Objective morality is independent of opinion....or is it?

[Andy]

So basically, when I asked you to do it without invoking god, you can't? So as I've said aplenty, your argument for OM has only ever been circular.

No, you missed my, "We can't prove it all the way (since, unless there is an original cause/ground) it is an infinite regress, yet there seems to be no good reason to think otherwise." You have also missed/ignored the definition of objective morality, i.e. that OM exists if there is at least one example of something being morally right or morally wrong independent of how many people think it so. A number of people here, not just Christians, have said that TACTDJFF is (always) morally wrong, though they then go on to be much more open to the possibility of their being wrong than on any other moral question I have seen. If they do indeed think that torturing a child to death just for fun (that being the complete motivation) then they are thereby agreeing that OM does indeed exist (since it is the one example we need), though they they go on to contradict themselves by saying that OM does not exist.

Again, the same misidentification of what morality is. You, like DT, are just arguing here for moral realism. Anyone, theist or atheist, who is basing TACTDJFF always being wrong are basing that on a fundamental, core value of human flourishing, well being or whatever. If I valued the flourishing of ants, lithium, the fluffiness of mash, or (insert whatever you like) more than anything else, then you could find ways of achieving those goals that are better than other ways, to the point where you could potentially scale them so you have one way as "the best", dictated by the reality in which all of this is happening. But all of that means nothing if you can't get passed your own subjective valuation.

Well isn't that the whole point of the subjective view, that it's from their own standpoint and that they can't point to anything external to themselves to conclude that it's morally good? It's their value and there's no evidence to point to that value having objective worth. Personally, I don't think it's right or wrong for humans to flourish, I just want them to, probably most simply because I am one. I'm under no pretence that I can turn my is into an ought.

I continue to look forward to hearing from those who think that the flourishing of humans/sentient beings is morally good why they think it so.

I'd be interested in your thoughts about whether there is any "ought" in life. Do you think I ought not use the term "ought"? If you think that the term "ought" has some meaning, please do explain why you think it has.

Thanks for the interesting discussion.

Yes, I think there are oughts, but they're based on valuations. You ought to score more goals than the other team if you value the three points. You ought to eat marmite (keep the theme going) sandwiches instead of battery acid if you value your health. Now whether I ought to value what I value is a different thing.

[wigginhall]

Yes, Andy, as usual, has teased out something which has always baffled me.   Some moral schemes seem to be based on a notion of human flourishing, as if this offered an objective base.   I just don't get that, so maybe I have a screw missing in my brain.   As Andy said again, I want human flourishing, because I am human.  If I was a shark, I might want human bodies in large chunks, yum yum.   The oughts are fine, but they are no more than flourishes, for me at any rate.  I mean, it all seems so irrevocably subjective to me.

[Gordon]

I was listening to the latest Podcast in the series 'Philosophy Bites', and although the topic was 'Speciesism' (and well worth a listen) the interviewee, Shelly Kagan, was outlining that many views on this were best thought of as being moral intuitions.

When listening it occurred to me that my view that 'TACTDJFF is wrong' might well be a moral intuition, albeit I can also think of practical reasons why it would be a bad thing for society at large, and I also recognise that my view is part of a near universal consensus. Even so, it seems to me that my moral intuition alone provides a sound basis to guide my behaviour.

[jjohnjil]

I was listening to the latest Podcast in the series 'Philosophy Bites', and although the topic was 'Speciesism' (and well worth a listen) the interviewee, Shelly Kagan, was outlining that many views on this were best thought of as being moral intuitions.

When listening it occurred to me that my view that 'TACTDJFF is wrong' might well be a moral intuition, albeit I can also think of practical reasons why it would be a bad thing for society at large, and I also recognise that my view is part of a near universal consensus. Even so, it seems to me that my moral intuition alone provides a sound basis to guide my behaviour.

Where Alien and co go wrong is in thinking having a near universal agreement that TACTDJFF is wrong means something more than a near universal agreement.  It doesn't.

The case for gay marriage being OM is far more interesting as that has far less of a consensus  - the theists would find it very hard to come to an agreement with that.

[Gordon]

I was listening to the latest Podcast in the series 'Philosophy Bites', and although the topic was 'Speciesism' (and well worth a listen) the interviewee, Shelly Kagan, was outlining that many views on this were best thought of as being moral intuitions.

When listening it occurred to me that my view that 'TACTDJFF is wrong' might well be a moral intuition, albeit I can also think of practical reasons why it would be a bad thing for society at large, and I also recognise that my view is part of a near universal consensus. Even so, it seems to me that my moral intuition alone provides a sound basis to guide my behaviour.

Where Alien and co go wrong is in thinking having a near universal agreement that TACTDJFF is wrong means something more than a near universal agreement.  It doesn't.

The case for gay marriage being OM is far more interesting as that has far less of a consensus  - the theists would find it very hard to come to an agreement with that.

Which is why Alan has studiously avoided other suggested examples, such as SSM or euthanasia, claiming that TACTDJFF alone is sufficient to demonstrate OM: it clearly isn't, and it is so obviously contrived as to be laughable as a meaningful example of a pressing moral issue (as expected, since WLC is its chief proponent). 

[wigginhall]

Well, killing is the classic wobbly, since there are so many different contexts where killing is praised, condemned, demanded, and so on.   So saying that killing is wrong demands a context, unless you are a pacifist.   Hence the just war theory shows how killing was always being contextualized (and still is).  Now it has happened with torture.

[Outrider]

Apologies - I've been out of the loop for a while, and when I looked back through the thread the opening post has the acronym without an explanation: TACTDJFF?

O.

[Nearly Sane]

Torturing A Child To Death Just For Fun

[Dryghtons Toe]

You're not supporting a moral argument for god. You're supporting an argument for moral realism.

I've actually been doing both although my version of the moral argument perhaps makes less ambitious than Alans.

I really don't see what you are hoping to achieve by doing this, and I'd say the same thing to any atheist arguing the same. Moral realism doesn't deal with the core value/s of what moral judgements are based on -  being as you state in your case the flourishing of humanity. If morality is objective, then to value human flourishing would have objective worth. You say that comes from god, where the atheist moral realists I've come across blankly ignore it, stick to moral realism and state that our moral judgements based on the value of human flourishing/well being are at the mercy of the reality we inhabit and not culture.

But that is where this discussion should be at - the objectivity of valuing human flourishing, and not this incessant arguing for moral realism. I would like to see it explained as to why we should value human flourishing - I want to see that is/ought bridge gapped, but if all you can do is invoke a god to do that, then the discussion moves to that god.

Well what I'm doing it for is because its a premise of the moral argument for God which is why your first statement is wrong...but I'm not invoking God as the reason we first believe in OM, I'm appealing to the nature of our moral experience and moral phenomenology to do that, I am appealing to God as premise 2, namely that God is the best explanation for morality for some of the reasons you have mentioned. I'm not going to do the atheist realist job for them and I do both want and am happy to rely on God.

[Dryghtons Toe]

So to 'demonstrating moral facts'.

Yes in a number of posts I have made it clear that the method we go about discovering OM will depend on the account we give of it. As a theist I have given an account of OM rooted in God and I outline this in reply 196. As this account derives its understanding of OM from the flourishing of conscious beings, defined in relation to God’s purpose then we discover moral truth by improving our understanding of our flourishing. This is partly something we do through reason and observation in relation to the physical and psychological facts that allows people to live rich fulfilling lives and the virtues of character necessary to enable these, and partly by deepening our experience of God to gain an insight into his character and purposes. This, like all fields of human discovery will of course be gradual and prone to error and revision in our understanding.

So it seems to me that you 'determine moral facts' by judging an actions to see if it delivers 'flourishing of conscious beings'.

I'm still not seeing the leap to objective?

So why is "flourishing of conscious beings" good? Are you a vegetarian?

Yes, why is it good? DT said it's because it's rooted in god - defined in relation to god's purpose, but you should be able to show that it's good without invoking god because you try and use the existence of OM to conclude god, not the other way around.

That's just getting the argument backwards - if there was no dependence of OM on God I couldn't conclude God. However my argument for believing in OM is based on our core intuitions about morality and our moral phenomenology not by reference to God. You are putting the cart before the horse in the argument to try to create a circularity that does not exist.

But you don't think there are "completely independent reasons" for thinking OM exists, because when we get down to the actual foundation of it, you invoke god.

I think there are independent reasons for thinking our morality is objective (premise 1) but that when we examine the idea of OM (premise 2) God provides the best explanation.

Moral realism doesn't show that morality is objective, but that your actions/judgements should be dictated by reality depending on what it is you value. If you really thought that all morality was was the way in which it is practiced (as I have said a couple of times now, this is you confusing the map for the place), then using god as the grounder of what you should morally value would be meaningless. That's you being contradictory.

Not so, if the good for conscious beings is a teleological fact then regardless of what I might choose to value there is a truth to the good whether or not I accept it and this does not alter if I rely on God as the source of that teleology as Gods nature is still a fact.

[Dryghtons Toe]

More to the point, if it's dependent upon a god it's not objective, it's a subjective morality: if the god changes, the morality which is subject to that god also changes.

O.

Yes, that's where this could lead, and staying relative to this thread, morality still wouldn't be independent of opinion.

However, I'm confident that it'll be seen as part of god's nature rather than god's opinion, but that brings up a whole host of problems itself.

Yes it is seen as part of Gods nature but no that only brings up problems for atheists who sit around dreaming up contradictory definitions of God and then congratulate themselves at having 'disproved' him.

[Dryghtons Toe]

Again, the same misidentification of what morality is. You, like DT, are just arguing here for moral realism. Anyone, theist or atheist, who is basing TACTDJFF always being wrong are basing that on a fundamental, core value of human flourishing, well being or whatever. If I valued the flourishing of ants, lithium, the fluffiness of mash, or (insert whatever you like) more than anything else, then you could find ways of achieving those goals that are better than other ways, to the point where you could potentially scale them so you have one way as "the best", dictated by the reality in which all of this is happening. But all of that means nothing if you can't get passed your own subjective valuation.

Which is all well and good if you are not a theist, but neither Alan or I are arguing for an atheistic realism, we are both arguing that God is the explanation for moral realism and so anyone who accepts that our morality is objective should also believe in God. As a theist and also an aristotelian I do not think Gods purposes stand apart from the universe but are teleogical facts within the universe, which its processes aim to realise. As the flourishing of conscious beings is a key fact of this nature (if not THE key fact) I may consciously choose to value whatever else I wish but then I would be wrong, and my wrongness would be based on me being at odds with the (teleological) facts.

[Andy]

Well what I'm doing it for is because its a premise of the moral argument for God which is why your first statement is wrong...but I'm not invoking God as the reason we first believe in OM, I'm appealing to the nature of our moral experience and moral phenomenology to do that, I am appealing to God as premise 2, namely that God is the best explanation for morality for some of the reasons you have mentioned. I'm not going to do the atheist realist job for them and I do both want and am happy to rely on God.

The nature of our experience/phenomenology/practice of morality is not morality itself. You are taking our "core intuitions" (the values which you base your moral realism on) to be axiomatically objectively morally right, basically because god says so. This is the epitome of you invoking god to first believe in OM. Moral realism doesn't get you to OM, never mind get you there first, if you understand that the values you base moral judgements on first need to be shown to be objectively morally right themselves.

[Andy]

So to 'demonstrating moral facts'.

Yes in a number of posts I have made it clear that the method we go about discovering OM will depend on the account we give of it. As a theist I have given an account of OM rooted in God and I outline this in reply 196. As this account derives its understanding of OM from the flourishing of conscious beings, defined in relation to God’s purpose then we discover moral truth by improving our understanding of our flourishing. This is partly something we do through reason and observation in relation to the physical and psychological facts that allows people to live rich fulfilling lives and the virtues of character necessary to enable these, and partly by deepening our experience of God to gain an insight into his character and purposes. This, like all fields of human discovery will of course be gradual and prone to error and revision in our understanding.

So it seems to me that you 'determine moral facts' by judging an actions to see if it delivers 'flourishing of conscious beings'.

I'm still not seeing the leap to objective?

So why is "flourishing of conscious beings" good? Are you a vegetarian?

Yes, why is it good? DT said it's because it's rooted in god - defined in relation to god's purpose, but you should be able to show that it's good without invoking god because you try and use the existence of OM to conclude god, not the other way around.

That's just getting the argument backwards - if there was no dependence of OM on God I couldn't conclude God.

Then tell Alan and WLC it's backwards, not me.

However my argument for believing in OM is based on our core intuitions about morality and our moral phenomenology not by reference to God. You are putting the cart before the horse in the argument to try to create a circularity that does not exist.

I was talking about Alan's argument, not yours.

But you don't think there are "completely independent reasons" for thinking OM exists, because when we get down to the actual foundation of it, you invoke god.

I think there are independent reasons for thinking our morality is objective (premise 1) but that when we examine the idea of OM (premise 2) God provides the best explanation.

No, it would seem after analysing your position, you conclude that god is the explanation because god is the grounder of what is moral, which includes the foundational values - the "core intuitions" by which you make judgements. You have failed to show that these values are objective morals without invoking god.

Moral realism doesn't show that morality is objective, but that your actions/judgements should be dictated by reality depending on what it is you value. If you really thought that all morality was was the way in which it is practiced (as I have said a couple of times now, this is you confusing the map for the place), then using god as the grounder of what you should morally value would be meaningless. That's you being contradictory.

Not so, if the good for conscious beings is a teleological fact then regardless of what I might choose to value there is a truth to the good whether or not I accept it and this does not alter if I rely on God as the source of that teleology as Gods nature is still a fact.

Yea, if it is a fact. Now it's your job to turn that "if" into an is. If god is your only ginnel for doing that, then you're not at god being the best explanation, but the explanation.

[Andy]

Again, the same misidentification of what morality is. You, like DT, are just arguing here for moral realism. Anyone, theist or atheist, who is basing TACTDJFF always being wrong are basing that on a fundamental, core value of human flourishing, well being or whatever. If I valued the flourishing of ants, lithium, the fluffiness of mash, or (insert whatever you like) more than anything else, then you could find ways of achieving those goals that are better than other ways, to the point where you could potentially scale them so you have one way as "the best", dictated by the reality in which all of this is happening. But all of that means nothing if you can't get passed your own subjective valuation.

Which is all well and good if you are not a theist, but neither Alan or I are arguing for an atheistic realism, we are both arguing that God is the explanation for moral realism and so anyone who accepts that our morality is objective should also believe in God. As a theist and also an aristotelian I do not think Gods purposes stand apart from the universe but are teleogical facts within the universe, which its processes aim to realise. As the flourishing of conscious beings is a key fact of this nature (if not THE key fact) I may consciously choose to value whatever else I wish but then I would be wrong, and my wrongness would be based on me being at odds with the (teleological) facts.

Yes, I get it about your moral realism. An atheist moral realist would state something along the lines of (to paraphrase Matt Dillahunty), we are physical being in a physical universe with physical laws, and our judgements are at the mercy of this physical reality. Basically, they are science-apt - they are truth-apt. The atheist will stop there but you go that step further and state that these truths have been put there by the creator of this physical reality, or something along those simplified lines.

Now we've got that out of the way, I say so fucking what? I bold your assertion and ask you to demonstrate it, to which I again just expect you to leap to god. I don't see it as a fact that it should be valued, only that it is valued.

[Andy]

More to the point, if it's dependent upon a god it's not objective, it's a subjective morality: if the god changes, the morality which is subject to that god also changes.

O.

Yes, that's where this could lead, and staying relative to this thread, morality still wouldn't be independent of opinion.

However, I'm confident that it'll be seen as part of god's nature rather than god's opinion, but that brings up a whole host of problems itself.

Yes it is seen as part of Gods nature but no that only brings up problems for atheists who sit around dreaming up contradictory definitions of God and then congratulate themselves at having 'disproved' him.

How about you say what these problems are instead of poisoning the well?

[Dryghtons Toe]

The nature of our experience/phenomenology/practice of morality is not morality itself. You are taking our "core intuitions" (the values which you base your moral realism on) to be axiomatically objectively morally right, basically because god says so. This is the epitome of you invoking god to first believe in OM. Moral realism doesn't get you to OM, never mind get you there first, if you understand that the values you base moral judgements on first need to be shown to be objectively morally right themselves.

I've not presented our experience/phenomenology etc as morality itself which is why my argument has never been 'morality assumes objectivity therefore its objective' but rather 'morality assumes objectivity therefore either our moral intuitions are correct and it is objective Or morality is distorted'. I have been abundantly clear about this and stated it many times. For those of us who do feel the strength and centrality of moral truth as being fundamental to the human condition then God provides the best explanation for those intuitions as the grounds for objective moral truth. Its an argument to God from our intuitions not the other way around.

 

Yes, why is it good? DT said it's because it's rooted in god - defined in relation to god's purpose, but you should be able to show that it's good without invoking god because you try and use the existence of OM to conclude god, not the other way around.

No I don't. If I showed it was good without God then the second part of the moral argument doesn't work. The reason I think it is good is because I reason from my moral intuitions.
 

Then tell Alan and WLC it's backwards, not me.

The order of the premises is unimportant, its the direction of travel from our intuitions to God rather than the other way around.

No, it would seem after analysing your position, you conclude that god is the explanation because god is the grounder of what is moral, which includes the foundational values - the "core intuitions" by which you make judgements. You have failed to show that these values are objective morals without invoking god.

I don't want to show them without invoking God. Gods sort of the point of the moral argument for God! But you are trying to claim that I have to invoke God in order to establish that our core intuitions about morality implicitly assume objectivity - but I don't and I haven't, I have relied entirely on examples from our moral reasoning and moral phenomenology, giving the dissenter an alternative route to take from this if they prefer and are willing to be consistent about its implications.

Yea, if it is a fact. Now it's your job to turn that "if" into an is. If god is your only ginnel for doing that, then you're not at god being the best explanation, but the explanation.

Well as I'm arguing for God I'd be quite happy with that however there are different constructions of an argument for OM that an atheist could take I think although I do think these become problematic at key points which is why God is the best explanation. I'm not going to spend my time giving an atheist argument for OM though that I don't support and I don't need to despite your mischaracterisation of the argument.

Yes, I get it about your moral realism. An atheist moral realist would state something along the lines of (to paraphrase Matt Dillahunty), we are physical being in a physical universe with physical laws, and our judgements are at the mercy of this physical reality. Basically, they are science-apt - they are truth-apt. The atheist will stop there but you go that step further and state that these truths have been put there by the creator of this physical reality, or something along those simplified lines.

Now we've got that out of the way, I say so fucking what? I bold your assertion and ask you to demonstrate it, to which I again just expect you to leap to god. I don't see it as a fact that it should be valued, only that it is valued.

There are other ways the atheist could go I think than the route you suggest. But to defend my argument and not theirs, the answer to how I argue to it is given above and is argued to from our moral intuitions, the 'so fucking what' of the bit you highlighted is that if my account is correct then the fact/value gap is something we breach this side of God, even though its explanation is grounded in God as, on the account I have given, teleological facts ARE facts that exist in contingent reality. I've also never claimed we can prove OM but I do think we can demonstrate that it is implicit within our morality as practiced and that this leaves us with a choice of either accepting God as the grounds or viewing morality as fundamentally distorted and accepting the consequences of this. For those of us who trust our moral intuitions and also reason that God is the best explanation of OM then we have reason to believe in God.

How about you say what these problems are instead of poisoning the well?

I don't think there are any to worry a serious and sensible theology.

[Leonard James]

 For those of us who do feel the strength and centrality of moral truth as being fundamental to the human condition then God provides the best explanation for those intuitions as the grounds for objective moral truth.

Depends what you mean by "God". If you are referring to some nebulous supernatural power which can't even be shown to exist, then it is definitely NOT the best explanation. The best explanation is in the process which produced us, evolution.

Always in my opinion, of course! 

[Dryghtons Toe]

Yes, I get it about your moral realism. An atheist moral realist would state something along the lines of (to paraphrase Matt Dillahunty), we...

Interesting when I read your supposed summary of an Atheist moral realism I didn’t recognise it as anything any of the leading realist philosophers would say and to be honest I’d never heard of Marr Dillahunty. Having had a google of him there is no wonder he’s some atheist micro-celeb, not one of the many serious atheists philosophers who have championed  moral realism.

I have no idea if he is a realist or not and its quite right to say that simply because many atheists are realists doesn’t makes realism right, what it does demonstrate however is that the motivation for realism is not God – the reason these atheist moral realists are moral realists is exactly the same as the reason I am  - it’s our core intuitions about morality and  the implicit assumptions embedded  in our moral experience. Whether or not they are right, their existence and motivation for realism demonstrates your assertion that belief in OM starts from God is wholly incorrect.

[Enki]

Hi DT,

In response to your post 475:

You have, but as per my last post your explanation isn't an explanation that I disagree with, at least not in the facts of evolution stripped of extra interpretation - evolution is neutral to the whole question we are discussing, open to both realist and anti-realist interpretations. In that sense 'evolution did it' isn't actually an explanation at all if the question is 'is morality objective or not'. To answer that we DO have to look at the question of whether its illusion or whether its a reality, however dimly we see it, and the interpretation you bring to the evolution account will depend on your preconceptions about the answer to that.

It is quite possible to see our moral sense as having an evolutionary tie up whilst accepting that this is the medium through which some sort of objective morality works, I quite agree.

However, as you know, this isn't my position. For me, evolutionary factors actually help my understanding of why we have a moral sense. I do not see the need to introduce a further layer, at least until it has been demonstrated that it actually exists.

I think that your last sentence here is extremely apposite. Much of what we say here depends on our preconceptions. For myself, I see the impulse for morality as a product of our brains. For you, if I have understood you correctly, you see our moral sense as indicative of something much more permanent, a quality which you would ascribe as originating from a theist god.

Still it doesn't stop us asking the questions we have been posing, e.g. How is it that we go about making decisions about whether, for instance, whether bully a gay child is wrong?'. Saying "evolution did it" doesn't help us answer that at all - I still need to know whether I'm appealing to facts (even if evolutionary determined) or personal responses (even if evolutionary determined). As that's the question that makes the difference here and as your explanation seems by your own admittance unable to help us deal with it one way or the other (after all you do say you 'don't know') what we need to get back to is looking at the character of our moral reasoning as opposed to speculations about how that character arose in an evolutionary context.

Indeed it doesn't stop us asking questions. I find the whole idea of morality to be an extremely awlward one to come to terms with, perhaps because on questions of moral significance I find it difficult not to become personally involved. I think that it is also true that many moral situations are not conducive to straightforward answers, probably because they contain complex issues that appeal to different(and often contrary) strains of our moral feeling and thinking.

Yes, quite right, I don't know. I made this clear back in Mess 164. None of us know. That, for me, makes it a fascinating area for debate. I offer my own slant on morality, and listen to the views of others, hopefully to become better informed.

Cheers

[Leonard James]

It is quite possible to see our moral sense as having an evolutionary tie up whilst accepting that this is the medium through which some sort of objective morality works, I quite agree.

However, as you know, this isn't my position. For me, evolutionary factors actually help my understanding of why we have a moral sense. I do not see the need to introduce a further layer, at least until it has been demonstrated that it actually exists.

There is no need to introduce a further layer, unless you are trying to shoehorn some hypothetical power into the discussion.

Morality is a man-made concept which we are trying to fit into the non-moral process of evolution.

Never the twain...

[Dryghtons Toe]

Hi DT,

In response to your post 475:

You have, but as per my last post your explanation isn't an explanation that I disagree with, at least not in the facts of evolution stripped of extra interpretation - evolution is neutral to the whole question we are discussing, open to both realist and anti-realist interpretations. In that sense 'evolution did it' isn't actually an explanation at all if the question is 'is morality objective or not'. To answer that we DO have to look at the question of whether its illusion or whether its a reality, however dimly we see it, and the interpretation you bring to the evolution account will depend on your preconceptions about the answer to that.

It is quite possible to see our moral sense as having an evolutionary tie up whilst accepting that this is the medium through which some sort of objective morality works, I quite agree.

However, as you know, this isn't my position. For me, evolutionary factors actually help my understanding of why we have a moral sense. I do not see the need to introduce a further layer, at least until it has been demonstrated that it actually exists.

I think that your last sentence here is extremely apposite. Much of what we say here depends on our preconceptions. For myself, I see the impulse for morality as a product of our brains. For you, if I have understood you correctly, you see our moral sense as indicative of something much more permanent, a quality which you would ascribe as originating from a theist god.

Still it doesn't stop us asking the questions we have been posing, e.g. How is it that we go about making decisions about whether, for instance, whether bully a gay child is wrong?'. Saying "evolution did it" doesn't help us answer that at all - I still need to know whether I'm appealing to facts (even if evolutionary determined) or personal responses (even if evolutionary determined). As that's the question that makes the difference here and as your explanation seems by your own admittance unable to help us deal with it one way or the other (after all you do say you 'don't know') what we need to get back to is looking at the character of our moral reasoning as opposed to speculations about how that character arose in an evolutionary context.

Indeed it doesn't stop us asking questions. I find the whole idea of morality to be an extremely awlward one to come to terms with, perhaps because on questions of moral significance I find it difficult not to become personally involved. I think that it is also true that many moral situations are not conducive to straightforward answers, probably because they contain complex issues that appeal to different(and often contrary) strains of our moral feeling and thinking.

Yes, quite right, I don't know. I made this clear back in Mess 164. None of us know. That, for me, makes it a fascinating area for debate. I offer my own slant on morality, and listen to the views of others, hopefully to become better informed.

Cheers

ok and fair enough.

[jakswan]

So to 'demonstrating moral facts'.

Yes in a number of posts I have made it clear that the method we go about discovering OM will depend on the account we give of it. As a theist I have given an account of OM rooted in God and I outline this in reply 196. As this account derives its understanding of OM from the flourishing of conscious beings, defined in relation to God’s purpose then we discover moral truth by improving our understanding of our flourishing. This is partly something we do through reason and observation in relation to the physical and psychological facts that allows people to live rich fulfilling lives and the virtues of character necessary to enable these, and partly by deepening our experience of God to gain an insight into his character and purposes. This, like all fields of human discovery will of course be gradual and prone to error and revision in our understanding.

So it seems to me that you 'determine moral facts' by judging an actions to see if it delivers 'flourishing of conscious beings'.

I'm still not seeing the leap to objective?

Ok well if you make an argument and defend your case or alternatively admit that you can't then I'll be happy to explain to too you.

You are asserting morality is objective you have the burden of proof.

[Leonard James]

You are asserting morality is objective you have the burden of proof.

Sadly for him, there isn't any. Moral laws only exist in the brains of the individuals subscribing to them ... nowhere else.

[Dryghtons Toe]

You are asserting morality is objective you have the burden of proof.

Oh I’m happy to explain it, I’m just not going to engage if you aren’t. You don’t get to dictate the terms of the debate, cower off when you can’t support your argument and expect me to keep jumping to your tune. I’ve gone into detail about my position while  you are asserting morality is subjective which is no less of an assertion and if it is at odds with our moral intuitions certainly requires an explanation. As its this ‘add odds with our intuitions’ bit you have failed to answer then this is entirely a reasonable ask