Does that excuse the lack of liaison between the emergency services on the night?
What does that is the lack of sufficient staff down-time to conduct large-scale practical exercises of major emergencies - LSED are down 55% in the past ten years in London, and between 25% and 45% across the rest of the country because unit up-time has increased.
Does that excuse the lack of update to any guidelines based on what happened at Lakanal?
The Coronor's report into Lakanal didn't include any recommendations for the fire brigade; however, after Lakanal the LFB did institute a working group on high-rise building safety involving the London Mayor's office, London Councils, National Social Housing Fire STrategy Group, Association of Residential Letting Agents and other groups.
Yes, I agree that the process has thrown the fire service under a bus, but as already mentioned given the length of tine to produce public inquiries in this country, that's understandable - if an indication that we need to improve how we do this - see the comment as regards the Clutha tragedy which was way simpler than this.
It's not 'understandable' it's cynical.
We have a problem with a media seeking an easy narrative, we have problems with the approach here , and the leaking and reporting from it is reprehensible but I don't see that you can say the phase findings themselves are 'political deception'.
The report was split into 'phases' and the emergency service response was targetted first, deliberately, to throw them out for the dogs whilst the root cause analysis lingers in the background. What is the point in coming up with recommendations for the emergency services based upon the results of this incident if the deeper root-cause analysis change the fundamental presumptions - then they'll need to conduct a further analysis of the emergency service response in order to update again. Remedial actions need to start at the highest priority, and therefore investigations need to prioritise root cause analysis and start implementing actions at the strategic level before determining that an operational response should be within that strategy.
Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005, Schedule 1, Part 3
"The principles are—
(a)avoiding risks;
(b)evaluating the risks which cannot be avoided;
(c)combating the risks at source;
(d)adapting to technical progress;
(e)replacing the dangerous by the non-dangerous or less dangerous;
(f)developing a coherent overall prevention policy which covers technology, organisation of work and the influence of factors relating to the working environment;
(g)giving collective protective measures priority over individual protective measures; and
(h)giving appropriate instructions to employees."
At best, the fire brigade response comes in at stage g - all of the other elements should take priority, as they are part of preventing the outbreak of fire. Dependent upon what these priorities are, and how they are interpreted into the expectations of building design and regulation will determine what the fire brigade response will be. If the later stages of this report ever see the light of day, they are likely to change at least some of the regulations around these preventive measures, and that will mean the fire brigade needing to update their procedures again.
O.
