AB,
But complexity and interconnectivity in themselves do not define conscious awareness.
You’re still getting confused here by using the term “define”. The evidence (from global workspace models, from multiple drafts theory, from dynamic core studies, from information integration theory, from thalamocortical rhythms, from neural coalitions, from field models, from subcortical models, from internal simulation and self-modelling, from sensorimotor theory, and from various other cognitive models) is that emergence is the best supported
model we have for how consciousness comes about. Models don’t "define" in the sense that they provide a complete parts list and working diagrams – they just model.
If you think you have a model that
better fits the available data though, by all means present it.
Any property emerging from the activity of material components is just a perceived complexity or functionality as seen from an outside observer.
Wrong. The “self-“ of “self-aware” is the critical part here. No “outside observer” is necessary for a
self-aware system. That’s the point.
It does not exist an an entity in its own right.
Yes it does, or at least that’s what the evidence suggests (see above).
The content of my many brain cells is perceived by a single conscious entity, which I assume to be my spiritual soul.
But that's an unnecessary and logically fundamentally flawed assumption that you cannot moreover "define" (or even model)
at all.
In computers, the content of the central processor and memory can produce programmed reactions, but at no point in the process is there anything which constitutes awareness - everything just comprises individual reactions, and the whole process and end results can be perceived only in human conscious awareness, so any property emerging from the computer process is only seen in human perception. Outside human perception, it is just lots of individual reactions.
Whether it’s “just lots of individual reactions” is moot, but either way it’s irrelevant. Essentially you’re saying here the equivalent of, “an abacus cannot produce spreadsheets or e-mails, therefore a calculating machine could never do that”.
You fail utterly in other words to grasp the significance of huge increases in complexity and interconnectedness, and of the potential they have to produce emergent properties by magnitudes more sophisticated than those that emerge from simpler systems.