Religion and Ethics Forum
Religion and Ethics Discussion => Philosophy, in all its guises. => Topic started by: Rhiannon on February 25, 2018, 08:29:46 AM
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I’m a big believer that we are all responsible for the choices that we make, even though sometimes they may feel like ‘no choice’ options. At the same time though, I accept that free will is illusory. How do these apparent contradictions work? Can we really choose to change, to try to understand, to do better? And does ‘there’s no such thing as free will’ work as a valid excuse not to?
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I’m a big believer that we are all responsible for the choices that we make, even though sometimes they may feel like ‘no choice’ options. At the same time though, I accept that free will is illusory. How do these apparent contradictions work? Can we really choose to change, to try to understand, to do better? And does ‘there’s no such thing as free will’ work as a valid excuse not to?
I wonder if in all our thinking about determinism we aren't forgetting one determinant. Ourselves.
It's as if this great hulking intelligence is absent from informing our decisions.
Another thing is why have the illusion of weighing up choice rather than actually weighing up?
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I wonder if in all our thinking about determinism we aren't forgetting one determinant. Ourselves.
It's as if this great hulking intelligence is absent from informing our decisions.
But if 'ourself' is itself determined then what difference does it make ?
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But if 'ourself' is itself determined then what difference does it make ?
Which makes me question at what point does personal responsibility begin and end. Why take responsibility for my life if it’s all about my genes/upbringing/experiences etc?
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...I accept that free will is illusory.
I beg to differ, see: Compatibilism (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compatibilism) and Elbow Room (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elbow_Room_(book)).
Can we really choose to change, to try to understand, to do better? And does ‘there’s no such thing as free will’ work as a valid excuse not to?
There is much about this in Elbow Room but determinism does not equate to fatalism (the notion that no matter what we do or think, some event will take place). There is nothing that says mental activity does not affect the future. We can see clearly from the past that people's plans and efforts have borne fruit.
We have the ability to deliberate and to decide on a course of action. If determinism is true, then from some god-like perspective, our choice is defined from the start but that point of view is just as inaccessible to us at the point of view of somebody in the future, when our choice has already been made. Only one future will happen (leaving aside some multiverse ideas) but people don't seem to regard that as an impediment to believing in 'free will'.
We say that "we can't change the past" but in fact, determinism or not, we can't change the future either. It doesn't even make sense; what would you be changing into what? What was going to happen into what is going to happen? Such a 'change' is every bit as counterfactual as looking back at an event and saying something like "if I hadn't done that, the this wouldn't have happened".
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But if 'ourself' is itself determined then what difference does it make ?
What is it then that makes a choice? It cannot be that which has determined your existence,I.e. My mother and father, it cannot even be some previous arrangement of my brain molecules can it?
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What is it then that makes a choice? It cannot be that which has determined your existence,I.e. My mother and father, it cannot even be some previous arrangement of my brain molecules can it?
Why not?
Of course you make the choice but you make the choice you do because of what? Obviously the circumstances you find yourself in and your state of mind. Perhaps most significantly, because of the person you are. But how did you become that person? Surely you are who you are because of some combination of nature and nurture and a lifetime of experience. If all of those things (including your exact state of mind at the moment) do not determine just one choice, then there is really nothing left in the way of reasons to choose one thing or another, so any remaining choice but be for no reason (i.e. random).
What is a free choice of not one made on the basis of the person you are?
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Why not?
Of course you make the choice but you make the choice you do because of what? Obviously the circumstances you find yourself in and your state of mind. Perhaps most significantly, because of the person you are. But how did you become that person? Surely you are who you are because of some combination of nature and nurture and a lifetime of experience. If all of those things (including your exact state of mind at the moment) do not determine just one choice, then there is really nothing left in the way of reasons to choose one thing or another, so any remaining choice but be for no reason (i.e. random).
What is a free choice of not one made on the basis of the person you are?
Yes, I am not denying what you are saying but there are shortfalls. As I say when we make a choice we are not a person in a vacuum, secondly each moment is unique in history and so that brings precedence at least a bit into question, also presumably how we are at the moment also involves random quantum events going on at all levels of organisation.
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As I say when we make a choice we are not a person in a vacuum...
That's why I said: "the circumstances you find yourself in".
...secondly each moment is unique in history and so that brings precedence at least a bit into question...
Precedence of what?
...also presumably how we are at the moment also involves random quantum events going on at all levels of organisation.
It seems unlikely (on current evidence) that "quantum events" have a significant role. As with most macro scale systems, the statistics swamp any individual events.
Even if they did - it only introduces some randomness and I don't see how that could make us more 'free'.
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That's why I said: "the circumstances you find yourself in".
Precedence of what?
It seems unlikely (on current evidence) that "quantum events" have a significant role. As with most macro scale systems, the statistics swamp any individual events.
Even if they did - it only introduces some randomness and I don't see how that could make us more 'free'.
Ok
I still see disconnect between the person and the decisions they take in terms of determination
A lack of determinant chain between experience and the inherent novelty of present conditions.
And a complete causal chain between fundamental particles and decisions taken.
We still seem in the realm of the assumed platitude.
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Ok
I still see disconnect between the person and the decisions they take in terms of determination
A lack of deternant chain between experience and the inherent novelty of present conditions.
And a complete causal chain between fundamental particles and decisions taken.
Of course there is a massive conceptual gap between fundamental physical laws and human minds. This is why it's, in practice, not a useful level of abstraction. Trying to discover a causal chain between them would be a bit like trying to understand your word processor in terms of quantum field theory - only more so. However, it doesn't change the fact that the one is the result of the other.
Neither does it change the fact that logic dictates that events (including human choices) can only be the result of determinism or randomness because the absence of one defines the other.
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Depends what you mean by free will. Some have argued that the ability to choose between different options in any real sense is illusory, but that a weak free-will is possible: If I had toast and marmalade for breakfast this morning, I may think that I could have had toast and honey, or a couple of boiled eggs, instead, but in fact I was predestined to have toast and marmalade - which doesn't alter the faqct that it was my choice. Whether that is enough to preserve moral responsibility is another question.
"Some", I repeat, "have argued": I'm not arguing it. Thinking philosophically about free-will and determination does my head in, so I just tend to go with Dr Johnson: "Our wills are free, and there's an end on't".
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Which makes me question at what point does personal responsibility begin and end. Why take responsibility for my life if it’s all about my genes/upbringing/experiences etc?
Perhaps a way of looking at it is in terms of absolute free will and relative free will. Our intentions to act or not act could be seen as relatively free rather than absolutely free and we are relatively responsible (answerable) for our actions according to our awareness and control of our mental and physical faculties. It is made difficult because there can be a conflict between what drives personal self will and collective self will (society) (and the absolute will of God if it exists).
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Depends what you mean by free will. Some have argued that the ability to choose between different options in any real sense is illusory, but that a weak free-will is possible: If I had toast and marmalade for breakfast this morning, I may think that I could have had toast and honey, or a couple of boiled eggs, instead, but in fact I was predestined to have toast and marmalade - which doesn't alter the faqct that it was my choice. Whether that is enough to preserve moral responsibility is another question.
"Some", I repeat, "have argued": I'm not arguing it. Thinking philosophically about free-will and determination does my head in, so I just tend to go with Dr Johnson: "Our wills are free, and there's an end on't".
Yes, the idea of free will has multiple meanings. For example, having choices, being able to do something else, having no determining cause as antecedent, having no impediment. Those are off the top of my head, and I think it makes discussion very difficult, as the meaning of it slides around. I suppose soft determinism refers to having choices, and also having determining factors, which I think is Dennett's position. But in any serious discussion, you would have to nail down what the other person meant by it, and try to make sure that nobody starts sliding.
For example, AB's position on the big thread, seems to be that our choices have no determining factor as antecedent. Now this is quite different from other positions on free will, for example, that there are no impediments to my choice. In fact, I would say it is an unusual position, as it seems to spell out randomness.
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Yes, the idea of free will has multiple meanings. For example, having choices, being able to do something else, having no determining cause as antecedent, having no impediment. Those are off the top of my head, and I think it makes discussion very difficult, as the meaning of it slides around. I suppose soft determinism refers to having choices, and also having determining factors, which I think is Dennett's position. But in any serious discussion, you would have to nail down what the other person meant by it, and try to make sure that nobody starts sliding.
For example, AB's position on the big thread, seems to be that our choices have no determining factor as antecedent. Now this is quite different from other positions on free will, for example, that there are no impediments to my choice. In fact, I would say it is an unusual position, as it seems to spell out randomness.
Yes, even the word 'choice' seems to be fraught with difficulty. For instance, flying across a road(unaided) isn't a choice for me at all, but either walking or running are. How the 'choice' is made seems intuitively to be a free decision, but I would say that there are causes and reasons for whatever my decision would be. So, as David Eagleman says, "if you rewound history a hundred times, I'd make that same decision every time. Why does that frustrate people? I guess it's because we want to believe that we can behave otherwise, that given some situation we're not slaves to the situation and our past."
In my eyes, even if this is correct, it's still a choice though.
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Perhaps a way of looking at it is in terms of absolute free will and relative free will. Our intentions to act or not act could be seen as relatively free rather than absolutely free and we are relatively responsible (answerable) for our actions according to our awareness and control of our mental and physical faculties. It is made difficult because there can be a conflict between what drives personal self will and collective self will (society) (and the absolute will of God if it exists).
Yes, a useful way into this is to think in terms of degrees of freedom; I look at my potato plant and see it is rooted to the soil, unable to move around, poor thing; I see a hedgehog scuttling about, it has far more degrees of freedom than the potato plant but still it has far less than an insurance salesman. All relative 'freedoms' but absolute freedom would be meaningless. Nothing has absolute freedom. In fact I think the concept of freedom is wrong-headed at base in this context. Freedom is not a thing; what we are really describing is degrees of sophistication and complexity, and there can be no such thing as absolute or total complexity.
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Yes, a useful way into this is to think in terms of degrees of freedom; I look at my potato plant and see it is rooted to the soil, unable to move around, poor thing; I see a hedgehog scuttling about, it has far more degrees of freedom than the potato plant but still it has far less than an insurance salesman. All relative 'freedoms' but absolute freedom would be meaningless. Nothing has absolute freedom. In fact I think the concept of freedom is wrong-headed at base in this context. Freedom is not a thing; what we are really describing is degrees of sophistication and complexity, and there can be no such thing as absolute or total complexity.
Absolute complexity would be something that has no parts, no internal conflicts. Complete homogeneity.
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Which makes me question at what point does personal responsibility begin and end. Why take responsibility for my life if it’s all about my genes/upbringing/experiences etc?
Well, yes, it is a dilemma for all of us who are culturally induced into thinking in terms of moral responsibility. In fact it's far deeper than merely cultural, I think without doubt a moral conscience has been selected for through our evolutionary history. This sits completely at odds with notions of determinism. We are not going to abandon our systems of criminal justice any time soon but over time notions of punishment need to be superseded by notions of rehabilitation. That guy next door, he's a peadophile, right, and I'm going to react with the same anger and vitriol to him, instinctively. But as humans we can also cultivate deeper abstract understandings that we can hold in parallel to our ancient instinctive reactions. This is the way we will go in the long term; eventually words like 'evil' will be expunged from our vocabulary as we come to see all offenders as ill, effectively.
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Well, yes, it is a dilemma for all of us who are culturally induced into thinking in terms of moral responsibility. In fact it's far deeper than merely cultural, I think without doubt a moral conscience has been selected for through our evolutionary history. This sits completely at odds with notions of determinism. We are not going to abandon our systems of criminal justice any time soon but over time notions of punishment need to be superseded by notions of rehabilitation. That guy next door, he's a peadophile, right, and I'm going to react with the same anger and vitriol to him, instinctively. But as humans we can also cultivate deeper abstract understandings that we can hold in parallel to our ancient instinctive reactions. This is the way we will go in the long term; eventually words like 'evil' will be expunged from our vocabulary as we come to see all offenders as ill, effectively.
Sorry but that is gibberish. Whatever does happen will be determined so it's not that we are making some decision that they are 'ill - as that makes no more sense than 'evil. Our reactions are just our reactions and using the pejorative primitive makes no sense.
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Sorry but that is gibberish. Whatever does happen will be determined so it's not that we are making some decision that they are 'ill - as that makes no more sense than 'evil. Our reactions are just our reactions and using the pejorative primitive makes no sense.
Eh ? Not sure about that. I didn't use the word primitive, perjoratively or otherwise. Our instinct to anger is ancient, if that is what you meant and our 'free will' is often characterised by our ability to substitute an instinctive behaviour with a more considered one. When Victorians started down the road of penal reform it was because an insight into the roots of maladaptive behaviours had been growing, for instance that the way people turn out as adults is very much to do with their nature and nurture in childhood over which they had no control. That is a societal trend that is continuing and I don't think we are going to return to a lock-em-up and throw away the key paradigm.
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Eh ? Not sure about that. I didn't use the word primitive, perjoratively or otherwise. Our instinct to anger is ancient, if that is what you meant and our 'free will' is often characterised by our ability to substitute an instinctive behaviour with a more considered one. When Victorians started down the road of penal reform it was because an insight into the roots of maladaptive behaviours had been growing, for instance that the way people turn out as adults is very much to do with their nature and nurture in childhood over which they had no control. That is a societal trend that is continuing and I don't think we are going to return to a lock-em-up and throw away the key paradigm.
But you can't claim freedom in this sense and logically be determinist. If progress is made, and in obviously taking the position that a lock em up and throw away the key isn't what 'should' be returned to, you are regarding the previous position as worse.
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But you can't claim freedom in this sense and logically be determinist.
Nonsense - determinism is simply irrelevant to this sort of consideration.
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Nonsense - determinism is simply irrelevant to this sort of consideration.
No, it's precisely relevant. Determinism is predeterminism so the idea of 'primitive' is specious.
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Determinism is predeterminism so the idea of 'primitive' is specious.
Why do you think determinism impacts on the idea of 'primitive'? For that matter, why did you introduce 'primitive' into the discussion in the first place?
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Why do you think determinism impacts on the idea of 'primitive'? For that matter, why did you introduce 'primitive' into the discussion in the first place?
I didn't, torridon did. The whole idea that knowing that determinism makes sense is somehow going to improve things is a contradiction of determinism. What happens, is what will happen.
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I didn't, torridon did.
The first occurrence of the word "primitive" in this topic is in your post #18.
The whole idea that knowing that determinism makes sense is somehow going to improve things is a contradiction of determinism.
You seem to be suggesting that an idea cannot have an effect - which it clearly can, determinism or not.
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I didn't, torridon did. The whole idea that knowing that determinism makes sense is somehow going to improve things is a contradiction of determinism. What happens, is what will happen.
No I didn't. I said 'ancient', and in a context of responding to Rhiannon of how we come to terms with the knowledge of determinism. Even in a deterministic universe, there will be patterns in how people react to knowledge, even if we have no real choice in the matter
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No I didn't. I said 'ancient', and in a context of responding to Rhiannon of how we come to terms with the knowledge of determinism. Even in a deterministic universe, there will be patterns in how people react to knowledge, even if we have no real choice in the matter
indeed you did, my apologies, I obviously filled that in but then what's the difference between 'ancient instinctive' responses and our current instinctive responses? Surely all our responses are in that sense instinctive?
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indeed you did, my apologies, I obviously filled that in but then what's the difference between 'ancient instinctive' responses and our current instinctive responses? Surely all our responses are in that sense instinctive?
Well, in the sense that we could substitute 'instinctive' for 'deterministic', perhaps, yes that would be right. Does that mean that we give up trying to think through problems because the outcome of our deliberations is inevitable ? If we start thinking like that we have crossed a line from determinism into fatalism. I see determinism as a framework of understanding in which the next moment is a logical consequence of the context of the current moment. That should be a source of comfort, not despair; if the next moment were random or illogical then we would have no predictability. Determinism means I can go to sleep at night safe in the knowledge that the sun will rise again on the morning, but more than that, it means that there will be reasons why some guy will starting shooting up random strangers in America or wherever.
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Well, in the sense that we could substitute 'instinctive' for 'deterministic', perhaps, yes that would be right. Does that mean that we give up trying to think through problems because the outcome of our deliberations is inevitable ? If we start thinking like that we have crossed a line from determinism into fatalism. I see determinism as a framework of understanding in which the next moment is a logical consequence of the context of the current moment. That should be a source of comfort, not despair; if the next moment were random or illogical then we would have no predictability. Determinism means I can go to sleep at night safe in the knowledge that the sun will rise again on the morning, but more than that, it means that there will be reasons why some guy will starting shooting up random strangers in America or wherever.
If someone croises over a line into fatalism, then that will have been determined. The idea that determinism can be used as a framework pf understanding is luducrous. You will do what you will do. U
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If someone croises over a line into fatalism, then that will have been determined.
Seems to have happened to you...
The idea that determinism can be used as a framework pf understanding is luducrous.
Why shouldn't understanding of determinism be a useful idea - just as any other understanding about our world is? You seem to be back at ideas not having an effect - which they obviously do.
You will do what you will do.
Yes you will - whether determinism is true or not.
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Seems to have happened to you...
Why shouldn't understanding of determinism be a useful idea - just as any other understanding about our world is? You seem to be back at ideas not having an effect - which they obviously do.
Yes you will - whether determinism is true or not.
No, I'm not a fatalist. I can't chose what I believe and I don't believe on a day to day position in fatalism. There's a basic confusion with both you and torridon about looking at the idea of determinism in an intellectual sense and how you carry out your normal life, I haven't said ideas don't have effects, so how I can be back at it, I don't know, But the effect that ideas will have are determined too. You cannot talk about using them as if it is some conscious choice different from determinism as you and torridon seem to think in the intellectual view and be logically consistent.
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There's a basic confusion with both you and torridon about looking at the idea of determinism in an intellectual sense and how you carry out your normal life...
I really don't see what determinism has to do with normal (day to day) life. There is no practical implication because the point of view necessary to perceive how things are determined is no more accessible than that of the retrospective view I will have after I've made whatever choice it might be (somewhat less accessible, actually).
Intellectually, if true, it will tells us something about our universe and our minds.
I haven't said ideas don't have effects, so how I can be back at it, I don't know...
I was referring back to #24 and my reply #25, where you seemed to be suggesting the same thing.
But the effect that ideas will have are determined too.
Yes.
You cannot talk about using them as if it is some conscious choice different from determinism as you and torridon seem to think in the intellectual view and be logically consistent.
I wasn't aware of either of us considering conscious choices that are different from determinism (although I'm not actually sure that we are taking exactly the same position). However, it's largely irrelevant to most situations because we still make conscious choices and those choices have effects. There is nothing about determinism that changes that.
It's very odd the kind of reactions people have to the idea of determinism compared to, for example, relativity that provides strong evidence for the "block universe", where the future is as real and concrete as the past and 'now' is no more meaningful than 'here'.
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I’m a big believer that we are all responsible for the choices that we make, even though sometimes they may feel like ‘no choice’ options. At the same time though, I accept that free will is illusory. How do these apparent contradictions work? Can we really choose to change, to try to understand, to do better? And does ‘there’s no such thing as free will’ work as a valid excuse not to?
I think the answer is that you are as free as you feel, and as responsible. There is no logic to help decide what is a "valid" feeling or not.
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I'm yet to meet a 'determinist' who doesn't function in their personal life as though they had free will. The sense of being an agent with freedom of will is innate. It's an aspect of what we mean when we say 'I'. I'm not sure how anyone could function normally without feeling free in this sense, whatever their intellectual conclusions on the matter. Presumably we have evolved this way for good reasons to do with survival. So one might say that to the extent we are persons with selfhood we have free will. This doesn't preclude an understanding that all 'our' choices are in fact dependent on causes and conditions that logically undermine the theory that we have free will. Both positions are 'true' from their own perspectives, even if these 'truths' may seem mutually exclusive. This kind of paradox tends to offend the rational mind, but that's life for you. I suspect we get knotted up about this issue because the debate tends to be framed in a way that ignores the illusory nature of self, conceiving instead the self as a kind of reified 'thing' that is either free or determined. This may to a large extent be a cultural problem. The free will vs determinism argument features large in the west but isn't really considered an issue in some eastern cultures.
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I really don't see what determinism has to do with normal (day to day) life. There is no practical implication because the point of view necessary to perceive how things are determined is no more accessible than that of the retrospective view I will have after I've made whatever choice it might be (somewhat less accessible, actually).
Intellectually, if true, it will tells us something about our universe and our minds.
I was referring back to #24 and my reply #25, where you seemed to be suggesting the same thing.
Yes.
I wasn't aware of either of us considering conscious choices that are different from determinism (although I'm not actually sure that we are taking exactly the same position). However, it's largely irrelevant to most situations because we still make conscious choices and those choices have effects. There is nothing about determinism that changes that.
It's very odd the kind of reactions people have to the idea of determinism compared to, for example, relativity that provides strong evidence for the "block universe", where the future is as real and concrete as the past and 'now' is no more meaningful than 'here'.
Since my position is that determinism doesn't have anything to di with day to day life, it would seem we are talking past each other. And that you have repeater your idea that I was saying that ideas do not have an effectbon real life doesn't mean that I have said that.