NS,
So for the sake of clarity, what you ate trying to justify is that you know that the 'world' is non purposive.
I know that as much as I know that gravity isn’t done by pixies, yes. And I know that because of the falsity of the arguments for a purposive world and the robustness of the arguments for a non-purposive world.
Your case seems to be there are known thresholds for knowledge in physics which you have not applied, and it's not clear can be applied to justify this.
No it doesn’t. You asked about thresholds for the status of knowledge and I gave you an example used in particular field. For the most part most people have to decide these things on the fly though – when crossing a road and deciding whether they know the speed of oncoming vehicles for example – or, as here, by evaluating the justifying arguments and treating the outcome as evidence.
That though those thresholds haven't been applied, they are just like basic empiricism, and mean whether the 'world' is non purposive is just like crossing the road.
Actually it isn’t, because I don’t evaluate the arguments for whether my belief that the approaching traffic won’t run me over is well-founded – a quick look and some likely mostly subconscious processing is enough for that purpose. I’m sufficiently confident nonetheless that I do know what I think I know about that that I will cross the road on that basis. And so, presumably, will you.
Concluding that I have sufficient evidence to justify a claim of knowing the world to be non-purposive on the other hand comes from reviewing the arguments for and against.
The point here is that there isn’t just one method for justifiably claiming to know something. I know the traffic won't run me over largely intuitively; I know the world is non-purposive largely through reasoning; I know the Higgs-Boson is real because I (or at least other people who understand these things) applied the five-sigma threshold test etc.
That though you accept there can be rational belief that isn't knowledge,…
What are you trying to say here? Rational reasoning applied to a proposition produces information, which we can (and generally do) call “knowledge”.
…you know that the 'world' is non purposive because it's much easier to measure even though you haven't measured it or shown that it can be, than what horse will win the 4.30 at Kempton.
I can’t make any sense of this. I know that that the world is non-purposive for the reasons I’ve explained to you: the falsity of the arguments that it isn’t and the robustness of the arguments that it is.
That I'm lying about rating my understanding of warped space time as not great.
As not great what?
That when I dismiss an explanation as not knowledge apt, I am somehow saying it is knowledge apt and valid.
You’re straw manning me here. If you think a proposition is “not knowledge apt” that doesn’t thereby imply a sort of epistemological equivalence between the truth claims of the knowledge apt and of the non-knowledge apt propositions. In that case if the arguments for the knowledge apt proposition are robust that’s the end of that matter because there’s nothing to consider about the non-knowledge apt proposition. This isn’t a claim that the non-knowledge apt proposition isn’t true though – instead it’s
a priori knowledge that the non-knowledge apt proposition
isn’t a proposition to start with – it’s just white noise.
That if you have 2 explanations, which still don't contradict outcomes, clash I somehow need knowledge of warped space time to trust getting on a plane. Just like I need to understand quantum physics to not sit on a chair.
First, you need to decide whether or not you’re still trying the “non-knowledge apt argument”. If you are, it’s not an “explanation” to begin with. Rhetorical white noise can’t be an explanation.
Second, just no. That’s not what I was saying at all. You criticised me for not applying a strict method to decide whether I could claim to have knowledge about something and in response I merely explained that we all decide that we know things all the time without doing that, and moreover that we’re so confident that we do indeed know the things we think we know that we risk our lives on being correct about that.
That looking at a general concept non purposive/purposive as regards the 'world', you can say you know it's non purposive by suggesting a non knowledge apt purposive 'explanation' and dismissing that.
You’ll need to unscramble that if you want me to make sense of it. I think I’ve set out before and above though pretty clearly what I actually think and why though. The point here remains: you would say that you "know" instinctively that the oncoming traffic won't run you over if you cross the road. If pressed, you would also say that you know that because because traffic moves in accordance with consistent physical laws and forces - ie, you could argue your way to a justification. If I claimed that trolls actually were pushing the traffic and that they could accelerate the cars at 1,000 mph at will you'd be so confident in your knowledge that I was either producing white noise or wrong that you'd cross the road anyway. How so if, according to you, such claims to knowledge aren't justified?