The free-will argument for the existence of God

[ippy]

Why not? Of all the mental processes we have, belief is one of the least consciously driven - you can't choose to believe something, you either believe it or you don't, it's an entirely subconscious process.

A freedom you've not established actually exists.

The 'you're stupid' school of argument rarely wins.  If you wish to demonstrate that freedom to contemplate belief is not a logical impossible then please, finally, explain how something can be both free of prior events and at the same time not random - that's the logical impossibility you're attempting to split, and which has been called out repeatedly.

Which, equally, extends to you not being able to claim that consciousness cannot be a purely mechanistic eventuality arising from brain activity because you can't imagine it working like that.

The problem with you 'just knowing' that reality is that someone else can equally 'just know' an entirely contradictory one...

O.

This post of yours Outlander is far to rational for Alan to give you an answer.

Regards, ippy.

[torridon]

Just to sum up:

If our perception of the freedom to consciously choose and drive our own thought processes is a reality, then it is evidence of the supernatural, because there is no natural explanation for such freedom to exist.

So in order to support the denial of anything supernatural, you would have to deny the existence of human free will.

So does the truth lie in our perception of reality, or in the outcome of a human ability to think up ways to deny the supernatural.   But where does this ability come from?  What drives it?

We can easily deny both free will and the supernatural since 1) there is no evidence for either, and 2) both concepts are inherently irrational and as such are beyond empirical investigation.

Just suppose we park the irrational nature of the free will claim for a moment, and consider what science would have to do to come up with empirical evidence in favour of free will.  The experiment might go something like this:

Sit a test subject down and ask him/her to choose a piece of fruit from the basket; maybe he goes for an apple, say.

Next, after ten seconds, put the arrow of time into reverse, wind the entire cosmos back 10 seconds and then let time run forward again.

If the test subject chooses a different fruit from the basket second time around, then you might argue you have discovered empirical evidence for free will.

Clearly we cannot do this, free will is bound to remain forever a speculation without any supporting evidence.  And even if the subject did choose a pear the second time around, it would be argued that, there being no reason for the change of choice given all conditions are identical, the choice is random.

You cannot get away from the bare fact, that a choice requires a reason.  For it not to be a random event, a choice must be a consequential outcome of the reason(s) that led to it.
 

[Alan Burns]

We can easily deny both free will and the supernatural since 1) there is no evidence for either, and 2) both concepts are inherently irrational and as such are beyond empirical investigation.

Such acts of denial are in themselves obvious evidence of our conscious freedom to choose to contemplate what is being denied and reach such a conclusion. (even though it is an obviously wrong conclusion!)

Just suppose we park the irrational nature of the free will claim for a moment, and consider what science would have to do to come up with empirical evidence in favour of free will.  The experiment might go something like this:

Sit a test subject down and ask him/her to choose a piece of fruit from the basket; maybe he goes for an apple, say.

Next, after ten seconds, put the arrow of time into reverse, wind the entire cosmos back 10 seconds and then let time run forward again.

If the test subject chooses a different fruit from the basket second time around, then you might argue you have discovered empirical evidence for free will.

Clearly we cannot do this, free will is bound to remain forever a speculation without any supporting evidence.  And even if the subject did choose a pear the second time around, it would be argued that, there being no reason for the change of choice given all conditions are identical, the choice is random.

I fully agree that this rather trivial, hypothetical scenario does not in any way give insight to our ability to consciously drive our own thought processes.

You cannot get away from the bare fact, that a choice requires a reason.  For it not to be a random event, a choice must be a consequential outcome of the reason(s) that led to it.

Yes, and the primary reason for any conscious choice is defined by our conscious will.  Where we seem to differ is in our interpretation of what causes our conscious will.  You appear to presume it to be absolutely defined by past events.  I believe it to be defined by our conscious awareness of past events coupled with our conscious freedom to choose how to react to past events.

[torridon]

Such acts of denial are in themselves obvious evidence of our conscious freedom to choose to contemplate what is being denied and reach such a conclusion. (even though it is an obviously wrong conclusion!)

It is evidence of freedom only in the trivial compatibilist sense of freedom from coercion.  It is not evidence for free will in any profound sense.  This was the whole point of reply #26.  Real evidence for free will is impossible to come by as I illustrated in the example given.

[torridon]

I fully agree that this rather trivial, hypothetical scenario does not in any way give insight to our ability to consciously drive our own thought processes.Yes, and the primary reason for any conscious choice is defined by our conscious will.  Where we seem to differ is in our interpretation of what causes our conscious will.  You appear to presume it to be absolutely defined by past events.  I believe it to be defined by our conscious awareness of past events coupled with our conscious freedom to choose how to react to past events.

So, how do you choose how to react ? Merely saying that we are 'free' to choose does not say how choice is made. How do you choose how to react ?

[torridon]

Yes, and the primary reason for any conscious choice is defined by our conscious will.  Where we seem to differ is in our interpretation of what causes our conscious will.  You appear to presume it to be absolutely defined by past events.  I believe it to be defined by our conscious awareness of past events coupled with our conscious freedom to choose how to react to past events.

Firstly, our conscious will cannot be its own cause.  That makes no sense.  If I want to eat an apple, it is not because I want to eat an apple.  Secondly, 'freedom' is not a cause, it is an absence of a restriction.  The choice of how to react must have a cause otherwise it is a random event.  So, how do you resolve the choice given that 'freedom' and 'consciousness' are not causes ?

[Stranger]

I fully agree that this rather trivial, hypothetical scenario does not in any way give insight to our ability to consciously drive our own thought processes.

It does actually. As a thought experiment, rewinding time does exactly what a thought experiment should do: it exposes logical problems. In this case the obvious contradiction at the heart of your simplistic assertions about "freedom".

If you claim that we'd always choose the same way, then minds must be fully deterministic (entirely the result of cause and effect). If you claim we could choose differently, then there can be no reason for the difference, so we have a random element.

That is the reason why you choose refuse to think about it.

[Stranger]

Such acts of denial are in themselves obvious evidence of our conscious freedom to choose to contemplate what is being denied and reach such a conclusion. (even though it is an obviously wrong conclusion!)

No they are not - at least they are not evidence of your (contradictory) claims about what "freedom" means.

It rather looks, from this assertion (and many previous similar ones), that your "argument" for your claims about freedom amounts to "well, it's obvious, innit?" Well, no Alan, it isn't - you need to establish it.

[Samuel]

I did it without sarcasm, but I had no choice in the matter...

O.

Oh Outrider, you do make me chuckle.