an individual who thinks the inerrantly correct moral rules are in a book cannot “make moral judgments” at all. The judgments have been made for him already. All he can do is to decide whether to be morally good (ie, follow the rules) or morally bad (ie, don’t follow the rules) – a much more restrictive, and binary paradigm.
Correct, but that person is still a moral agent.
How then can he be held accountable for his actions when he would say that he had no choice when, say, he set fire to an abortion clinic in order to be morally good?
But broader society would say that his actions were morally (and legally) wrong and he would be held accountable for his actions via the courts. He might think that he would be looked at favourably by god in due course, but that is a different matter. And of course he had a choice - he could have decided not to set fire to the clinic.
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PD,
But an individual who thinks the inerrantly correct moral rules are in a book cannot “make moral judgments” at all. The judgments have been made for him already. All he can do is to decide whether to be morally good (ie, follow the rules) or morally bad (ie, don’t follow the rules) – a much more restrictive, and binary paradigm.
In the Judaeo/Christian tradition, I don't think it's quite so cut and dried as that. The Jewish law of doing no work on the Sabbath apparently has certain qualifications (according to Reform Jews, anyway). That is to say, if the situation is considered to be so serious that lives are in danger if no action is taken, then this in itself would be considered to be morally wrong. Christ himself is shown breaking this law, in a relatively trivial instance, and the way he justifies it with an example from the OT is hardly logically compelling - but at least it shows that the 'law' may be broken in certain instances.
However, it is still up the individual to make a moral decision on what he considers a matter of life and death (which of course may turn out not to be the case).
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SteveH i wonder if the Quakers would suit you?
You certainly can be a liberal Christian and a Quaker, there's no conflict. In fact you can be a non-Christian and a Quaker, the SofF has changed since the days of George Fox.
I admire them.
https://www.quaker.org.uk/
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SteveH i wonder if the Quakers would suit you?
You certainly can be a liberal Christian and a Quaker, there's no conflict. In fact you can be a non-Christian and a Quaker, the SofF has changed since the days of George Fox.
I admire them.
https://www.quaker.org.uk/
I was a Quaker attender for some yeasrs in the early 70s, and sometimes wish I'd stuck with them.
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Nothing to stop you attending again,you don't have to sign up to anything.
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Nothing to stop you attending again,you don't have to sign up to anything.
Bit late now - I'm 66, and have been an anglican for 40 years.
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I'm a practising anglican Christian, although a very liberal one, but ethically I side most of the time with humanists, and have considered joining the British Humanist Association (I think they're called "Humanists UK" now). I may yet do so. I have just joined a Facebook group called 'Humanists for a better world". Are Christianity and humanism inevitably opposed, or not?
Just stop being a Christian then you wont have a dilemma, simple!
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Bit late now - I'm 66, and have been an anglican for 40 years.
You were talking of becoming a Humanist Steve.
The Friends are a 'broad church' encompassing much of what you admire in humanism.You could still take the Eucharist if that is what you'd miss about Anglicanism (something I like &would miss).
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Can humanism when matched to Christ and his actions really compete?
I do not believe they can be compared. Christ could actively change things. Humanism is really about behaviour to each other.
Not sure that you can ask the question can you be an humanist and a Christian. You could ask which makes you the better person?