NS,
i think there are problems here but to answer them would take a post almost as long as your entire reply here, and the point about morality in this context is that it is part of how we judge actions and people, and my doubts about Susan Doris's idea that she doesn't judge people at all. If you want to start a thread about how we, as individuals, think of morality, I think it would be a better approach.
Fair enough.
There is a strong hint of some of my best friends are RCs there.
No there isn’t. The “some of my best friends are…” line is cover for prejudice (“I can’t be antisemitic/homophobic etc because some of my best friends are” etc.) Here my antipathy to the RC or any other faith is set out for
reasons – I merely referenced friends of ours to confirm with an example your take that, in some cases, faith makes little difference to the way people live their lives day-to-day.
And while I think I could argue that having been brought up in tge RCC, and attended 2 RC schools, including a Jesuit secondary, that I have more experience of the spectrum than you by some distance,…
No, you’ve likely had more exposure to the same part of the spectrum than I have but unless you’ve lived in a society where the state and church are the same thing (with all that follows from that) then our exposure to the spectrum as a whole probably isn’t that far apart.
I think it's irrelevant to the point. I am suggesting tgat it's more important to judge the individual by their actions rather tgan look at them as simply a member of an institution
Yes, but that wasn’t my point at all. Rather my point was about
why people act as they do, not about the actions themselves. “Judging people by their actions” just gives you “I would/would not agree” with that action. The point though surely is to understand why we disagree.
Indeed there are many institutions that are not religious which behave in dictatorial ways. It seems that that is a pretty generic bit of humanity rather than anything specific to religions.
That’s just whataboutery, but in any case the same question arises: why do such people behave as they do, and are their actions justifiable? This is a religion and ethics mb so we tend to focus on the religious, but if it was, say, a political mb I’d ask the same questions in that context.
Again 5his seems to posit the idea that this is somehow specific to the religious. My point, in reply to Susan Doris, was about the belief feeling right but it applies to the other judgements you mention as well.
No it doesn’t – see above. You were arguing that some beliefs and action “feel right” to the people doing them. I was just saying that, presumably, pretty much all actions feel right to the people who do them (religious and otherwise), otherwise they wouldn’t do them.
Since we have accepted that the fact of someone having religious beliefs tells us nothing about how they will act as a person,…
Who’s “we”, and where did we do that? Clearly there are cases where the religious belief does tell us how someone will behave – someone who subscribes to strongly homophobic “holy” texts for example will in all likelihood himself behave as a homophobe would. More to the point though, when someone justifies their religious beliefs with “because that’s my faith” that also tells us that in all likelihood “but that’s my faith” is its own justification – ie, they’re unlikely to have a good answer to the response, “so what?”.
I don't see the use in mentioning some bad religious person. And since there are many bad people in both your judgement and mine who do not have religious beliefs, they seem irrelevant to how we judge the individual.
It was just an illustration of an extremist behaving as they did because it “feels right” to him. I could just as well have picked Hitler or Shipman, but the context here was religious so I picked Phelps instead.
You miss the point about it feeling like nonsense. On a day to day level, I, and indeed you, will act as if it is a nonsense. Then you judge someone else's internal experience to have a bad justicatiobis just you expressing your internal experience of that person.
You’re not getting it still. I don’t care about (what someone describes as) their internal experience when that experience is expressed as, say, “therefore god did it”. What I
do care about though is how they arrived at that explanation rather than another one – you’re conflating here “experience” with “explanatory narrative for the cause of an experience”.
Again, I think this misses the point about asking for arguments which I am suggesting are post rationalisations.
All explanations are post rationalisations – that’s the point. If I drop a cup of coffee, “gravity” for it falling is a post rationalisation.
Pointing out that those arguments fail is irrelevant if those are not why the person actually believes.
But that
is why the person actually believes. You can ask them, “why do you think your explanation of a cause for your experience is correct?” and they will tell you. Generally what they tell you is false or impenetrable (“because that’s my faith” etc), but they will tell you nonetheless. Identifying why the response is false or impenetrable though isn’t irrelevant at all – it’s the rationale for, “in that case you give me no reason to take your claim seriously”.
Further, I think this applies to a lot of what we all believe on a day to day basis. The whole idea of people having thought out world views that they examine to establish logical consistency just seems outwith my experience.
Yes, on a colloquial, day-to-day, pragmatic view of the lived experience that’s probably true, but it’s not what we’re talking about here. The discussion here is about digging deeper than place marker “that’s good enough for now” assumptions to understand truth at a deeper level. Thor causing thunder was functionally good enough for the people who used that explanation, but there are richer understandings available when such explanatory claims are challenged and tested.
Again my argument in that sense is that none of us think straight. Ir's built in to the ought is gap that rationality is sufficient to come to a conclusion of how we ought to behave. And as part of my not thinking straight, I am happier with people who act as I might hope rather than think as I might hope. This is because I just see a lot of limited human beings, and being religious or non religious doesn't seem at all useful in determining whether I approve of their actions.
(Again), that wasn’t my point.
Why do you hope people behave a certain way? What is it about their actions that makes you approve or disapprove of them, and indeed how is it that you justify your opinions about these matters to yourself? To me the actions themselves are very much a second order issue – it’s the rationales for them (post or not) that interest me much more. Don’t they you?
The idea that someone is justified in committing murder because of their faith is not one I have made so this feels like a strawman.
This isn’t about you specifically. Clearly people have (and still do) commit murder (and many other appalling acts) using their various faiths as justifications. That’s a practical outcome in my view of privileging faith above just guessing, and I think that’s worth discussing.
Rather people seem to murder because of who they are and the circumstances they are in and I think I should judge them on that not on whether they are religious or not since that may in specific cases be part of the motivation but isn't useful in a generalized approach. Indeed, it seems to me that thinking it can be generalized when the evidence seems to be against it would be dangerous.
It’s not a generalisation I’m making though – not at all. What I’m talking about is cases in which
the perpetrators themselves will tell you they acted as they did because they think their faith mandates it. Sure if someone comes home and finds his partner in bed with another and the red mist descends that’s another story, but here we’re talking about why some behaviours “feel right” to the people who carry them out when those behaviours are justified with bad arguments. Identifying bad arguments and countering them seems to me to be something that should be taught at an early age and should be a lifelong concern if truth is not to be lost. That’s why I care only about the arguments, not about the conclusions - it's why for me "why" questions are greatly more interesting that "what" ones.