NS,
I didn't say me saying you are wrong makes it so.
No, but you didn’t tell me why you thought I was wrong – just that I was.
As to re article given that it covers a wide range of ideas, how about you select s one that you think supports your idea that arguments are evidence rather than using evidence and we might be able to have a discussion?
Gladly. Have a look at this:
“a. Propositional Evidence in Explanatory, Probabilistic and Deductive Reasoning
One way to approach the matter is to consider the role of evidence in certain kinds of reasoning in which we engage. Recently, such a strategy has led Timothy Williamson to the conclusion that evidence must be propositional—that is, that it must consist in a proposition or set of propositions (Williamson 2000, pp. 194-200).
Although Williamson declines to give any theoretical account of propositions, minimally we may take propositions to be the bearers of truth and falsity (what is true or false), the contents of assertions (what is said or asserted) and the objects of propositional attitudes (e.g. what is believed or known). More generally, propositions may be taken to be the referents of that-clauses: for instance, I believe or know that the house is on fire; it is true or false that the Orioles won last night; I said or asserted that Jones is a thief; and so on.
To begin with, Williamson points out that evidence is often featured in explanatory reasoning, in the sense that we tend to infer to the hypothesis that provides the best explanation of the evidence. Whatever else evidence may be, then, at the very least it is the kind of thing that hypotheses explain. But what hypotheses explain, Williamson contends, are propositions; we use hypotheses to explain why such-and-such is the case, and so what is explained—the evidence—is that such-and-such is the case. By contrast, it makes no sense whatsoever to explain an object; we cannot explain this knife, for example. What we might explain, however, is something true about this knife, such as that it is bloody. Here, the evidence would be that the knife is bloody—again, a proposition, not an object. Nor, on Williamson's view, would it make sense to explain a sensory experience. The hypothesis that I have a cold does not explain the tickle in my throat, but would explain why I have a tickle in my throat. Again, what is explained—the evidence—is that I have a tickle in my throat, not the experience itself. Accordingly, if we consider the role of evidence in explanatory reasoning, it seems that evidence is propositional."
You seem to be opening up a distinction between reasoning (or argument) and evidence (“rather than using evidence”) that I think is false. A bloody knife next to a corpse for example isn’t on a stand alone basis “evidence” of a murder weapon – rather reason or argument has to be brought to bear to create an evidential narrative. At a fundamental level therefore
all evidence is argument – without it all we have is data (“the bloody knife exists” etc).
As for pure reason (eg, when there is no knife) then I see no barrier to that being evidence either. If we take “argument” to mean something like “truth bearing statements that lead to a conclusion”, then if I say, “All men are mortal” that statement is either true or false. The same goes with the statement “Fred is a man”.
From these two statements (which are themselves reason-based, and so on back up the chain of propositions) I can argue:
1. All men are mortal
2. Fred is a man
3. Therefore Fred is mortal
Logical inference (ie, argument) provides thereby evidence to believe the conclusion that Fred is mortal.
I haven't said anything about absolutes except that as an individual I am aware that I am unable to declare an absolute. Knowing that affects how I feel about arguments. At no stage have I said that the arguments itself has to be cast iron, insurmountable, and sound in an objective sense, though as already noted your use of a term sound which in a technical sense is a claim to truth, causes issues in discussion because your use of terminology is sloppy.
Yes you did. I said (Reply 260):
“
But the point was that you cannot be an atheist if you're aware of an argument for theism that's sound. "No sound arguments for theism" is a necessary condition for atheism - or at least it is for honest atheism. Although Vlad's "goddodging" car crash that he just ran away from a while back was hopeless thinking (because it just assumes its premise), ironically someone who found a cast iron argument for theism that he couldn't falsify but who nonetheless insisted he was still an atheist would I suppose be one such.”
Note that I referred there specifically to “someone who found a cast iron argument for theism that he couldn't falsify”.
You then commented (I think to Maeght) in Reply 266:
“
Is there such a thing as a cast iron argument in this area, or indeed in most areas we deal with in a daily basis? How could I know what a 'cast iron' argument was? It can't simply that I can't see how to refute it, To quote Russell on the ontological argument "it is easier to feel convinced that it must be fallacious than it is to find out precisely where the fallacy lies". That 'feels' seems much closer to my experience than bhs's view of how we reach belief.”
Again, I’m not doubting anyone’s “experience” here – I merely say that, if you found an argument for theism that you couldn’t unravel, then your atheism would be untenable (at least if you were to remain honest about it). And so would the atheism of anyone else.
