The god of suffering

[Nearly Sane]

NS,

I don't. Moral answers seem to me to be a mix of intuition and reasoning, and sometimes they catch the wind and become the Zeitgeist accordingly (until and unless they change). There's no truth component as there is when considering, say, gravity. The probabilistic truth part concerns for example the findings of science - if I jump out of the window it's probably true that I'll hit the deck shortly afterwards, and that gives me a "true enough" truth to allow me to distinguish that clam from, say, the claim that there's an invisible dragon living in my garage.

No - see above. What I said was that the natural is all we know of that's reliably accessible and investigable - and we know that because (as you noted) it provides truths that demonstrably work: 'planes fly, medicines cure etc. There's no avoiding the problem of solipsism there at all - for all I know it's all a mirage, "I" am a brain in a vat or a bit of junk code in a giant computer game somewhere. Inasmuch as I can sort and model the world as it appears to be though, the distinctions "subjective" and "objective" are useful ones with no appeal to absolutes in either case. 

And that's very different to Vlad's approach.

Nope, you still are not getting the problem. To state the natural is all we know of that us investigable, id to state the causes of it as in cause and effect are naturalistic. You actually have no way to establish this as it's just a built in part of the axiom that we will assume that things have natural causes. We do not rule out the possibility that all or any causes are supernatural because we have no method to do that. That's where your circularity us, and that's why it's just like Vlad in that you use the axiom you assume to prove itself

[Anchorman]

That's true, Anchor, thankfully. I never liked to listen to the Prosperity Gospel and miracles on Premier but someone I worked with listened to Benny Hinn whenever he was on (every evening?), taped him and gave me a couple of tapes which I listened to because she wanted me to.  I found it quite uncomfortable. Just found this article/blog from a Christian who attended one of his meetings: https://www.onfaith.co/commentary/the-five-most-disturbing-things-about-a-benny-hinn-miracle-service There are quite a few reports of limbs growing back, I've not seen any involving Hinn but it wouldn't surprise me. Some people are so desperate, they will try anything but it is so unfair for them to be exploited. The only healing services I ever attended were low key and prayerful with no promises of miracles - but they were compassionate.

Agreed, Brownie. Like you., Hinn and his ilk worry me - the prosperity gospel rubbish - and that's what it is - has nothing of the Christian message I know in it. Bad stuff happens to folk - Christian or nonchristian - and sometimes - often - we have to tolerate it, cope with it, deal with it and even use it in any way God asks us to. As I've pointed out on this thread, Paul was a prime example of someone who had to endure suffering and disability, without, as far as we know, healing. Far from being a hinderance, it was a tool he used in the work he was asked to do. If that was Paul's lot, then sometimes the rest of us need to see that, whether we like it or not, the answer to prayer is 'No' - or 'Not yet'. As for healing services, I've attended a few and even had the honour of laying on of hands and anointing a person. This was done in a dignified, worshipful, ordered and prayerful manner - which was far more effective than the mass hysteria of a Hinn 'event'. Was everyone we prayed for healed? No (though a few were.) Yet everyone WAS lifted, enriched and energised and many were renewed in faith to continue. That's fine in my book.

[bluehillside Retd.]

NS,

Nope, you still are not getting the problem. To state the natural is all we know of that us investigable, id to state the causes of it as in cause and effect are naturalistic.

Nope. By “investigable” I mean only that we can only work on assumptions of cause and effect (as I’ve said often, I assume that my fingers are hitting the keys but I have to way to establish that, say, there aren’t invisible pixies sneaking in just ahead of me and doing it instead). Absent a model that better fits the phenomena I think I observe though, those assumptions are all I have to work with. I well aware though that – as Hume said – ultimately nothing can be proven to be causal of an effect.

You actually have no way to establish this as it's just a built in part of the axiom that we will assume that things have natural causes. We do not rule out the possibility that all or any causes are supernatural because we have no method to do that. That's where your circularity us, and that's why it's just like Vlad in that you use the axiom you assume to prove itself

Nope – see above. It’s not something I seek to establish at all, and there is no circularity therefore.

[Nearly Sane]

NS,

Nope – see above. It’s not something I seek to establish at all, and there is no circularity therefore.

But it is something that you state when you say you are a philosophic naturalist and that 'the natural is all we know of that's reliably accessible and investigable' since you are admitting that you cannot know that at the same time. You are now contradicting yourself.

[Dicky Underpants]

But it is something that you state when you say you are a philosophic naturalist and that 'the natural is all we know of that's reliably accessible and investigable' since you are admitting that you cannot know that at the same time. You are now contradicting yourself.

Have to admit that my little head is beginning to hurt

[bluehillside Retd.]

NS,

But it is something that you state when you say you are a philosophic naturalist and that 'the natural is all we know of that's reliably accessible and investigable' since you are admitting that you cannot know that at the same time. You are now contradicting yourself.

I don't see a contradiction there at all. Remember I went on to explain what I meant by the term (ie, something other than Vlad's personal definition of it). "Reliably" in this context just means "within the context of various axioms and assumptions" - not "absolutely", "certainly" or similar. In that context 'planes fly and medicines cure, but I rely on axioms to accept that there are any 'planes and medicines at all, as indeed I do for concept of "I". 

[Sebastian Toe]

I have a one word description for Hinn  and it begins with a 'C'

Charming?

[Brownie]

I thought Walter meant, "Chin", because it rhymes with "Hinn", and he does have a double chin.  That's Benny Hinn, not Walter.
http://cdn.charismanews.com/images/stories/2015/featured-news/benny_hinn.jpg

[Walter]

Charming?

yeah, that's right

[Nearly Sane]

NS,

I don't see a contradiction there at all. Remember I went on to explain what I meant by the term (ie, something other than Vlad's personal definition of it). "Reliably" in this context just means "within the context of various axioms and assumptions" - not "absolutely", "certainly" or similar. In that context 'planes fly and medicines cure, but I rely on axioms to accept that there are any 'planes and medicines at all, as indeed I do for concept of "I".

You don't have a method that 'reliably' shows natural causes, you have one that assumes them. In which case your 'knowing' is built on the assumption, and you are back to your position being circular.

[bluehillside Retd.]

NS,

You don't have a method that 'reliably' shows natural causes, you have one that assumes them. In which case your 'knowing' is built on the assumption, and you are back to your position being circular.

Nope - you're still trying to read too much into it.

First, the "reliably" referred to observable phenomena ('planes flying, medicines curing etc) rather than to an epistemic discussion of cause and effect.

Second, "reliably" in this context just means "consistently" or "predictably". However many 'planes I look at, pretty much all of them will fly. Whether that's actually because they're held aloft by the invisible hands of the winged god Hermes rather than by the natural forcers of weight, lift, thrust and drag is though a different matter entirely.

That's what's meant when people say that the fruits of science observably work - and thus a positive feedback loop is created for their (probabilistic) truth values. Strict epistemic considerations of cause and effect on the other hand are a different matter, and for the purpose of distinguishing scientific from religious claims the assumption of cause and effect is sufficient. The alternative is - as you noted - to go nuclear, which lays waste to any discussion about (probable) truth vs (probable) non truth. This is essentially what Vlad does when he re-defines "philosophical naturalism" and then tries his, "OK I might be guessing, but so are you" schtick.

Not sure why you're flogging this dead horse so hard, but a dead horse it seems to be nonetheless.

[Nearly Sane]

NS,

Nope - you're still trying to read too much into it.

First, the "reliably" referred to observable phenomena ('planes flying, medicines curing etc) rather than to an epistemic discussion of cause and effect.

Second, "reliably" in this context just means "consistently" or "predictably". However many 'planes I look at, pretty much all of them will fly. Whether that's actually because they're held aloft by the invisible hands of the winged god Hermes rather than by the natural forcers of weight, lift, thrust and drag is though a different matter entirely.

That's what's meant when people say that the fruits of science observably work - and thus a positive feedback loop is created for their (probabilistic) truth values. Strict epistemic considerations of cause and effect on the other hand are a different matter, and for the purpose of distinguishing scientific from religious claims the assumption of cause and effect is sufficient. The alternative is - as you noted - to go nuclear, which lays waste to any discussion about (probable) truth vs (probable) non truth. This is essentially what Vlad does when he re-defines "philosophical naturalism" and then tries his, "OK I might be guessing, but so are you" schtick.

Not sure why you're flogging this dead horse so hard, but a dead horse it seems to be nonetheless.

But in stating your philosophic naturalist position of the 'natural is we know that is investigable' you are stating an epistemic (ser use of 'know') conclusion which by your above post you admit cannot be justified. We have a method that is based on an axiom, it cannot be extended to a philosophical claim as you have done earlier.

Further going nuclear, while we both agree on its effect on Vlad's case, is not problematic if one is a relativist. It's perfectly possible being a relativist to accept that what appears to work is useful, indeed that we have little choice but to believe it works. In that sense it's like free will. I have no evidence outside personal experience that it does exist. And methodological naturalism would rule it out, but I have no choice but to act as if it does. In many ways this parallels the 'arguments' put by theists for their god(s).

When I put up the post that triggered this particular discussion between us, I argued that Sriram's approach is justifiable in claiming that we create a non existent divide between the natural and the supernatural. Now, I think we will agree that that is done by those making the claims of the supernatural since it posits something not only that we do not have evidence for, but that in our categorisation of evidence, we cannot have evidence for. That they then seek to say 'unexplained' things are evidence, I think we will also both agree is a contradiction in their position and one that is based on the personal incredulity fallacy.


However, any move beyond acceptance of methodological naturalism to philosophical  seems to me a positive claim that we don't have evidence for, and as with the supernatural claims cannot have evidence for because it's built-in the unprovable axiom and would therefore be circular.

[bluehillside Retd.]

NS,

But in stating your philosophic naturalist position of the 'natural is we know that is investigable' you are stating an epistemic (ser use of 'know') conclusion which by your above post you admit cannot be justified. We have a method that is based on an axiom, it cannot be extended to a philosophical claim as you have done earlier.

What philosophical claim do you think I have made? I’ve neither said nor implied that we reliably know that A causes B – rather all I’ve said is that certain phenomena observably happen consistently and predictably: ‘planes are designed and built, and then they fly etc. There’s no claim to an ultimate or an absolute truth there – only to our observations about the way the world appears to be.

That the natural is all we know of that’s reliably accessible and investigable is also only a statement of observed experience. While it’s entirely possible that someone one day will propose a method to access “God” and to investigate the claim, so far at least no-one has ever managed to do so. That’s the relevance of the “all we know of” bit: what we know of makes no claim to an equivalence to all there is.

Further going nuclear, while we both agree on its effect on Vlad's case, is not problematic if one is a relativist.

I agree – and I am one!

It's perfectly possible being a relativist to accept that what appears to work is useful, indeed that we have little choice but to believe it works.

Quite so – and what works we often label “true” and what doesn’t we label “not true” (or at least “not shown to be true”). For epistemic purposes that’s good enough – indeed it’s all we have to assign probabilistic values to truth propositions. The point though is that these conclusions are probabilistic – there’s no way to map them to universal or absolute positions.
 

In that sense it's like free will. I have no evidence outside personal experience that it does exist. And methodological naturalism would rule it out, but I have no choice but to act as if it does. In many ways this parallels the 'arguments' put by theists for their god(s).

I’m with you on the first bit, but less sure on your analogy to religious arguments. Yes I have to behave as if I have “free” will, albeit that I can rationalise what’s actually happening to an unfathomably long chain of causes and effects. As for belief in god(s) though, why would I have no choice about that too? There are plenty who have lost their faith and have proceeded accordingly, and it seems to me that there is a practical alternative to it of a type that isn’t available to me if I want to dump the notion of free will. That is, beliefs in gods are discretionary in a way that. say, beliefs about what will happen if I jump out of the window are not.

When I put up the post that triggered this particular discussion between us, I argued that Sriram's approach is justifiable in claiming that we create a non existent divide between the natural and the supernatural.

Here we part company. The divide is in the narratives we can tell about each type of truth claim – for the former we can investigate and model, and attach probabilistic values to the results; for the latter though, what? Again, that says nothing to notions of absolutes about either claims of the natural or of the supernatural – rather it just says that, if I assume the “I” that appears to be, then that “I” can use a method to sort the probably true from the probably not true, and then proceed accordingly.

Now, I think we will agree that that is done by those making the claims of the supernatural since it posits something not only that we do not have evidence for, but that in our categorisation of evidence, we cannot have evidence for. That they then seek to say 'unexplained' things are evidence, I think we will also both agree is a contradiction in their position and one that is based on the personal incredulity fallacy.

Pretty much, yes. I’d look askance at the “our categorisation of evidence” bit though – if the word is to mean anything (eg, “distinguishable from guessing”) then at core the categorisation has to be the same for whoever is using it, albeit that the attendant methods could in principle at least be different.

However, any move beyond acceptance of methodological naturalism to philosophical  seems to me a positive claim that we don't have evidence for, and as with the supernatural claims cannot have evidence for because it's built-in the unprovable axiom and would therefore be circular.

Perhaps we’re at cross purposes about what each of us mean by “philosophical naturalism” here? What I mean by it (and what any reference source I look at say it means) is essentially that the natural is all we know of that’s reliably accessible and investigable (albeit that everything rests on the axioms we talked about earlier). Vlad’s straw man version on the other hand is that it means something like, “the natural is necessarily all there is” – which a moment’s thought re the problem of unknown unknowns will tell you would be untenable.

That’s the only positive claim I make therefore, and it seems fine to me. Only if I overreached into the World of Vlad re-definition of it would the circularity you refer to apply.   

[Nearly Sane]

 To  Bluehilkside:


I am at a losss as to why restating your philosophical naturalist statement which I used in my post both restating it at the start and then referring to it throughout is helping. It is in its use of 'know' and 'natural' making an epistemic claim which is ined by the axiom. Brwak away for a moment from Vlad's position which we both agree is flawed, and look at that claim to knowledge you make. In order for it to be judged in any way probabilistically true you would gave to have something that showed the claim to be valid. As the method makes an assumption, it cannot be the method that shows this.


BTW I don't think anyone talking about probabilistically true can be a relativist since it assumes that there is an absolute standatprd of truth against which the probabilistic can be measured. If there is no measure nothing can be more or less true in any sense

[bluehillside Retd.]

NS,

I am at a losss as to why restating your philosophical naturalist statement which I used in my post both restating it at the start and then referring to it throughout is helping. It is in its use of 'know' and 'natural' making an epistemic claim which is ined by the axiom. Brwak away for a moment from Vlad's position which we both agree is flawed, and look at that claim to knowledge you make. In order for it to be judged in any way probabilistically true you would gave to have something that showed the claim to be valid. As the method makes an assumption, it cannot be the method that shows this.

No – think of it like the tiers of a wedding cake. We might not know whether the bottom tier is real but, if we assume it is, we can then model the world on the basis of the tiers above it. I cannot “know” with any certainty whether the “I” that appears to be exists at all but, once I assume it does, then various arguments in logic can follow albeit relying on some underlying axioms. One of those arguments concerns the observable effect of various claims: I can compare the claim, “if I jump out of the window I will hit the deck shortly afterwards” with the claim, “if I jump out of the window an angel will lower me gently to the ground” with practical experiments and, when I do, decide that one claim is “probably true” and the other is “probably not true”.

And yes, I am aware of Russell’s turkey (actually he used a chicken I think) – ie, the turkey thinks, “this nice farmer feeds me every day, therefore that’s what farmers do” with disastrous results. For all I know one day an angel would lower me to the ground, but the entire sample of (say) a million experiments at least suggests otherwise. That’s what I mean by “know” in the sentence, “the natural is all we know of that’s reliably accessible and investigable”. It could all be built on quicksand for all I know (ie the axioms are false), but it’s all I have to work with. That’s the only validity I claim – valid by reference to the only axiom-based reasoning available to me, but not to any supposed absolute value. 

By contrast, what though should I work with when someone asserts “God”?   

BTW I don't think anyone talking about probabilistically true can be a relativist since it assumes that there is an absolute standatprd of truth against which the probabilistic can be measured. If there is no measure nothing can be more or less true in any sense

As I said earlier, by “probabilistically” I only mean “more likely than not based on observation”. It’s probabilistically true that a dropped ball will fall to the ground as it has every other time I’ve tried it – but for all know the next time it could fly sideways instead. To make the statement, “dropped balls will probably fall to the ground” I don’t though need to assume an absolute standard of truth at all. 

[Nearly Sane]

NS,
No – think of it like the tiers of a wedding cake. We might not know whether the bottom tier is real but, if we assume it is, we can then model the world on the basis of the tiers above it. I cannot “know” with any certainty whether the “I” that appears to be exists at all but, once I assume it does, then various arguments in logic can follow albeit relying on some underlying axioms. One of those arguments concerns the observable effect of various claims: I can compare the claim, “if I jump out of the window I will hit the deck shortly afterwards” with the claim, “if I jump out of the window an angel will lower me gently to the ground” with practical experiments and, when I do, decide that one claim is “probably true” and the other is “probably not true”.

And yes, I am aware of Russell’s turkey (actually he used a chicken I think) – ie, the turkey thinks, “this nice farmer feeds me every day, therefore that’s what farmers do” with disastrous results. For all I know one day an angel would lower me to the ground, but the entire sample of (say) a million experiments at least suggests otherwise. That’s what I mean by “know” in the sentence, “the natural is all we know of that’s reliably accessible and investigable”. It could all be built on quicksand for all I know (ie the axioms are false), but it’s all I have to work with. That’s the only validity I claim – valid by reference to the only axiom-based reasoning available to me, but not to any supposed absolute value. 

By contrast, what though should I work with when someone asserts “God”?   

As I said earlier, by “probabilistically” I only mean “more likely than not based on observation”. It’s probabilistically true that a dropped ball will fall to the ground as it has every other time I’ve tried it – but for all know the next time it could fly sideways instead. To make the statement, “dropped balls will probably fall to the ground” I don’t though need to assume an absolute standard of truth at all.

It doesn't matter which level you approach it on, and you are getting confused with invalidating the claims of theists, which is not something we are disagreeing on, and your own epistemic claims. That things appear to happen in  a way that can be measured is fine. Again we don't disagree but what is actually happening I.e. are those things that happen what we classify as natural is not something that can be demonstrated by a method that makes that assumption.

Indeed the distinction itself, as already covered, between natural/supernatural is meaningless unless iris looked at from the idea that there any such thing as the supernatural. That's why I keep on mentioning Sriram's take that whatever happens and however it is caused is all part  of the same process. Making a philosophic claim of an epistemic kind as regards natural is making a category error unless you think that the supernatural makes sense in some way.

[bluehillside Retd.]

NS,

It doesn't matter which level you approach it on…

It matters a lot I think. The goldfish in a bowl models his reality – his “truths” if you like – on the basis of what he observes and (inasmuch as goldfish can reason) his reason. His belief “little plastic castle” is true for him on that basis, as it’s also true for any other goldfish that want to test his claim. Whereas his clerical chum asserting “goldfish god” offers nothing for him to get his teeth into (assuming that goldfish have teeth).

Similarity we model our reality using the tools available to us, but that’s not to say that we’re not just another layer of reality (different types of “goldfish”) with whole worlds or reality beyond our ken. 

That’s all that’s being said here: we can reliably model answers just as the goldfish reliably models “castle” because those answers provide solutions that work, which is as good a definition of “true” as we have.

…and you are getting confused with invalidating the claims of theists, which is not something we are disagreeing on, and your own epistemic claims.

Perhaps, but the former entail absolutes whereas mine are provisional but ok…

That things appear to happen in  a way that can be measured is fine. Again we don't disagree but what is actually happening I.e. are those things that happen what we classify as natural is not something that can be demonstrated by a method that makes that assumption.

Sorry, but you’re going to have to tease this out a little as it doesn’t scan. What do you mean by “actually” here? I’m not sure that we can ever know “actually” can we – how would we eliminate the goldfish problem for example?

I make no claim to an “actually” in any case, so I have nothing that would rely on it to demonstrate. All I do say is that, even when the epistemic bedrock is uncertainty, logical models that rest on it and that provide working solutions still give us “true enough to be useful” truths nonetheless.

Indeed the distinction itself, as already covered, between natural/supernatural is meaningless unless iris looked at from the idea that there any such thing as the supernatural. That's why I keep on mentioning Sriram's take that whatever happens and however it is caused is all part  of the same process. Making a philosophic claim of an epistemic kind as regards natural is making a category error unless you think that the supernatural makes sense in some way.

I’ll have to unpick that:

“Indeed the distinction itself, as already covered, between natural/supernatural is meaningless unless iris looked at from the idea that there any such thing as the supernatural.”

But the meaninglessness (ie, inability to produce truths) of the term “supernatural” is itself the distinction! There’s nothing to model – and that’s what differentiates truth claims about the supernatural from truth claims about the natural. As soon as you try to examine the former term it dissolves. Natural vs supernatural is a non-white noise vs white noise issue.

“That's why I keep on mentioning Sriram's take that whatever happens and however it is caused is all part of the same process.”

How can explanations that are not even wrong be part of the same process as those that can be tested and found to be either right or wrong (albeit resting on….etc)?

Claims of fact that are found to be true or not true are fine, but claims of the supernatural aren’t part of that process at all – they’re inherently not truth apt.

"Making a philosophic claim of an epistemic kind as regards natural is making a category error unless you think that the supernatural makes sense in some way."

The only philosophic claim of an epistemic kind is that the natural is all we know of that we can reliably access and test (albeit… etc). The term “supernatural” doesn’t need to be meaningful at all for that purpose – “all we know of” just means “all we know of”. It’s complete in itself, and it doesn’t entail consideration of the supernatural for its force (a rejection that would, as you say, require the term “supernatural” to be meaningful). That’s the point – the universe appears to consist of various components that don’t (or didn’t) require some kind of intelligent intervention, so there’s nothing else to consider.

[Nearly Sane]

NS,

It matters a lot I think. The goldfish in a bowl models his reality – his “truths” if you like – on the basis of what he observes and (inasmuch as goldfish can reason) his reason. His belief “little plastic castle” is true for him on that basis, as it’s also true for any other goldfish that want to test his claim. Whereas his clerical chum asserting “goldfish god” offers nothing for him to get his teeth into (assuming that goldfish have teeth).

Similarity we model our reality using the tools available to us, but that’s not to say that we’re not just another layer of reality (different types of “goldfish”) with whole worlds or reality beyond our ken. 

That’s all that’s being said here: we can reliably model answers just as the goldfish reliably models “castle” because those answers provide solutions that work, which is as good a definition of “true” as we have.

Perhaps, but the former entail absolutes whereas mine are provisional but ok…

Sorry, but you’re going to have to tease this out a little as it doesn’t scan. What do you mean by “actually” here? I’m not sure that we can ever know “actually” can we – how would we eliminate the goldfish problem for example?

I make no claim to an “actually” in any case, so I have nothing that would rely on it to demonstrate. All I do say is that, even when the epistemic bedrock is uncertainty, logical models that rest on it and that provide working solutions still give us “true enough to be useful” truths nonetheless.

I’ll have to unpick that:

“Indeed the distinction itself, as already covered, between natural/supernatural is meaningless unless iris looked at from the idea that there any such thing as the supernatural.”

But the meaninglessness (ie, inability to produce truths) of the term “supernatural” is itself the distinction! There’s nothing to model – and that’s what differentiates truth claims about the supernatural from truth claims about the natural. As soon as you try to examine the former term it dissolves. Natural vs supernatural is a non-white noise vs white noise issue.

“That's why I keep on mentioning Sriram's take that whatever happens and however it is caused is all part of the same process.”

How can explanations that are not even wrong be part of the same process as those that can be tested and found to be either right or wrong (albeit resting on….etc)?

Claims of fact that are found to be true or not true are fine, but claims of the supernatural aren’t part of that process at all – they’re inherently not truth apt.

"Making a philosophic claim of an epistemic kind as regards natural is making a category error unless you think that the supernatural makes sense in some way."

The only philosophic claim of an epistemic kind is that the natural is all we know of that we can reliably access and test (albeit… etc). The term “supernatural” doesn’t need to be meaningful at all for that purpose – “all we know of” just means “all we know of”. It’s complete in itself, and it doesn’t entail consideration of the supernatural for its force (a rejection that would, as you say, require the term “supernatural” to be meaningful). That’s the point – the universe appears to consist of various components that don’t (or didn’t) require some kind of intelligent intervention, so there’s nothing else to consider.

And again you are still hung up on the claims of those arguing for some distinction and defining your knowledge against that. To claim that natural us non white noise is to make a philosophic claim that the method cannot support. And again, to claim that the natural is all we know that is investigable is tautologous once you remove the idea of supernatural. It is a set if things that can be investigated. Given a method based on axioms about what can be investigated and what evidence is, then it is entirely circular. Claims to philosophic epistemics from it are nothing more than a description of the methodology.

Further given that we can investigate subjective judgements, even if not in terms of looking to establish anything inter subjective, your position seems to be that morality would have to be not natural.

[bluehillside Retd.]

NS,

And again you are still hung up on the claims of those arguing for some distinction and defining your knowledge against that. To claim that natural us non white noise is to make a philosophic claim that the method cannot support.

Again you seem to be relying here on some idea of the absolute, something I’ve expressly said (several times) is not what I claim at all. The natural is non-white noise only within the paradigm of a model of reality. The “I” that appears to be appears to be able to establish various truths that appear to enable me to navigate the world that “I” appear to inhabit. Strictly within that paradigm – and that paradigm only – I can then call certain things not white noise when they provide the solutions that enable me to do that. 

When different claims on the other hand don’t do that because they’re incoherent, then the distinction between them as white noise and non-white noise statements is a helpful one.

And again, to claim that the natural is all we know that is investigable is tautologous once you remove the idea of supernatural. It is a set if things that can be investigated. Given a method based on axioms about what can be investigated and what evidence is, then it is entirely circular. Claims to philosophic epistemics from it are nothing more than a description of the methodology.

Yes, the natural (ie, that which does not appear to have had a non-natural intelligent something involved) is the set of things that can be investigated. Saying that it’s the only set of things we know of that can be investigated though doesn’t involved a tautology at all – it’s just a statement of observable fact. You don’t in other words need a meaningful definition of a different potential set for that statement to be true nonetheless. This is true as a general proposition – the statement “gravity is all we know of that causes apples to fall” for example doesn’t require a cogent explanation of pixies with thin strings theory to make it true on its own terms.

Had I not bothered with the “that we know of” and instead said something like, “the natural is all there is that can be investigated” on the other hand then you’d have had a point.

Further given that we can investigate subjective judgements, even if not in terms of looking to establish anything inter subjective, your position seems to be that morality would have to be not natural.

Say what now? How would you propose to investigate subjective judgements? I might judge “The Haywain” to be a great painting (or to be a terrible one) – what would you have to investigate about that?

Unless there’s an answer to that, the morality point is a non-sequitur.

[Nearly Sane]

NS,

Again you seem to be relying here on some idea of the absolute, something I’ve expressly said (several times) is not what I claim at all. The natural is non-white noise only within the paradigm of a model of reality. The “I” that appears to be appears to be able to establish various truths that appear to enable me to navigate the world that “I” appear to inhabit. Strictly within that paradigm – and that paradigm only – I can then call certain things not white noise when they provide the solutions that enable me to do that. 

When different claims on the other hand don’t do that because they’re incoherent, then the distinction between them as white noise and non-white noise statements is a helpful one.

Yes, the natural (ie, that which does not appear to have had a non-natural intelligent something involved) is the set of things that can be investigated. Saying that it’s the only set of things we know of that can be investigated though doesn’t involved a tautology at all – it’s just a statement of observable fact. You don’t in other words need a meaningful definition of a different potential set for that statement to be true nonetheless. This is true as a general proposition – the statement “gravity is all we know of that causes apples to fall” for example doesn’t require a cogent explanation of pixies with thin strings theory to make it true on its own terms.

Had I not bothered with the “that we know of” and instead said something like, “the natural is all there is that can be investigated” on the other hand then you’d have had a point.

Say what now? How would you propose to investigate subjective judgements? I might “The Haywain” to be a great painting (or to be a terrible one) – what would you have to investigate about that?

Unless there’s an answer to that, the morality point is a non-sequitur.

Just to address the last point, you've missed the what I was saying. It's not that the subjective can be investigated but if you take the position that we define the natural as that which we can investigate, and that morality is not investigable, then your position is morality is not natural.

[Udayana]

The statement " the natural is all we know of that’s reliably accessible and investigable" ultimately rests on a circular definition and self-reference. This definition is fine to use  on a day to day basis, but we can't use it philosophically to define "reality". It is the same as trying to prove that the universe can be described in maths. So, bhs's claim that he is using it practically, not as an absolute - should be fine.

The subjective can be investigated by the subject - whether anything that is found can be understood by someone else is a different matter. We could point out aspects of the Haywain that influence someone else into appreciating it where previously they did not. We may be able to determine how this process works, and indeed how views on morality can be influenced, but of-course, we will never know if the other "really" see or feel the same as us or not or if that "really" has any meaning.

[bluehillside Retd.]

NS,

Just to address the last point, you've missed the what I was saying. It's not that the subjective can be investigated but if you take the position that we define the natural as that which we can investigate, and that morality is not investigable, then your position is morality is not natural.

Thanks for clarifying. The clue I think is in the word "investigable": the speed of light in a vacuum is investigable in the sense that it can be approximated and the answer said to be "true"; morality, language, aesthetics etc on the other hand are in a different category because they're not truth apt. They can though be "investigated" inasmuch as the questions have meaning, and so we can intuit and reason our way to our opinions about them (albeit that in the end all we have is opinions).

That's qualitatively different I think from "God" or for that matter from "3479y397f", neither of which offers anything either to intuit or to reason about. Even to form an opinion about "God" you'd need to have a coherent question to address, as you would if, say, you were forming an opinion about capital punishment.

[Nearly Sane]

NS,

Thanks for clarifying. The clue I think is in the word "investigable": the speed of light in a vacuum is investigable in the sense that it can be approximated and the answer said to be "true"; morality, language, aesthetics etc on the other hand are in a different category because they're not truth apt. They can though be "investigated" inasmuch as the questions have meaning, and so we can intuit and reason our way to our opinions about them (albeit that in the end all we have is opinions).

That's qualitatively different I think from "God" or for that matter from "3479y397f", neither of which offers anything either to intuit or to reason about. Even to form an opinion about "God" you'd need to have a coherent question to address, as you would if, say, you were forming an opinion about capital punishment.

I still don't see how this addresses your position which is the natural is investigable, morality isn't investigable, therefore morality isn't natural.

[bluehillside Retd.]

Udayana,

The statement " the natural is all we know of that’s reliably accessible and investigable" ultimately rests on a circular definition and self-reference. This definition is fine to use  on a day to day basis, but we can't use it philosophically to define "reality". It is the same as trying to prove that the universe can be described in maths. So, bhs's claim that he is using it practically, not as an absolute - should be fine.

The subjective can be investigated by the subject - whether anything that is found can be understood by someone else is a different matter. We could point out aspects of the Haywain that influence someone else into appreciating it where previously they did not. We may be able to determine how this process works, and indeed how views on morality can be influenced, but of-course, we will never know if the other "really" see or feel the same as us or not or if that "really" has any meaning.

Reply 143 addresses some of this I think. I don't use it to "define reality" at all - rather I use it to model a reality with no reference at all to an ultimate (or "actual) definition of it. Essentially it's a pragmatic approach to epistemology: if it provides solutions (or even opinions we use as solutions to coherent questions) then we label the proposition "true", or "my opinion"; you can't though assign a truth value or even an opinion to a proposition that's just incoherent.     

[bluehillside Retd.]

NS,

I still don't see how this addresses your position which is the natural is investigable, morality isn't investigable, therefore morality isn't natural.

Because "investigable" is a broad term - it doesn't necessarily need to lead to an answer that's on the true/not true spectrum; it might just lead to a "this is my opinion on the matter" outcome. If, say, I asked you a moral question you hadn't considered before chances are you'd think about it for a bit, and then come up with an opinion that's a mix of intuition and reasoning (perhaps based on certain precepts, like equality).

On the other hand, if I asked you "uhyo877y 67tt 7y7866 i7o6?" you'd just say that the question is incoherent. 

"God" falls into the latter category, not the former. The actual moral answer though isn't supernatural because it's not on the true/not true spectrum type of investigable.