what is the definition of the universe?

[ProfessorDavey]

I get the feeling Jeremy is quite happy with the idea of a necessary entity but wants it to be the universe itself and you aren't and are trying every trick to avoid a necessary entity.

Until or unless you are able to provide credible arguments that require necessary entities then we must accept that there may be necessary entities or there may not.

And you use this disingenuous sleight of hand - even if necessary entities are a thing, why should there only be one - surely there could be two, or many - each would sit at the tip of a tree of causation.

[ProfessorDavey]

Aquinas understood less of the science but unhappily for atheism science plumped for the study of observing contingent things and leaves the necessary entity in the pervue of the philosophers.

Gibberish - translation - Aquinas knew virtually nothing about the nature of the universe. Not his fault, of course, he lived in the 13thC, at a time when people simply didn't have the tools to study the universe in the manner we do today, but also within a culture that commonly rejected knowledge that challenged faith positions.

Vlad - you live in a time and a culture which has far, far greater understanding and inquisitive tolerance where religious orthodoxies are far less likely to try to clamp down on the truth, demonstrated by research. So you have no excuse Vlad. 

[ProfessorDavey]

What has the scale of the universe got to do with anything?

Everything - if you believe the universe is rather small, with earth at its centre and its longevity closely maps on to the time when humans have been around then it is easy to come to the classic anthropocentric thinking that the universe is all 'something about us', that humans are someone not just important but the most important things and that the universe kind of (literally) revolves around them. Invent an anthropomorphised god (a kind of being with idealised human characteristics and behaviours) and the full gamut of anthropocentric thinking is complete.

Much harder to sustain that kind of anthropocentric non-sense if you recognise that the universe is unimaginably big, unimaginable old, the earth is not at its centre and frankly humans are a completely irrelevant blink of an eye in cosmic terms.

[Walt Zingmatilder]

Gibberish - translation - Aquinas knew virtually nothing about the nature of the universe. Not his fault, of course, he lived in the 13thC, at a time when people simply didn't have the tools to study the universe in the manner we do today, but also within a culture that commonly rejected knowledge that challenged faith positions.

Vlad - you live in a time and a culture which has far, far greater understanding and inquisitive tolerance where religious orthodoxies are far less likely to try to clamp down on the truth, demonstrated by research. So you have no excuse Vlad.

He applied observation to establish change as a principle and by extension contingency and contingent things. That has not ceased and science, in which sufficient reason forms a major part, still observes to discover reasons so any discoveries have been within the framework of empirical observation like Aquinas.

The argument from contingency is a bottom up idea in which the notion of the necessary being coming at the end of a bottom up heirarchy, so much of what you say about Aquinas is misplaced.

So now we come to someone with someone with scientific credentials who is prepared, without warrant as far as I can see, who is prepared to sacrifice the principle of sufficient reason at a certain point. Until you justify that thinking the only obvious reason is that you are protecting atheism at the expense of one of the principles of science.

[Walt Zingmatilder]

Until or unless you are able to provide credible arguments that require necessary entities then we must accept that there may be necessary entities or there may not.

And you use this disingenuous sleight of hand - even if necessary entities are a thing, why should there only be one - surely there could be two, or many - each would sit at the tip of a tree of causation.

There can only be one necessary entity apart from abstract ones. That you don't understand this means that you are not au fait with the argument or the terms of the argument. To even contemplate no necessary entity is to believe that the universe is contingent and therefore one may ask ''contingent on what''.
The existence of the universe provides sufficient reason for the necessary entity for the universe.

Contingency without necessity is absurd.

There can only be one because two would be contingent on each other in terms of status. Only one is necessary and there would then be the question, why two, or three, What wider conditions are those entities subject to? Whatever caused there to be more than one surely sits at the tip of causation.

Also more than one defies Occam's razor.

[ProfessorDavey]

The argument from contingency is a bottom up idea in which the notion of the necessary being coming at the end of a bottom up heirarchy ...

Oh dear, you really aren't helping yourself are you. A 'bottom-up' hierarchy - presumable one with the simplest things at the 'bottom' and the most complex at the 'top' where your self-defined necessary entity must lie. So very 'nothing can exist unless designed by a designer', so self defeating I would have thought. If you really want necessity (I'm not convinced of the argument) then surely it would be the other way around. So the something near to necessity might be atoms, but they'd be contingent on sub-atomic entities etc. So the necessity would be the simplest thing as anything more complex is merely a particular rearrangement of those simplest elements.

But if you are anthropocentric you can't get over the notion that humans must be at the top of the heap.

[ProfessorDavey]

There can only be one necessary entity ...

Only if your definition of a necessary entity allows for only one, which would be biasing.

I see no reason why there cannot be more than one necessary entity - indeed in hierarchies there are countless things which are both necessary for some things but also contingent on other things.

If you are arguing that there must be entities that are necessary but not contingent, firstly good luck with that, but also if true then why should there only be one. All it would require is for those entities to be independent and non-interacting. If so then you could have as many as you'd like, albeit you'd first have to argue convincingly that something can be necessary but not contingent in the first place.

[ProfessorDavey]

He applied observation to establish change as a principle and by extension contingency and contingent things. That has not ceased and science, in which sufficient reason forms a major part, still observes to discover reasons so any discoveries have been within the framework of empirical observation like Aquinas.

Just because someone uses observation doesn't mean their explanation for that observation is correct. In the past people observed the horizon and concluded that this was the edge of the world - people observed the traverse of sun and planets across the sky and concluded that the sun and planets went around the earth. They were wrong.

And your further problem is you throw around sufficient reason and argument from contingency as if these are accepted and proven principles - news for you Vlad, they aren't. Why, because they are based on poor logic, muddled thinking and are achingly transparent as arguments used in an attempt to justify a pre-determined faith-based view. Aquinas' original formulation of the argument from contingency is about as credible as going 'ta, ra ... god'.

[ProfessorDavey]

Also more than one defies Occam's razor.

Actually Occam would lead to a conclusion that there are no necessary entities as to posit one, unless proven to be necessary (rather than asserted to be) makes the argument more complex.

And in fact there are plenty of examples where Occam might be comfortable with zero, may be happy with many, but requiring one and one only provides the most complex conclusion as you need to justify why two, or three, or zero is impossible.

[ProfessorDavey]

... who is prepared to sacrifice the principle of sufficient reason at a certain point. Until you justify that thinking ...

The principle of sufficient reason is not proven - therefore if you assert its fundamental importance (as you appear to do Vlad) then the onus is on you to justify why you are right. Something you are struggling greatly to do. You seem to posit sufficient reason as if is is proven and universally accepted to be true - it isn't.

[Walt Zingmatilder]

Actually Occam would lead to a conclusion that there are no necessary entities as to posit one, unless proven to be necessary (rather than asserted to be) makes the argument more complex.

Apart from pitting one scholastic philosopher against another. I'm afraid that if the universe is the necessary entity we need to identify what it is about the universe which is necessary for the er,
contingent things. There is also the warning about multiplying entities beyond necessity so Occam assumes necessity

And in fact there are plenty of examples where Occam might be comfortable with zero, may be happy with many, but requiring one and one only provides the most complex conclusion as you need to justify why two, or three, or zero is impossible.

Occam's razor assumes necessity Davey, it doesn't eliminate it. What it seeks to eliminate is entity beyond necessity. This rather puts the mockers on an infinite regress.

[ProfessorDavey]

Occam's razor assumes necessity Davey, it doesn't eliminate it. What it seeks to eliminate is entity beyond necessity. This rather puts the mockers on an infinite regress.

Occam suggests that the explanation for something that requires the fewest required steps is preferred. Note that the requirement in Occam isn't the same as necessity in the argument from contingency.

But if something can be explained in a manner that can have one necessary entity, or two, or none that will be preferred to an explanation that requires a further essential step to justify why one, and only one, necessary entity must be present.

[ProfessorDavey]

Apart from pitting one scholastic philosopher against another. I'm afraid that if the universe is the necessary entity we need to identify what it is about the universe which is necessary for the er, contingent things.

But I'm not arguing that the universe is a necessary entity - indeed I'm not arguing that there must be necessary entities, let alone that there must be one, and only one. So I don't see why I am required to justify something that I've never claims.

You one the other hand claim that there must be one, and only one, necessary entity - that there cannot be none, nor more than one. So you need to justify that claim, which you have patently failed to do. Further you add 2+2 and conclude 3million but claiming that this one and only necessary entity (that you've failed to justify is even required) must be god, which you cannot even provide evidence for its existence let alone that it is a necessary entity, even less that it is the one and only necessary entity.

And by the way I suspect claiming the universe to be a necessary entity seems to be getting things the wrong way around - surely the universe is merely the sum of its constituent parts, so if there are any necessary entities about they'd be the most fundamental components of the universe that are required for the universe to exist.

[Walt Zingmatilder]

Occam suggests that the explanation for something that requires the fewest required steps is preferred. Note that the requirement in Occam isn't the same as necessity in the argument from contingency.

Not only does it assume necessity but it mentions it. ''Do not multiply entities beyond necessity....absolutely no dismissal of necessity here.

[Walt Zingmatilder]

And by the way I suspect claiming the universe to be a necessary entity seems to be getting things the wrong way around - surely the universe is merely the sum of its constituent parts, so if there are any necessary entities about they'd be the most fundamental components of the universe that are required for the universe to exist.

Well thank you for providing a definition of the universe. I agree with your thesis that the necessary entity is the most fundamental component required for the universe to exist but I think we have to go further. That is why I explained why there can only be one ultimate at the tip of causation and tip of sufficient reason.

[ProfessorDavey]

Not only does it assume necessity but it mentions it. ''Do not multiply entities beyond necessity....absolutely no dismissal of necessity here.

Not the same type of necessity as you are claiming in your arguments - Occam doesn't consider something that is necessary to not be contingent, merely that it is required for that explanation. Effectively the explanation with the fewest assumption is preferred.

But if you think that Occam's use of necessary is the same as yours (I actually don't think you do) then you really have shot yourself in the foot. You think that there must be one necessary entity and one alone. Occam is happy with one, two or two thousands necessary elements - all Occam wants is the fewest.

So back to your Occam justifies just one and only one necessary entity, let's try an example.

Imagine you hear the sound of an owl in a tree - which of the following fits Occam best:

1. I assume there is an owl in that tree.
2. I assume that there is one and only one owl in the tree

Occam plumps for the first - there could be loads of owls, some might be asleep, you might be hearing hooting from more than one owl. To limit the number of owls to one and only one falls foul of Occam as it adds an additional, unnecessary step.

[Walt Zingmatilder]

Not the same type of necessity as you are claiming in your arguments - Occam doesn't consider something that is necessary to not be contingent, merely that it is required for that explanation. Effectively the explanation with the fewest assumption is preferred.

But if you think that Occam's use of necessary is the same as yours (I actually don't think you do) then you really have shot yourself in the foot. You think that there must be one necessary entity and one alone. Occam is happy with one, two or two thousands necessary elements - all Occam wants is the fewest.

So back to your Occam justifies just one and only one necessary entity, let's try an example.

Imagine you hear the sound of an owl in a tree - which of the following fits Occam best:

1. I assume there is an owl in that tree.
2. I assume that there is one and only one owl in the tree

Occam plumps for the first - there could be loads of owls, some might be asleep, you might be hearing hooting from more than one owl. To limit the number of owls to one and only one falls foul of Occam as it adds an additional, unnecessary step.

If you think that the sum total of it's components constitutes the universe then some will be contingent and at least one will be the necessary entity without which the contingent part of the universe would not exist. Thus the necessary being must be at the tip of causation and not ''The universe'' as such.

[ProfessorDavey]

... and at least one will be the necessary entity without which the contingent part of the universe would not exist.

Glad to see we are making progress and you are now accepting that there might be more than one necessary entity. Just need you to accept that there may be no necessary entities and that we make have a network of entities that are both necessary in some contexts and contingent in others and that there may be no entity (single or more than one) that isn't contingent.

[Walt Zingmatilder]

Glad to see we are making progress and you are now accepting that there might be more than one necessary entity. Just need you to accept that there may be no necessary entities and that we make have a network of entities that are both necessary in some contexts and contingent in others and that there may be no entity (single or more than one) that isn't contingent.

I'm afraid I'm going to have to backslide on that one.
If there were more than one then the issue is ''what is it which determines there should be more than one''. So there cannot be more than one since multiple entities then need to be explained by something external. This makes them  contingent.

[Walt Zingmatilder]

Glad to see we are making progress and you are now accepting that there might be more than one necessary entity. Just need you to accept that there may be no necessary entities and that we make have a network of entities that are both necessary in some contexts and contingent in others and that there may be no entity (single or more than one) that isn't contingent.

But you are avoiding the notion of sufficient reason. On what warrant?
There cannot be an absence of a necessary entity for the universe. If you are logically arguing that some things are necessary for other things you are accepting that where there is a contingent there is a necessary. So using your own logic if there is a universe and it is contingent...what is necessary for it? I'll let you digest that.

[ProfessorDavey]

So there cannot be more than one since multiple entities then need to be explained by something external. This makes them  contingent.

Not if they are necessary and not contingent - your argument applies just as much to a single claimed necessary entity - the only reason it is asserted to be necessary is that someone has claimed that it isn't contingent on something else. And if this applies to one entity then it can apply to many. The big leap is from zero to one, not from one to two or many.

[ProfessorDavey]

But you are avoiding the notion of sufficient reason. On what warrant?

Because it is non-sense. My major issue with 'sufficient reason' is it is framed in the language of intent, or conscious action, of purpose. How I have no issue with the fundamental argument of mechanistic cause and effect, in other words mechanistically if there is an effect there must be a mechanistic cause. That is basic physics. But none of this requires there to be intent, conscious action or purpose - it is just a mechanistic relationship.

As soon as you start opining on 'reason', on 'intent', on 'purpose' you slide (of course deliberately) into the notion of an intender, a reasoning being, a designer etc. That is, of course, total non-sense. Virtually all of the cause/effect relationships we see in the universe are purely mechanistic with absolutely no purpose or intent behind them. There are a tiny number of such relationships that to have intent, associated with the higher consciousness of human life and other similar species, but even these are underpinned by purely mechanistic means.

So let's not talk of sufficient reason as it is an obviously biased notion based on some prejudged, but unevidenced, view that there is a creator. Nope let's talk of sufficient mechanistic evidence to support understanding of the relationships within the universe.

[Walt Zingmatilder]

Because it is non-sense. My major issue with 'sufficient reason' is it is framed in the language of intent, or conscious action, of purpose. How I have no issue with the fundamental argument of mechanistic cause and effect, in other words mechanistically if there is an effect there must be a mechanistic cause. That is basic physics. But none of this requires there to be intent, conscious action or purpose - it is just a mechanistic relationship.

As soon as you start opining on 'reason', on 'intent', on 'purpose' you slide (of course deliberately) into the notion of an intender, a reasoning being, a designer etc. That is, of course, total non-sense. Virtually all of the cause/effect relationships we see in the universe are purely mechanistic with absolutely no purpose or intent behind them. There are a tiny number of such relationships that to have intent, associated with the higher consciousness of human life and other similar species, but even these are underpinned by purely mechanistic means.

So let's not talk of sufficient reason as it is an obviously biased notion based on some prejudged, but unevidenced, view that there is a creator. Nope let's talk of sufficient mechanistic evidence to support understanding of the relationships within the universe.

We probably agree on those but that line is non sequitur to whether the universe is contingent or necessary. I'm afraid all your arguments so far have been on the grounds of sufficient reason and as someone has pointed out arguments against sufficient reason invariably appeal to the principle of sufficient reason. Sufficient mechanistic evidence can provide sufficient reason for certain proposition it's true.

What you are suggesting is against the spirit of this board which is about philosophy.

[jeremyp]

He uses the argument from contingency based upon how the status of everything which is observed changes.

But he was unable to observe everything, so he has no basis to suggest that the Universe itself is contingent.

I think rather he divides the cosmos into the necessary entity and the contingent.

But he provides no reasoning for why everything in the cosmos - the Universe in particular - is contingent. Just saying something g is contingent doesn't make it so.

In any case as I keep asking you, what is it about the universe which could be the necessary being because it cannot be the contingent things.

My answer would be probably the Universe itself. I don't know for sure but that doesn't matter. All that matters is that you have failed to eliminate the Universe as being necessary. Until you do that, we have at least one alternative to God as the necessary entity do your attempt to prove God fails.

As I have said before ANY necessary entity must be sovereign, and of unitary and continuous substance.

Why?

[jeremyp]

I get the feeling Jeremy is quite happy with the idea of a necessary entity but wants it to be the universe itself and you aren't and are trying every trick to avoid a necessary entity.

I don't want the necessary entity to be the Universe. I'm just pointing out that you haven't excluded the possibility that it could be the Universe.

I think that, at some level, there must be something that "just is". Whether it's the Universe, God, an infinite sequence of Universes or something else, I don't know and neither do you and neither did Thomas Aquinas.