Vlad,
And it might be credible if Hillside had actually taken the trouble to take the Kalam Cosmological Argument apart point by point instead of his usual contentless rambles.
I did take it apart in shorthand form (because it’s been done so often before), only for you to duck and dive in response. If you really want it set out more fully though, here it is once again:
The standard Kalam cosmological argument for the existence of “god” as I understand it comes in six parts:
1. Everything that has a beginning of its existence has a cause of its existence.
This is the first premise, and it fails for two reasons:
1) It provides no grounds for its assumption that the universe began. Just assuming that because, say, a PC had a beginning then so must the universe have had a beginning is called the fallacy of equivocation.
2) Even if you ignore the first unfounded assumption that does not mean that the universe must have had a cause external to it for it to begin. There are various plausible hypotheses for how a non-externally caused universe could have occurred, and the cosmological argument makes no attempt to disqualify them.
2. The universe has a beginning of its existence.
Another unfounded assumption. No-one knows whether the universe began to exist or if it has "always" existed in some form. Nor do we know for example whether “this” universe began but that it’s also part of a larger, meta universe that itself need not necessarily have begun.
3. Thus the universe has a cause of its existence.
This conclusion (“thus”) is invalid because its two premises are invalid. While the premises are possible, that’s all they are – possibilities. We’re in “it’s possible there are pots of gold at the ends of rainbows, therefore leprechauns” territory again.
4. This first uncaused cause must transcend physical reality.
That’s quite a leap. Having arrived at an "uncaused cause" (albeit fallaciously), the argument just jumps to it “transcending physical reality” (whatever that means) without bothering to define or demonstrate such a thing, even in principle. Even if there was a cause outside “this” universe, that’s not to say that a meta universe might not have very different iteration of “physical reality” that wouldn’t have to have been “transcended” for it to exist. It would though still be “natural” rather than “supernatural”, which essentially remains white noise until someone manages to make an argument for it rather than just an assertion about it.
You can of course hypothesise anything you like – something “transcending physical reality” included – if you want to, but hypotheses cannot be relied on as premises for logical arguments because they have not been shown to be true (the same problem with whole cosmological argument by the way).
5. This uncaused cause that transcends physical reality is the description of God.
Even if all the prior arguments weren’t fallacious, this step says nothing at all. It just attaches a label to an unknown – for “god” you could equally say “the metaverse” (or anything else) and it would be equally “valid”. Worse still, the term “god” carries associated meanings baggage – that it’s self-aware for example – for which there’s no justification at all, whereas other possibilities are less freighted with additional assumptions. Occam’s razor has something to say about that.
6. Therefore God exists.
You could equally say "therefore the metaverse exists" with the same validity (ie, none at all). Essentially this part of the argument is circular: "God” is what caused the universe to exist, therefore god exists." Swap “god” for anything else that takes your fancy and it’s just as (in)valid. (Nor incidentally does this (mis-) step tell you anything about whether it's a theistic rather than a deistic god, and nor whether it's the Christian god or any other god.)
In short, the cosmological argument is folkloric, assumption-based, and dependent on logically false arguments. Demolition over.
So, do you (ok, WLC then) have anything in the locker less obviously broken than the cosmological argument?
