I do not put forward the following view of my sense of morality as anything but my opinions on said subject. However I do suggest that I am being internally consistent by having such views.
1) I see morality as having an evolutionary basis.
2) I see no reason to think that the idea of evolution needs an outside agency such as a god for the process of evolution to work. Hence, I see no reason to think that morality needs any outside agency.
3) I accept that there is a 'potential' for morality, if it aids survival. However I see this as no different to any other 'potentials' such as the eye, movement, ability to breed, speed, strength, selfishness and a myriad of other characteristics of living things. I do not see these 'potentials' as having any outside existence in their own right, and, therefore do not regard them as objective in the sense of having an existence separate from the creatures which exhibit these characteristics.
4) I have a morality which I try to adhere to. For me, this is probably driven by such traits as empathy and natural feelings of co-operation and responsibility towards others. Culture, environment, experience, upbringing, and a rational approach, for me, superimpose upon those feelings, so that I attempt to give the most constructive outcome which would satisfy my original motivations. I do not see this as some 'distortion' of morality in any way. My morality seems entirely consistent with certain evolutionary motivations rather than reflecting some sort of morality which has an objective existence. Thus my sense of moral wrongness/rightness depends upon my own unique characteristics wedded to group characteristics via evolution.
5) I generally think and feel that I am correct in my moral thoughts and decisions, because that is the way in which I have evolved to think and feel. That is not to say that I can't make immoral decisions, but it would be odd, indeed, if I went around thinking that my moral thoughts and decisions were inherently wrong. However If it was demonstrated to me that some particular moral thought or action of mine was wrong, then I would try to analyse why it might be wrong, and if then I was convinced of this wrongness, I would try to adjust accordingly.
6) Moral thoughts and decisions can involve deep seated and natural emotions, often in relation to the extreme nature of a situation. Hence, in general terms, I would consider a brutal murder or a savage rape to be much more extreme than a small theft, for instance. Thus I would have a greater sense of condemnation for murder than theft. I find this to be entirely consistent with the evolutionary characteristics I referred to in point 4.
7) Because I am a member of an extremely social species, I see the need for group decisions as well as for valuing my own. Therefore, and especially, when I see social cohesion being threatened or undermined, I also understand the impulse for curtailing antisocial behaviour in myself and others. Conflict often arises from this attempt at balancing social/individual behaviour. I see this as entirely consistent with point 1 and point 4.
8 ) Once I die, my own motivations and feelings are no longer in existence. I might well hope that others may have the same sense of morality that I had, but it would be of no relevance to me as I no longer exist. In other words my sense of morality has died with me.
9) If all human beings died(and leaving aside the evidence for proto-morality in certain other animals) then, as I see it, there would be no such thing as morality actually existing, although the 'potential' for morality would not cease, given that evolution continues and that morality aids survival.
