The nomological argument for god

[Outrider]

You are because if it isn't necessary then it has to be by definition contingent. If you are saying you don't know then you have no reason to deny it a necessary cause.

I love the smell of false dichotomy in the morning...

O.

[jeremyp]

I support a necessary being though.

We know you support a necessary being, but you haven't given us any reason to agree that such a thing exists.

It cannot be the manifold since what never talk proposes is emergent.

Unfortunately, for me, no coherent meaning emerged from that collection of words.

[bluehillside Retd.]

Vlad,

If you are saying you don't know then you have no reason to deny it a necessary cause.

I don’t suppose there’s any chance is there of you showing us where you think NTtS claimed to have a “reason to deny it a necessary cause”. As ever, you fundamentally misunderstand (or choose to misrepresent) what a “don’t know” entails. “Don’t know” means only “don’t know” – nothing more, nothing less. It does not mean, “your claim X is certainly wrong” as you perennially straw man it to mean.

Are leprechauns real? I don’t know. I can though on the basis of that same “don’t know” reasonably refuse to accept the claim “leprechauns” because what I do know is that there’s no good reason to think they do exist.   

You on the other hand are making the positive claims here: according to you, the universe as a whole must be contingent on something other than itself (though you will never tell us why you think that), and according to you that necessary cause must be “God” (though you will also never tell us why you think that too). These are both positive claims though – you’re no longer in “don’t know” territory because such claims rest on “I do knows”. Which is fine, but if you expect anyone to take your “I do know” claims and assertions seriously then, finally, you need to provide some arguments to justify them…

…which is exactly the point at which you always run away, and will do so again now won’t you.     

Why is that, and what does your endless evasiveness say about you do you think?

[SteveH]

IF God exists, then God exists necessarily - the idea of a contingent god makes no sense, because God's necessary existence is one of God's defining characteristics. but that leaves entirely open the question of God's existence. Think of it in terms of possible worlds: it is possible without falling into logical contradiction to imagine a world in which I don't exist (maybe my parents never met), but it doesn't make sense to think of two possible worlds, in one of which God exists, and in the other of which God doesn't. If God exists, God must exist in all possible worlds. If God doesn't, God can't exist in any world.
I dare say NS will think this is drivel, but if so, and he chooses to reply, I'd be grateful if he explains why he thinks so, not just that he does.

[Nearly Sane]

IF God exists, then God exists necessarily - the idea of a contingent god makes no sense, because God's necessary existence is one of God's defining characteristics. but that leaves entirely open the question of God's existence. Think of it in terms of possible worlds: it is possible without falling into logical contradiction to imagine a world in which I don't exist (maybe my parents never met), but it doesn't make sense to think of two possible worlds, in one of which God exists, and in the other of which God doesn't. If God exists, God must exist in all possible worlds. If God doesn't, God can't exist in any world.
I dare say NS will think this is drivel, but if so, and he chooses to reply, I'd be grateful if he explains why he thinks so, not just that he does.

Define 'God'.

[SteveH]

Define 'God'.

The omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent creator of everything else, who exists necessarily. (I'm not saying I believe in God.)

[Nearly Sane]

The omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent creator of everything else, who exists necessarily. (I'm not saying I believe in God.)

So given that makes no sense... and is circular in terms of necessity...

[Enki]

IF God exists, then God exists necessarily - the idea of a contingent god makes no sense, because God's necessary existence is one of God's defining characteristics. but that leaves entirely open the question of God's existence. Think of it in terms of possible worlds: it is possible without falling into logical contradiction to imagine a world in which I don't exist (maybe my parents never met), but it doesn't make sense to think of two possible worlds, in one of which God exists, and in the other of which God doesn't. If God exists, God must exist in all possible worlds. If God doesn't, God can't exist in any world.
I dare say NS will think this is drivel, but if so, and he chooses to reply, I'd be grateful if he explains why he thinks so, not just that he does.

As you have defined God as having these characteristics in post 430, I fail to see any problem at all. As you say, the only question that remains is whether such a god actually exists.

[Walt Zingmatilder]

As you have defined God as having these characteristics in post 430, I fail to see any problem at all. As you say, the only question that remains is whether such a god actually exists.

The law of sufficient reason on which the enterprise of science is based on necessitates a reason for the universe which is sufficient. I suppose that this is what makes me uncomfortable with the demand for an empirical, natural, material, physical sufficient reason.

Yes says the demander I can see the need for sufficient reason but I steadfastly refuse it's existence until I have it here before my very (insert organ or instrument of observation here). Suspending acceptance of the sufficient reason for the universe begins to look a bit like an act of macho defiance

There are of course reasons for why such a reason may not be observable in an empirical sense. Observation would render it contingent since observation as we now know is not a neutral act.

[Nearly Sane]

The law of sufficient reason on which the enterprise of science is based on necessitates a reason for the universe which is sufficient. I suppose that this is what makes me uncomfortable with the demand for an empirical, natural, material, physical sufficient reason.

Yes says the demander I can see the need for sufficient reason but I steadfastly refuse it's existence until I have it here before my very (insert organ or instrument of observation here). Suspending acceptance of the sufficient reason for the universe begins to look a bit like an act of macho defiance

There are of course reasons for why such a reason may not be observable in an empirical sense. Observation would render it contingent since observation as we now know is not a neutral act.

Glue sniffing again

[SteveH]

it's existence...

Forgive me being pedantic, but you make this mistake all the time, and it irritates the heck out of me: you mean "its existence". "It's" (with an apostrophe) is short for "it is" or "it has"; "its" (no apostrophe) means "belonging to it".

[Walt Zingmatilder]

Forgive me being pedantic, but you make this mistake all the time, and it irritates the heck out of me: you mean "its existence". "It's" (with an apostrophe) is short for "it is" or "it has"; "its" (no apostrophe) means "belonging to it".

You don't need forgiveness for trying to save the language from linguistic joyriders like meself.

[Dicky Underpants]

IF God exists, then God exists necessarily - the idea of a contingent god makes no sense, because God's necessary existence is one of God's defining characteristics. but that leaves entirely open the question of God's existence. Think of it in terms of possible worlds: it is possible without falling into logical contradiction to imagine a world in which I don't exist (maybe my parents never met), but it doesn't make sense to think of two possible worlds, in one of which God exists, and in the other of which God doesn't. If God exists, God must exist in all possible worlds. If God doesn't, God can't exist in any world.
I dare say NS will think this is drivel, but if so, and he chooses to reply, I'd be grateful if he explains why he thinks so, not just that he does.

If that's a classic exposition on God's existence, then it is contradicted by another classic description.
Your words above refer to God existing IN worlds. Surely, the main idea is that God's existence is not like that of other beings or objects IN anything. His supposed existence is of a completely different nature to this.

[SteveH]

If that's a classic exposition on God's existence, then it is contradicted by another classic description.
Your words above refer to God existing IN worlds. Surely, the main idea is that God's existence is not like that of other beings or objects IN anything. His supposed existence is of a completely different nature to this.

Yes, quite. It isn't really accurate to talk of God existing; it'd be better to say that God is existence, in its ultimate meaning. Tillich, and all that.

[Outrider]

The law of sufficient reason on which the enterprise of science is based on necessitates a reason for the universe which is sufficient. I suppose that this is what makes me uncomfortable with the demand for an empirical, natural, material, physical sufficient reason.

There is not a 'demand' for an empirical reason, there's a demand for a justification for presuming the validity of anything else until a methodology to support it can be justified.

Yes says the demander I can see the need for sufficient reason but I steadfastly refuse it's existence until I have it here before my very (insert organ or instrument of observation here). Suspending acceptance of the sufficient reason for the universe begins to look a bit like an act of macho defiance.

No, saying 'we don't know' just does not lead to 'therefore magic'.

There are of course reasons for why such a reason may not be observable in an empirical sense.

He asserted.

Observation would render it contingent since observation as we now know is not a neutral act.

That rather depends on the method of observation - archaeology, for instance, is not an 'active' observation, it's deduction from available evidence, but the conclusions that are being drawn cannot be affected by the act of observations (subjectivity limitations of interpretation are, of course, always a possibility). Similarly, deducing information regarding the inception of the universe from patterns in matter and energy in the current universe would appear to be divorced from the observer effect in the same way - it's not a guarantee, but it's a least plausible that this is the case.

O.

[Walt Zingmatilder]

There is not a 'demand' for an empirical reason, there's a demand for a justification for presuming the validity of anything else until a methodology to support it can be justified.

Firstly you have to demonstrate where the virtue is in taking this line since it assumes that everything that is is revealed by this method. That assertion itself is not revealed by the very method it advocates to establish validity. It is time then for one of you to establish the virtue of your assertion.

As I have said before, observation is no longer a neutral act and therefore that which is affected by observation is contingent. The law of sufficient reason logically proposes a necessary as sufficient reason for the universe. That necessary reason cannot logically be a contingent and so even if you propose that in some way the universe itself is the sufficient reason you have to find what that necessary thing is. Unfortunately the atheist cosmologist Sean Carroll declared his intention to try to find a loophole in the principle of sufficient reason and Bertrand Russell just baldly avoided it where the universe was concerned.

No, saying 'we don't know' just does not lead to 'therefore magic'.

Magic is the antithesis of the principle of sufficient reason and yet we have two aforementioned atheists who wished to ditch the principle and it is that attitude which I can't understand.

So on balance saying that the universe just is and there's an end to it(Russell) or suspending sufficient reason in the case of the universe(Carroll) is special pleading and looks suspisciously like sufficient reason for the universe dodging or even Goddodging.

Again if you want to please show the virtue of the Russell or Carroll positions.

That rather depends on the method of observation - archaeology, for instance, is not an 'active' observation, it's deduction from available evidence, but the conclusions that are being drawn cannot be affected by the act of observations (subjectivity limitations of interpretation are, of course, always a possibility). Similarly, deducing information regarding the inception of the universe from patterns in matter and energy in the current universe would appear to be divorced from the observer effect in the same way - it's not a guarantee, but it's a least plausible that this is the case.

And of course all of this will be carried out under the principle of sufficient reason........which Russell sought and Carroll is seeking to suspend in this very investigation.
One can also suppose that as we are talking about a non contingent we are not looking at a past entity here and whatever it is about the universe that is necessary for it (sufficient reason) has not passed.

[Outrider]

Firstly you have to demonstrate where the virtue is in taking this line since it assumes that everything that is is revealed by this method. That assertion itself is not revealed by the very method it advocates to establish validity. It is time then for one of you to establish the virtue of your assertion.

No, because it's not precluding other systems, it's not saying this is the only way, it's saying if you want to propose another way then it needs a similarly robust justification, or it can be ignored.

As I have said before, observation is no longer a neutral act and therefore that which is affected by observation is contingent.

But the reasons that you give for holding that view aren't convincing anyone.

The law of sufficient reason logically proposes a necessary as sufficient reason for the universe.

Which is begging the question in the first place. We have a universe, yes, but there's nothing in there to show a reason to think that this universe had to happen.

That necessary reason cannot logically be a contingent and so even if you propose that in some way the universe itself is the sufficient reason you have to find what that necessary thing is.

Given that the evidence available suggests that time, as we understand it, is a facet of this universe, and came into being with this universe, then ideas of contingency outside of this universe and causing it don't necessarily follow the same rules as the contingency within the universe. There is no 'before' or 'after' outside of the universe where our time does not exist.

Unfortunately the atheist cosmologist Sean Carroll declared his intention to try to find a loophole in the principle of sufficient reason and Bertrand Russell just baldly avoided it where the universe was concerned.

I'm not familiar enough with either of their works to comment.

So on balance saying that the universe just is and there's an end to it(Russell) or suspending sufficient reason in the case of the universe(Carroll) is special pleading and looks suspisciously like sufficient reason for the universe dodging or even Goddodging.

No, it's not special pleading. If you want to claim that the 'purpose' of reality is our universe you need to justify that. Yes, there's a case for coming up with a sufficient cause for the universe to explain where we come from, but there's no need to try to find a necessary cause until and unless you can justify the claim that we are necessary at all.

Again if you want to please show the virtue of the Russell or Carroll positions.

As I said, I'm not familiar enough with either of their works to know if this supports or is parallel to their takes on things.

O.

[Walt Zingmatilder]

Given that the evidence available suggests that time, as we understand it, is a facet of this universe, and came into being with this universe, then ideas of contingency outside of this universe and causing it don't necessarily follow the same rules as the contingency within the universe. There is no 'before' or 'after' outside of the universe where our time does not exist.

Since time itself is contingent I don't think what is necessary for existence would be at all subject to it. This point seems a red herring and certainly doesn't answer the question of the virtue of demanding empirical answers to this question.

No, it's not special pleading. If you want to claim that the 'purpose' of reality is our universe you need to justify that. Yes, there's a case for coming up with a sufficient cause for the universe to explain where we come from, but there's no need to try to find a necessary cause until and unless you can justify the claim that we are necessary at all.

Another red herring? I don't believe I've mentioned purpose please explain. I certainly have at no point said that we are necessary.

What I'm talking about is how we are here what is it that was or is necessary for for our contingency.i.e what is the sufficient reason?

[Outrider]

Since time itself is contingent I don't think what is necessary for existence would be at all subject to it.

Except that your reasoning for needing a necessary cause it based on an understanding of contingency that is based upon cause and effect and the unidirectional arrow of time, which once you move to consideration of elements outside of the universe can't be relied upon.

This point seems a red herring and certainly doesn't answer the question of the virtue of demanding empirical answers to this question.

The demand is not for empirical answers; the demand is that if you're going to recommend answers that don't rely on empricism, then you're going to have to come up with an equally rigorous support for those answers, and I don't see that you do that. You try, it seems to me, to come at things from a pure logic stance, but when that runs up against the rigorously supported evidence you have a tendency to want to dismiss the empiricism rather than accept that there must have been a gap in the logical flow somewhere.

Another red herring? I don't believe I've mentioned purpose please explain. I certainly have at no point said that we are necessary.

If we (or some other element of the universe) aren't necessary, then the universe isn't necessary, in which case why do we need both a sufficient and necessary reason?

What I'm talking about is how we are here what is it that was or is necessary for for our contingency.i.e what is the sufficient reason?

And I still don't see why an infinite reality is not a sufficient reason. Why do you need to presume a conscious intent and a deliberate action, when random activity in an infinite space adequately answers your question.

O.

O.

[Walt Zingmatilder]

Except that your reasoning for needing a necessary cause it based on an understanding of contingency that is based upon cause and effect and the unidirectional arrow of time, which once you move to consideration of elements outside of the universe can't be relied upon.

That immediately looks like suspending the principle of sufficient reason without grounds.  I am not making a Kalam. Cosmological argument with a beginning here or advocating any linear hierarchy. I am arguing rather a finite vertical hierarchy where the status of something is dependent on something lower and so on to the bottom in simultaneous fashion. Temporal beginning being irrelevant to the argument. As a metaphor think of a jenga tower. Cause suggests a physical cause I think reason correctly steals us from an illogical commitment to empiricism here.

If we (or some other element of the universe) aren't necessary, then the universe isn't necessary, in which case why do we need both a sufficient and necessary reason?

The principle of sufficient reason demands that everything has sufficient reason whether necessary or contingent. The argument from contingency leads us to a necessity

And I still don't see why an infinite reality is not a sufficient reason. Why do you need to presume a conscious intent and a deliberate action, when random activity in an infinite space adequately answers your question.

If it is not not a sufficient reason then it must be a sufficient reason so over to you.
If there is an infinite reality the we are still back to the knotty problem of separating the necessary from the contingent.

I move you want to see an infinite reality without God or even the notion of necessity and that is what
puzzles me. It is hard for an ego to accept existential dependence I suppose and your argument does appeal to existential equality.Are you proposing a circular hierarchy of causation perhaps?

[Outrider]

That immediately looks like suspending the principle of sufficient reason without grounds.  I am not making a Kalam. Cosmological argument with a beginning here or advocating any linear hierarchy. I am arguing rather a finite vertical hierarchy where the status of something is dependent on something lower and so on to the bottom in simultaneous fashion. Temporal beginning being irrelevant to the argument. As a metaphor think of a jenga tower. Cause suggests a physical cause I think reason correctly steals us from an illogical commitment to empiricism here.The principle of sufficient reason demands that everything has sufficient reason whether necessary or contingent. The argument from contingency leads us to a necessity. If it is not not a sufficient reason then it must be a sufficient reason so over to you.

If you're trying to conceive of contingency then you need to strongly define the sequencing, because if you're considering potential events outside of the universe then the very notion of 'cause and effect' comes into question without time to set those sequences in. Yes I'm 'suspending the principle of sufficient reason' to an extent, but not without grounds: I'm saying that we can't rely on in-universe assumptions about sufficient reason might work, because outside of the universe the rules that we're used to can't be presumed to apply.

If there is an infinite reality the we are still back to the knotty problem of separating the necessary from the contingent.

No, we aren't. If reality is infinite then it is not contingent upon something else, but the notion of it being 'necessary' is also called into question as what is there outside of it to make it 'necessary', what is the plan that necessitates it?

I move you want to see an infinite reality without God or even the notion of necessity and that is what puzzles me.

It's not what I 'want', it's what I conclude when I look out there.

It is hard for an ego to accept existential dependence I suppose and your argument does appeal to existential equality.

Some people - perhaps I am one - might well find that difficult. I could equally suggest that some people struggle with their cosmic insignificance and try to make the universe about them. We can discuss the psychological influences on various takes on reality if you'd like, but they aren't going to reveal anything about what's actually happening, just about people's nature might influence their opinion. I'm not suggesting that this is an ad hominem, but I can see that others might see it that way.

Are you proposing a circular hierarchy of causation perhaps?

Not actively, just that without our conventional appreciation of a linear-ish timeline it's not something that we can easily rule out.

O.

[Walt Zingmatilder]

If you're trying to conceive of contingency then you need to strongly define the sequencing,

The argument from contingency is not concerned primarily with sequential events but hierarchies of dependency that may be simultaneous and vertical

because if you're considering potential events outside of the universe then the very notion of 'cause and effect' comes into question without time to set those sequences in.

Again, the argument from contingency does not depend on sequential event but on contingent dependency so I’m not looking at events outside the universe but  the fundamental necessary for contingent entities

Yes I'm 'suspending the principle of sufficient reason' to an extent, but not without grounds: I'm saying that we can't rely on in-universe assumptions about sufficient reason might work, because outside of the universe the rules that we're used to can't be presumed to apply.

But those grounds are based on an incorrect understanding of the argument from contingency. We cannot rely on the physics but reason and logic demand either a necessary for the contingency, a sufficient reason for why there is anything or a surrender to magical thinking. Remember, admitting ignorance in what is the necessary is not the same as deliberately suspending the principle of sufficient reason.

No, we aren't. If reality is infinite then it is not contingent upon something else, but the notion of it being 'necessary' is also called into question as what is there outside of it to make it 'necessary', what is the plan that necessitates it?

Firstly you need to rescue your thesis of an infinite reality from the charge of nebulosity, woo and deepity.

The term infinite reality could really be co opted by anyone on this forum....You, Sriram or me.

Secondly, infinite reality stands therefore as your ‘necessary’ whether you like it or not so now all you have to do is to separate the obvious contingency in the universe from the thing which is necessary. Physics won’t help you there imho.

Not actively, just that without our conventional appreciation of a linear-ish timeline it's not something that we can easily rule out.

Ah the old bootstrap idea.

What a circular hierarchy does propose though is something providing its own explanation for itself. Congratulations. You have provided an alternative philosophical explanation for why God doesn’t need a creator.

Joking aside a circular hierarchy would not provide an answer to the question why something and not nothing.