A couple of recent interesting and thought-provoking threads on and around humanism have led me to clarify my thoughts on the subject - in particular, why I find the concept (perhaps the word specifically) problematic and why I typically don't regard myself and label myself as a humanist.
It certainly isn't an ideological issue. There have been umpteen humanist manifestos put out by various organisations over the lion's share of a century; it would be fair to say that I've probably read all of them or almost all and there's very little indeed - certainly nothing springs to mind - with which I disagree.
The problem I have is that in practice, when it comes to living out humanist ideals and principles,
some humanists (I stress this since it clearly doesn't apply to all) turn humanism into anthropocentrism, where humans, human wants and needs, human relationships, human societies are the
only areas of moral regard; anything outside of these - non-human animals; the biosphere or the environment generally - have at best instrumental value depending upon what they can do for humans and how they can serve human needs. It's doubtless an easy trap to fall into - the clue's in the name - but it is, in my estimation, wholly unjustifed. Irrational, even. It's a bold claim I know but I would say that nobody who is more or less scientifically literate and scientifically informed - especially about evolution - can maintain this anthropocentric attitude (fundamentally a religious attitude, I think) of humans as the summit of creation; the only rational creature, the only creative creature and so forth. This in effect makes humanism into a religion: take down God and simply put Man in his stead. This is a religion with humanity on the pedestal vacated by a god or gods, as August Comte amongst others was not only aware but about which he was absolutely explicit.
Not too many self-identified humanists seem to challenge this, in my experience. One who does, happily, is A. C. Grayling, in his (IMO rather good, especially in the second half)
The God Argument: The Case Against Religion and For Humanism, which has such clear and persuasive arguments for humanism that in reading it it's the one and only time that I've almost been swayed into adopting the humanist label. This is doubtless because Grayling, in effect, agrees with me, or vice versa: humanism can't just be about human concerns:
The principal subject matter of morality is, overwhelmingly, human relationships. As an aside, though, it should be noted that there are good arguments for including the animal and more generally the natural world in the sphere of moral concern. One source of this thought is an important distinction that is almost always overlooked both in informal and in philosophical discussions of morality. This is the distinction between moral agents and moral patients.
A moral agent is something that can choose, act, consider the consequences of both choices and actions, be held responsible for them, and be praised or blamed accordingly. The typical moral agent is a human being who has attained the age of reason, but it happens that corporate bodies are moral agents too - companies, governments, institutions - and they can be held accountable in the same way [...]
A moral patient is something that is worthy of moral regard in virtue of its ability to be affected by what moral agents do. Moral agents are also moral patients, because the activity of other moral agents can affect them. A chicken is not a moral agent, but it is a moral patient; it can suffer in that it can experience pain and fear, and it can take pleasure in strutting about and pecking the ground without nearby threats; and therefore it is worthy of moral regard - of being treated in a way that is accordant with and respectful of these facts about it.
[...]Efforts have been made to persuade us to count the animal world and indeed the whole of nature as objects of moral concern - quite rightly in my view. [...] I shall not pursue these points further here. I note them in order to point out that humanism is not just about humans in the sense of believing that the only worthwhile topics of moral and ethical debate are human beings and their societies. Humanism is about behaving like the best of civilised, thoughtful, responsible, considerate moral agents. We talk about being humane toward animals; that is, acting with the consideration and kindness that arise from conscious interest in their welfare. You would expect a humanist to be humane - a humane-ist you might say - in all things, including attitudes to nature and its non-human inhabitants.
(
The God Argument, pp. 195-6).
I don't want to overdo the animal angle or to turn this into a point specifically about animal rights, environmentalism/conservation
per se - that's for another time and place. These examples though - non-human animals; the environment - do point up the principle that Grayling's brand of humanism, and the only one that I can in good conscience sign up to, actually dethrones humanity from the central position some put it in and has implications that many would not, will not like; namely, that for a greater good sometimes some human needs (or mere wants) may have to take a back seat, and humanity come second for a change. With population out of control and climate change showing its hand, I suspect that in a not-too-distant future I won't live to see, this could lead to some uncomfortable consequences.
