Can I be a Christian and a humanist?

[ProfessorDavey]

To be distinguishing , it would need to be something true surely of humanism and not other views. I think humans exist and am not a humanist. Ergo it isn't a distinguishing feature. Indeed Prof D thinks it is universal so how could it be 'distinguishing'?

You need to understand the difference with necessary and sufficient.

Believing that humans exist and are moral agents is necessary for humanism, it is not sufficient - but most people will buy into those starting necessary assumptions.

Believing that god or gods exist is necessary for a theistic moral philosophy, but again it is not sufficient - however many people wont be able to buy into that starting necessary assumption.

[Nearly Sane]

I didn't compare humanism with theism, I compared it with theistic moral philosophy - I'm sure you recognise the difference.

This makes your position even less clear. If the axioms are universal then they are part of the starting point of any theistic moral philosophy and as you have been making clear throughout the thread then is along tradition of theistic moral philosophy which holds the basic precepts of humanism.

This then means that any exclusionary aspects of theistic moral philosophy are questionable by your own arguments, since that seems to relate much more to the belief system in terms of facts.

[ProfessorDavey]

I will leave Prof D to expand on what he meant by moral agents but if it is as you define it, then that then seems to be exclusionary of a belief in  a god as you point out so therefore cannot be universal as Prof D claimed.

I think the concept of moral agency is pretty well established - for example:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_agency

'Moral agency is an individual's ability to make moral judgments based on some notion of right and wrong and to be held accountable for these actions. A moral agent is "a being who is capable of acting with reference to right and wrong."'

The concept doesn't define where the notion of right or wrong comes from, but is based on an assumption that the individual is responsible for their actions, and accountable for those actions in moral terms. That isn't inconsistent with being a theist.

[ProfessorDavey]

This makes your position even less clear. If the axioms are universal then they are part of the starting point of any theistic moral philosophy and as you have been making clear throughout the thread then is along tradition of theistic moral philosophy which holds the basic precepts of humanism.

This then means that any exclusionary aspects of theistic moral philosophy are questionable by your own arguments, since that seems to relate much more to the belief system in terms of facts.

No because the key assumption for a theistic moral philosophy is a believe that god or gods exist - otherwise we would simply call is a moral philosophy.

[Nearly Sane]

You need to understand the difference with necessary and sufficient.

Believing that humans exist and are moral agents is necessary for humanism, it is not sufficient - but most people will buy into those starting necessary assumptions.

Believing that god or gods exist is necessary for a theistic moral philosophy, but again it is not sufficient - however many people wont be able to buy into that starting necessary assumption.

I do understand the difference, but they don't relate to someone's using the term 'distinguishing', which seems to me to be acclaim to sufficiency. What sufficiency cannot mean is being universal which was what you made the claim for. It would help if you didn't use different terms at different stages in different ways.

[Nearly Sane]

No because the key assumption for a theistic moral philosophy is a believe that god or gods exist - otherwise we would simply call is a moral philosophy.

As a means of being sufficient/distinguishing/key to identifying it,yes but it tells you nothing more than that. The issue is that you gave already stated that your axioms that humans exist and are moral agents ate universal so they too form part of this base of a set of beliefs.

If you define humanism as a way that it forms the base of a universal system, then we are back at it being meaningless to compare humanism with a subset of itself and say that the subset is more exclusionary.

[ProfessorDavey]

What sufficiency cannot mean is being universal which was what you made the claim for.

No I didn't - I was very clear that as we progress should the further assumptions required for sufficiency for humanism there will be plenty of people who will get to a point and go 'I'm out'. See reply 17.

[ProfessorDavey]

As a means of being sufficient/distinguishing/key to identifying it,yes but it tells you nothing more than that. The issue is that you gave already stated that your axioms that humans exist and are moral agents ate universal so they too form part of this base of a set of beliefs.

Believing in the existence of god or gods is a necessary requirement for agreement with a theistic moral philosophy, it is not a sufficient requirement.

Believing in the existence of humans and that they are moral agents are necessary requirement for agreement with humanism, again they are not sufficient.

The difference being that those initial necessary requirements for humanism are almost universal, the necessary requirements for a theistic moral philosophy are far from universal.

And while humanism is currently (particularly in the UK) seen as being non religious, this is a narrow interpretation and throughout history, and today, there are those who clearly see themselves as Christian humanists, Buddhist humanists, Muslim humanists etc.

[Nearly Sane]

No I didn't - I was very clear that as we progress should the further assumptions required for sufficiency for humanism there will be plenty of people who will get to a point and go 'I'm out'. See reply 17.

which puts it back as another subset, if possibly, a larger subset of the universal set as theistic moral philosophy. Indeed it may be that the two subsets have a rather large overlap.

[ProfessorDavey]

Indeed it may be that the two subsets have a rather large overlap.

Obviously as you can be a Christian humanist.

However you can't be an atheist adherent of a theistic moral philosophy - because you'd have to be an atheist theist, which I think is impossible.

[Nearly Sane]

Believing in the existence of god or gods is a necessary requirement for agreement with a theistic moral philosophy, it is not a sufficient requirement.

Believing in the existence of humans and that they are moral agents are necessary requirement for agreement with humanism, again they are not sufficient.

The difference being that those initial necessary requirements for humanism are almost universal, the necessary requirements for a theistic moral philosophy are far from universal.

And while humanism is currently (particularly in the UK) seen as being non religious, this is a narrow interpretation and throughout history, and today, there are those who clearly see themselves as Christian humanists, Buddhist humanists, Muslim humanists etc.

Seems to me in the sense of your approach here, believing in god or does amounts to both a necessary and sufficient requirement for a theistic moral philosophy. And it is that additional use of the sufficient requirement in one but not the other that is your inconsistency.

[Nearly Sane]

Obviously as you can be a Christian humanist.

However you can't be an atheist adherent of a theistic moral philosophy - because you'd have to be an atheist theist, which I think is impossible.

Has someone suggested that one could be an atheist theist?

[bluehillside Retd.]

Prof,

The concept doesn't define where the notion of right or wrong comes from, but is based on an assumption that the individual is responsible for their actions, and accountable for those actions in moral terms. That isn't inconsistent with being a theist.

Is that true though? Some of the theists here for example will tell you that their theism isn't a choice, but rather that they "experienced "God"", "met Jesus" etc and that various moral rules in a "holy" text must therefore be correct. How then are those individuals responsible for their moral actions when in fact they're just following the rules provided for them?

That seems to me to be quite a big difference between humanism and theism.     

[ProfessorDavey]

Seems to me in the sense of your approach here, believing in god or does amounts to both a necessary and sufficient requirement for a theistic moral philosophy. And it is that additional use of the sufficient requirement in one but not the other that is your inconsistency.

No believing in god or gods is not sufficient. So if you believe in Thor is that sufficient to agree with Christianity as a theistic moral philosophy?

[ProfessorDavey]

Prof,

Is that true though? Some of the theists here for example will tell you that their theism isn't a choice, but rather that they "experienced "God"", "met Jesus" etc and that various moral rules in a "holy" text must therefore be correct. How then are those individuals responsible for their moral actions when in fact they're just following the rules provided for them?

That seems to me to be quite a big difference between humanism and theism.   

The two aren't mutually exclusive - you can be a theist humanist - loads are and there is a longstanding history of Christian humanism, Islamic humanism etc etc.

That isn't to say that all theists are humanist - many aren't.

But you seem to be implying that you cannot be both a theist and a humanism - I don't think that is true.

What you cannot be is an atheist theist - and therefore you cannot be both an atheist and agree with a theistic moral philosophy.

[Nearly Sane]

No believing in god or gods is not sufficient. So if you believe in Thor is that sufficient to agree with Christianity as a theistic moral philosophy?

I think in the sense of there being a theistic moral philosophy, and that seems to the way you have been using beliefs here.

[ProfessorDavey]

I think in the sense of there being a theistic moral philosophy, and that seems to the way you have been using beliefs here.

There are, of course, many many theistic moral philosophies.

A belief in god or gods is necessary for agreement but not sufficient.

[Nearly Sane]

The two aren't mutually exclusive - you can be a theist humanist - loads are and there is a longstanding history of Christian humanism, Islamic humanism etc etc.

That isn't to say that all theists are humanist - many aren't.

But you seem to be implying that you cannot be both a theist and a humanism - I don't think that is true.

What you cannot be is an atheist theist - and therefore you cannot be both an atheist and agree with a theistic moral philosophy.

for the theists who are not humanist, what is it that makes them not humanist?

[Nearly Sane]

There are, of course, many many theistic moral philosophies.

A belief in god or gods is necessary for agreement but not sufficient.

But sufficient for agreement t that there is such a thing as a theistic moral philosophy. I think if you want further agreement then that is merely sufficient conditions for further subsets.

[bluehillside Retd.]

Prof,

The two aren't mutually exclusive - you can be a theist humanist - loads are and there is a longstanding history of Christian humanism, Islamic humanism etc etc.

That isn't to say that all theists are humanist - many aren't.

But you seem to be implying that you cannot be both a theist and a humanism - I don't think that is true.

What you cannot be is an atheist theist - and therefore you cannot be both an atheist and agree with a theistic moral philosophy.

Yes I know there's a long tradition of theistic humanism, but I merely flag the difference between "I the individual am responsible for my moral actions" and "a god is responsible for my moral actions". They seem to me to be fundamentally different – and potentially at least mutually exclusive – approaches to morality.     

[Nearly Sane]

Prof,

Yes I know there's a long tradition of theistic humanism, but I merely flag the difference between "I the individual am responsible for my moral actions" and "a god is responsible for my moral actions". They seem to me to be fundamentally different – and potentially at least mutually exclusive – approaches to morality.     

There are very few theists who take the position that god is responsible for their moral actions. There are a number where you might argue that that would be consistent with some of their ideas but it seems wrong to suggest that that is their actual position. Indeed I think that the tradition of theistic humanism is there precisely to state that it is not just by grace or the choice of a god that you are saved. And again, that tension is apparent in many posters on here who put their 'saving' down to the 'grace' of their god but most of those would be amongst the most vehement that we are responsible for our actions.

[ProfessorDavey]

Prof,

Yes I know there's a long tradition of theistic humanism, but I merely flag the difference between "I the individual am responsible for my moral actions" and "a god is responsible for my moral actions". They seem to me to be fundamentally different – and potentially at least mutually exclusive – approaches to morality.     

I don't see many theists claiming that god is responsible for their moral actions - a more common view is that the individual is responsible for their own actions, but are accountable to god. So an atheist humanist may see themselves as accountable to their conscience, other people and society. A Christian humanist (for example) may see themselves as accountable to their conscience, other people, society and (most significantly) to god.

But in both cases I think they'd accept they are responsible for their own actions.

[bluehillside Retd.]

NS/Prof,

You surprise me a little - "God makes the rules so I have no choice but to follow them" is fairly common I'd have thought, but perhaps we should allow the theists here to tell us what they do think.

[ProfessorDavey]

NS/Prof,

You surprise me a little - "God makes the rules so I have no choice but to follow them" is fairly common I'd have thought, but perhaps we should allow the theists here to tell us what they do think.

We should certainly hear from the theists, but that isn't the impression I get.

I think the typical view is that god makes the rules, it is a matter of our free will whether we choose to follow god's rules, but we will be accountable to god for our choices.

[Nearly Sane]

NS/Prof,

You surprise me a little - "God makes the rules so I have no choice but to follow them" is fairly common I'd have thought, but perhaps we should allow the theists here to tell us what they do think.

You seem to be defining 'moral responsibility' as being about making the rules. What I would suggest is that the Prof and I are taking the more traditional view that the person is responsible, and should be held responsible, for their own actions.

Most theists might agree that god makes the rules, buy that they have a specific choice as to following them. The idea of sin points out that they accept failure is an option here, and the moral agency and responsibility lies there.