So basically, when I asked you to do it without invoking god, you can't? So as I've said aplenty, your argument for OM has only ever been circular.
No, you missed my, "We can't prove it all the way (since, unless there is an original cause/ground) it is an infinite regress, yet there seems to be no good reason to think otherwise." You have also missed/ignored the definition of objective morality, i.e. that OM exists if there is at least one example of something being morally right or morally wrong independent of how many people think it so. A number of people here, not just Christians, have said that TACTDJFF is (always) morally wrong, though they then go on to be much more open to the possibility of their being wrong than on any other moral question I have seen. If they do indeed think that torturing a child to death just for fun (that being the complete motivation) then they are thereby agreeing that OM does indeed exist (since it is the one example we need), though they they go on to contradict themselves by saying that OM does not exist.
Again, the same misidentification of what morality is. You, like DT, are just arguing here for moral realism. Anyone, theist or atheist, who is basing TACTDJFF always being wrong are basing that on a fundamental, core value of human flourishing, well being or whatever. If I valued the flourishing of ants, lithium, the fluffiness of mash, or (insert whatever you like) more than anything else, then you could find ways of achieving those goals that are better than other ways, to the point where you could potentially scale them so you have one way as "the best", dictated by the reality in which all of this is happening. But all of that means nothing if you can't get passed your own subjective valuation.
My valuation of the morality of something might well be subjective, though that would be a failure on my part, I would think (or at least partial failure).
I think you should re-familiarise yourself with WLC's moral argument at this point. All I'll say is I made an incorrect reference to it myself earlier in the thread.
However, the point is whether there is anything which is morally wrong/right and whose moral wrongness/rightness does not depend on how many people think it so. That is the definition of objective morality which is under discussion.
But this definition holds it's foundation in the intrinsic values we hold. If I value human well being above all else, then I'll put saving a child's life over the joy of someone wanting to torture them to death. However, if I value human suffering above all else, then I'd probably do the opposite. These are the things that are right, that I
should do, if I want to achieve either value and stay consistent to them. This is why the question of objective morality is at the level of value and not judgements that use objective, truth-apt facts that can show us the best way(s) to achieve those values.
Yes, I think there are oughts, but they're based on valuations. You ought to score more goals than the other team if you value the three points. You ought to eat marmite (keep the theme going) sandwiches instead of battery acid if you value your health. Now whether I ought to value what I value is a different thing.
Yes and thus I ask you whether you should value the wellbeing of a child being tortured to death just for fun more than any right the torturer might have to have fun. I would suggest that it is. Do you agree?
Do I agree that I
should value well being more than any right a torturer might have to have fun? I've not a clue because I can only take that valuation as far back as myself. I haven't come across some objectiveness that goes beyond depending on what I think. That I
do value well being over the torturer is where it starts, but that says nothing about whether I
should value that. I'm under no illusions that this isn't easy to reconcile, as you often play the emotive card here yourself with an "I hope so" or some such, but this is just how it appears to be - that there currently is no reason to think there is a
should.
