NS,
You don't appear to understand Occam's Razor,…
At this stage I appear to understand Occam’s razor better than you do. It simply states that an explanation that requires fewer assumptions is more likely to be correct than an explanation that requires more assumptions. A non-purposive world explanation requires fewer assumptions than a purposive world explanation because the latter also needs a purposive agent (or agents, whether supernatural or not). That’s why the gravity vs pixies example is fine: for the latter to be true, you’d have to establish first that pixies even exist at all before concerning yourself with whether or not they could be causing gravitational effects.
…and it's a bit odd when replying to a post where I pointed out the supernatural is unimportant to the position, that it's unimportant to the position.
You were the one who raised the issue of supernaturalism. I merely explained why it’s irrelevant, and by the way why there was no more a category error than there is in the “a good man is as hard to find as a needle in a haystack” analogy notwithstanding that needles and men are in different categories too.
I'll go back to a question asked earlier which you ignored. What would the difference be to us between a non purposive 'world' and a purposive world that we couldn't know the purpose of?
And I’ll go back to the answer that you seem to have missed. There would be no more observable difference than there would be if invisible pixies caused gravity and yet, like me, you believe you “know” that gravity isn’t caused by invisible pixies. How so?
You're confused by the idea that there might be some things that we might not be able to know into thinking that would mean we could know nothing.
No, you’re confused by your wrongheaded idea that
any claim to knowledge could be undone by a “but what if?” question, because that would mean no possibility of
anything being a legitimate claim to knowledge. You seem to have fallen into the same trap that Vlad has essayed here so many times, namely that a claim of truth (or knowledge about the truth) is an absolute, rather than a statement that a claim is true/knowledge only insofar as it’s supported by the evidence – “evidence” meaning only the contemporaneously available facts and information.
It seems to me that the application of Occam’s razor (among other things) to the claim of a purposive world or of pixies equally produces information, and that information is therefore evidence for the purpose of justifying a claim of knowledge. Your seem to disagree with this, but I don’t know why. Nor do I know how, following your reasoning,
any claim to knowledge could ever be justified.