Objective morality is independent of opinion....or is it?

[jakswan]

Situation S = Tom is TACTDJFF and has the instinct/opinions/emotion that its ok to TACTDJFF.
Proposition P1 = HT thinks what is morally right is determined by our instincts, opinions and emotions.
Proposition P2 = HT thinks Tom's act of TACTDFF is morally wrong and would be wrong for anyone.

S, P1 and P2 form an inconsistent triad. Therefore in situation S you have to either reject P1 (emotivist anti-realism) or reject P2. Unfortunately P2 reflects some deep seated aspects of our moral practice and discarding them would not leave our morality intact.

Reject P2, I think S is wrong however accept Tom has a different opinion.

[Andy]

Actually, that's partly the point I'm trying to make when only one factor is used to cover all situations. Saying things are done just for this and just for that, is unrealistic, as there are "often a huge range of morally relevant factors need to be weighed up when deciding what the right thing to do is, so it might be the right thing to do to do X in one situation and the wrong thing to do in another". My point is if you're going to try and argue for OM, then you require to incorporate the relevant factors, and not just one. In other words, be more specific.

Hi Andy, sorry I'm afraid I'm missing what your asking for here. I don't know what the 'one' is you refer to - do you mean the TACTDJFF situation?? If so as far as i'm concerned the point of this example is just to indicate some of our intuitions about moral truth. OM, in my view is about the virtues of character necessary for our flourishing. Right action is what a virtuous person would do after weighing up al the morally relevant factors in a situation.

The one factor I am referring to is "fun", as that is the only factor presented. As you point out, all relevant factors need weighing up, so if there is just one but it is phrased to cover all situations, then it negates there being just one factor.

I went down the infallible line to negate the belief of something always being right/wrong based on limited factors.

Ok well that's a red herring in terms of understanding what moral realists are claiming. Even many philosophers who believe in principles (as opposed to  particularists like me who do not) often don't believe they take the form 'X is always wrong' but rather 'x will always weigh negatively when considered in a calculation of about what the is the right thing to do'.

Well you're kinda shooting the messenger here, as I am just responding to what has been stated thus far, that being "X is always wrong".

[Dryghtons Toe]

This is why I don't like the Tactdjff example as it causes more confusion than clarity. The point of the example is that it reveals our moral instincts as something we would consider wrong for everyone regardless of what there views might be in all situations. However to say it is wrong even for someone who thinks it is ok is to contradict the view that what makes something 'right' is a persons emotional reaction or opinion about it(or even a societies view about it). If you took the latter (irrealist) view then the best you can consistently say is 'I disapprove of Tactdjff'. This however does not capture what we (or at least what most people as part of normal moral discourse) mean when we say something is wrong. Indeed it would significantly degrade our morality if it was reduced morality to such a weak claim.

[Dryghtons Toe]

Situation S = Tom is TACTDJFF and has the instinct/opinions/emotion that its ok to TACTDJFF.
Proposition P1 = HT thinks what is morally right is determined by our instincts, opinions and emotions.
Proposition P2 = HT thinks Tom's act of TACTDFF is morally wrong and would be wrong for anyone.

S, P1 and P2 form an inconsistent triad. Therefore in situation S you have to either reject P1 (emotivist anti-realism) or reject P2. Unfortunately P2 reflects some deep seated aspects of our moral practice and discarding them would not leave our morality intact.

Reject P2, I think S is wrong however accept Tom has a different opinion.

Which would be entirely consistent, but would also be abandoning central elements of human morality to fit a theory rather than find a theory that accurately describes morality.

[wigginhall]

I would guess that there are people who think it OK to torture kids for fun, e.g. Ian Brady.  Well, I can see the counter-argument immediately, that 'it is still wrong', even if someone thinks it good.   What's the next step in this ghastly spiral?  That opinion doesn't matter in the question of objective morality, even though we are asked for our opinion?!

+ also in reply to Enkis post:

Opinion doesn't matter in the case of objective morality. As Alan has clarified the reason he has asked for your opinion is to make the point that IF you think TACTJFF is wrong and wrong for everyone, then the fact that you think it is wrong for everyone is inconsistent with the statement 'what is morally right depends on the instincts/emotions/opinions of the person making them or social group they are part of'.

See inconsistent triad example in reply 281 above.

Regards

DT

But why does 'wrong for everyone' mean that it's objective?   I see it as morally wrong not because of Brady's opinions, feelings, and so on, but because of mine.   I've arrived at that view via a subjective process, not impersonally.   

[Nearly Sane]

Situation S = Tom is TACTDJFF and has the instinct/opinions/emotion that its ok to TACTDJFF.
Proposition P1 = HT thinks what is morally right is determined by our instincts, opinions and emotions.
Proposition P2 = HT thinks Tom's act of TACTDFF is morally wrong and would be wrong for anyone.

S, P1 and P2 form an inconsistent triad. Therefore in situation S you have to either reject P1 (emotivist anti-realism) or reject P2. Unfortunately P2 reflects some deep seated aspects of our moral practice and discarding them would not leave our morality intact.

Reject P2, I think S is wrong however accept Tom has a different opinion.

Which would be entirely consistent, but would also be abandoning central elements of human morality to fit a theory rather than find a theory that accurately describes morality.

since all we have with morality is currently opinion then it is accurately describing it. Classifying strongly held it or absolutely expressed opinion as some how indicative of it not being is mere opinion.

[Dryghtons Toe]

I would guess that there are people who think it OK to torture kids for fun, e.g. Ian Brady.  Well, I can see the counter-argument immediately, that 'it is still wrong', even if someone thinks it good.   What's the next step in this ghastly spiral?  That opinion doesn't matter in the question of objective morality, even though we are asked for our opinion?!

+ also in reply to Enkis post:

Opinion doesn't matter in the case of objective morality. As Alan has clarified the reason he has asked for your opinion is to make the point that IF you think TACTJFF is wrong and wrong for everyone, then the fact that you think it is wrong for everyone is inconsistent with the statement 'what is morally right depends on the instincts/emotions/opinions of the person making them or social group they are part of'.

See inconsistent triad example in reply 281 above.

Regards

DT

But why does 'wrong for everyone' mean that it's objective?   I see it as morally wrong not because of Brady's opinions, feelings, and so on, but because of mine.   I've arrived at that view via a subjective process, not impersonally.

By subjective process you are simply meaning that you decide...but that doesn't mean the claim you are making is subjective. I go through a subjective process of deciding whether I think the moon landings really happened or where faked, but the answer i come up with is still either right or wrong and is not dependent on my opinion for its correctness.

Making a judgement about something being right is not the same as saying 'I disapprove of x'. It is inconsistent to say what is morally right depends on our opinions/emotions and also say that it is 'wrong' for someone who thinks it is ok.

Irealism equates Saying 'x is correct' means the same thing as 'p thinks x is correct'....but the statement 'p thinks x is correct' is a purely descriptive statement, one that anyone can agree with no matter what they might think about x, and so it deprives the judgement 'x is correct' of any normative content at all. It can only survive as a intelligible if it is reformulated in the 'i disapprove of x' manner i mentioned above and drops the reference to it being 'right' or 'wrong'. But to drop this sense of truth is a huge degradation of our morality as it is practiced.

[Dryghtons Toe]

Situation S = Tom is TACTDJFF and has the instinct/opinions/emotion that its ok to TACTDJFF.
Proposition P1 = HT thinks what is morally right is determined by our instincts, opinions and emotions.
Proposition P2 = HT thinks Tom's act of TACTDFF is morally wrong and would be wrong for anyone.

S, P1 and P2 form an inconsistent triad. Therefore in situation S you have to either reject P1 (emotivist anti-realism) or reject P2. Unfortunately P2 reflects some deep seated aspects of our moral practice and discarding them would not leave our morality intact.

Reject P2, I think S is wrong however accept Tom has a different opinion.

Which would be entirely consistent, but would also be abandoning central elements of human morality to fit a theory rather than find a theory that accurately describes morality.

since all we have with morality is currently opinion then it is accurately describing it. Classifying strongly held it or absolutely expressed opinion as some how indicative of it not being is mere opinion.

That's not correct there is a difference between opinions we might have on moral issues and the implicit assumptions within our moral practice. I am referring to the latter.

[wigginhall]

DT  - are you really comparing morality to the moon landings.  Oh shit.  You are starting with your conclusion then.

[Dryghtons Toe]

DT  - are you really comparing morality to the moon landings.  Oh shit.  You are starting with your conclusion then.

No I'm just pointing out that what you refer to as 'going through a subjective process' is not an indicator of the subjective status of the subject of your deliberations..you seemed to me to be implying it was, I was giving you a counter example that isn't. Whether morality is or not is what we are trying to get to but that fact you make some personal deliberations about it is neither here nor there in reaching that conclusion.

[wigginhall]

DT  - are you really comparing morality to the moon landings.  Oh shit.  You are starting with your conclusion then.

No I'm just pointing out that what you refer to as 'going through a subjective process' is not an indicator of the subjective status of the subject of your deliberations..you seemed to me to be implying it was, I was giving you a counter example that isn't. Whether morality is or not is what we are trying to get to but that fact you make some personal deliberations about it is neither here nor there in reaching that conclusion.

Yeah, but the moon landings is a terrible analogy, I think.  It's a kind of cheat.

[Nearly Sane]

Situation S = Tom is TACTDJFF and has the instinct/opinions/emotion that its ok to TACTDJFF.
Proposition P1 = HT thinks what is morally right is determined by our instincts, opinions and emotions.
Proposition P2 = HT thinks Tom's act of TACTDFF is morally wrong and would be wrong for anyone.

S, P1 and P2 form an inconsistent triad. Therefore in situation S you have to either reject P1 (emotivist anti-realism) or reject P2. Unfortunately P2 reflects some deep seated aspects of our moral practice and discarding them would not leave our morality intact.

Reject P2, I think S is wrong however accept Tom has a different opinion.

Which would be entirely consistent, but would also be abandoning central elements of human morality to fit a theory rather than find a theory that accurately describes morality.

since all we have with morality is currently opinion then it is accurately describing it. Classifying strongly held it or absolutely expressed opinion as some how indicative of it not being is mere opinion.

That's not correct there is a difference between opinions we might have on moral issues and the implicit assumptions within our moral practice. I am referring to the latter.

you could be referring to King Dial, the best dressed man in Barbados for all it matters, calling things different names doesn' t change whether they are opinion or not. Further I would suggest you are falling into a version of the appeal to nature but is an appeal to words added to an ad populum.

[Dryghtons Toe]

DT  - are you really comparing morality to the moon landings.  Oh shit.  You are starting with your conclusion then.

No I'm just pointing out that what you refer to as 'going through a subjective process' is not an indicator of the subjective status of the subject of your deliberations..you seemed to me to be implying it was, I was giving you a counter example that isn't. Whether morality is or not is what we are trying to get to but that fact you make some personal deliberations about it is neither here nor there in reaching that conclusion.

Yeah, but the moon landings is a terrible analogy, I think.  It's a kind of cheat.

It's just an example of how we subjectively deliberate over a factual issue. There are many examples if you don't like it pick another, but it's not a cheat

[wigginhall]

DT  - are you really comparing morality to the moon landings.  Oh shit.  You are starting with your conclusion then.

No I'm just pointing out that what you refer to as 'going through a subjective process' is not an indicator of the subjective status of the subject of your deliberations..you seemed to me to be implying it was, I was giving you a counter example that isn't. Whether morality is or not is what we are trying to get to but that fact you make some personal deliberations about it is neither here nor there in reaching that conclusion.

Yeah, but the moon landings is a terrible analogy, I think.  It's a kind of cheat.

It's just an example of how we subjectively deliberate over a factual issue. There are many examples if you don't like it pick another, but it's not a cheat

I think it's a cheat, because you're taking something which most people would accept is factual, and then comparing morality to this, without explaining the similarities and dissimilarities, as if we're supposed to say, oh yes, morality is like the moon landings then.   OK, it's not a cheat, it's a con.   Show your working out. 

[Dryghtons Toe]

Situation S = Tom is TACTDJFF and has the instinct/opinions/emotion that its ok to TACTDJFF.
Proposition P1 = HT thinks what is morally right is determined by our instincts, opinions and emotions.
Proposition P2 = HT thinks Tom's act of TACTDFF is morally wrong and would be wrong for anyone.

S, P1 and P2 form an inconsistent triad. Therefore in situation S you have to either reject P1 (emotivist anti-realism) or reject P2. Unfortunately P2 reflects some deep seated aspects of our moral practice and discarding them would not leave our morality intact.

Reject P2, I think S is wrong however accept Tom has a different opinion.

Which would be entirely consistent, but would also be abandoning central elements of human morality to fit a theory rather than find a theory that accurately describes morality.

since all we have with morality is currently opinion then it is accurately describing it. Classifying strongly held it or absolutely expressed opinion as some how indicative of it not being is mere opinion.

That's not correct there is a difference between opinions we might have on moral issues and the implicit assumptions within our moral practice. I am referring to the latter.

you could be referring to King Dial, the best dressed man in Barbados for all it matters, calling things different names doesn' t change whether they are opinion or not. Further I would suggest you are falling into a version of the appeal to nature but is an appeal to words added to an ad populum.

It's not an appeal to nature..it's an argument based on our core intuitions about morality. The point of a theory that explains morality is that it does just that, explain morality as it is. If irrealism leads us to have to redefine morality to fit it then it's failing as a theory.

Also an implicit assumption embodied in a practice is not the same as an opinion. We can have an opinion that is contra to our embodied assumptions and not recognise these assumptions until they are pointed out. That happens all the time in philosophy.

[Dryghtons Toe]

DT  - are you really comparing morality to the moon landings.  Oh shit.  You are starting with your conclusion then.

No I'm just pointing out that what you refer to as 'going through a subjective process' is not an indicator of the subjective status of the subject of your deliberations..you seemed to me to be implying it was, I was giving you a counter example that isn't. Whether morality is or not is what we are trying to get to but that fact you make some personal deliberations about it is neither here nor there in reaching that conclusion.

Yeah, but the moon landings is a terrible analogy, I think.  It's a kind of cheat.

It's just an example of how we subjectively deliberate over a factual issue. There are many examples if you don't like it pick another, but it's not a cheat

I think it's a cheat, because you're taking something which most people would accept is factual, and then comparing morality to this, without explaining the similarities and dissimilarities, as if we're supposed to say, oh yes, morality is like the moon landings then.   OK, it's not a cheat, it's a con.   Show your working out.

I'm not comparing morality to it ..I'm just saying that it involves subjective deliberation. YOU were implying that anything involving subjective deliberation was by virtue of this 'only' a subjective matter. I'm just pointing out thus isn't the case nothing more.

[Nearly Sane]

Situation S = Tom is TACTDJFF and has the instinct/opinions/emotion that its ok to TACTDJFF.
Proposition P1 = HT thinks what is morally right is determined by our instincts, opinions and emotions.
Proposition P2 = HT thinks Tom's act of TACTDFF is morally wrong and would be wrong for anyone.

S, P1 and P2 form an inconsistent triad. Therefore in situation S you have to either reject P1 (emotivist anti-realism) or reject P2. Unfortunately P2 reflects some deep seated aspects of our moral practice and discarding them would not leave our morality intact.

Reject P2, I think S is wrong however accept Tom has a different opinion.

Which would be entirely consistent, but would also be abandoning central elements of human morality to fit a theory rather than find a theory that accurately describes morality.

since all we have with morality is currently opinion then it is accurately describing it. Classifying strongly held it or absolutely expressed opinion as some how indicative of it not being is mere opinion.

That's not correct there is a difference between opinions we might have on moral issues and the implicit assumptions within our moral practice. I am referring to the latter.

you could be referring to King Dial, the best dressed man in Barbados for all it matters, calling things different names doesn' t change whether they are opinion or not. Further I would suggest you are falling into a version of the appeal to nature but is an appeal to words added to an ad populum.

It's not an appeal to nature..it's an argument based on our core intuitions about morality. The point of a theory that explains morality is that it does just that, explain morality as it is. If irrealism leads us to have to redefine morality to fit it then it's failing as a theory.

Also an implicit assumption embodied in a practice is not the same as an opinion. We can have an opinion that is contra to our embodied assumptions and not recognise these assumptions until they are pointed out. That happens all the time in philosophy.

and yet it no more makes those implicit assumptions objective than it makes them pink and sparkly. That we might express an opinion that is not in line with some other opinion is entirely useless.

And it is exactly an appeal to nature because you are assuming there is a level of opinion, and again calling it a core value or Arthur Negus gives it no more relationship to being objective, where it is somehow not an opinion. That is simply an appeal to nature and has no validity other than assertion and, yet again opinion.

[Andy]

DT  - are you really comparing morality to the moon landings.  Oh shit.  You are starting with your conclusion then.

No I'm just pointing out that what you refer to as 'going through a subjective process' is not an indicator of the subjective status of the subject of your deliberations..you seemed to me to be implying it was, I was giving you a counter example that isn't. Whether morality is or not is what we are trying to get to but that fact you make some personal deliberations about it is neither here nor there in reaching that conclusion.

Yeah, but the moon landings is a terrible analogy, I think.  It's a kind of cheat.

It's just an example of how we subjectively deliberate over a factual issue. There are many examples if you don't like it pick another, but it's not a cheat

I think it's a cheat, because you're taking something which most people would accept is factual, and then comparing morality to this, without explaining the similarities and dissimilarities, as if we're supposed to say, oh yes, morality is like the moon landings then.   OK, it's not a cheat, it's a con.   Show your working out.

I'm not comparing morality to it ..I'm just saying that it involves subjective deliberation. YOU were implying that anything involving subjective deliberation was by virtue of this 'only' a subjective matter. I'm just pointing out thus isn't the case nothing more.

I don't see the point in pointing this out. I mean, when do we ever escape subjective deliberation?

[Dryghtons Toe]

DT  - are you really comparing morality to the moon landings.  Oh shit.  You are starting with your conclusion then.

No I'm just pointing out that what you refer to as 'going through a subjective process' is not an indicator of the subjective status of the subject of your deliberations..you seemed to me to be implying it was, I was giving you a counter example that isn't. Whether morality is or not is what we are trying to get to but that fact you make some personal deliberations about it is neither here nor there in reaching that conclusion.

Yeah, but the moon landings is a terrible analogy, I think.  It's a kind of cheat.

It's just an example of how we subjectively deliberate over a factual issue. There are many examples if you don't like it pick another, but it's not a cheat

I think it's a cheat, because you're taking something which most people would accept is factual, and then comparing morality to this, without explaining the similarities and dissimilarities, as if we're supposed to say, oh yes, morality is like the moon landings then.   OK, it's not a cheat, it's a con.   Show your working out.

I'm not comparing morality to it ..I'm just saying that it involves subjective deliberation. YOU were implying that anything involving subjective deliberation was by virtue of this 'only' a subjective matter. I'm just pointing out thus isn't the case nothing more.

I don't see the point in pointing this out. I mean, when do we ever escape subjective deliberation?

I agree we don't escape subjective deliberation, however an appeal to this seemed to be the only substantive point in Wiggs reply 305 above.

[Andy]

Well I inadvertently nuked the fridge with saying that, but you agree, so I guess we're done with being able to assess whether morality is objective or not then...?

[Dryghtons Toe]

Situation S = Tom is TACTDJFF and has the instinct/opinions/emotion that its ok to TACTDJFF.
Proposition P1 = HT thinks what is morally right is determined by our instincts, opinions and emotions.
Proposition P2 = HT thinks Tom's act of TACTDFF is morally wrong and would be wrong for anyone.

S, P1 and P2 form an inconsistent triad. Therefore in situation S you have to either reject P1 (emotivist anti-realism) or reject P2. Unfortunately P2 reflects some deep seated aspects of our moral practice and discarding them would not leave our morality intact.

Reject P2, I think S is wrong however accept Tom has a different opinion.

Which would be entirely consistent, but would also be abandoning central elements of human morality to fit a theory rather than find a theory that accurately describes morality.

since all we have with morality is currently opinion then it is accurately describing it. Classifying strongly held it or absolutely expressed opinion as some how indicative of it not being is mere opinion.

That's not correct there is a difference between opinions we might have on moral issues and the implicit assumptions within our moral practice. I am referring to the latter.

you could be referring to King Dial, the best dressed man in Barbados for all it matters, calling things different names doesn' t change whether they are opinion or not. Further I would suggest you are falling into a version of the appeal to nature but is an appeal to words added to an ad populum.

It's not an appeal to nature..it's an argument based on our core intuitions about morality. The point of a theory that explains morality is that it does just that, explain morality as it is. If irrealism leads us to have to redefine morality to fit it then it's failing as a theory.

Also an implicit assumption embodied in a practice is not the same as an opinion. We can have an opinion that is contra to our embodied assumptions and not recognise these assumptions until they are pointed out. That happens all the time in philosophy.

and yet it no more makes those implicit assumptions objective than it makes them pink and sparkly. That we might express an opinion that is not in line with some other opinion is entirely useless.

And it is exactly an appeal to nature because you are assuming there is a level of opinion, and again calling it a core value or Arthur Negus gives it no more relationship to being objective, where it is somehow not an opinion. That is simply an appeal to nature and has no validity other than assertion and, yet again opinion.

The argument from morality doesn't claim that our intuitions or implicit assumptions MAKE morality objective, they are indicators that we perceive morality in this way. If morality is objective how we make sense of that is something we have to do quite separately from our intuitions and I've given an account of that. But the objectivity of morality is a metaphysical proposition and as such it's not something we can prove, it's something we have can only examine our core intuitions about and give our best account of.

[Dryghtons Toe]

Well I inadvertently nuked the fridge with saying that, but you agree, so I guess we're done with being able to assess whether morality is objective or not then...?

I was agreeing that we don't escape subjective deliberation. But as we often subjectively deliberate about objective things that doesn't reflect on the issue of OM one way or the other. The arguement for OM is based on OM being the best account we can give of morality that matches morality as it is practiced.

[Nearly Sane]

Situation S = Tom is TACTDJFF and has the instinct/opinions/emotion that its ok to TACTDJFF.
Proposition P1 = HT thinks what is morally right is determined by our instincts, opinions and emotions.
Proposition P2 = HT thinks Tom's act of TACTDFF is morally wrong and would be wrong for anyone.

S, P1 and P2 form an inconsistent triad. Therefore in situation S you have to either reject P1 (emotivist anti-realism) or reject P2. Unfortunately P2 reflects some deep seated aspects of our moral practice and discarding them would not leave our morality intact.

Reject P2, I think S is wrong however accept Tom has a different opinion.

Which would be entirely consistent, but would also be abandoning central elements of human morality to fit a theory rather than find a theory that accurately describes morality.

since all we have with morality is currently opinion then it is accurately describing it. Classifying strongly held it or absolutely expressed opinion as some how indicative of it not being is mere opinion.

That's not correct there is a difference between opinions we might have on moral issues and the implicit assumptions within our moral practice. I am referring to the latter.

you could be referring to King Dial, the best dressed man in Barbados for all it matters, calling things different names doesn' t change whether they are opinion or not. Further I would suggest you are falling into a version of the appeal to nature but is an appeal to words added to an ad populum.

It's not an appeal to nature..it's an argument based on our core intuitions about morality. The point of a theory that explains morality is that it does just that, explain morality as it is. If irrealism leads us to have to redefine morality to fit it then it's failing as a theory.

Also an implicit assumption embodied in a practice is not the same as an opinion. We can have an opinion that is contra to our embodied assumptions and not recognise these assumptions until they are pointed out. That happens all the time in philosophy.

and yet it no more makes those implicit assumptions objective than it makes them pink and sparkly. That we might express an opinion that is not in line with some other opinion is entirely useless.

And it is exactly an appeal to nature because you are assuming there is a level of opinion, and again calling it a core value or Arthur Negus gives it no more relationship to being objective, where it is somehow not an opinion. That is simply an appeal to nature and has no validity other than assertion and, yet again opinion.

The argument from morality doesn't claim that our intuitions or implicit assumptions MAKE morality objective, they are indicators that we perceive morality in this way. If morality is objective how we make sense of that is something we have to do quite separately from our intuitions and I've given an account of that. But the objectivity of morality is a metaphysical proposition and as such it's not something we can prove, it's something we have can only examine our core intuitions about and give our best account of.

and we call them our core intuitions and use the word ' core' to smuggle an appeal to nature and an ad populum. Your argument boils down to I would like this to be true and so would some other people, maybe quite a lot of people, but we have no way to justify it other than really really wanting it and thinking that it is what we feel like so it must be true.

[Andy]

Well I inadvertently nuked the fridge with saying that, but you agree, so I guess we're done with being able to assess whether morality is objective or not then...?

I was agreeing that we don't escape subjective deliberation. But as we often subjectively deliberate about objective things that doesn't reflect on the issue of OM one way or the other. The arguement for OM is based on OM being the best account we can give of morality that matches morality as it is practiced.

And I almost see that as confusing the map for the place. Even if you were correct about how morality was practiced, that's not a description of what morality is fundamentally.

[jakswan]

Situation S = Tom is TACTDJFF and has the instinct/opinions/emotion that its ok to TACTDJFF.
Proposition P1 = HT thinks what is morally right is determined by our instincts, opinions and emotions.
Proposition P2 = HT thinks Tom's act of TACTDFF is morally wrong and would be wrong for anyone.

S, P1 and P2 form an inconsistent triad. Therefore in situation S you have to either reject P1 (emotivist anti-realism) or reject P2. Unfortunately P2 reflects some deep seated aspects of our moral practice and discarding them would not leave our morality intact.

Reject P2, I think S is wrong however accept Tom has a different opinion.

Which would be entirely consistent,

Thanks.

but would also be abandoning central elements of human morality to fit a theory rather than find a theory that accurately describes morality.

Nope, I love my family and accept you don't.