Searching for GOD...

[wigginhall]

It is not troubling - just a logical conclusion.

Because all the evidence (in particular on this forum) indicates that we have the freedom to choose what we write.

And this freedom can't be defined by unavoidable physical reactions.

I don't think that's correct, actually, but I appreciate that your mind is well and truly closed to any other point of view, so there's not much point in exploring it.   

[floo]

If you leave out the spiritual, you are left with unavoidable chain reactions of physical events.  And every criminal will have a cast iron alibi - nature did it!

Like some religious people use god as their excuse, for things which aren't of benefit to the human race.

[wigginhall]

Interesting idea in Kant that thinking and imagination enable humans to conceive of reality as different from what it appears to be.   This is obvious - I can easily imagine being a woman, or being Austrian, or not being born.    Hence we can re-think things, and act accordingly.   However, this is not the same as AB's version of 'free will stems from the soul', since that ability to re-think need not be attributed to the soul.    Occam's razor again.

[torridon]

It makes no difference to you because you assume that there is nothing else but physical.  In order to break into the predictable chains of physical cause and effect to facilitate our conscious ability to choose, you need something which derives from the non physical.  Otherwise our choice is not a choice - just an inevitable reaction.

Is gravity physical ?  I'm not denying gravity, but it nonetheless follows the principles of cause and effect as far as we know. I think you are using terms like 'non-physical', or 'spiritual' as euphemisms to avoid facing up to logic. If there is some other realm of reality, 'spiritual', then it would be incomprehensible if cause and effect does not operate there. Without cause and effect, there can be no meaning.

[bluehillside Retd.]

AB,

It is not troubling - just a logical conclusion.

No, it’s an illogical one. Just calling your conjectures “soul”, “spiritual” etc doesn’t somehow break them out of the rules of logic. “Not deterministic and not random” is no more coherent than “four-sided triangle”.

Because all the evidence (in particular on this forum) indicates that we have the freedom to choose what we write.

No, “all the evidence” suggests the opposite of that. What it also suggests though is the appearance of “free” will.

And this freedom can't be defined by unavoidable physical reactions.

Yes it can because your premise is false.

Ultimately all you have here is an argumentum ad consequentiam – “I don’t like the idea that “free” will isn’t the way it feels, therefore I need to invent a logically incoherent entity to break the chain of cause and effect”, which is hopeless thinking. 

[bluehillside Retd.]

Wiggs,

So it's deterministic.

And circular. He's trying to arrive at the conclusion "soul" by using soul as his premise.

[Walt Zingmatilder]

“free” will isn’t the way it feels,

Why then does it feel like free will? If free will is an illusion what is it an illusion of? Isn't free will being faced with choices?

Your move Muddy.

[Maeght]

Why then does it feel like free will? If free will is an illusion what is it an illusion of? Isn't free will being faced with choices?

Your move Muddy.

It feels like free will because we are not aware of the process going on when making an apparently free choice.

The illusion is that the process is free rather than being predetermined by previous experiences.

Free will is being able to make choices which are not predetermined by previous experiences.

Fairly obvious answers I'd have thought.

[bluehillside Retd.]

Fallacy Boy,

Why then does it feel like free will? If free will is an illusion what is it an illusion of? Isn't free will being faced with choices?

Your move Muddy.

It’s illusory because to be “free” in the sense that AB would really like it to be it would have to step outside anything we know about the observable universe. That’s why he has to invent a little man at the controls he calls “soul”, apparently oblivious to the problem that all that would do would be to transfer the same to problem to that little man. His only way out of that is essentially “it’s magic”, but that doesn’t get him off the hook of incoherence nonetheless.

Incidentally, I notice that your “Isn’t God great, now let me tell you all about my personal beliefs about Him” thread is still locked down. Was it something you said?   

[Walt Zingmatilder]

It feels like free will because we are not aware of the process going on when making an apparently free choice is made.

The illusion is that the process is free rather than being predetermined by previous experiences.

Free will is being able to make choices which are not predetermined by previous experiences.

Fairly obvious answers I'd have thought.

Not really. What is the feeling of free will for?
Just like what is the feeling that we are a conscious self for?
If it is an illusion of free will then aren't we merely illuded into something that notionally exists. Rather like an illusion of unicorn could be a horse with its nose up and a church steeple behind it.
What I mean is that the illusion is a composite of the real. What then is the illusion of free will a composite of?
Secondly, you are not taking into account that we have a choice in new experiences. We make choices in the context of new unexperienced situations.

[Walt Zingmatilder]

I notice that your “Isn’t God great, now let me tell you all about my personal beliefs about Him” thread is still locked down. Was it something you said?

I'm surprised you've declared that's what I meant particularly when I put my grounds in the opening post of that thread.

I was just interested in your terms and sought some explanation from you......The triumph of hope over experience you might say.

[torridon]

Not really. What is the feeling of free will for?
Just like what is the feeling that we are a conscious self for?....

I think these two things are intimately connected, and you are right to describe them as 'feelings'. As to what they are 'for', that is something we can explain in terms of  evolutionary mechanisms - a creature that develops a strong sense of self and ownership of its decision making is at an advantage over a similar creature that experiences no such sense of agency or a lesser sense of selfhood.

[bluehillside Retd.]

Fallacy Boy,

Not really.

Yes really.

What is the feeling of free will for?

It’s “for” the practical expediency of surviving without the massive investment that would be needed to see what’s under the bonnet in real time.

And what it’s for is irrelevant to the facts of the matter by the way.

Just like what is the feeling that we are a conscious self for?

See above.

If it is an illusion of free will then aren't we merely illuded into something that notionally exists. Rather like an illusion of unicorn could be a horse with its nose up and a church steeple behind it.

In comprehensible English?

What I mean is that the illusion is a composite of the real. What then is the illusion of free will a composite of?

The real.

Secondly…

“Secondly”? You need a “firstly” first.

…you are not taking into account that we have a choice in new experiences. We make choices in the context of new unexperienced situations.

Doh! The subconscious doesn’t need to have every possible circumstance pre-programmed to function: “That’s a black cat, therefore I know what it is. Wait – what the hell is that white furry thing with a collar and a bell? Yikes!”

We’re talking theory of mind here, not SatNav devices. 

[torridon]

Secondly, you are not taking into account that we have a choice in new experiences. We make choices in the context of new unexperienced situations.

We experience novel situations, but we still deal with them through the same neurological mechanisms, based on biology which is based on chemistry and physics.  The mechanisms of choice are deterministic.

[bluehillside Retd.]

Fallacy Boy,

I'm surprised you've declared that's what I meant particularly when I put my grounds in the opening post of that thread.

I was just interested in your terms and sought some explanation from you......The triumph of hope over experience you might say.

Don't be - I knew what you meant because you tried to shut down Gordon for not accepting at face value the speculations in your reply. It was just an extended reification fallacy.   

[Walt Zingmatilder]

I think these two things are intimately connected, and you are right to describe them as 'feelings'. As to what they are 'for', that is something we can explain through evolutionary mechanisms - a creature that develops a strong sense of self and ownership of its decision making is at an advantage over a similar creature that experiences no such sense of agency or a lesser sense of selfhood.

So what is not real about a sense of self? I'm afraid i'm with Searle when he states the sense of self IS that which needs explaining, that this is unexplained while Dennett and his little wizards have 'explained it away' and are ignoring it. If a mirage is an illusion of water what is the self an illusion of?

[Walt Zingmatilder]

Fallacy Boy,

Don't be - I knew what you meant because you tried to shut down Gordon for not accepting at face value the speculations in your reply. It was just an extended reification fallacy.   

No I think there is space for the short sharp answer. Gordon's subsequent use of rhetoric was not in the spirit of the thread, We could have spun his objections and his need for antitheist rhetoric onto another thread but he declined.

[Maeght]

Not really. What is the feeling of free will for?

Why should it be for anything?

If it is an illusion of free will then aren't we merely illuded into something that notionally exists. Rather like an illusion of unicorn could be a horse with its nose up and a church steeple behind it.
What I mean is that the illusion is a composite of the real. What then is the illusion of free will a composite of?

No idea.

Secondly, you are not taking into account that we have a choice in new experiences. We make choices in the context of new unexperienced situations.

Of course I am. For any new experience reference is still made to previous experiences which determine what choic we make. We then learn from what happens as a result of that and this determines what we do the next time we are in that situation. If a choice is truly free then it is random and I see no evidence of that. How would free will actually work and not be random?

[torridon]

So what is not real about a sense of self? I'm afraid i'm with Searle when he states the sense of self IS that which needs explaining, that this is unexplained while Dennett and his little wizards have 'explained it away' and are ignoring it. If a mirage is an illusion of water what is the self an illusion of?

I think it is illusory in at least two ways. 

1. The self feels like a thing, something with a separate ontology to the body that creates it, hence personhood, hence Cartesian dualism, hence the little man at the controls.
2. It feels like a singular thing, whereas in reality it is a composite thing with no central defining quality of 'me', but rather multiple impulses that are constantly in competition and cooperation with each other.  David Hume had a nice analogy of a twisted rope - the sense of self has the strength and integrity of a twisted rope but there is no single strand that defines the rope; together they make it up something that is greater than the sum of the parts.

[Walt Zingmatilder]

We experience novel situations, but we still deal with them through the same neurological mechanisms, based on biology which is based on chemistry and physics.  The mechanisms of choice are deterministic.

How can you have a mechanism for something novel?

That is a non rhetorical question.

[bluehillside Retd.]

Fallacy Boy,

No I think there is space for the short sharp answer.

Yes there is, but your rambling one that just assumed its terms wasn’t one of them.

Gordon's subsequent use of rhetoric was not in the spirit of the thread, We could have spun his objections and his need for antitheist rhetoric onto another thread but he declined.

No, all he did was to ask you to demonstrate your premises. As “the spirit of the thread” was that others played along with your reification it was about as helpful as my starting a “Questions for leprechaunists” thread that had lots of answers with “because leprechauns…” in them.

Apart from that though…

[bluehillside Retd.]

Fallacy Boy,

How can you have a mechanism for something novel?

That is a non rhetorical question.

Sadly, I believe you. Processes and methods precisely deal with the novel. If a turquoise tiger was discovered tomorrow I'm pretty sure we'd figure out fairly quickly what it was.

[Walt Zingmatilder]

I think it is illusory in at least two ways. 

1. The self feels like a thing, something with a separate ontology to the body that creates.................................

Which is why it would not compute to a physicalist who would then have to scrub about for the nearest if inadequate descriptor i.e. illusion. But it is that which is THE THING IN QUESTION and as Searle has pointed out the thing which Dennett avoids because it does not compute to his flavour of materialism etc.
....again what is the illusion of free will an illusion of? If a mirage is an illusion of water what are illusions of self and free will illusions of?

[Walt Zingmatilder]

Fallacy Boy,

Sadly, I believe you. Processes and methods precisely deal with the novel. If a turquoise tiger was discovered tomorrow I'm pretty sure we'd figure out fairly quickly what it was.

Since their is nothing novel about turquoise and tiger of course we would figure it out but it's appearance would not constitute anything like a choice so this post as with the majority of  handwaving is non sequitur.

[bluehillside Retd.]

Fallacy Boy,

Since their is nothing novel about turquoise and tiger of course we would figure it out...

But the combination would be novel. Perhaps if you told us what you think you mean by "novel" that would help?

Either way though, the point is that methods and processes are tools that deal with the novel and no pre-programming of every possible circumstance is necessary for those tools to work functionally well.
 

...but it's appearance would not constitute anything like a choice...

Of course it would. The choices would come from the various processes we employed to work out its taxonomy.

...so this post as with the majority of  handwaving is non sequitur.

"Handwaving" is just one of your various capitulations when you can't engage with the reasoning that undoes you, and your misuse of non sequitur tells me that you still have no idea what it actually means.