Is atheism just a "true for me" thing.

[Enki]

Because it's nonsensical. "I do not believe that x exists" = "I believe that x does not exist".

I'm saying that I lack the belief that x exists.  I have no belief that x exists. It might well exist, I do not dismiss it, I simply do not have the belief that it exists.  I submit that it is entirely logical.

[bluehillside Retd.]

GHG,

To borrow an example from Bertrand Russell if I were to say that there is a teapot orbiting Earth just beyond the range of our instruments to detect it, would you say:

A. That you have been given no coherent reason to think I’m right about that; or

B. That there certainly isn’t a teapot?

Statement A is objectively true. Statement B cannot be objectively true because you have no means of validating it.

A-teapotism/a-theism is statement A, but not statement B (regardless of Vlad's endless attempts to elide the two).

[jeremyp]

I give up.

I am with you to an extent on this.

Functionally there is little difference between "I do not believe there is a god" and "I believe there is no god". If we were forced to lay a bet with the choices "god"/"no god" we would all put our money on "no god".

The only reason people are bending over backwards on this one is the point about burden of proof. The statement "there is no god" is an assertion and it demands evidence. The only evidence there is for it can only be that nobody has ever found any evidence that there is a god. In this respect, it is no different to trying to demonstrate that there are no leprechauns or mermaids or any other imaginary thing that humans have dreamed up.

The default position has to be non belief, otherwise when I start talking about the purple nosed snoot, you'd have to accept it exists (got any evidence it doesn't?).

[bluehillside Retd.]

jeremy,

I am with you to an extent on this.

Functionally there is little difference between "I do not believe there is a god" and "I believe there is no god". If we were forced to lay a bet with the choices "god"/"no god" we would all put our money on "no god".

The only reason people are bending over backwards on this one is the point about burden of proof. The statement "there is no god" is an assertion and it demands evidence. The only evidence there is for it can only be that nobody has ever found any evidence that there is a god. In this respect, it is no different to trying to demonstrate that there are no leprechauns or mermaids or any other imaginary thing that humans have dreamed up.

The default position has to be non belief, otherwise when I start talking about the purple nosed snoot, you'd have to accept it exists (got any evidence it doesn't?).

Functionally there may well be little difference - I live my life as if I think that god(s) do not exist - but epistemologically there's all the difference in the world. That matters because by trying to elide the two meanings some people will immediately divert the conversation to, "OK, prove that god does not exist then" as if they were making a legitimate point.

[BeRational]

I give up.

I think you should as you do not understand the first thing about logic.

[Nearly Sane]

I am with you to an extent on this.

Functionally there is little difference between "I do not believe there is a god" and "I believe there is no god". If we were forced to lay a bet with the choices "god"/"no god" we would all put our money on "no god".

The only reason people are bending over backwards on this one is the point about burden of proof. The statement "there is no god" is an assertion and it demands evidence. The only evidence there is for it can only be that nobody has ever found any evidence that there is a god. In this respect, it is no different to trying to demonstrate that there are no leprechauns or mermaids or any other imaginary thing that humans have dreamed up.

The default position has to be non belief, otherwise when I start talking about the purple nosed snoot, you'd have to accept it exists (got any evidence it doesn't?).

And then for some of us, the statement 'There is/are god(s)' doesn't seem to be on the basis of what each individual says about it, yet seem to have enough coherence to allow be to say I have no belief in such a thing, as the lack of a logically coherent definition so far means the sentence makes no sense, and that also buggers up the idea of 'evidence'

[Nearly Sane]

GHG,

To borrow an example from Bertrand Russell if I were to say that there is a teapot orbiting Earth just beyond the range of our instruments to detect it, would you say:

A. That you have been given no coherent reason to think I’m right about that; or

B. That there certainly isn’t a teapot?

Statement A is objectively true. Statement B cannot be objectively true because you have no means of validating it.

A-teapotism/a-theism is statement A, but not statement B (regardless of Vlad's endless attempts to elide the two).

Is Statement A 'objectively true'? Surely the you/I in the sentence makes that impossible?

[Nearly Sane]

To go back to the OP, is anything that doesn't have something that has a methodology to at least intersubjectively be tested amount to anything more than 'in my opinion'?

[bluehillside Retd.]

NS,

And then for some of us, the statement 'There is/are god(s)' doesn't seem to be on the basis of what each individual says about it, yet seem to have enough coherence to allow be to say I have no belief in such a thing, as the lack of a logically coherent definition so far means the sentence makes no sense, and that also buggers up the idea of 'evidence'

Yes, quite We've talked about this before - when someone says "god" the initial response can only be, "I have no idea what you mean by that word and nor it seems have you so any discussion about its existence is redundant". That's ignosticism.

For ordinary dialogue though there's generally a sort of unspoken contract - "OK, let's both work on the basis that "god" has an agreed meaning, so now let's look at the arguments you attempt for its existence".

[bluehillside Retd.]

NS,

Is Statement A 'objectively true'? Surely the you/I in the sentence makes that impossible?

Yes, it's objectively true.

The statement is: "That you have been given no coherent reason to think I’m right about that". "There's an orbiting teapot..." etc has no argument to support it, so necessarily statement A is true. Even if some arguments had been attempted though, their coherence or otherwise would also be objectively verifiable.

[Nearly Sane]

NS,

Yes, it's objectively true.

The statement is: "That you have been given no coherent reason to think I’m right about that". "There's an orbiting teapot..." etc has no argument to support it, so necessarily statement A is true. Even if some arguments had been attempted though, their coherence or otherwise would also be objectively verifiable.

But my own reasoning could be faulty so how is that an objective statement?

[Nearly Sane]

NS,

Yes, quite We've talked about this before - when someone says "god" the initial response can only be, "I have no idea what you mean by that word and nor it seems have you so any discussion about its existence is redundant". That's ignosticism.

For ordinary dialogue though there's generally a sort of unspoken contract - "OK, let's both work on the basis that "god" has an agreed meaning, so now let's look at the arguments you attempt for its existence".

But we're not really talking about this in just 'ordinary dialogue', and since we are talking about 'evidence' then without moving beyond 'ordinary dialogue', it's a worthless discussion as we have no agreed concept of evidence.

[bluehillside Retd.]

NS,

But my own reasoning could be faulty so how is that an objective statement?

By reference to codified models of these things. The argumentum ad consequentiam for example isn’t an objectively bad argument because I rely on my (potentially faulty) reasoning to find it so. It’s a bad argument because anyone can look it up and test it for themselves.

This incidentally is something I always look askance at. Those who would argue for “god” using logical fallacies already know them pretty much to be logical fallacies. They know this because they know that using the same reasoning for something else fails when they try it. Thus, say, using “you can’t disprove god, therefore it’s true” would also apply to anything else they think not to be true.
   

But we're not really talking about this in just 'ordinary dialogue',…

Yes we are. We have ordinary dialogue here all the time. If every OP was met with, “I have no idea what you mean by “god” so there’s nothing to talk about” there’d be no discussion at all.

…and since we are talking about 'evidence' then without moving beyond 'ordinary dialogue', it's a worthless discussion as we have no agreed concept of evidence.

As you’re fond of reminding us, “evidence” is itself a naturalistic concept so applying it to claims of the supernatural would seem to be misplaced. The complaint that “but all you’re considering is naturalistic evidence” is particularly otiose I find because it just assumes that there’s a non-natural version of it. What would that even entail I wonder?

[Walt Zingmatilder]

NS,

By reference to codified models of these things. The argumentum ad consequentiam for example isn’t an objectively bad argument because I rely on my (potentially faulty) reasoning to find it so. It’s a bad argument because anyone can look it up and test it for themselves.

This incidentally is something I always look askance at. Those who would argue for “god” using logical fallacies already know them pretty much to be logical fallacies. They know this because they know that using the same reasoning for something else fails when they try it. Thus, say, using “you can’t disprove god, therefore it’s true” would also apply to anything else they think not to be true.
   
Yes we are. We have ordinary dialogue here all the time. If every OP was met with, “I have no idea what you mean by “god” so there’s nothing to talk about” there’d be no discussion at all.

As you’re fond of reminding us, “evidence” is itself a naturalistic concept so applying it to claims of the supernatural would seem to be misplaced. The complaint that “but all you’re considering is naturalistic evidence” is particularly otiose I find because it just assumes that there’s a non-natural version of it. What would that even entail I wonder?

Im not sure naturalism is established by naturŕlistic methodology.

[jeremyp]

jeremy,

Functionally there may well be little difference - I live my life as if I think that god(s) do not exist - but epistemologically there's all the difference in the world. That matters because by trying to elide the two meanings some people will immediately divert the conversation to, "OK, prove that god does not exist then" as if they were making a legitimate point.

Yes, I thought my post explained that, but clearly not.

[Sebastian Toe]

Im not sure naturalism is established by naturŕlistic methodology.

Is supernaturalism established by supernaturalistic methodology?

[SteveH]

I am with you to an extent on this.

Functionally there is little difference between "I do not believe there is a god" and "I believe there is no god". If we were forced to lay a bet with the choices "god"/"no god" we would all put our money on "no god".

The only reason people are bending over backwards on this one is the point about burden of proof. The statement "there is no god" is an assertion and it demands evidence. The only evidence there is for it can only be that nobody has ever found any evidence that there is a god. In this respect, it is no different to trying to demonstrate that there are no leprechauns or mermaids or any other imaginary thing that humans have dreamed up.

The default position has to be non belief, otherwise when I start talking about the purple nosed snoot, you'd have to accept it exists (got any evidence it doesn't?).

At last - sanity!

[Nearly Sane]

NS,

By reference to codified models of these things. The argumentum ad consequentiam for example isn’t an objectively bad argument because I rely on my (potentially faulty) reasoning to find it so. It’s a bad argument because anyone can look it up and test it for themselves.

This incidentally is something I always look askance at. Those who would argue for “god” using logical fallacies already know them pretty much to be logical fallacies. They know this because they know that using the same reasoning for something else fails when they try it. Thus, say, using “you can’t disprove god, therefore it’s true” would also apply to anything else they think not to be true.
 

But it's the individual that decides the argument is a specific fallacy, and their reasoning, or understanding of the statements may be faulty so it cannot be declared objectively true.

Your idea that those arguing for god actually somehow know that they are making fallacious arguments, that they are fallacydodging as opposed to goddodging, reads to me as an argument from incredulity, in that you cannot believe that they don't see what you see. You will no doubt disagree so how can we state things objectively about arguments?
 

Yes we are. We have ordinary dialogue here all the time. If every OP was met with, “I have no idea what you mean by “god” so there’s nothing to talk about” there’d be no discussion at all.

We have some ordinary discussion but I would suggest that ordinary discussion sort of runs out after

'I believe in God, do you?'
'No.'
'Are you sure?'
'Yes'
'Oh well do you want a cup of tea?'

If we are in the world of discussing epistemology, and logical fallacies, we are necessarily going to have to ask 'What is your definition of god?'

As you’re fond of reminding us, “evidence” is itself a naturalistic concept so applying it to claims of the supernatural would seem to be misplaced. The complaint that “but all you’re considering is naturalistic evidence” is particularly otiose I find because it just assumes that there’s a non-natural version of it. What would that even entail I wonder?

Which illustrates both that we aren't just have 'ordinary discussion' in that the point is being made, and we aren't just accepting a simple idea of evidence, and  my point that if you want to have any worthwhile discussion you need to agree terms in more detail.

[Nearly Sane]

Im not sure naturalism is established by naturŕlistic methodology.

This reads as a non sequitur to the post it was replying to, in that I don't think the claim is that naturalism, and by that I presume you mean philosophical naturalism, is established by the naturalist methodology. Can you point out where you think bhs's post says that?

[SteveH]

This incidentally is something I always look askance at. Those who would argue for “god” using logical fallacies already know them pretty much to be logical fallacies. They know this because they know that using the same reasoning for something else fails when they try it. Thus, say, using “you can’t disprove god, therefore it’s true” would also apply to anything else they think not to be true.
 

Give me a quotation from any Christian using that fallacy to defend God. I remember reading it once in a stupid book aimed at stupid people, but never since. Incidentally, that fallacy supports what I've been saying - that the burden of proof lies with the person making the positive assertion.

[BeRational]

I am with you to an extent on this.

Functionally there is little difference between "I do not believe there is a god" and "I believe there is no god". If we were forced to lay a bet with the choices "god"/"no god" we would all put our money on "no god".

The only reason people are bending over backwards on this one is the point about burden of proof. The statement "there is no god" is an assertion and it demands evidence. The only evidence there is for it can only be that nobody has ever found any evidence that there is a god. In this respect, it is no different to trying to demonstrate that there are no leprechauns or mermaids or any other imaginary thing that humans have dreamed up.

The default position has to be non belief, otherwise when I start talking about the purple nosed snoot, you'd have to accept it exists (got any evidence it doesn't?).

Would you say that logically I do not believe X, means I believe X is not true.

I do not think you would, as to understand logic you must accept that these are not the same.

[SteveH]

Of course they're the same.

[Nearly Sane]

Of course they're the same.

Does 'Not Guilty' mean you think someone is innocent?

[BeRational]

Of course they're the same.

NO they are absolutely NOT.

Did you not understand the blades of grass example.

Just because I do not believe (as i have not reason to) that the number is even, THAT DOES NOT mean that I believe it is not even.

I have no idea whether is is even or odd, and until I have evidence I am justified in not accepting either claim of odd or even.
Note, I accept it MUST be one or the other, but I cannot tell which.

This is really really simple, and if you cannot get this, then logic will fail for you.

[SteveH]

"I do not believe that there is an even number of blades of grass" does indeed mean "I believe that there is an odd number of blades of grass", because you're mis-using the word "believe". What you mean is "I do not know whether the number is even or odd". In the case of God, you should ssy "I do not know whether God exists or not". "Believe" puts you definitely on one side of the question, even if you acknowledge, as you should, that you might be wrong.