7 thought experiments

[Nearly Sane]

Sensationalist title for a fairly reasonable article on 7 philosophical thought experiments.


https://bigthink.com/personal-growth/seven-thought-experiments-thatll-make-you-question-everything/

[Walt Zingmatilder]

Sensationalist title for a fairly reasonable article on 7 philosophical thought experiments.


https://bigthink.com/personal-growth/seven-thought-experiments-thatll-make-you-question-everything/

Mary's Room seems a kind of version of CD Broad's Archangel in his knowledge argument for emergence as more than the sum of parts and probably a bit sharper IMV.

[Nearly Sane]

Mary's Room seems a kind of version of CD Broad's Archangel in his knowledge argument for emergence as more than the sum of parts and probably a bit sharper IMV.

The point of the Mary's Room thought experiment here seems to have nothing to do with emergence as the colour is not presented as an emergent property. Can you outline why you think it does?

[ProfessorDavey]

Sensationalist title for a fairly reasonable article on 7 philosophical thought experiments.


https://bigthink.com/personal-growth/seven-thought-experiments-thatll-make-you-question-everything/

An interesting article and a fair few I already knew.

I think previously I've suggested people here read Judith Thomson's violinist piece which I've always thought is very good.

[Nearly Sane]

An interesting article and a fair few I already knew.

I think previously I've suggested people here read Judith Thomson's violinist piece which I've always thought is very good.

Yes, I'd agree that it's good but I do wonder about the point of such thought experiments. For those that seek to illustrate ethical positions such as this or the Veil of Ignorance, they feel like post hoc justifications for judgements already made.

Others such as Burridan's Ass, or Mary's Room seem so far removed from quotidoan decisions and actions that for many people it will just look like intellectual wanking. Indeed to an extent that's the charge that Dennett applies to the Swampman thought experiment. I also find that to a fairly pointless reworking of various thought experiments or even science fiction books and tv shows.

[Walt Zingmatilder]

The point of the Mary's Room thought experiment here seems to have nothing to do with emergence as the colour is not presented as an emergent property. Can you outline why you think it does?

Yes I see how you might argue that.
However I read Mary's room as asking the question "Could Mary have known colour from the resources in her room" or is colour a property that is novel and that is the premise of Broad's archangel. Who has perfect intellectual knowledge of chemistry
?then is introduced to an actual substance, Ammonia. Broad of course is using this mind experiment in the context of emergence.

[Nearly Sane]

Yes I see how you might argue that.
However I read Mary's room as asking the question "Could Mary have known colour from the resources in her room" or is colour a property that is novel and that is the premise of Broad's archangel. Who has perfect intellectual knowledge of chemistry
?then is introduced to an actual substance, Ammonia. Broad of course is using this mind experiment in the context of emergence.

You need to reread it. The thought experiment isn't abouv Mary. It's about qualis.

[Walt Zingmatilder]

You need to reread it. The thought experiment isn't abouv Mary. It's about qualis.

In Wikipedia it is referred to as the Knowledge argument which is what Broad's archangel is also referred to. The two are
Essentially the same and it has implications for the discussion of emergence so an attempt to sever the link is wrong.

[Nearly Sane]

In Wikipedia it is referred to as the Knowledge argument which is what Broad's archangel is also referred to. The two are
Essentially the same and it has implications for the discussion of emergence so an attempt to sever the link is wrong.

Ah thank you, that makes much clearer what you are thinking. I think you've got it backwards though. It doesn't have imolucations for emergence as it accepts emergence as a phenemenon, but then looks at whether being able to predict an example of emergence will give yoj anything like knowledge of what it would be like to experience that.

Could you outline what implications you think it has for the discussion of emergence?

[Walt Zingmatilder]

Ah thank you, that makes much clearer what you are thinking. I think you've got it backwards though. It doesn't have imolucations for emergence as it accepts emergence as a phenemenon, but then looks at whether being able to predict an example of emergence will give yoj anything like knowledge of what it would be like to experience that.

Could you outline what implications you think it has for the discussion of emergence?

recently on this board there was a debate on whether
Emergent entities are resultant I.e.completely deducible from the components. In Mary's room that would be the words in the books and media. Or whether they are completely novel and non deducible from components.

[Nearly Sane]

recently on this board there was a debate on whether
Emergent entities are resultant I.e.completely deducible from the components. In Mary's room that would be the words in the books and media. Or whether they are completely novel and non deducible from components.

I think you are stretching what a thoughf experiment does. It's based on lits of assumptions. Here that all emergency is deducible - that isn't an argument that it is so, or that it needs to be so. That's why I think you've got this backwards.

[jeremyp]

I don't understand why Burridan's Ass is a problem for anybody. The argument seems to be "there must be free will because, if there isn't, the ass will starve to death". This is very much the fallacy of adverse consequences.

Furthermore, rationality doesn't preclude the donkey inventing a strategy to break the symmetry. It could say "if I can't make up my mind to choose one of the bales, I'll take a step to the left and then re-evaluate the situation".

[Nearly Sane]

I don't understand why Burridan's Ass is a problem for anybody. The argument seems to be "there must be free will because, if there isn't, the ass will starve to death". This is very much the fallacy of adverse consequences.

Furthermore, rationality doesn't preclude the donkey inventing a strategy to break the symmetry. It could say "if I can't make up my mind to choose one of the bales, I'll take a step to the left and then re-evaluate the situation".

  Yes, agree. I think it falls on decisions not being rational, but even if they were and it makes no difference to decide one way then there is no reason not to decide either way.

[ProfessorDavey]

I don't understand why Burridan's Ass is a problem for anybody. The argument seems to be "there must be free will because, if there isn't, the ass will starve to death". This is very much the fallacy of adverse consequences.

Furthermore, rationality doesn't preclude the donkey inventing a strategy to break the symmetry. It could say "if I can't make up my mind to choose one of the bales, I'll take a step to the left and then re-evaluate the situation".

I think that is correct.

The basic premise is based on situations being completely static - but they aren't. If the Ass moves slightly or even tilts its head so one pile of hay is more in vision then the symmetry is lost.

But more fundamentally I don't really understand the issue - the Ass wants to eat hay so the Ass will move to a pile of hay and eat it - it doesn't matter which pile of hay so the notion of choice is irrelevant. Once the Ass has eaten one pile of hay it will presumably move over to the other pile and eat that one. The notion that it will be somehow gridlocked by uncertainty and starve to dead seems non-sense - moving to either pile is beneficial so the key is to move to one, the choice of which one to move towards is irrelevant.

[Udayana]

https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/experiments-in-philosophy/200804/would-you-be-willing-enter-the-matrix

I thought I had come across a link to this short article on R&E just recently - but can't seem to find it now.

Thought it very interesting as it does prompt further questions related to living in simulations, qualia, hedonism and perfection. And, mostly - what do you think life is for?

"Long before Hollywood gave us the Matrix, philosophers were wondering whether it would be right to choose a life of illusion if one could thereby have a more pleasurable existence. The usual way of framing this problem was to ask the reader to imagine that he or she had the opportunity to enter an 'experience machine.' If you entered this machine, you would have the experience of being a successful rock star, living a fabulous life filled with interesting friends, adoring fans, and fascinating artistic challenges... but, ultimately, it would all be an illusion. In reality, you would just be sitting in a machine somewhere having a kind of hallucination that all of these wonderful things were occurring."