For anyone in the mood, one of my favourites, Antonio Damasio, on the neurophysiological basis of a self :
https://www.youtube.com/watch?annotation_id=annotation_3680046417&feature=iv&src_vid=uhRhtFFhNzQ&v=LMrzdk_YnYY
Here is something on the Hard problem of Consciousness....
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness**************
The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining how and why sentient organisms have qualia or phenomenal experiences
The philosopher David Chalmers, who introduced the term "hard problem" of consciousness,[2] contrasts this with the "easy problems" of explaining the ability to discriminate, integrate information, report mental states, focus attention, etc.
Easy problems are easy because all that is required for their solution is to specify a mechanism that can perform the function. That is, their proposed solutions, regardless of how complex or poorly understood they may be, can be entirely consistent with the modern materialistic conception of natural phenomena.
Chalmers claims that the problem of experience is distinct from this set and that the problem of experience will "persist even when the performance of all the relevant functions is explained".[3]
Integrated information theory (IIT), developed by the neuroscientist and psychiatrist Giulio Tononi in 2004 and more recently also advocated by Koch, is one of the most discussed models of consciousness in neuroscience and elsewhere.[18][19] The theory proposes an identity between consciousness and integrated information, with the latter item (denoted as Φ) defined mathematically and thus in principle measurable.[19][20]
The hard problem of consciousness, write Tononi and Koch, may indeed be intractable when working from matter to consciousness.[21] However, because IIT inverts this relationship and works from phenomenological axioms to matter, they say it could be able to solve the hard problem.[21] In this vein, proponents have said the theory goes beyond identifying human neural correlates and can be extrapolated to all physical systems. Tononi wrote (along with two colleagues):
While identifying the “neural correlates of consciousness” is undoubtedly important, it is hard to see how it could ever lead to a satisfactory explanation of what consciousness is and how it comes about. As will be illustrated below, IIT offers a way to analyze systems of mechanisms to determine if they are properly structured to give rise to consciousness, how much of it, and of which kind.[22]
***************
Quite clearly not all scientists think neural mechanisms are sufficient to explain Consciousness.
Cheers.
Sriram
