Vlad,
Here's your problem first of all we have here the danger of a bottom up establishment of events taking place.
Were I an atheist that might ''shit me up something bad.''
“Bottom up” is how epistemology works. The type or content of the claim can’t be back-fitted to change that. It’s you’re, “OK, a small dragon would be daft, but a really big one on the other hand…” problem.
Because for one thing I am speaking about general things like methodology and supernatural. So I can dismiss Christianity from the start on the precepts of my beliefs on the supernatural. That is not particularly satisfactory.
No, you dismiss the factual claims of Christianity on the ground that there are no cogent arguments to support them.
Secondly,…
“Secondly…”?
Key miracles...example could a virgin birth happen and could it be methodologically established as a virgin birth? Well yes because we know it is both physically possible and methodologically establishable.
We know neither of those things. What on earth are you smoking these days?
So...we have to be careful in saying what physical phenomenon...and a person once dead and risen would be a physical phenomenon...can physically happen.
No, all we have to be careful about is claiming as facts things we cannot know to be true – about the supernatural for example.
Polkinghorne points out that miracles could be improbable events.
Yes, but lots of events are improbable without overreaching into claims of the supernatural. If you want to call those events "miracles", that's up to you.
What cannot be established is the divine as Polkinghorne points out.
Finally! So if can’t be “established”, why assert it anyway?
A logical materialist would see my point since life is due to arrangement of the physical.
Have you finally changed sides or something? Yes, a materialist works on the assumption that the world is material.
What can't be established would be the reason for it or the divinity of it. That is a different dimension.
“Reason" and “divinity” are not the same thing, and asking for a reason is begging the question: you’d have to establish
first a something to determine the reason, which immediately gives you the problem of the reason for that “something” being there too.