Searching for GOD...

[ProfessorDavey]

I don't think you have to be a theist to propose real emergence rather than universal resultancy.

So you've now coined your own term to try to define emergence as only being real if it fits your exceptionally narrow, and highly contested (and actually non-sensical) definition.

As far as I am concerned emergence and emergent properties occur when an entity is observed to have properties its parts do not have on their own, properties or behaviors that emerge only when the parts interact in a wider whole. Nothing more, nothing less - as per the standard definition.

It doesn't matter one jot whether we have been able to predict the emergent property from understanding of the distinct properties of the component parts and an understanding of how those component parts. Regardless of whether we have that understanding the property is still emergents. Still less does it matter whether we theoretically can predict the emergent property from understanding of the distinct properties of the component parts and an understanding of how those component parts given sufficient knowledge and predictive power. That is a completely sterile argument and totally irrelevant to whether we consider a property to be emergent or not.

[Walt Zingmatilder]

So you've now coined your own term to try to define emergency as only being real if it fits your exceptionally narrow, and highly contested (and actually non-sensical) definition.

As far as I am concerned emergence and emergent properties occur when an entity is observed to have properties its parts do not have on their own, properties or behaviors that emerge only when the parts interact in a wider whole. Nothing more, nothing less - as per the standard definition.

It doesn't matter one jot whether we have been able to predict the emergent property from understanding of the distinct properties of the component parts and an understanding of how those component parts. Regardless of whether we have that understanding the property is still emergents. Still less does it matter whether we theoretically can predict the emergent property from understanding of the distinct properties of the component parts and an understanding of how those component parts given sufficient knowledge and predictive power. That is a completely sterile argument and totally irrelevant to whether we consider a property to be emergent or not.

I use the term real emergence to distinguish something which cannot be explained purely in terms of its components from the use of emergence to mean a resultant which hasn't yet been explained purely in terms of it's components.

Of course reductionist should be allowed to continue their work on consciousness.

Whether those who conflate the emergent with the resultant, or eliminativists should be allowed within a mile of the topic is a different issue.

Now that we are aware of the subtlety here let's not see unqualified use of the term Emerge or emergents are just resultant.

I find my self in the position of Searle who is/was prepared to receive a confirmed reductionist verdict on consciousness but pointed out that we are not at that point.

And with that I shall remove myself from this thread on consciousness one that I have said I've no real horse in.I only intervened when I saw the suggestion that  emergence is just sexed up resultant.

[ProfessorDavey]

I use the term real emergence to distinguish something which cannot be explained purely in terms of its components with the use of emergence to mean a resultant which hasn't yet been explained purely in terms of it's components.

Completely inappropriate coining of terms. Clearly by using real you are implying that everyone that doesn't meet you criteria are not real.

But what you have argued for is that real emergence simply does not exist as (similar to Popper's black swan) you can never prove that something cannot be explained purely in terms of its components. You can have something that has been explained purely in terms of its components (the equivalent of finding a black swan), you can have something which hasn't yet been explained purely in terms of it's components (the equivalence of not finding a black swan yet), but that doesn't mean it cannot. But you cannot prove that something cannot be explained purely in terms of its components as that presumes we know everything about the nature and properties of the components and have the theoretical predictive power to assess all interactive permutations. It is the equivalent of concluding that black swans cannot exist because you've only ever seen white swans.

But while theoretically interesting all this is irrelevant to discussion of emergence.

Something is emergent regardless of whether you can explain the emergent properties in terms of the component parts or not. All that is required for emergence and emergent properties is for an entity to have properties its parts do not have on their own, properties or behaviors that emerge only when the parts interact in a wider whole.

[Alan Burns]

This is the simple truth:
Whatever "emerges" from physically controlled material reactions can have no influence over the reactions from which it emerges.  So in order to believe that our conscious awareness is nothing more than an emergent property, you would have to concede that everything in your conscious awareness is already determined before we become aware of it.  So in this scenario, we can have no conscious control over our choices, thoughts, beliefs or conclusions.   Bluehillside keeps telling me that this is the inevitable conclusion we should come to if we just think about it.  The irony is that our ability to consciously think about it disproves the conclusion.

[ProfessorDavey]

This is the simple truth:
Whatever "emerges" from physically controlled material reactions can have no influence over the reactions from which it emerges.

That is complete non-sense. There are numerous examples of 'feedback' process by which reaction A affects component B in such a manner that component B controls reaction A. Happens all the time in biology.

[Walt Zingmatilder]

This is the simple truth:
Whatever "emerges" from physically controlled material reactions can have no influence over the reactions from which it emerges.  So in order to believe that our conscious awareness is nothing more than an emergent property, you would have to concede that everything in your conscious awareness is already determined before we become aware of it.  So in this scenario, we can have no conscious control over our choices, thoughts, beliefs or conclusions.   Bluehillside keeps telling me that this is the inevitable conclusion we should come to if we just think about it. 

Yes, he would have thought about it as a reductionist physicalist

[Sebastian Toe]

Yes, he would have thought about it as a reductionist physicalist

Have you thought about Alan's soul hypothesis/conjecture/theory/obvious fact?
Do you buy into the soul controlling the physical brain, in real-time whilst itself is residing outwith our spacetime and connecting to our brain via quantum tunneling?

[Walt Zingmatilder]

Have you thought about Alan's soul hypothesis/conjecture/theory/obvious fact?

No not recently

Do you buy into the soul controlling the physical brain, in real-time whilst itself is residing outwith our spacetime and connecting to our brain via quantum tunneling?

Can I come back to you with me thoughts?

[Sebastian Toe]

No not recently Can I come back to you with me thoughts?

Sure.
Back from where though? The Soul-realm?

[Walt Zingmatilder]

Sure.
Back from where though? The Soul-realm?

The Twiglet zone. Where Twiglets emerged from marmite and biscuit but the whole is greater than the sum.

[ProfessorDavey]

Yes, he would have thought about it as a reductionist physicalist

BHS can answer for himself, but I doubt he spent much time contemplating what a reductionist physicalist might think. Indeed I think you are the only person interested in reductionist physicalism in the slightest.

I suspect BHS bases his view on the available evidence.

[Gordon]

The Twiglet zone. Where Twiglets emerged from marmite and biscuit but the whole is greater than the sum.

I've 'twigged' it, Vlad: you've secretly joined us on secondment from the Twilight Zone (which explains a great deal).

[Walt Zingmatilder]

I've 'twigged' it, Vlad: you've secretly joined us on secondment from the Twilight Zone (which explains a great deal).

LOL....seconded from the Twilight zone to The Outer Limits.

[Walt Zingmatilder]

Completely inappropriate coining of terms. Clearly by using real you are implying that everyone that doesn't meet you criteria are not real.

But what you have argued for is that real emergence simply does not exist as (similar to Popper's black swan) you can never prove that something cannot be explained purely in terms of its components. You can have something that has been explained purely in terms of its components (the equivalent of finding a black swan), you can have something which hasn't yet been explained purely in terms of it's components (the equivalence of not finding a black swan yet), but that doesn't mean it cannot. But you cannot prove that something cannot be explained purely in terms of its components as that presumes we know everything about the nature and properties of the components and have the theoretical predictive power to assess all interactive permutations. It is the equivalent of concluding that black swans cannot exist because you've only ever seen white swans.

But while theoretically interesting all this is irrelevant to discussion of emergence.

Something is emergent regardless of whether you can explain the emergent properties in terms of the component parts or not. All that is required for emergence and emergent properties is for an entity to have properties its parts do not have on their own, properties or behaviours that emerge only when the parts interact in a wider whole.

I rather think K. Godel and C.D. Broad would beg to differ with you. The trouble with your statement is that the term emergent covers two contradictory ideas, one where the property is irreducible to and not deducible from it's components or previous organisational level and one where it is the resultant of all lower levels. In the second definition the word emergent is redundant since there is a more apt expression which definitionally covers the described phenomenon i.e. A resultant.

No amount of appropriation, word piracy or casual use of terms can eliminate the plane fact that the Emergentist definition better describes a property that isn't part of ''the sea'' of properties that it emerges from and floats on or that the word resultant is better than the word emergent if the property is explicable in terms of it's components.   

As I have said there is a burden on you to demonstrate that all emergent entities are resultants/ deducible from their components or lower levels of organisation.

[ProfessorDavey]

I rather think K. Godel and C.D. Broad would beg to differ with you.

I doubt they would actually Vlad - for the simple reason that both have been dead for over 40 years, indeed Broad has been dead for over 50 years.

And of course in those 40-50 years our evidence-based knowledge of the working of the brain and neuroscience, and indeed our understanding of the universe has moved forward hugely. So understandably their views while alive are clearly outdated as they cannot take account of new evidence and any serious scholar must be prepared to change their views as new evidence arises.

Ah, but here is the rub - both Godel and Broad seem to have a rather detached relationship to evidence, both seemingly prefer to based their views on un-evidenced presumption. So in the case of Broad, his long-standing presidency of the Society for Psychical Research (there being no evidence for the paranormal of psychic phenomena) suggests he played fast and loose with the importance of evidence. Similarly Godel claimed that his philosophy was theological, therefore based on a presumption that god exists and, of course there is no credible evidence that god exists.

[ProfessorDavey]

As I have said there is a burden on you to demonstrate that all emergent entities are resultants/ deducible from their components or lower levels of organisation.

There is no burden on me to do anything of the sort.

My view is that emergence and emergent properties occur when an entity is observed to have properties its parts do not have on their own, properties or behaviors that emerge only when the parts interact in a wider whole. Nothing more, nothing less - as per the standard definition.

I make no claim about deducibility or otherwise so there is no onus on me to demonstrate that all emergent entities are deducible from their components - they might be, they might not - makes no difference to whether they are emergent.

On resultants - well the standard definition is such that properties in the wider whole that are the sum (or other cumulative) of similar properties in the component parts are not emergent. So it would be non-sense to expect me to demonstrate that emergents are resultants as my definition is clear that they are not.

Now back to deducible - now you are the one that is making the claim that emergent properties somehow cannot be deducible - so over to you to justify that claim, which, as I have pointed out previously, is completely non-sensical.

[Walt Zingmatilder]

There is no burden on me to do anything of the sort.

My view is that emergence and emergent properties occur when an entity is observed to have properties its parts do not have on their own, properties or behaviors that emerge only when the parts interact in a wider whole. Nothing more, nothing less - as per the standard definition.

I make no claim about deducibility or otherwise so there is no onus on me to demonstrate that all emergent entities are deducible from their components - they might be, they might not - makes no difference to whether they are emergent.

On resultants - well the standard definition is such that properties in the wider whole that are the sum (or other cumulative) of similar properties in the component parts are not emergent. So it would be non-sense to expect me to demonstrate that emergents are resultants as my definition is clear that they are not.

Now back to deducible - now you are the one that is making the claim that emergent properties somehow cannot be deducible - so over to you to justify that claim, which, as I have pointed out previously, is completely non-sensical.

One wonders why then you suggested that those who consider they maybe indeducible are not Sane.

The view that all properties may be resultant has the same burden that the view that some may not be resultant carries.

Broad puts forward an argument that some non resultant properties are possible. That  just needs proof in logic.

And there is I belief an argument based on the B theory of time but not the A theory.

[Walt Zingmatilder]

I doubt they would actually Vlad - for the simple reason that both have been dead for over 40 years, indeed Broad has been dead for over 50 years.

very droll

And of course in those 40-50 years our evidence-based knowledge of the working of the brain and neuroscience, and indeed our understanding of the universe has moved forward hugely. So understandably their views while alive are clearly outdated as they cannot take account of new evidence and any serious scholar must be prepared to change their views as new evidence arises.

Science has moved on but it has not settled the resultant question. In fact, satisfaction with reductionism and resultancy seems to have diminished. Science then remains merely methodologically reductionist. Also you are here making the fallacy of modernity

Ah, but here is the rub - both Godel and Broad seem to have a rather detached relationship to evidence, both seemingly prefer to based their views on un-evidenced presumption. So in the case of Broad, his long-standing presidency of the Society for Psychical Research (there being no evidence for the paranormal of psychic phenomena) suggests he played fast and loose with the importance of evidence. Similarly Godel claimed that his philosophy was theological, therefore based on a presumption that god exists and, of course there is no credible evidence that god exists.

That looks like a ''If he's wrong on one thing he's wrong on all things argument'' In fact the argument you make is very Godelian saying as it does that no theory of Godel's is unaffected by the wrongness of religion''. You have also committed the genetic fallacy here. Stop misrepresenting them by suggesting that science has demonstrated or even advocates universal resultancy. That is not the case. Here is the litmus test. How has science disproved Godel? How has it disproved Broad on emergence? Since the question is to do with emergence and not psychicism?
If Broad's logic on emergence is sound then any 'psychical' work is neither here nor there. You might as well ignore Newton for his theology or Kepler or James Clerk Maxwell or Oliver Lodge.

 So we await your Debunking of that logic as well as Godel's. Until we have that, all we have is your allegations and a dubious association with Bluehillside, his ad hominising and his eliminationism.

[ProfessorDavey]

very droll

But also absolutely critical.

Anyone making assertions 4-50+ years about cause/effect and emergence linked to brain function and/or the universe cannot take account of the huge advances in our knowledge and understanding of these topics. Therefore their views are of limited value compared to people who are actually up to date on our understanding of the matters. It isn't their fault, of course, that they died 40-50 years ago but that doesn't alter the fact that their views are based on understand far behind where we are now.

[ProfessorDavey]

One wonders why then you suggested that those who consider they maybe indeducible are not Sane.

I've explained my views on indeducibility (is that even a word!).

If in practice - i.e. we currently don't know whether there is a link - then it is merely an argument from ignorance.

If in theory - then it either falls foul on Popper (how do you know that you have all the information you need to determine a link in the same manner as how do we know we've looked everywhere for a black swan) or is an appeal to the supernatural.

Both are non-sense arguments.

[bluehillside Retd.]

AB,

This is the simple truth:…

So far at least every time you’ve claimed a “simple truth”, a “plain truth” etc what’s actually followed with has been just your reason- and evidence-denying bias for a religious narrative you happen to find comforting. Let’s see whether you can do better this time though….
 

Whatever "emerges" from physically controlled material reactions can have no influence over the reactions from which it emerges.  So in order to believe that our conscious awareness is nothing more than an emergent property, you would have to concede that everything in your conscious awareness is already determined before we become aware of it.  So in this scenario, we can have no conscious control over our choices, thoughts, beliefs or conclusions.

“Physically controlled material reactions” is wrong, but you’re finally on the right lines. Keep going.

Bluehillside keeps telling me that this is the inevitable conclusion we should come to if we just think about it.  The irony is that our ability to consciously think about it disproves the conclusion.

…and then you fell apart again. I’ve explained to you countless times why you’re wrong about this (“our ability to consciously think about it” is exactly how you’d expect the illusion of “free” will agency to feel) without rebuttal (just repeating the initial mistake isn’t a rebuttal) so let’s try something else instead. Consider the following two statements:

A. This morning I saw the Loch Ness Monster.

B. This morning I saw the ghost of the Loch Ness Monster.

Can you see why B is more problematic than A? No matter how unlikely you might think the LNM to be, to establish the ghost of the LNM you’d not only have to establish that there is (or was) an LNM but also that there are ghosts. This is what you’re trying here: you (presumably) think the material explanation for consciousness to be just as unlikely as the LNM existing, but now you have to establish a whole extra category of speculation to justify your answer “soul”.   

And that actually is a “simple truth”.     

[Walt Zingmatilder]

But also absolutely critical.

Anyone making assertions 4-50+ years about cause/effect and emergence linked to brain function and/or the universe cannot take account of the huge advances in our knowledge and understanding of these topics. Therefore their views are of limited value compared to people who are actually up to date on our understanding of the matters. It isn't their fault, of course, that they died 40-50 years ago but that doesn't alter the fact that their views are based on understand far behind where we are now.

OK. What developments in Neuroscience disprove Godel...or the logical argument on emergence of C.D. Broad found here:

 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/broad/

[Walt Zingmatilder]

I've explained my views on indeducibility (is that even a word!).

If in practice - i.e. we currently don't know whether there is a link - then it is merely an argument from ignorance.

If in theory - then it either falls foul on Popper (how do you know that you have all the information you need to determine a link in the same manner as how do we know we've looked everywhere for a black swan) or is an appeal to the supernatural.

Both are non-sense arguments.

I think the statement ''all properties are resultant'' fails Popper and ''Black Swan'' or the induction problem.

It also suggests that we will know these...that's scientism. What if we cannot know these?How do we distinguish between never knowing and not all properties are resultant? 

[ProfessorDavey]

OK. What developments in Neuroscience disprove Godel...or the logical argument on emergence of C.D. Broad found here:

 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/broad/

There you go:

"Broad prefers to capture this in epistemic terms: an emergent property of a whole is a property that it is impossible to logically infer from even the most complete knowledge of the properties of the parts of the whole"

By his own definition what we consider to be even the most complete knowledge of the properties of the parts changes over time as we gain more knowledge and understanding. What fitted those criteria 40-50 years ago are not the same as the information that fulfils those criteria now. And indeed this will be different again in another 40-50 years time.

And, as I've pointed out until I'm blue in the face, if this is some theoretical 'we know everything' how can we ever know that we know everything and that the little extra that is still to be known is the key to understanding the relationship between the properties of the parts and the emergent property of the whole.

But, once again - this is all irrelevant - I don't accept Broad's narrow philosophical position on emergence - I consider that emergence and emergent properties occur when an entity is observed to have properties its parts do not have on their own, properties or behaviors that emerge only when the parts interact in a wider whole. Nothing more, nothing less - as per the standard definition. It is, therefore, completely irrelevant as to whether or not, we have (or indeed we can) determine the link between the properties of the parts and the properties of the whole.

Going back to my example - our understanding of the basic chemistry of individual phospholipid molecules and how they interact in an aqueous environment means that we can readily predict that they will interact to form a lipid bilayer that will have the properties of selective permeability and compartmentalisation. That doesn't change the conclusion that those properties are emergent - they are because they exist in the whole, but not in the component parts.

[ProfessorDavey]

I think the statement ''all properties are resultant'' fails Popper and ''Black Swan'' or the induction problem.

Who is making that claim Vlad - certainly not me.

Some properties are resultant - e.g. ability to withstand tensile strain in a collagen microfibril, or within a multi stranded rope.

Other properties are emergent - e.g. selective permeability and compartmentalisation in a lipid bilayer.