Vlad,
It's the hard problem of materialism, physicalism and naturalism Hillside.............how do you get from the methodological to the philosophical?
Oh dear. No it isn’t.
Think of reality as an epistemic onion. At the centre is an “ultimate” reality – the be all and end all final explanation for everything. Whether there
is such a thing, let alone how you, I or even a god would know we’ve found it is another matter but go with it.
The next layer out is the material – matter and forces. We know about it because we appear at least to experience it, and what’s more we agree on its content because it’s investigable with intersubjective experience. Thus if one of us clams that an apple will fall downwards and the other that it’ll fly sideways we can wait until Autumn and see who’s right.
Thus we have a pragmatic, working model for reality that in turn gives us mobile ‘phones and jumbo jets and medicines. There is though no need to validate that model by finding a path to the centre of the onion – it works just fine as it is, and no-one (except apparently the physicalist) would bother to claim otherwise (which is essentially the straw man you attempt at this point).
Now picture another epistemic layer out – the immaterial. On that layer sits your god, the Muslim god, Ra, leprechauns, and any other unfalsifiable conjecture anyone may care to believe in. The reason they sit outside the first layer is that they’re not investigable with intersubjective experience – they’re just claims. Your claim for what “God” thinks and does is as valid or invalid as anyone else’s, as it would be for Ra. There is other words no way to connect that layer to the next layer in.
Importantly by the way, a key difference is in the claims that can be
excluded from each layer. On the first, material layer, the claim "the apple will fly sideways" can be excluded. On the second layer though, there's no way to exclude any claim. If you think, "but that's my faith" is a good reason for including your belief, then it must also be a good reason for including any other belief too.
What actually happens though is that those who populate that layer with their faith beliefs typically then proceed to skip the next layer in, and to go straight to the centre with claims of ultimate truths – “the ground of all being” and all that.
In other words, the “hard problem” you think you’ve identified is only a hard problem if you want to position materialism/naturalism at the centre of the onion. Not only does no-one much do that though, it’s not necessary to establish the epistemic difference between the first layer and the second one.
And
that’s why the Wiki citation you thought would help you actually blew you out of the water. As you just ignored it, here it is again:
“Assuming naturalism in working methods is the current paradigm, without the unfounded consideration of naturalism as an absolute truth with philosophical entailment, called methodological naturalism.[ The subject matter here is a philosophy of acquiring knowledge based on an assumed paradigm.
Did you notice the “without the unfounded consideration of naturalism as an absolute truth with philosophical entailment” and the, “The subject matter here is a philosophy of acquiring knowledge based on an assumed paradigm” there?
That’s the point, and that’s where you keep going wrong.