AB,
There is no definition of how consciousness can emerge from neurological activity.
Of course there’s a “definition” of that – just look it up. What you’re trying to say here is that the explanation is
incomplete – which is true, but doesn’t help you at all.
All there is is an observed correlation.
But correlation alone does not define conscious awareness.
Even for you this is depressingly dim-witted. What you’re groping toward here is Hume’s problem of induction, codified as the
post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy: no matter how many times we observe that B follows A, we cannot with certainty know that B is caused by A.
Here’s where you go wrong though: all truths are
probabilistic. The evidence that women give birth to babies for example is substantial, but we cannot know absolutely that it’s not invisible hypnotising storks that do it. Nonetheless, the statement “women have babies” is sufficiently true enough to be useful.
Still with me? Good. Now consider the axiom, “if it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it probably is a duck.” Can you see how that works? If the only evidence available to you implies “duck”, then it’s reasonable to proceed on the basis that you’re looking at a duck.
Now here’s what’s happening here: the evidence for consciousness as an emergent property of neurological activity is the "women have babies"/“if it looks like a duck” etc type. It’s substantial, cogent and coherent and, absent any evidence of any sort for any other explanation, it’s reasonable therefore to proceed on that basis. You on the other hand just dismiss all the “looks like a duck” evidence for consciousness (or attempt solecisms like, “there’s no definition of how a quacking thing could be a duck”), and tell us it’s the equivalent of a gryphon instead.
I have no confidence you will understand or engage honestly with any of this, but it remains your problem nonetheless.