L’Eau
…goes on to qualify that in various ways, including versions similar to my "able to do everything that can be done".
None of which help you:
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The term omnipotent has been used to connote a number of different positions. These positions include, but are not limited to, the following:
1.A deity is able to do anything that it chooses to do.[1]”
This just relocates the problem. The choice precedes the action, but it doesn’t mean that any action at all isn’t possible if this “God” so chooses
a priori. It’s a matter of choice, not of the possibility or otherwise of the action.
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2. A deity is able to do anything that is in accord with its own nature (thus, for instance, if it is a logical consequence of a deity's nature that what it speaks is truth, then it is not able to lie).”
See above. The “it’s nature” precedes the action but it doesn’t mean the action itself is impossible.
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3. It is part of a deity's nature to be consistent and that it would be inconsistent for said deity to go against its own laws unless there was a reason to do so.[2]”
That’s called begging the question. Why just assume that “
it’s part of a deity’s nature to be consistent”, particularly when the claims of the religious suggest pretty much the opposite of that – the capriciousness with which prayers are apparently answered and ignored for example?
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4. A deity can bring about any state of affairs which is logically possible for anyone to bring about in that situation.”
So? The “logically possible” I covered (but you ignored – four-sided triangles and all that) and surely it’s not for “
anyone to bring about” there when it should be “for anyone
thought to be omnipotent to bring about”.
“5. A deity is able to do anything that corresponds with its omniscience and therefore with its worldplan.”
Circular reasoning. You’d have to argue omniscience or argue omnipotence first, not make them co-dependent. It’s also begging the question again.
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6. Every action performed in the world is 'actually' being performed by the deity, either due to omni-immanence, or because all actions must be 'supported' or 'permitted' by the deity.”
So? What does that tell you about actions this supposedly omnipotent god can’t do?
There is a quotation from Thomas Aquinas to that effect, more or less, and an explanation of the God of Process theology, which says that God can persuade but not compel.
Is all process theology as daft as this? If, say, I’m driving one day and fiddling with the radio when a kid steps out and “God” decides to intervene (maybe he’s having a break from giving malaria to African babies) does he “compel” me to turn the steering wheel, or does he just “persuade” me – perhaps by popping into my head with a, “sorry to trouble you old chap, but would you mind awfully – you know, if it’s not too much trouble – not running over that kiddie I’ve just brought to your attention? Thanks everso”?