Objective morality is independent of opinion....or is it?

[Dryghtons Toe]

Situation S = Tom is TACTDJFF and has the instinct/opinions/emotion that its ok to TACTDJFF.
Proposition P1 = HT thinks what is morally right is determined by our instincts, opinions and emotions.
Proposition P2 = HT thinks Tom's act of TACTDFF is morally wrong and would be wrong for anyone.

S, P1 and P2 form an inconsistent triad. Therefore in situation S you have to either reject P1 (emotivist anti-realism) or reject P2. Unfortunately P2 reflects some deep seated aspects of our moral practice and discarding them would not leave our morality intact.

Reject P2, I think S is wrong however accept Tom has a different opinion.

Which would be entirely consistent, but would also be abandoning central elements of human morality to fit a theory rather than find a theory that accurately describes morality.

since all we have with morality is currently opinion then it is accurately describing it. Classifying strongly held it or absolutely expressed opinion as some how indicative of it not being is mere opinion.

That's not correct there is a difference between opinions we might have on moral issues and the implicit assumptions within our moral practice. I am referring to the latter.

you could be referring to King Dial, the best dressed man in Barbados for all it matters, calling things different names doesn' t change whether they are opinion or not. Further I would suggest you are falling into a version of the appeal to nature but is an appeal to words added to an ad populum.

It's not an appeal to nature..it's an argument based on our core intuitions about morality. The point of a theory that explains morality is that it does just that, explain morality as it is. If irrealism leads us to have to redefine morality to fit it then it's failing as a theory.

Also an implicit assumption embodied in a practice is not the same as an opinion. We can have an opinion that is contra to our embodied assumptions and not recognise these assumptions until they are pointed out. That happens all the time in philosophy.

and yet it no more makes those implicit assumptions objective than it makes them pink and sparkly. That we might express an opinion that is not in line with some other opinion is entirely useless.

And it is exactly an appeal to nature because you are assuming there is a level of opinion, and again calling it a core value or Arthur Negus gives it no more relationship to being objective, where it is somehow not an opinion. That is simply an appeal to nature and has no validity other than assertion and, yet again opinion.

The argument from morality doesn't claim that our intuitions or implicit assumptions MAKE morality objective, they are indicators that we perceive morality in this way. If morality is objective how we make sense of that is something we have to do quite separately from our intuitions and I've given an account of that. But the objectivity of morality is a metaphysical proposition and as such it's not something we can prove, it's something we have can only examine our core intuitions about and give our best account of.

and we call them our core intuitions and use the word ' core' to smuggle an appeal to nature and an ad populum. Your argument boils down to I would like this to be true and so would some other people, maybe quite a lot of people, but we have no way to justify it other than really really wanting it and thinking that it is what we feel like so it must be true.

And you can repeat 'appeal to nature' and 'ad populum' as often as you like but an appeal to our core intuitions about morality is neither of these things and if you think it is you need to go back and check what they mean. We have a social practice 'morality' which makes statements which assume truth and external standards of rightness. Theists at least (and arguably others) can give an account of why this is the case. When we examine the detailed features of realist and anti realist accounts realists come off best there too, when looking at moral motivation or the relationship between motivational and cognitive states for example. Its still quite possible to be an anti realist though in the light of that, you can do this by adopting an 'error theory' about morality.... By saying that our fundamental sense of morality is mistaken in key ways and it will ultimately be down to our intuitions about morality over which route we take. (The fact that the arguement leaves open a route for anti realism andis not saying 'it is true because...' Is also one of the reasons it is neither an ad populum or an appeal to nature).

For people whose intuitions lead them to accept OM there is also a reason to believe in God (assuming for now premise 2- that God is the best explanation for OM) for those who adopt an error theory for morality then they are left to (1) give an account of how morality could have come to be so universally distorted and (2) face up to the consequences that advocating a truth-free morality would have on our moral practice and moral motivation.

[Dryghtons Toe]

Situation S = Tom is TACTDJFF and has the instinct/opinions/emotion that its ok to TACTDJFF.
Proposition P1 = HT thinks what is morally right is determined by our instincts, opinions and emotions.
Proposition P2 = HT thinks Tom's act of TACTDFF is morally wrong and would be wrong for anyone.

S, P1 and P2 form an inconsistent triad. Therefore in situation S you have to either reject P1 (emotivist anti-realism) or reject P2. Unfortunately P2 reflects some deep seated aspects of our moral practice and discarding them would not leave our morality intact.

Reject P2, I think S is wrong however accept Tom has a different opinion.

Which would be entirely consistent,

Thanks.

but would also be abandoning central elements of human morality to fit a theory rather than find a theory that accurately describes morality.

Nope, I love my family and accept you don't.

Which is fine when we are talking about who we love or questions of taste, but when it comes to Morality saying 'i disapprove of burning people alive but accept that Islamic State don't' doesn't come close to capturing what we want to say about the wrongness of that act.

[Leonard James]

Morality (a behaviour is right or wrong) is a concept that only exists in the mind. Where else can it exist?

[Leonard James]

Morality (a behaviour is right or wrong) is a concept that only exists in the mind. Where else can it exist?

Looking at the various arguments on the Internet, some seem to think some of it could be genetic.

Which is basically the same thing, I think.

[Dryghtons Toe]

Morality (a behaviour is right or wrong) is a concept that only exists in the mind. Where else can it exist?

It could exist as a consequence of facts about the flourishing of conscious beings....such an account still requires minds but it is appealing to facts about beings with certain types of mental capacities rather than being derived from those capacities.

[Dryghtons Toe]

Morality (a behaviour is right or wrong) is a concept that only exists in the mind. Where else can it exist?

Looking at the various arguments on the Internet, some seem to think some of it could be genetic.

Which is basically the same thing, I think.

No it isnt

[Leonard James]

Morality (a behaviour is right or wrong) is a concept that only exists in the mind. Where else can it exist?

Looking at the various arguments on the Internet, some seem to think some of it could be genetic.

Which is basically the same thing, I think.

No it isnt

Basically it is. The genes can only express themselves through the mind.

[jakswan]

Situation S = Tom is TACTDJFF and has the instinct/opinions/emotion that its ok to TACTDJFF.
Proposition P1 = HT thinks what is morally right is determined by our instincts, opinions and emotions.
Proposition P2 = HT thinks Tom's act of TACTDFF is morally wrong and would be wrong for anyone.

S, P1 and P2 form an inconsistent triad. Therefore in situation S you have to either reject P1 (emotivist anti-realism) or reject P2. Unfortunately P2 reflects some deep seated aspects of our moral practice and discarding them would not leave our morality intact.

Reject P2, I think S is wrong however accept Tom has a different opinion.

Which would be entirely consistent,

Thanks.

but would also be abandoning central elements of human morality to fit a theory rather than find a theory that accurately describes morality.

Nope, I love my family and accept you don't.

Which is fine when we are talking about who we love or questions of taste, but when it comes to Morality saying 'i disapprove of burning people alive but accept that Islamic State don't' doesn't come close to capturing what we want to say about the wrongness of that act.

No, I love my family but accept you do not, is exactly the same.

[Nearly Sane]

And you can repeat 'appeal to nature' and 'ad populum' as often as you like but an appeal to our core intuitions about morality is neither of these things and if you think it is you need to go back and check what they mean. We have a social practice 'morality' which makes statements which assume truth and external standards of rightness. Theists at least (and arguably others) can give an account of why this is the case. When we examine the detailed features of realist and anti realist accounts realists come off best there too, when looking at moral motivation or the relationship between motivational and cognitive states for example. Its still quite possible to be an anti realist though in the light of that, you can do this by adopting an 'error theory' about morality.... By saying that our fundamental sense of morality is mistaken in key ways and it will ultimately be down to our intuitions about morality over which route we take. (The fact that the arguement leaves open a route for anti realism andis not saying 'it is true because...' Is also one of the reasons it is neither an ad populum or an appeal to nature).

For people whose intuitions lead them to accept OM there is also a reason to believe in God (assuming for now premise 2- that God is the best explanation for OM) for those who adopt an error theory for morality then they are left to (1) give an account of how morality could have come to be so universally distorted and (2) face up to the consequences that advocating a truth-free morality would have on our moral practice and moral motivation.

I am repeating them because you are merely asserting that they do not apply and continuing with them

Let's make it clearer though. The appeal to nature is a strange version of it, as I have already mentioned, in that it is using the way people talk about morality to argue that this shows there is something different about it from 'opinions'. Even if it is allowed that there is a specific difference, then that is merely an appeal to nature since it is based on what we say and how we say it rather than anything beyond it. That you then dress up opinion with some spanx and a good dye job and call core moral intuitions does not change them.
Further when it is pointed out that not all people do talk aboit morality in that way, you then appeal to numbers and society, or terms as 'universally' which is an ad populism.

And your last comment is by definition an ad consequentiam.

[horsethorn]

DT  - are you really comparing morality to the moon landings.  Oh shit.  You are starting with your conclusion then.

No I'm just pointing out that what you refer to as 'going through a subjective process' is not an indicator of the subjective status of the subject of your deliberations..you seemed to me to be implying it was, I was giving you a counter example that isn't. Whether morality is or not is what we are trying to get to but that fact you make some personal deliberations about it is neither here nor there in reaching that conclusion.

Yeah, but the moon landings is a terrible analogy, I think.  It's a kind of cheat.

It's just an example of how we subjectively deliberate over a factual issue. There are many examples if you don't like it pick another, but it's not a cheat

I think it's a cheat, because you're taking something which most people would accept is factual, and then comparing morality to this, without explaining the similarities and dissimilarities, as if we're supposed to say, oh yes, morality is like the moon landings then.   OK, it's not a cheat, it's a con.   Show your working out.

On the contrary, I think the Moon Landings is a good thing to use as a comparison.

Most people think the landings happened.
Most people think TACTDJFF is wrong

A few people don't think the landings happened (conspiracy theorists)
A few people don't think TACTDJFF is wrong (sociopaths)

What people think about the landings has no impact on whether they did objectively happen or not.
What people think about TACTDJFF has no impact on whether it is objectively right or wrong.
(according to the definition of 'objective')

We have the means to determine whether the landings happened; observation through telescopes for objects on the moon; data from the event and since; and eventhe possibility to visit the Moon again and see for ourselves.

We don't have the means to determine the OM of a situation, so all we can have is our subjective opinion about it.

ht

[Dryghtons Toe]

Situation S = Tom is TACTDJFF and has the instinct/opinions/emotion that its ok to TACTDJFF.
Proposition P1 = HT thinks what is morally right is determined by our instincts, opinions and emotions.
Proposition P2 = HT thinks Tom's act of TACTDFF is morally wrong and would be wrong for anyone.

S, P1 and P2 form an inconsistent triad. Therefore in situation S you have to either reject P1 (emotivist anti-realism) or reject P2. Unfortunately P2 reflects some deep seated aspects of our moral practice and discarding them would not leave our morality intact.

Reject P2, I think S is wrong however accept Tom has a different opinion.

Which would be entirely consistent,

Thanks.

but would also be abandoning central elements of human morality to fit a theory rather than find a theory that accurately describes morality.

Nope, I love my family and accept you don't.

Lol I think that's what they call making your practice fit the theory.

[Dryghtons Toe]

And you can repeat 'appeal to nature' and 'ad populum' as often as you like but an appeal to our core intuitions about morality is neither of these things and if you think it is you need to go back and check what they mean. We have a social practice 'morality' which makes statements which assume truth and external standards of rightness. Theists at least (and arguably others) can give an account of why this is the case. When we examine the detailed features of realist and anti realist accounts realists come off best there too, when looking at moral motivation or the relationship between motivational and cognitive states for example. Its still quite possible to be an anti realist though in the light of that, you can do this by adopting an 'error theory' about morality.... By saying that our fundamental sense of morality is mistaken in key ways and it will ultimately be down to our intuitions about morality over which route we take. (The fact that the arguement leaves open a route for anti realism andis not saying 'it is true because...' Is also one of the reasons it is neither an ad populum or an appeal to nature).

For people whose intuitions lead them to accept OM there is also a reason to believe in God (assuming for now premise 2- that God is the best explanation for OM) for those who adopt an error theory for morality then they are left to (1) give an account of how morality could have come to be so universally distorted and (2) face up to the consequences that advocating a truth-free morality would have on our moral practice and moral motivation.

I am repeating them because you are merely asserting that they do not apply and continuing with them

Let's make it clearer though. The appeal to nature is a strange version of it, as I have already mentioned, in that it is using the way people talk about morality to argue that this shows there is something different about it from 'opinions'. Even if it is allowed that there is a specific difference, then that is merely an appeal to nature since it is based on what we say and how we say it rather than anything beyond it. That you then dress up opinion with some spanx and a good dye job and call core moral intuitions does not change them.
Further when it is pointed out that not all people do talk aboit morality in that way, you then appeal to numbers and society, or terms as 'universally' which is an ad populism.

And your last comment is by definition an ad consequentiam.

Well its not an appeal to nature because I am not saying anything like 'this is natural and therefore right' rather I am making an observation about human moral discourse drawing out its implications. saying this is not 'a strange version of it' isn't going to help you squeeze a square peg into a round hole i'm afraid. 

And of course it is different from opinions, and obviously so if you can have an opinion about morality being subjective yet still conform to moral practices that explicitly assume objectivity.

Linked to this point is the second one. Its quite correct that morality in all human societies have agreed on the expectation of a right answer. This point though isn't made to make a premise in a deductive argument (as it would need to be to be an ad populum) but rather to emphasise the implausibility of the idea morality could have become so universally distorted in its form. I've said this many times now. This is the trouble with getting half baked understandings of logical fallacies banded around on internet forums. Lots of things which are fallacies when applied to formal deductive arguments might  very well be legitimately relevant to other forms of arguments such as related to the assessment of broad plausibility. Consequences are a another good example of something that is fallacious in the former but not the latter.

My last comment is simply a recognition that any argument (whether the moral argument for God or any other) only works if you agree with the premise and doesn't if you don't.

[Dryghtons Toe]

DT  - are you really comparing morality to the moon landings.  Oh shit.  You are starting with your conclusion then.

No I'm just pointing out that what you refer to as 'going through a subjective process' is not an indicator of the subjective status of the subject of your deliberations..you seemed to me to be implying it was, I was giving you a counter example that isn't. Whether morality is or not is what we are trying to get to but that fact you make some personal deliberations about it is neither here nor there in reaching that conclusion.

Yeah, but the moon landings is a terrible analogy, I think.  It's a kind of cheat.

It's just an example of how we subjectively deliberate over a factual issue. There are many examples if you don't like it pick another, but it's not a cheat

I think it's a cheat, because you're taking something which most people would accept is factual, and then comparing morality to this, without explaining the similarities and dissimilarities, as if we're supposed to say, oh yes, morality is like the moon landings then.   OK, it's not a cheat, it's a con.   Show your working out.

On the contrary, I think the Moon Landings is a good thing to use as a comparison.

Most people think the landings happened.
Most people think TACTDJFF is wrong

A few people don't think the landings happened (conspiracy theorists)
A few people don't think TACTDJFF is wrong (sociopaths)

What people think about the landings has no impact on whether they did objectively happen or not.
What people think about TACTDJFF has no impact on whether it is objectively right or wrong.
(according to the definition of 'objective')

We have the means to determine whether the landings happened; observation through telescopes for objects on the moon; data from the event and since; and eventhe possibility to visit the Moon again and see for ourselves.

We don't have the means to determine the OM of a situation, so all we can have is our subjective opinion about it.

ht

You are appealing to a separate criteria again to define objectivity and subjectivity ( verification) - but that's not how ontological objectivity and subjectivity (the sense we are discussion in relation to morality) is defined - it simply means it exists independently of what we believe about it, whether we can verify it or not. All we have to do to show this is replace 'moon landings' in your example with a factual question that we can't verify like 'the existence of other universes' and your whole argument collapses.

[jakswan]

Situation S = Tom is TACTDJFF and has the instinct/opinions/emotion that its ok to TACTDJFF.
Proposition P1 = HT thinks what is morally right is determined by our instincts, opinions and emotions.
Proposition P2 = HT thinks Tom's act of TACTDFF is morally wrong and would be wrong for anyone.

S, P1 and P2 form an inconsistent triad. Therefore in situation S you have to either reject P1 (emotivist anti-realism) or reject P2. Unfortunately P2 reflects some deep seated aspects of our moral practice and discarding them would not leave our morality intact.

Reject P2, I think S is wrong however accept Tom has a different opinion.

Which would be entirely consistent,

Thanks.

but would also be abandoning central elements of human morality to fit a theory rather than find a theory that accurately describes morality.

Nope, I love my family and accept you don't.

Lol I think that's what they call making your practice fit the theory.

LOL thanks, sorry you lost the argument by the way, better luck next time.

[Dryghtons Toe]

Situation S = Tom is TACTDJFF and has the instinct/opinions/emotion that its ok to TACTDJFF.
Proposition P1 = HT thinks what is morally right is determined by our instincts, opinions and emotions.
Proposition P2 = HT thinks Tom's act of TACTDFF is morally wrong and would be wrong for anyone.

S, P1 and P2 form an inconsistent triad. Therefore in situation S you have to either reject P1 (emotivist anti-realism) or reject P2. Unfortunately P2 reflects some deep seated aspects of our moral practice and discarding them would not leave our morality intact.

Reject P2, I think S is wrong however accept Tom has a different opinion.

Which would be entirely consistent,

Thanks.

but would also be abandoning central elements of human morality to fit a theory rather than find a theory that accurately describes morality.

Nope, I love my family and accept you don't.

Lol I think that's what they call making your practice fit the theory.

LOL thanks, sorry you lost the argument by the way, better luck next time.

Aww bless you is that what you think! I've been arguing that the anti-realist must either abandon anti-realism or abandon core intuitions about morality. As you've had to do the latter I'm quite delighted to have been proved right ..the fact that you do so shamelessly doesn't make it any better for you!

[jakswan]

Aww bless you is that what you think! I've been arguing that the anti-realist must either abandon anti-realism or abandon core intuitions about morality. As you've had to do the latter I'm quite delighted to have been proved right ..the fact that you do so shamelessly doesn't make it any better for you!

Sorry bud think you've failed to do that, keep pretending though!

[Dryghtons Toe]

Aww bless you is that what you think! I've been arguing that the anti-realist must either abandon anti-realism or abandon core intuitions about morality. As you've had to do the latter I'm quite delighted to have been proved right ..the fact that you do so shamelessly doesn't make it any better for you!

Sorry bud think you've failed to do that, keep pretending though!

I know thats what you think....I'm more concerned with reality however than what you think, and telling yourself that stating 'I love my family...' Is somehow contributing a substantial point doesn't make it so. Sorry about that.

[jakswan]

Aww bless you is that what you think! I've been arguing that the anti-realist must either abandon anti-realism or abandon core intuitions about morality. As you've had to do the latter I'm quite delighted to have been proved right ..the fact that you do so shamelessly doesn't make it any better for you!

Sorry bud think you've failed to do that, keep pretending though!

I know thats what you think....I'm more concerned with reality however than what you think, and telling yourself that stating 'I love my family...' Is somehow contributing a substantial point doesn't make it so. Sorry about that.

By using that analogy I have not abandoned core intuitions of morality, so you are refuted.

[Dryghtons Toe]

Aww bless you is that what you think! I've been arguing that the anti-realist must either abandon anti-realism or abandon core intuitions about morality. As you've had to do the latter I'm quite delighted to have been proved right ..the fact that you do so shamelessly doesn't make it any better for you!

Sorry bud think you've failed to do that, keep pretending though!

I know thats what you think....I'm more concerned with reality however than what you think, and telling yourself that stating 'I love my family...' Is somehow contributing a substantial point doesn't make it so. Sorry about that.

By using that analogy I have not abandoned core intuitions of morality, so you are refuted.

It demonstrates quite the opposite. You can say 'i love my family and i accept that others don't'...so apply that to analogy to one of the moral situations we have been discussing...

"I disapprove of Tactdjff but accept that others don't"
"I disapprove of the Taliban burning people to death but i accept that the don't"

If you think either of those capture what we want to say morally about these situations you are deluding yourself to sustain your arguement...it's about as bad as analogy as you can get and well illustrates the inadequacies of the irrealist position here.

[jakswan]

It demonstrates quite the opposite. You can say 'i love my family and i accept that others don't'...so apply that to analogy to one of the moral situations we have been discussing...

"I disapprove of Tactdjff but accept that others don't"
"I disapprove of the Taliban burning people to death but i accept that the don't"

If you think either of those capture what we want to say morally about these situations you are deluding yourself to sustain your arguement...it's about as bad as analogy as you can get and well illustrates the inadequacies of the irrealist position here.

You'll have to explain you think I'm deluding myself , do you think the Taliban think burning people really think its wrong but do it anyway?

[horsethorn]

DT  - are you really comparing morality to the moon landings.  Oh shit.  You are starting with your conclusion then.

No I'm just pointing out that what you refer to as 'going through a subjective process' is not an indicator of the subjective status of the subject of your deliberations..you seemed to me to be implying it was, I was giving you a counter example that isn't. Whether morality is or not is what we are trying to get to but that fact you make some personal deliberations about it is neither here nor there in reaching that conclusion.

Yeah, but the moon landings is a terrible analogy, I think.  It's a kind of cheat.

It's just an example of how we subjectively deliberate over a factual issue. There are many examples if you don't like it pick another, but it's not a cheat

I think it's a cheat, because you're taking something which most people would accept is factual, and then comparing morality to this, without explaining the similarities and dissimilarities, as if we're supposed to say, oh yes, morality is like the moon landings then.   OK, it's not a cheat, it's a con.   Show your working out.

On the contrary, I think the Moon Landings is a good thing to use as a comparison.

Most people think the landings happened.
Most people think TACTDJFF is wrong

A few people don't think the landings happened (conspiracy theorists)
A few people don't think TACTDJFF is wrong (sociopaths)

What people think about the landings has no impact on whether they did objectively happen or not.
What people think about TACTDJFF has no impact on whether it is objectively right or wrong.
(according to the definition of 'objective')

We have the means to determine whether the landings happened; observation through telescopes for objects on the moon; data from the event and since; and eventhe possibility to visit the Moon again and see for ourselves.

We don't have the means to determine the OM of a situation, so all we can have is our subjective opinion about it.

ht

You are appealing to a separate criteria again to define objectivity and subjectivity ( verification) - but that's not how ontological objectivity and subjectivity (the sense we are discussion in relation to morality) is defined - it simply means it exists independently of what we believe about it, whether we can verify it or not. All we have to do to show this is replace 'moon landings' in your example with a factual question that we can't verify like 'the existence of other universes' and your whole argument collapses.

In what way does 'the existence of other universes' collapse my argument?

Most people think the landings happened.
Most people think TACTDJFF is wrong
Some people think other universes exist

A few people don't think the landings happened (conspiracy theorists)
A few people don't think TACTDJFF is wrong (sociopaths)
Some people don't think other universes exist

What people think about the landings has no impact on whether they did objectively happen or not.
What people think about TACTDJFF has no impact on whether it is objectively right or wrong.
What people think about the existence of other universes has no impact on whether they objectively exist or not
(according to the definition of 'objective')

We have the means to determine whether the landings happened; observation through telescopes for objects on the moon; data from the event and since; and eventhe possibility to visit the Moon again and see for ourselves.

We don't have the means to determine the OM of a situation, so all we can have is our subjective opinion about it.

We don't (currently) have the means to determine whether other universes exist, so all we can (currently) have is our subjective opinion about it.

How has that collapsed the argument?

ht

[Enki]

Hi Alan,

When reading through your response to Andy(mess 289) you said this:

I sincerely hope you would and would expect all our regular contributors here to agree (if they were not in a discussion on the Christian Topic message board and aware of where agreeing that objective morality existing might lead them).

This seemed to be a response to you asking whether Andy would agree that, even if there were other motives, the idea of TACTD just for fun is morally wrong.

However, for my own part, I am somwhat puzzled by the response that I have quoted above. I have already stated several times that in my opinion it is morally wrong, and that I see no reason to invoke OM, so no problem on the first part. However, I'm not at all sure what the second part actually means.

Are you suggesting that by stating that I think it is morally wrong, I accept the idea that OM definitely exists? In which case, I would disagree, and for reasons which I have made clear previously.

Or/and are you suggesting that my disagreement is predicated on the idea that belief in OM would, in some way, lead to the conclusion that a god, especially the Christian God, exists, and, consequentially therefore, I would simply reject the whole idea of OM because I don't believe in any god? Again, if this is what you meant, I would disagree. I have tried to look at the whole idea of OM in its own right. My own conclusions, such as they are, take into account the cultural influences of religions as one facet of our moral behaviour but are not based on, or even coloured by, any ideas associated with the existence/non existence of gods at all. 

And, furthermore, are you suggesting that I may well have a different view of OM if I were not on 'the Christian Topic message board'? I am at a loss to make any sense of this unless you mean that I only hold to my ideas about OM in the presence of or when arguing with Christians. If this is what you meant then I would again disagree. I am always prepared to alter my views according to how convincing I find the evidence and arguments, but my views would not alter simply according to whom I am debating/discussing with.

A little clarification of your above quote would not not come amiss. Ta muchly.

Bumped for Alan(Alien) to respond to, hopefully.

[Dryghtons Toe]

DT  - are you really comparing morality to the moon landings.  Oh shit.  You are starting with your conclusion then.

No I'm just pointing out that what you refer to as 'going through a subjective process' is not an indicator of the subjective status of the subject of your deliberations..you seemed to me to be implying it was, I was giving you a counter example that isn't. Whether morality is or not is what we are trying to get to but that fact you make some personal deliberations about it is neither here nor there in reaching that conclusion.

Yeah, but the moon landings is a terrible analogy, I think.  It's a kind of cheat.

It's just an example of how we subjectively deliberate over a factual issue. There are many examples if you don't like it pick another, but it's not a cheat

I think it's a cheat, because you're taking something which most people would accept is factual, and then comparing morality to this, without explaining the similarities and dissimilarities, as if we're supposed to say, oh yes, morality is like the moon landings then.   OK, it's not a cheat, it's a con.   Show your working out.

On the contrary, I think the Moon Landings is a good thing to use as a comparison.

Most people think the landings happened.
Most people think TACTDJFF is wrong

A few people don't think the landings happened (conspiracy theorists)
A few people don't think TACTDJFF is wrong (sociopaths)

What people think about the landings has no impact on whether they did objectively happen or not.
What people think about TACTDJFF has no impact on whether it is objectively right or wrong.
(according to the definition of 'objective')

We have the means to determine whether the landings happened; observation through telescopes for objects on the moon; data from the event and since; and eventhe possibility to visit the Moon again and see for ourselves.

We don't have the means to determine the OM of a situation, so all we can have is our subjective opinion about it.

ht

You are appealing to a separate criteria again to define objectivity and subjectivity ( verification) - but that's not how ontological objectivity and subjectivity (the sense we are discussion in relation to morality) is defined - it simply means it exists independently of what we believe about it, whether we can verify it or not. All we have to do to show this is replace 'moon landings' in your example with a factual question that we can't verify like 'the existence of other universes' and your whole argument collapses.

In what way does 'the existence of other universes' collapse my argument?

Most people think the landings happened.
Most people think TACTDJFF is wrong
Some people think other universes exist

A few people don't think the landings happened (conspiracy theorists)
A few people don't think TACTDJFF is wrong (sociopaths)
Some people don't think other universes exist

What people think about the landings has no impact on whether they did objectively happen or not.
What people think about TACTDJFF has no impact on whether it is objectively right or wrong.
What people think about the existence of other universes has no impact on whether they objectively exist or not
(according to the definition of 'objective')

We have the means to determine whether the landings happened; observation through telescopes for objects on the moon; data from the event and since; and eventhe possibility to visit the Moon again and see for ourselves.

We don't have the means to determine the OM of a situation, so all we can have is our subjective opinion about it.

We don't (currently) have the means to determine whether other universes exist, so all we can (currently) have is our subjective opinion about it.

How has that collapsed the argument?

ht

Depends what your point is.....I have nothing against saying that we can't determine the objective truth of the existence of other universes and so our beliefs about them can only be our opinions and also saying exactly the same of OM. I've said myself more than once that we can't prove OM...but if that's all you are saying then why? No one has claimed OM can be proved.

But as it happens you have said more than that - you have said that you think to have a subjective belief about OM is self contradictory, but that's clearly not true for the reasons you yourself admit...when we can't prove something, we can't prove it, but that doesn't mean it doesn't exist as an objective fact...to use your own phrase our beliefs have "no impact on whether they exist or not". That's exactly right, as Alan and I have both said. Our belief about OM (whether we believe in it or if you don't) have no impact on it...so it can't possibly be the case that our beliefs about OM existing contradicts its existence - if it did then that would be an impact and a pretty big one too. Whenever this is pointed out to you, you have just gone off talking about verification, but as soon as we come to something that can't be verified like other universes, we all have to agree that our beliefs have no impact = none at all one way or the other, and certainly not a self-contradictory one as you have claimed.

Alan has clarified (repeatedly now) that his argument is about consistency of belief, one about our beliefs making morality objective.

[Dryghtons Toe]

It demonstrates quite the opposite. You can say 'i love my family and i accept that others don't'...so apply that to analogy to one of the moral situations we have been discussing...

"I disapprove of Tactdjff but accept that others don't"
"I disapprove of the Taliban burning people to death but i accept that the don't"

If you think either of those capture what we want to say morally about these situations you are deluding yourself to sustain your arguement...it's about as bad as analogy as you can get and well illustrates the inadequacies of the irrealist position here.

You'll have to explain you think I'm deluding myself , do you think the Taliban think burning people really think its wrong but do it anyway?

I’m quite sure the IS guy thinks his actions are ok – the problem with the statement “I disapproves of burning people alive but IS thinks its ok” isn’t that its false (as far as it goes) but rather that it doesn’t adequately express what we want to say about this situation morally. If morality was like loving your wife, and accepting that others don’t, then when people behave in ways we don’t like the best we can say is ‘I disapprove of that’. But in no society, at any point in human history has acts of moral condemnation ever just meant ‘I disapprove of you doing that’- when is meant by it is it is wrong, that the people doing it are worthy of blame...but we don't blame people for not agreeing with us about who to love or whether they should share our taste in marmite. We don't think they are wrong in having different tastes, it stops at the emotion/taste - they don't like it and that's that.

The same issue arises re my previous example of why we change our moral beliefs, including at times our core beliefs, we do so because we think our previous beliefs were mistaken and not because we have had a change of taste or emotion.

These aren't periphery elements of morality -they are absolutely central features of it.

There are other more technical problems too: If moral judgements were just emotional responses then how do we distinguish between moral and none moral domains of judgement? - Moral judgements have universally been treated as different from general preferences or ascetic judgements but there's no clear way to even demarcate these different sort of judgements if your analogy is correct. It gets worse still for your analogy, as expressions of personal preference derive their forcefulness from situational context but moral statements derive their force from articulation of rational arguments which presuppose impersonal standards.

There are also many cases in which find ourselves conflicted between what we want to do and what we feel we ought to do...in other words we pit rational standards of what is morally right against our emotions, tastes and desires. Further, as Syn pointed out on the last thread, if we analyse our use of moral language we find the use of the same semantic and pragmatic linguistic mechanisms to analyze their truth value as we do with factual claims.
I could go on the - whole assumption of fact-value division behind this view of morality is, as I discussed in an earlier post, woefully inadequate at describing our moral motivation and general cognitive processes - the way our conception of the world are simultaneously both descriptive and evaluative....

In other words comparing morality to loving your family is about as bad an analogy as you can get. When we create theories about morality their job is to explain morality...but treating morality as an emotion like loving your family fails repeatedly to explain morality as it is, and rather does exactly what I accused you of doing - trying to make morality fit your theory rather than the other way around. Your theory erodes our morality and just leaves us with a pale reflection of it.

[jakswan]

Thanks for explaining your argument I had no idea it would so pitifully weak. I could put it all apart but will just focus on the weakest parts of your post.

But in no society, at any point in human history has acts of moral condemnation ever just meant ‘I disapprove of you doing that’- when is meant by it is it is wrong, that the people doing it are worthy of blame...but we don't blame people for not agreeing with us about who to love or whether they should share our taste in marmite. We don't think they are wrong in having different tastes, it stops at the emotion/taste - they don't like it and that's that.

Factually incorrect there are countless examples where others morally condemn an act and meant 'I disapprove', is it moral to not pray five times a day, to smoke, to eat a lot of fatty foods, to scratch ones arse, to vote conservative. Every single action we take has a moral dimension to it.

The same issue arises re my previous example of why we change our moral beliefs, including at times our core beliefs, we do so because we think our previous beliefs were mistaken and not because we have had a change of taste or emotion.

These aren't periphery elements of morality -they are absolutely central features of it.

When I was a young adult I would have described myself as homophobic, empathy, an emotion, for homosexuals changed my view.

There are other more technical problems too: If moral judgements were just emotional responses then how do we distinguish between moral and none moral domains of judgement? - Moral judgements have universally been treated as different from general preferences or ascetic judgements but there's no clear way to even demarcate these different sort of judgements if your analogy is correct.

I never claimed moral judgements were just emotional responses. Moral judgements are a complex mix of emotions and reason. Love is a complex mix of emotion and reason. The mix of both is different but the analogy stands.

It gets worse still for your analogy, as expressions of personal preference derive their forcefulness from situational context but moral statements derive their force from articulation of rational arguments which presuppose impersonal standards.

Moral statements derive their force from emotions.

There are also many cases in which find ourselves conflicted between what we want to do and what we feel we ought to do...in other words we pit rational standards of what is morally right against our emotions, tastes and desires.

As we do sometimes with love.

In other words comparing morality to loving your family is about as bad an analogy as you can get. When we create theories about morality their job is to explain morality...but treating morality as an emotion like loving your family fails repeatedly to explain morality as it is, and rather does exactly what I accused you of doing - trying to make morality fit your theory rather than the other way around. Your theory erodes our morality and just leaves us with a pale reflection of it.

I don't think your understand what an analogy is. Treating morality as an objective like 2+2=4 erodes the value of morality and just leaves us with a pale reflection of it.