Hi Enki,
Sorry I haven't replied sooner. Been quite busy over the weekend.
That's ok I often go long periods of being too busy to reply as this last gap is testament to.
I never entered this discussion either in this thread or the original one to state that OM can't exist, but to show the flaws in Alan's arguments(especially the ones predicated on his TACTDJFF example) that OM must exist. Of course there are differing opinions on this, and atheists being a disparate bunch, some would take an entirely different position to me. I find that no problem at all.
fair enough. I've also tried to give a different interpretation of what I think Alan was saying than was being represented by Ht et al but we've done that to death I think and I have mounted enough of my own defence of OM now to leave Alan's argument to rest, unless he decides to rejoin the discussion. theists are a disparate bunch to and the version of moral realisms relationship with God I have sketched is not the standard one.
I have suggested that the ideas inherent in evolution can account for our sense of morality. If you wish to go further and suggest that these moral ideas have a basis in a morality which is extraneous to human thinking, no problem at all. However, to convince me, some sort of evidence is needed that this is so. I suggest that evidence of the flavour of 'I have a strong, deep seated, intuitive feeling that X is right and Y is wrong' is not the evidence I am looking for. Perhaps I may put it this way. The fact that I live my life as if free will existed is not evidence that it actually does.
Well as per the first point I certainly think that the process of evolution is the medium for the development of our morality but if you go on to say its capable of accounting for the strong and universal sense of truth in human societies re morality then it incumbent on you to explain how. The same is true of the second bit of what you say here. Its correct that just because we think there is moral truth and just because we think there is free will, that that doesn't necessarily mean that there is, nevertheless our basic experience of the world are the starting point for any discussion on morality (or indeed free will) and if you think our deep intuitions are delusions its incumbent on you to say why and also how such illusions could have come to be so widely held. Even when this is done and if you had given a consistent account, that wouldn't give us a reason to prefer that account over a moral realist alternative unless there are compelling reasons to do so. You seem to want to place the burden of proof on the moral realist but that is the complete reverse of the case when you are claiming our core intuitions and experiences are delusions. What you are doing here is assuming a framework for interpreting the world is true (i.e. physicalism) and then speaking about some of the counter-intuitive implications of physicalism as if they are self-evident….but physicalism is itself an unprovable metaphysical perspective and not at all self evident. If physicalism is so compelling as to make us want to embrace conclusions that are hugely counter-intuitive and at odds with our experience of the world, then what evidence is so strong as to make us want to embrace such a view?
We have both agreed that any particular situation is not moral/immoral of itself. Therefore it has to be the human mind acting on such a situation that decides thus. I have suggested that it is quite reasonable to suggest that the morality/immorality of such a situation therefore exists solely in the human mind. Now, I accept that if one has a different world view, for instance that is quite feasible to think that the moral values which exist in our mind come from some sort of outside source(perhaps similar to the Platonic world of forms), then that too could be entirely possible. Unfortunately, for me, I repeat that I would have to have convincing evidence that this source actually exists. And, I don't.
No we haven't agreed that and if you think that you misunderstand. To be clear there are realists who believe moral truth is reducable to natural facts and there are realists who believe in morality existing in a platonic form but I have given a different account to either of those. I have argued that when we perceive morality in a situation its a result of our conception of the world and that this is to do with a particular way beings with particular faculties and the a particular balance of virtues will see the situation - nevertheless the moral truth isn't based just on the fact that they are perceived because of our conception (something in our minds) but because there is a right way to perceive the world. This ‘right way’ is based on teleological facts that are entirely independent of our conception - they are facts based on the flourishing of conscious beings. I introduced the idea of 'conception' in contrast to the naive view of facts and values as entirely distinct in response to Wiggs point about emotions and morality, not as the grounding for moral truth in itself.
My position is that in all sorts of areas (e.g. god, beauty, morality, spirituality) we often think we are right to believe that they have an existence(or not, as the case may be). My contention is that, unless there is actual solid evidence that they exist, then it is just as reasonable to suggest that they are products of the human mind.
The crux here is what does ‘evidence’ mean. Our perception of moral truth, God, etc are of epistemologically relevant forms of evidence for belief formation – it doesn’t mean they are necessarily true, but all of our perceptions form the evidential basis of our beliefs. Indeed if we are giving an account of morality (as we are) then the primary evidence of its correctness is its fit with morality as it exists and is experienced. If your theory can't do that adequately its a poor theory and in order to take the way we view morality is distorted then that's a pretty big claim - to make that claim you are drawing on a prior commitment to something that to you weighs more heavily than the facts about our moral experience and discourse, and it seems thats a commitment to physicalism.
Here I find myself a bit conflicted because I have tried to be fair to moral realim in a wider form than my own particular views and there are moral realists who are also physicalists and do not want to ground moral reality in God etc. nevertheless I do ground it in God and as no one else is arguing for the physicalist realist position here I'm not going to do that for them.
There's no doubt its true that the argument for morality can work the other way if you have a pre-commitment to physicalism and also believe that you can't give a physiicalist compatible account of morality:
1. Physicalism is true
2. You can't give an account of OM consistent with physicalism
3. Therefore morality is not objective.
Which is the trouble with forums like this as it almost always ends up with 2 sides with incompatible base commitments bumping heads. Nevertheless for anyone who did not start with such a prior ideological preclusion, a moral theory would be judged by its fit with our moral experience (and not with any claim to evidence that might resemble scientific evidence which is not appropriate to the subject matter) and if the implications of that contradict physicalism them that's all well and good.
In other words, we tend to think that our views at any given moment on a myriad of situations are the right ones. And, as you say, when we disagree with another view, we tend to think that it is we who have the 'right' answer, whether we do or not. I don't see this as a problem at all. For me, this is the way nature, through evolution, has created us.
Hold on, but it hasn't created this kind of error with our view of taste in music or marmite, why should it with morality? Human societies may have disagreed on the content of moral truth but they have agreed that there is a right answer. If this has been got wrong so fundamentally why on earth would that happen? Simply saying 'evolution did it' doesn't shed any light on this at all.
I do think that there are some similarities between questions of taste and those of morality. As I have already stated, questions of morality seem to have a much deeper emotional base, and therefore the rightness or wrongness of these is held with much greater conviction.(I would suggest, for powerful evolutionary reasons.)
I wouldn't suggest that our sense of moral truth is 'just an error' at all. It seems to be a mechanism which, despite its obvious problems of interpretation, basically welds societies together and allows humans to function within a social setting. In this sense, it seems to be largely a useful survival mechanism, rather than an 'error'. I would suggest that the very fact that whole groups/societies have, thoughout history, tended to construct their own moral laws, especially as regards an individual's behaviour within that group, shows what I would call the moral instinct at work.
But strength of emotion doesn't make it switch over into truth at some point...and if its still an emotional reaction without a right answer and so us implicitly thinking their is a right answer to moral questions IS a mistake however we try to dress it up. It also throws up other problems:
(1) Not all moral commitments are linked to huge emotional responses as we have seen, we can be quite dispassionate about moral decisions at times and indeed think things are morally required despite the emotional desire to do something else. Equally some of our taste preferences are incredibly strong but don't give rise to the same delusion of truth.
(2) If we had evolved emotional commitments to moral positions that are so strong that we couldn't distinguish them from truth claims, then how is it possible for other members of the same species who share our evolutionary history to have evolved a belief in conflicting moral positions? You paint our strength of commitment to morality as a 'general commitment' so powerful that it overpowers our ability to distinguish it from other forms of taste, yet apparently one society can slot into that 'X' and another 'not X' without any apparent need for the content of morality itself to be the point of commitment. This is deeply implausible.
....I don't stop thinking I feel that this is right or this is wrong simply because I also think that when I die, my moral attitudes die with me. I would suggest that similar moral feelings will live on after my death because, for reasons already given, I see the bases of these feelings to be an integral part of human minds.
Some moral realists may well agree -but they would distinguish between dependent on human minds meaning 'dependent on human perception' on one hand and 'dependent on human conception based on our shared capacities and faculties as a species' on the other. Re. the latter, these faculties are themselves facts about the universe independent of our beliefs about them and which provide a factual basis for human flourishing.
I don't, however, see moral instincts or feelings having some sort of objective existence outside of humanity(unless, of course you include the proto-morality of some animal species, or consider the viabilty of unknown aliens). Therefore, I see no reason to think that the consequences of not accepting OM will be any different to those that already exist.
well it makes a pretty big difference for the place of morality in our lives and our commitment to it to believe on one hand that what we are doing is right, and that we forge our lives in accordance with what is right.... and on the other to believe that our sense of right is after all reducible to a moral taste, however strongly held, which is neither right or wrong...a world in which, should my moral tastes have been different I would be equally 'right' to do the things I currently abhor.
I have enjoyed reading your replies, DT, but I think that I, at least, am beginning to simply go over old ground. so, unless anything new arises, I intend to leave it there. Thanks for the obvious care and commitment you have put into your responses. These have been very much appreciated.
Thanks Enki and me too its been a thoughtful exchange and no doubt we will continue to disagree about this and other matters. As your post was so considered I wanted to articulate an equally considered response.... nevertheless it may well be that you feel this provides nothing substantially new to respond to in which case thanks for the interesting discussion.
regards
DT
