Vlad,
Methodological empiricism fine, Philosophical empiricism? Where and what is the support for it?
(Wearily)…yet again…
First, “philosophical empiricism” doesn’t mean what you think (or claim) it means. What you’re thinking of is called
physicalism – “the metaphysical thesis that "everything is physical", that there is "nothing over and above" the physical, or that everything supervenes on the physical” (
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physicalism). No-one that I know of argues for physicalism.
Second, materialism confines itself only to distinguishing demonstrable truths claims from non-demonstrable truth claims. Thus it tells us that using a parachute will enable you to land safely so “parachutes work” is a demonstrable truth, whereas “praying to god will cause him to fly me safely down” is just a non-demonstrable truth claim.
The first category of truths are called “objective” (ie, true for everyone), the second “subjective” (ie, true only for the person who believes them). This distinction works perfectly well with no appeal to universal or absolute realities.
Your cheat is to misdescribe empirically verified objective truths as requiring universal or absolute veracity, and when that can’t be shown to reduce both truth types (objective and subjective) to epistemic equivalence. Laying waste to the epistemological difference like this is sometimes called “going nuclear”. As well as being wrong in itself, in permitting your god it also permits unicorns, Jack Frost and any other conjecture that pops into anyone’s head. This alone should give you pause.
You won’t engage with any of this of course (you never do) but at least you have no excuse for pretending that it hasn’t been explained to you.
Again.