Religion and Ethics Forum
Religion and Ethics Discussion => Philosophy, in all its guises. => Topic started by: Walt Zingmatilder on April 11, 2024, 08:38:54 AM
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https://bigthink.com/series/legends/philosophy-and-science/
Personally I think he has it Arse about face.
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Gets what arse about face? I can't watch the video at the moment.
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Gets what arse about face? I can't watch the video at the moment.
He thinks philosophers should take time out to seek out scientists whereas Others think scientists should be taking a bit of time finding out about philosophy, rather than, as that Hawking chap did, write it off.
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https://bigthink.com/series/legends/philosophy-and-science/
Personally I think he has it Arse about face.
Not really sure what 'arse about face' means in the context. Are you suggesting thar scientists should know more about philosophy? If so, I don't think Dennett would disagree, or that the ideas are in any sense exclusive.
You may mean something else as it's a bit of a ramble from Dennett. I find his idea that historians are in search of truth rather than truthiness naive.
I think Dennett is a valuable thinker but an even better salesperson. Why name a book 'Some thinking about Consciousness' when you can call it 'Consciousness Explained'
His use of evolution, and memes here, as in 'Darwin's Dangerous Idea' underlines for me the seductiveness of metaphor for him. To an extent, he seems to substitute his expanded idea of evolution for the idea of a purposeful 'god'. There is a tendency to turn questions into why rather than how too quickly because he has a live of an explanatory simplicity.
That said, I think it is good for philosophers, a category that I find harder to define as I get more curmudgeonly, to know more about science generally, and particularly in relation to any areas they are looking at.
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Not really sure what 'arse about face' means in the context. Are you suggesting thar scientists should know more about philosophy? If so, I don't think Dennett would disagree, or that the ideas are in any sense exclusive.
You may mean something else as it's a bit of a ramble from Dennett. I find his idea that historians are in search of truth rather than truthiness naive.
I think Dennett is a valuable thinker but an even better salesperson. Why name a book 'Some thinking about Consciousness' when you can call it 'Consciousness Explained'
I haven't read the book, but my guess would be that doesn't explain consciousness in it.
His use of evolution, and memes here, as in 'Darwin's Dangerous Idea' underlines for me the seductiveness of metaphor for him. To an extent, he seems to substitute his expanded idea of evolution for the idea of a purposeful 'god'. There is a tendency to turn questions into why rather than how too quickly because he has a live of an explanatory simplicity.
That said, I think it is good for philosophers, a category that I find harder to define as I get more curmudgeonly, to know more about science generally, and particularly in relation to any areas they are looking at.
This attempt of Vlad to try to create a dichotomy between philosophy and science is interesting. Science is what happens when philosophers start testing their ideas in the real world. Science is a natural outgrowth of philosophy. This is why I'm interested in what Vlad thinks Dennett got arse about face.
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I haven't read the book, but my guess would be that doesn't explain consciousness in it.
This attempt of Vlad to try to create a dichotomy between philosophy and science is interesting. Science is what happens when philosophers start testing their ideas in the real world. Science is a natural outgrowth of philosophy. This is why I'm interested in what Vlad thinks Dennett got arse about face.
There's a lot of 'oughts' in philosophy that will never be within science's pursuit of the 'is'. I think Vlad's take is that scientists should know more philosophy is more important than philosophers knowing science. As I said, I don't think Dennett is arguing against that, though I probably would. I think the problem with some scientists and philosophy is not a lack of knowledge, but an assumption of great knowledge which leads to pronouncements about philosophy that are incredibly simplistic. That said, I think there are swathes of philosophy which are intellectual wanking. (Thought I might go for an incredibly simplistic pronouncement there as a piece of irony)
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I'm wondering what more about methodological naturalism, an academic philosopher needs to know? More scientific facts?
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I'm wondering what more about methodological naturalism, an academic philosopher needs to know? More scientific facts?
Since he's not suggesting that the philosopher needs to know more about methodological naturalism, that's a strawman.
He is suggesting that knowing about relevant science would be beneficial, and that seems sensible. If you are going to talk about what philosophically consciousness is then knowledge of what is happening in science in the relevant area is surely useful? If you don't think so, can you explain why?
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Since he's not suggesting that the philosopher needs to know more about methodological naturalism, that's a strawman.
He is suggesting that knowing about relevant science would be beneficial, and that seems sensible. If you are going to talk about what philosophically consciousness is then knowledge of what is happening in science in the relevant area is surely useful? If you don't think so, can you explain why?
Dennett wants philosophers to know more science and collaborate with scientists more. Questions arise. How much more science and collaboration is enough? How does philosophy benefit? Who are the philosophers who would benefit? How does he expect scientific to change philosophy other than it becoming philosophically naturalist(not guaranteed surely), How can there be more collaboration when, it seems several prominent scientists are moving away from a need for philosophers?
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Dennett wants philosophers to know more science and collaborate with scientists more. Questions arise. How much more science and collaboration is enough? How does philosophy benefit? Who are the philosophers who would benefit? How does he expect scientific to change philosophy other than it becoming philosophically naturalist(not guaranteed surely), How can there be more collaboration when, it seems several prominent scientists are moving away from a need for philosophers?
This seems to entirely ignore the question I asked. Your questions also seem odd. Why, if someone is arguing thar it would be useful for philosophers to know more science would one have to specify an exact amount of what would constitute 'enough'? Why have you talked about collaboration between philosophers and scientists when that isn't what the articles talk about?
Your post reads like an attempted distraction from a fairly simple idea by a Gish gallop of largely irrelevant questions.
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It is, of course, valuable for philosophers to understand more about science, and for scientists to understand more about philosophy. More knowledge and a wider exchange of knowledge it always a good thing.
But, and it is a big but, science and philosophy are not equivalents - one is about uncovering actual, verifiable understanding of our world etc, the other uncovering a way of understanding and a structured approach to ask 'why' questions.
The point being that science without philosophy might lack context or value, but it would still be correct. Philosophy without science runs a major risk of being plain, flat out wrong.
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It is, of course, valuable for philosophers to understand more about science, and for scientists to understand more about philosophy. More knowledge and a wider exchange of knowledge it always a good thing.
But, and it is a big but, science and philosophy are not equivalents - one is about uncovering actual, verifiable understanding of our world etc, the other uncovering a way of understanding and a structured approach to ask 'why' questions.
The point being that science without philosophy might lack context or value, but it would still be correct. Philosophy without science runs a major risk of being plain, flat out wrong.
Science can be wrong.
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It is, of course, valuable for philosophers to understand more about science, and for scientists to understand more about philosophy. More knowledge and a wider exchange of knowledge it always a good thing.
But, and it is a big but, science and philosophy are not equivalents - one is about uncovering actual, verifiable understanding of our world etc, the other uncovering a way of understanding and a structured approach to ask 'why' questions.
The point being that science without philosophy might lack context or value, but it would still be correct. Philosophy without science runs a major risk of being plain, flat out wrong.
Science is philosophy. It is that branch of philosophy that deals with the real world. In fact, before the term "science" was coined, it was called "natural philosophy".
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Science can be wrong.
But it is self correcting.
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Science is philosophy. It is that branch of philosophy that deals with the real world. In fact, before the term "science" was coined, it was called "natural philosophy".
Sure - I get that. But that isn't what we are really talking about here, is it JP. We are talking about philosophy in a distinct sense from science or there would be no point in discussing whether scientists need to know more about philosophy ... as they would be ... err ... just another group of philosophers who know a shit load of natural philosophy.
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But it is self correcting.
Not necessarily and it still means your statement: 'The point being that science without philosophy might lack context or value, but it would still be correct' was wrong. Is it yourself that is correcting that now?
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Not necessarily
The whole point about the scientific method is that hypotheses are falsifiable and repeatable. Should a scientific theory (the best current explanation for the current data) prove to be no longer sustainable on the basis of new data then a new (or more detailed) theory is developed. Hence it is self correcting. The only proviso is that further science is performed, but the whole point of repeatability in the scientific method requires there to be 'more science'.
'The point being that science without philosophy might lack context or value, but it would still be correct' was wrong. Is it yourself that is correcting that now?
Not really unless you ossify something at a single point in time as the science will always be self-correcting.
The problem with philosophy by contrast, is firstly that it is non-falsifiable (so you cannot know whether or not it is correct), but that isn't my point. If you have philosophy without scientific underpinning then you may apply incorrect assumptions on which to develop your philosophy and therefore any philosophy, however sophisticated, however clever, however complex - will just be wrong. So it doesn't matter one jot how sophisticated your philosophy is to describe the way the universe was created in 6 days in 4000BC. if this is based on an assumption that has been robustly falsified by science.
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The whole point about the scientific method is that hypotheses are falsifiable and repeatable. Should a scientific theory (the best current explanation for the current data) prove to be no longer sustainable on the basis of new data then a new (or more detailed) theory is developed. Hence it is self correcting. The only proviso is that further science is performed, but the whole point of repeatability in the scientific method requires there to be 'more science'.
Not really unless you ossify something at a single point in time as the science will always be self-correcting.
The problem with philosophy by contrast, is firstly that it is non-falsifiable (so you cannot know whether or not it is correct), but that isn't my point. If you have philosophy without scientific underpinning then you may apply incorrect assumptions on which to develop your philosophy and therefore any philosophy, however sophisticated, however clever, however complex - will just be wrong. So it doesn't matter one jot how sophisticated your philosophy is to describe the way the world was created in 6 days in 4000BC. if this is based on an assumption that has been robustly falsified by science.
If your statement had been that science was in theory, capable of being correct, then fine, but it wasn't so you were wrong.
As to it always being self correcting, that would assume that humans would have no limit to investigation methods, and that you could never reach a position that was based on all the possible information that we could gather, that was wrong, but would need information that we were incapable of gathering to correct. I don't see a way of demonstrating that.
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If your statement had been that science was in theory, capable of being correct, then fine, but it wasn't so you were wrong.
As to it always being self correcting, that would assume that humans would have no limit to investigation methods, and that you could never reach a position that was based on all the possible information that we could gather, that was wrong, but would need information that we were incapable of gathering to correct. I don't see a way of demonstrating that.
All methods have their limitations NS - but the point about the scientific method is that it both recognises those limitations (and therefore bases conclusions firmly within the context of the limitations) and is also self correcting as further methods allow us to gain more information. It is rare, of course, for this to completely change the prevailing hypothesis - more often more data, using more sophisticated methods cements the basic theory but provides greater levels of detailed understanding.
But philosophy really doesn't have any of those features as there isn't objectivity nor falsifiability. Philosophy may help us to think about stuff, but it isn't good at actually moving us towards the truth in an objective sense.
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All methods have their limitations NS - but the point about the scientific method is that it both recognises those limitations and is self correcting as further methods allow us to gain more information. It is rare, of course, for this to completely change the prevailing hypothesis - more often more data, using more sophisticated methods cements the basic theory but provides greater levels of detailed understanding.
But philosophy really doesn't have any of those features as there isn't objectivity nor falsifiability. Philosophy may help us to think about stuff, but it isn't good at actually moving us towards the truth in an objective sense.
And your original statement didn't recognise those limitations and was therefore wrong.
And since you cannot get beyond the problems of hard solipsism, all you can claim for science is that it appears to be intersubjectively correct, mot objectively so.
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And your original statement didn't recognise those limitations and was therefore wrong.
With respect NS - you are not a scientist. Science and the scientific method requires studies to take account of the limitations of the methods and for conclusions to be bounded by those limitations.
If you try to publish a scientific paper where you try to expand conclusions beyond the limitations set by your methodology you will rapidly find that the peer review process will require you to alter your discussion and conclusions sections before the study is accepted for publication.
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With respect NS - you are not a scientist. Science and the scientific method requires studies to take account of the limitations of the methods and for conclusions to be bounded by those limitations.
If you try to publish a scientific paper where you try to expand conclusions beyond the limitations set by your methodology you will rapidly find that the peer review process will require you to alter your discussion and conclusions sections before the study is accepted for publication.
Oh look a courtier's reply. And one that doesn',t address any of the points that were made.
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Oh look a courtier's reply. And one that doesn',t address any of the points that were made.
Call it what you like - it is inherent when discussing science and the scientific methods that any conclusions drawn must take account of the limitations of the methodology.
You claimed that 'And your original statement didn't recognise those limitations and was therefore wrong.'. Your statement is wrong as the limitations are an inherent part of the scientific method - I shouldn't need to state this separately (although I ultimately had to as it would appear you don't really understand how the scientific method works).
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Call it what you like - it is inherent when discussing science and the scientific methods that any conclusions drawn must take account of the limitations of the methodology.
You claimed that 'And your original statement didn't recognise those limitations and was therefore wrong.'. Your statement is wrong as the limitations are an inherent part of the scientific method - I shouldn't need to state this separately (although I ultimately had to as it would appear you don't really understand how the scientific method works).
No, you see the problem here is the limitations you are discussing here are epistemology, not science. And the objection applies because it was incorrect based on what thise limitations are. That you had your fingers crossed, and said to yourself that you were a scientist, doesn't really help.
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No, you see the problem here is the limitations you are discussing here are epistemology, not science. And the injection applies because it was incorrect based on what thise limitations are. That you had your fingers crossed, and said to yourself that you were a scientist, doesn't really help.
Wrong again - the limitations I am talking about are inherently part of the scientific process and any conclusions drawn from studies.
So - to use an example:
I, as a scientist have a hypothesis that a particular pharmacological agent up-regulates a particular enzyme, so I perform a study and I measure (using PCR) the expression level of the gene that codes for that enzyme. If I conclude that the pharmacological agent up-regulates that particular enzyme the peer review process will put me straight back in my box as the limitations of the methodology I used are not consistent with the conclusions drawn. So I'd be told to either:
1. Temper my conclusions to indicate that the pharmacological agent upregulates the expression of the gene in question alone or
2. Perform more studies to look at whether the increased gene expression is translated into more protein and/or whether there is increases enzymatic activity.
When using the scientific method you cannot draw conclusions that go beyond the inherent limitations of the methods used.
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Wrong again - the limitations I am talking about are inherently part of the scientific process and any conclusions drawn from studies.
So - to use an example:
I, as a scientist have a hypothesis that a particular pharmacological agent up-regulates a particular enzyme, so I perform a study and I measure (using PCR) the expression level of the gene that codes for that enzyme. If I conclude that the pharmacological agent up-regulates that particular enzyme the peer review process will put me straight back in my box as the limitations of the methodology I used are not consistent with the conclusions drawn. So I'd be told to either:
1. Temper my conclusions to indicate that the pharmacological agent upregulates the expression of the gene in question alone or
2. Perform more studies to look at whether the increased gene expression is translated into more protein and/or whether there is increases enzymatic activity.
When using the scientific method you cannot draw conclusions that go beyond the inherent limitations of the methods used.
More epistemology, not science. The philosophical base of science is about the axioms you assume that allows it to work. They are not in themselves science.
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More epistemology, not science. The philosophical base of science is about the axioms you assume that allows it to work. They are not in themselves science.
They are inherently part of the scientific method, which is, of course, the very underpinning of science.
Weirdly when I send a scientific research paper to a journal they send it off for scientific peer review, not epistemological peer review. Why do you think that might be NS? Perhaps because the limitations etc are an inherent and integral part of the scientific method and therefore are inherent and integral to the science itself.
Why on earth do you think us researchers spend hours diligently reporting the materials and methods in papers - including the source and catalogue numbers of every reagent we use, the make and model of every piece of equipment we use. This is, partly because it allows the study to be repeated, but also inherently our conclusions are bounded by the limitations associated with the exact materials and methods used. So we are effectively saying 'these are the results we got with this cell line using this culture medium' - which provides the caveat that you might get different results if you used a different cell line or different culture medium.
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They are inherently part of the scientific method, which is, of course, the very underpinning of science.
Weirdly when I send a scientific research paper to a journal they send it off for scientific peer review, not epistemological peer review. Why do you think that might be NS? Perhaps because the limitations etc are an inherent and integral part of the scientific method and therefore are inherent and integral to the science itself.
Why on earth do you think us researchers spend hours diligently reporting the materials and methods in papers - including the source and catalogue numbers of every reagent we use, the make and model of every piece of equipment we use. This is, partly because it allows the study to be repeated, but also inherently our conclusions are bounded by the limitations associated with the exact materials and methods used. So we are effectively saying 'these are the results we got with this cell line using this culture medium' - which provides the caveat that you might get different results if you used a different cell line or different culture medium.
The scientific method is philosophy. When you are doing science it's the basis of how you carry it out, and what science is. Why on earth would you send scientific work to a philosophy journal?
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The scientific method is philosophy. When you are doing science it's the basis of how you carry it out, and what science is.
I've covered this with JP - sure you can argue that everything is philosophy, including science. But the basic discussion here is that science and philosophy are distinct (hence whether philosophers need to understand more science and vice versa).
So we can argue whether science is philosophy and that will get us nowhere in the current discussion. However, it is absolutely beyond doubt that the scientific method is absolutely central to science.
Why on earth would you send scientific work to a philosophy journal?
I don't - I send my scientific research to scientific journals that base their assessment of the research on whether or not it adheres to the scientific method. While they may once have been seen to be one and the same we now accept that science and philosophy are different disciplines. You will find those academic disciplines and their research in different faculties within most universities, for obvious reasons.
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I've covered this with JP - sure you can argue that everything is philosophy, including science. But the basic discussion here is that science and philosophy are distinct (hence whether philosophers need to understand more science and vice versa).
So we can argue whether science is philosophy and that will get us nowhere in the current discussion. However, it is absolutely beyond doubt that the scientific method is absolutely central to science.
I don't - I send my scientific research to scientific journals that base their assessment of the research on whether or not it adheres to the scientific method. While they may once have been seen to be one and the same we now accept that science and philosophy are different disciplines. You will find those academic disciplines and their research in different faculties within most universities, for obvious reasons.
On the level of epistemology science cannot be distinct from philosophy. None of what you have been doing in this thread is science.
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On the level of epistemology science cannot be distinct from philosophy. None of what you have been doing in this thread is science.
Which would make the starting comments for this element of the discussion (e.g.):
'Are you suggesting thar [sic] scientists should know more about philosophy?'
Becomes pointless, or effectively:
'Are you suggesting that philiosophers should know more about philosophy?' - which basically makes no sense.
Oh by the way - that's your quote NS. Throughout this thread we have assumed that philosophy and science are distinct and that philosophers are not scientists and that scientists are not philosophers (not least you). And that is the accepted modern understanding of the different disciplines.
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Which would make the starting comments for this element of the discussion (e.g.):
'Are you suggesting thar [sic] scientists should know more about philosophy?'
Becomes pointless, or effectively:
'Are you suggesting that philiosophers should know more about philosophy?' - which basically makes no sense.
Oh by the way - that's your quote NS. Throughout this thread we have assumed that philosophy and science are distinct and that philosophers are not scientists and that scientists are not philosophers (not least you). And that is the accepted modern understanding of the different disciplines.
That the scientific method is based on epistemology doesn't mean that all of philosophy is summed up in the scientific method. And it doesn't mean that there isn't an activity that cannot be described as doing science.
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That the scientific method is based on epistemology doesn't mean that all of philosophy is summed up in the scientific method. And it doesn't mean that there isn't an activity that cannot be described as doing science.
But the term epistemology wasn't even coined until the mid 19thC, while the scientific method dates back millennia - so how can it be based on a concept that wouldn't be defined for thousands of years.
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But the term epistemology wasn't even coined until the mid 19thC, while the scientific method dates back millennia - so how can it be based on a concept that wouldn't be defined for thousands of years.
If things not being named meant that they weren't happening then the 'scientific method' doesn't date back millennia.
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If things not being named meant that they weren't happening then the 'scientific method' doesn't date back millennia.
It would still date back further than epistemology.
And if we are talking about being used without necessarily being named as such then still the scientific method pre-dates epistemology. There are written records reporting the scientific method that are from over 1000 years before philosophical consideration of epistemology (as it was later coined) started to emerge.
But in reality the history of the scientific method almost certainly goes way further back than this, as it is, in essence, a form of systematic trial and error to determine what works and what doesn't work. So this can be traced back to early human evolution.
So, no NS, the scientific method is not based on epistemology. Indeed without the innovations based on rudimentary scientific methods of early humans I doubt any later philosophers would have had the luxury of sitting around discussing the nature of knowledge as a philosophical discipline.
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It would still date back further than epistemology.
And if we are talking about being used without necessarily being named as such then still the scientific method pre-dates epistemology. There are written records reporting the scientific method that are from over 1000 years before philosophical consideration of epistemology (as it was later coined) started to emerge.
But in reality the history of the scientific method almost certainly goes way further back than this, as it is, in essence, a form of systematic trial and error to determine what works and what doesn't work. So this can be traced back to early human evolution.
So, no NS, the scientific method is not based on epistemology. Indeed without the innovations based on rudimentary scientific methods of early humans I doubt any later philosophers would have had the luxury of sitting around discussing the nature of knowledge as a philosophical discipline.
This sort of reductionism of the scientific method does down your own discipline. And if working out how to make fire is the scientific method, then thinking fire is a good thing to have is philosophy.
Again none of what you are discussing here is science. You are talking about science philosophically.
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This sort of reductionism of the scientific method does down your own discipline.
No it doesn't - of course our methods have become much more sophisticate over time, but the basic concepts of systematic experimentation and repeatability have been there all along.
And if working out how to make fire is the scientific method
When it involves a systematic trial and error approach that leads to a repeatable method to be able to start a fire in a manner which has utility, then yup that's the scientific method.
, then thinking fire is a good thing to have is philosophy.
See what you did there NS - you've expanded epistemology to be all of philosophy, when it is, of course merely a small branch of philosophy. Sure the early humans may have considered fire to be a good thing, although I'm not sure even then that would represent philosophy (which requires study, rather than just an opinion on something), but I doubt very much they'd have been sitting around enjoying their fire and debating the nature of knowledge.
Again none of what you are discussing here is science. You are talking about science philosophically.
Nope, wrong again - we are discussing whether early humans used an early form of the scientific method to innovate, e.g. to create fire, tools, pigments, agriculture. And sure they did - they were early scientists.
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No it doesn't - of course our methods have become much more sophisticate over time, but the basic concepts of systematic experimentation and repeatability have been there all along.
When it involves a systematic trial and error approach that leads to a repeatable method to be able to start a fire in a manner which has utility, then yup that's the scientific method.
See what you did there NS - you've expanded epistemology to be all of philosophy, when it is, of course merely a small branch of philosophy. Sure the early humans may have considered fire to be a good thing, although I'm not sure even then that would represent philosophy (which requires study, rather than just an opinion on something), but I doubt very much they'd have been sitting around enjoying their fire and debating the nature of knowledge.
Nope, wrong again - we are discussing whether early humans used an early form of the scientific method to innovate, e.g. to create fire, tools, pigments, agriculture. And sure they did - they were early scientists.
I don't disagree that humans were doing a form of science, but as covered on that basis they were also doing philosophy. You seem emotionally invested in some need to have science as the primary form of knowledge but that you are treating it as knowledge means you are exactly doing epistemology.
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I don't disagree that humans were doing a form of science, but as covered on that basis they were also doing philosophy. You seem emotionally invested in some need to have science as the primary form of knowledge but that you are treating it as knowledge means you are exactly doing epistemology.
Nope - epistemology is a philosophical study of the nature of knowledge - if someone derives knowledge from a basic scientific experiment and then records and uses that knowledge - that isn't epistemology as they aren't actively studying the nature of that knowledge. If I use language that doesn't mean I am engaging in linguistic study.
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Nope - epistemology is a philosophical study of the nature of knowledge - if someone derives knowledge from a basic scientific experiment and then records and uses that knowledge - that isn't epistemology as they aren't actively studying the nature of that knowledge. If I use language that doesn't mean I am engaging in linguistic study.
Since you aren't doing science, and you are talking about knowledge and its meaning, what would you classify it as?
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Since you aren't doing science, and you are talking about knowledge and its meaning, what would you classify it as?
But we aren't discussing whether you and I might do epistemology - we are discussing whether early humans having worked out how to reliably start and safely maintain fire through embryonic scientific experimentation then sat down to discuss the nature of knowledge as a philosophical study. Somehow I doubt it.
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Since you aren't doing science, and you are talking about knowledge and its meaning, what would you classify it as?
Nope I don't think I am - if I discuss the way in which knowledge may be derived via science and how it may then be used, I am discussing science. I don't agree that I am engaging in philosophical study about the nature of knowledge.
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Nope I don't think I am - if I discuss the way in which knowledge may be derived via science and how it may then be used, I am discussing science. I don't agree that I am engaging in philosophical study about the nature of knowledge.
I note you didn't answer the question. What is knowledge, or science, without definition?
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I note you didn't answer the question. What is knowledge, or science, without definition?
But using a definition isn't the same as studying the nature of that definition. You really don't seem to understand the difference.
I come back to my analogy - I can use language (and in doing so accept the definition of what language is and how it can be used) without engaging in linguistic study.
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But we aren't discussing whether you and I might do epistemology - we are discussing whether early humans having worked out how to reliably start and safely maintain fire through embryonic scientific experimentation then sat down to discuss the nature of knowledge as a philosophical study. Somehow I doubt it.
In terms of 'doing' philosophy or 'science', they weren't doing either as we might talk about it today. The issue is that in doing embryonic experimentation, they were were making embryonic assumptions about what knowledge was and how to check it.
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But using a definition isn't the same as studying the nature of that definition. You really don't seem to understand the difference.
I come back to my analogy - I can use language (and in doing so accept the definition of what language is and how it can be used) without engaging in linguistic study.
I pointed out the problems with that so repeating it is not useful
In order to talk about science you need some form of idea of knowledge, and why science is useful. It's not a random activity, and to give it value, you have to at some level understand why you are doing it.
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I pointed out the problems with that so repeating it is not useful
In order to talk about science you need some form of idea of knowledge, and why science is useful. It's not a random activity, and to give it value, you have to at some level understand why you are doing it.
For crying out loud NS - having an idea of what knowledge is isn't the same as a philosophical study of its nature. The point about epistemology is that it is about studying the nature of knowledge which isn't the same as the knowledge itself. If I study how the eye works that is ophthalmology - a discipline based on study. If I accept the definition of an eye and use my eyes to gain knowledge, I am not engaging in ophthalmology.
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For crying out loud NS - having an idea of what knowledge is isn't the same as a philosophical study of its nature. The point about epistemology is that it is about studying the nature of knowledge which isn't the same as the knowledge itself. If I study how the eye works that is ophthalmology - a discipline based on study. If I accept the definition of an eye and use my eyes to gain knowledge, I am not engaging in ophthalmology.
And where would you have the idea of 'knowledge' from?
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And where would you have the idea of 'knowledge' from?
What on earth do you mean the idea of knowledge NS. Obtaining and using knowledge is not the same as studying its nature. I guess if I spent my research time ruminating over the idea or nature of knowledge then I'd be an epistemologist. But I don't - I used prior knowledge to derive hypotheses and then use robust methods to test those hypotheses to generate new knowledge. That's why I'm a scientist not an epistemologist.
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More epistemology, not science.
So what? How you choose to label it makes no difference to the correctness of what PD is saying.
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So what? How you choose to label it makes no difference to the correctness of what PD is saying.
And yet labelling something as science is entirely dependent on that approach.
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So what? How you choose to label it makes no difference to the correctness of what PD is saying.
NS is a bit like Vlad at times - continually arguing over obscure philosophical terms and moving goalposts rather than simply accept that he is wrong.
The notion that science is somehow in hock and dependent on the obscure branch of academic philosophy that is epistemology is frankly a bonkers proposition.
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NS is a bit like Vlad at times - continually arguing over obscure philosophical terms and moving goalposts rather than simply accept that he is wrong.
The notion that science is somehow in hock and dependent on the obscure branch of philosophy that is epistemology is frankly a bonkers proposition.
So I take it you think jeremyp was bonkers in writing " Science is what happens when philosophers start testing their ideas in the real world. Science is a natural outgrowth of philosophy" in reply 4 on the thread?
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So I take it you think jeremyp was bonkers in writing " Science is what happens when philosophers start testing their ideas in the real world. Science is a natural outgrowth of philosophy" in reply 4 on the thread?
There you go NS - you've done it again. Narrowed your focus on epistemology when it suits your purposes and then broaden it out to the whole of philosophy when you wish. You really are just like Vlad in your approach.
In the post you are replying to I was referring to the narrow backwater within philosophy which is the philosophical sub, sub, sub-discipline of epistemology. Hence:
'The notion that science is somehow in hock and dependent on the obscure branch of academic philosophy that is epistemology is frankly a bonkers proposition.'
I also completely accept that science was once considered to be a sub-discipline of philosophy (see reply 14), but in modern times (and by modern I mean centuries) they have been considered to be distinct disciplines. And in the context of the early post on this thread where the discussion was about whether scientists should learn more philosophy or philosophers should learn more science - then that can only make any sense if they are considered to be distinct disciplines.
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There you go NS - you've done it again. Narrowed your focus on epistemology when it suits your purposes and then broaden it out to the whole of philosophy when you wish. You really are just like Vlad in your approach.
In the post you are replying to I was referring to the narrow backwater within philosophy which is the philosophical sub, sub, sub-discipline of epistemology. Hence:
'The notion that science is somehow in hock and dependent on the obscure branch of academic philosophy that is epistemology is frankly a bonkers proposition.'
I also completely accept that science was once considered to be a sub-discipline of philosophy, but in modern time (and by modern I mean centuries) they have been considered to be distinct disciplines. And in the context of the early post on this thread where the discussion was about whether scientists should learn more philosophy or philosophers should learn more science - then that can only make any sense if they are considered to be distinct disciplines.
When science grew put of philosophy, as you now accept, then there wasn't a division called epistemology but the question of knowledge was what was being addresses. So just as those earlier scientists were doing science without the scientific method' as defined in the 16th and 17th century, so those early philosophers were looking at the philosophy of knowledge before the term epistemology became a 'branch'.
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When science grew put of philosophy, as you now accept, ...
I never said that science grew out of philosophy - I said that science was once considered to be a branch of philosophy. That isn't the same thing at all.
There is a pretty strong argument that during the very earliest evolution of humans, those humans were engaging in primitive science - using a systematic approach to gain knowledge on what worked and what didn't work. Were those early human ancestors engaging in philosophy - who knows - much harder to find archeological evidence of what people were thinking rather than what they were doing in a practical sense.
So I think it is pretty hard to say which came first - I'd probably argue that philosophical discourse would be a second order need which would come along after the practical first order needs that would be addressed by the earliest scientific endeavours (which generated tools, agriculture, effective methods for hunting etc, etc) which are more survival based.
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I never said that science grew out of philosophy - I said that science was once considered to be a branch of philosophy. That isn't the same thing at all.
There is a pretty strong argument that during the very earliest evolution of humans, those humans were engaging in primitive science - using a systematic approach to gain knowledge on what worked and what didn't work. Were those early human ancestors engaging in philosophy - who knows - much harder to find archeological evidence of what people were thinking rather than what they were doing in a practical sense.
So I think it is pretty hard to say which came first - I'd probably argue that philosophical discourse would be a second order need which would come along after the practical first order needs that would be addressed by the earliest scientific endeavours (which generated tools, agriculture, effective methods for hunting etc, etc) which are more survival based.
What constitutes knowledge is a practical first order need.
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So just as those earlier scientists were doing science without the scientific method' as defined in the 16th and 17th century, so those early philosophers were looking at the philosophy of knowledge before the term epistemology became a 'branch'.
Except, of course, there is documented evidence from as long ago as 1600BE of the scientific method being used and reported. And this is just written records - the basic proposition of the scientific method - make a prediction, test it in a systematic way, make observations and analyse what happened and draw conclusions - was happening way earlier than that, even if not written down as such.
The scientific method didn't emerge in the 16th and 17thC - far from it
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What constitutes knowledge is a practical first order need.
Once again you are confusing the acquisition and use of knowledge (definitely first order in terms of human survival) with the philosophical study of the nature of knowledge. As interesting as the latter may be, you don't need to study the nature of knowledge to be able to acquire and use knowledge.
I come back to my language analogy - early humans will have acquired and used language in a manner that had utility - without any need to study the nature of language, i.e. linguistics.
You seem to be arguing the equivalent of saying that somehow you cannot have language and its utility until after you have linguistics. And that somehow linguistics, rather than language, is what confers first order survival advantage.