It is right I think to recognise a difference between logical truths and contingent truths but there must be some relationship between the two classes of truth and the nature of that relationship must be of the form that contingent truths are dependent on or are bounded by logical truths and this is what I mean by the phrase 'primacy of logic'. Logical truths need no law giver to decide them; two plus two would always equal four inevitably in any possible world; the area of a circle will always be 3.14 times the square of its radius in all possible worlds. However when we come to natural law things are much messier, the speed of light in a vacuum say or the charge on an electron. These things are probably contingent but contingent upon what is not always easy to say, and that is why science is a process, a process of finding the way back from contingent truths to logical truths.
Hi torridon,
Thank you for the above post.
Whether there is a
"law giver" or not, we appear to agree that mathematical concepts are true objectively (independent of human minds). In you words:-
"in all possible worlds".
However, except for maths, there is no
"difference between logical truths and contingent truths" in respect of uncertainty. Indeed, if there is
"some relationship between the two classes of truth", it is that (except for maths) logical truths
"are dependent on or bound by" contingent truths - the opposite of what you argue here.
Except for maths, logic cannot be primary in science, because it can never tell us anything about the world unless it is supplemented by something additional. By their nature, logical statements have an implied 'IF' in each premises, and these 'ifs' need support from inductive (uncertain) reasoning before they can be considered 'sound' (i.e. probably true).
For example:- (a) all men are mortal (b) Socrates is a man (c) therefore Socrates is mortal. That is a 'valid' logical statement which we accept as 'sound' because of the inductive support for both premises (a) and (b). In essence, it means (a) if all men are mortal (b) and if Socrates is a man (c) then Socrates is mortal.
Compare that against:- (x) all men have red hair (y) Socrates is a man (z) therefore Socrates has red hair. This also is a 'valid' logical statement, but we do not accept it as 'sound' because it lacks inductive support for premise (x). So, unlike maths (true in all possible worlds), other logical statements are only true in particular cases (not true in all possible worlds).
However, mathematical concepts are different to all other human statements in that they are true in themselves, and in all possible worlds (whether humans inhabit those worlds or not). Science would make no sense unless this was so. It is contingent upon maths.
An interesting question then arises. Is that all there is to it? Are mathematical concepts the ultimate reality? Or is there a further abstract reality underlying maths, something like an abstract mathematician's intellect? Prof. Max Tegmark has published a book claiming the former, while Christians believe the latter due to the goodness and miracles of Jesus (i.e. the Logos).
Deciding between these (or any other idea you might like to raise) needs abductive reasoning, but then, so did Special and General Relativity.
I hope you find this interesting,
God bless