Actually I think he's making two fairly simple points, first that one conceive of something does not mean it does or can exist, and second that if two people start from a different axiomatic base they talk past each other rather than have a dialogue. He overlays that with the idea that Chalmers' zombies have to be dualistic and I think makes a valid case. This other stuff you are seeing may just be an example of your different axiomatic base?I think at least one of those points is one of your tropes.
I think at least one of those points is one of your tropes.Not sure which point you mean as being one of 'my tropes', I quite often mention different axioms. is that it? If so it being a common point raised doesn't make it wrong and it's one that Carroll specifically raises.
I don't see how a zombie has to be dualistic since they have no more about them than mechanism.
What Carroll is doing here is what Dennett does which is in effect saying we can only study mechanism therefore there is only mechanism.
Is Chalmers actually proposing dualism or is he being outed as a dualist. Is he proposing a soul thing or is he like Searle suggesting a mechanism which would remain hidden if Dennetts lazy and sloppy methodology prevail?
Not sure which point you mean as being one of 'my tropes', I quite often mention different axioms. is that it? If so it being a common point raised doesn't make it wrong and it's one that Carroll specifically raises.I think the piece flags up the problems Searle has with Dennett namely Dennett thinks the suggestion of mechanism covers the problem of consciousness rather than the demonstration of the actual mechanism. For Searle a ''it must be a mechanism because that is the way the world is'' is not enough and neither it is.
I think we have to be careful here - Carroll's using dualist in a specific explained sense and rules out the Cartesian approach - it's covered in the first para. I disagree that Carroll is stating that there is only mechanism - rather he sees it as the simplest solution. This reads like your common conflation of methodological and philosophic naturalism in saying there doesn't seem to be a methodology to study non naturalist (and I am unsure that there is a sensible definition of the term) claims, does not mean that someone is stating there is no such thing.
Again I think we have to be careful that you seem to be using dualist in the Cartesian sense. it seems to me that both Chalmers and Searle are proposing a dualism in that the motivation for the actions of the zombie are not in the zombie itself, and the meaning of the signs in the Chinese Room are not determined by the 'worker' in the room. It's that the mechanism is separate rather than hidden that creates the dualism. I also don't see Carroll as here attempting to say that Chalmers is categorically wrong here but attempting to draw out the differences in approach. I think his use of the term 'poetic' is ill advised because of the connotations it creates.
I think the piece flags up the problems Searle has with Dennett namely Dennett thinks the suggestion of mechanism covers the problem of consciousness rather than the demonstration of the actual mechanism. For Searle a ''it must be a mechanism because that is the way the world is'' is not enough and neither it is.No, It really doesn't seem to do that since it doesn't, as already covered in the post you just replied to, state that there can't be anything other than the mechanism, and seek to explain in terms not affected by the axiom problem that he covers the 'poetic' naturalist idea. I think moving into some form of coded discussion of Dennett and Searle who aren't mentioned is odd.