Reductionism vs. Emergence

[Walt Zingmatilder]

This article on Reductionism vs Emergence has, er, emerged.

https://bigthink.com/13-8/reductionism-vs-emergence-science-philosophy/

[bluehillside Retd.]

Vlad,

This article on Reductionism vs Emergence has, er, emerged.

https://bigthink.com/13-8/reductionism-vs-emergence-science-philosophy/

And here's a rebuttal:

https://bigthink.com/starts-with-a-bang/universe-reductionist/

[Walt Zingmatilder]

Vlad,

And here's a rebuttal:

https://bigthink.com/starts-with-a-bang/universe-reductionist/

Tried to find at least some sketchy explanatory chain from physics to sociology and art but alas he never got beyond er, physics and when he did get out of physics into biology it was a very physical biology. I wouldn't be surprised if eliminationists were round this like flies around the proverbial.

Alas the whole piece emerges as another case of someone who thinks that what he does for a living with how the world is.

Emergence fails for him seemingly because and solely because it isn't reductionism.

He cannot forgive emergentists for not knowing how emergence works but is quick to absolve reductionists for not knowing the same things with an added promissory note that they are sure to if only they have the right gear.

[bluehillside Retd.]

Vlad,

Tried to find at least some sketchy explanatory chain from physics to sociology and art but alas he never got beyond er, physics and when he did get out of physics into biology it was a very physical biology. I wouldn't be surprised if eliminationists were round this like flies around the proverbial.

Alas the whole piece emerges as another case of someone who thinks that what he does for a living with how the world is.

Emergence fails for him seemingly because and solely because it isn't reductionism.

He cannot forgive emergentists for not knowing how emergence works but is quick to absolve reductionists for not knowing the same things with an added promissory note that they are sure to if only they have the right gear.

As with so much else, you have this wrong. The “emergentist” claim is: “You, your dog, and the specifics of your person-dog affection could not be predicted, even in principle, even from perfect knowledge of all your elementary particles”. The problem with that bold claim that Ethan Siegel sets out is that there’s no justifying argument to support it. That is, why given both perfect knowledge of the initial conditions and sufficiently massive computing power could all that not be predicted?

The rest of your effort is just your standard ad hom ascribing of dodgy motives for no apparent reason.     

[Walt Zingmatilder]

Vlad,

As with so much else, you have this wrong. The “emergentist” claim is: “You, your dog, and the specifics of your person-dog affection could not be predicted, even in principle, even from perfect knowledge of all your elementary particles”. The problem with that bold claim that Ethan Siegel sets out is that there’s no justifying argument to support it. That is, why given both perfect knowledge of the initial conditions and sufficiently massive computing power could all that not be predicted?

The rest of your effort is just your standard ad hom ascribing of dodgy motives for no apparent reason.     

It certainly wasn't an ad hom Hillside. That comes now. By only talking about physics he was taking the piss. Was it this that attracted you to this article?

[bluehillside Retd.]

Vlad,

It certainly wasn't an ad hom Hillside. That comes now. By only talking about physics he was taking the piss. Was it this that attracted you to this article?

Evasion noted. He actually explained why "just" physics is the default, and that the burden of proof is thus with the "emergentist" to explain why it's not. Burden of proof is something that's always foxed you, but even you should be able to grasp the point here surely? 

[Walt Zingmatilder]

Vlad,

Evasion noted. He actually explained why "just" physics is the default, and that the burden of proof is thus with the "emergentist" to explain why it's not. Burden of proof is something that's always foxed you, but even you should be able to grasp the point here surely?

Firstly there is his claim of fundamental laws and then what he calls additional laws. The assertion here is there can be no more fundamental laws and that we know them all.
Secondly his attitude to what he calls qualitative novel properties is one that they are illusory. This is eliminationist and that is not an established position.
Since he has not established reducibility as universal rather than a technique in science I don't see how he can have the default position.

[bluehillside Retd.]

Vlad,

Firstly there is his claim of fundamental laws and then what he calls additional laws. The assertion here is there can be no more fundamental laws and that we know them all.

No it isn’t. If you think he asserts that nonetheless though, then just quote that part.

Clue: you won’t be able to.   

Secondly his attitude to what he calls qualitative novel properties is one that they are illusory. This is eliminationist and that is not an established position.

Again, tell us where he does that and, once you’ve done so, explain why it’s “eliminationist” not to accept as real that which hasn’t been demonstrated to be real?

Since he has not established reducibility as universal rather than a technique in science I don't see how he can have the default position.

Presumably that’s because you don’t understand the term “default”? You don’t have to demonstrate universality to have a default position. Try to understand why this is.

[Outrider]

It certainly wasn't an ad hom Hillside. That comes now. By only talking about physics he was taking the piss. Was it this that attracted you to this article?

Given that biology is just applied chemistry, and chemistry is just applied physics, I can see his stance, but I agree with you that to just think of the physics is fundamentally flawed.

Physics, after all, is just applied maths.

O.

[Walt Zingmatilder]

Given that biology is just applied chemistry, and chemistry is just applied physics, I can see his stance,

Yes, Eliminationist

but I agree with you that to just think of the physics is fundamentally flawed.

Physics, after all, is just applied maths.

I did hear somewhere that Maths was shorthand for philosophy...

[bluehillside Retd.]

Vlad,

Yes, Eliminationist

No. The claim is that, even with perfect knowledge of the starting conditions and unlimited computing power, the emergent phenomena would be impossible to predict even in principle (“You, your dog, and the specifics of your person-dog affection could not be predicted, even in principle, even from perfect knowledge of all your elementary particles”).

So far as I can see there’s no argument to justify that claim but that’s what it is nonetheless.

I did hear somewhere that Maths was shorthand for philosophy...

Perhaps you did, but it’s irrelevant – your mistake was to think that a default position requires a universal application (“…since he has not established reducibility as universal”) rather than its actual meaning of a holding position pending any further information that may invalidate or amend it. 

[Walt Zingmatilder]

Vlad,

No. The claim is that, even with perfect knowledge of the starting conditions and unlimited computing power, the emergent phenomena would be impossible to predict even in principle (“You, your dog, and the specifics of your person-dog affection could not be predicted, even in principle, even from perfect knowledge of all your elementary particles”).

That seems a most complex rendering of a ''claim''. You might be the only one making that on behalf of people like myself. If the fundamentals are basically units that can join together we can predict there will be large number complex arrangements of units and that's about it. we may speculate that these may become repeating or chaotic but I don't see this predicting anything more. Thus anything more than this would have to be eliminatively reduced to what I've previously said for your contention to work.

Chomsky observed that the pure sciences become less useful when we move into areas such as sociology, psychology and anthropology. Is the language of say, physics sufficient for ecology or ethology? I would say not.

So far as I can see there’s no argument to justify that claim but that’s what it is nonetheless.

I don't know who is making that exact claim.

Does the claim of reductionism here match other default position claims you have made? I would say not since those have been made in the context of empirical or sense data, here empirical sense such as say wetness seems to be dismissed as at worst illusion and at best merely sensing forces between particles and being somehow hoodwinked by qualia. So it is difficult to justify reductionist here as any kind of default position. Also can you call a philosophy a default position? I'm not sure you can.

[bluehillside Retd.]

Vlad,

That seems a most complex rendering of a ''claim''.

As I quoted its author verbatim you might want to take that up with him.

You might be the only one making that on behalf of people like myself.

What are you trying to say here? I merely told you what the claim was, and quoted it from the article. 

If the fundamentals are basically units that can join together we can predict there will be large number complex arrangements of units and that's about it. we may speculate that these may become repeating or chaotic but I don't see this predicting anything more. Thus anything more than this would have to be eliminatively reduced to what I've previously said for your contention to work.

Try to focus there – the claim is: “You, your dog, and the specifics of your person-dog affection could not be predicted, even in principle, even from perfect knowledge of all your elementary particles”. Assuming unlimited computing power too, can you see any justification for it? I can’t.

Chomsky observed that the pure sciences become less useful when we move into areas such as sociology, psychology and anthropology. Is the language of say, physics sufficient for ecology or ethology? I would say not.

Relevance? We’re talking about a claim made even in principle here remember, not in practice.

I don't know who is making that exact claim.

The author of the article you posted a link to in your OP.

Does the claim of reductionism here match other default position claims you have made? I would say not since those have been made in the context of empirical or sense data, here empirical sense such as say wetness seems to be dismissed as at worst illusion and at best merely sensing forces between particles and being somehow hoodwinked by qualia. So it is difficult to justify reductionist here as any kind of default position. Also can you call a philosophy a default position? I'm not sure you can.

You’ve collapsed into gibberish again here. The “default position” (ie, “reductionism" to an empirical model are least in principle) is the default position because the only knowledge hitherto we’ve verifiably and usefully obtained is empirical in character. Thus we start with that model pending any information or method that might invalidate it.

And that’s why what the author calls reductionism should be the default position.       

[Outrider]

If the fundamentals are basically units that can join together we can predict there will be large number complex arrangements of units and that's about it.

No, we can accurately predict interactions between a small number of particles. The interactions themselves do not become more complex in larger systems, there are simply a vast number of them to be considered. The problem isn't one of understanding when one tries to scale up to macroscopic effects, but rather one of scale.

we may speculate that these may become repeating or chaotic but I don't see this predicting anything more.

And yet we have increasingly accurate models for any number of phenomena, from air-flow over formula 1 aerofoils to population growth of bacteria in various media.

Chomsky observed that the pure sciences become less useful when we move into areas such as sociology, psychology and anthropology. Is the language of say, physics sufficient for ecology or ethology? I would say not.  I don't know who is making that exact claim.

It is an unfortunate aspect of reality that it's really, really hard to find perfectly spherical chickens which do not evince wind resistance in order to conduct experiments in ideal conditions... Is the language of physics sufficient for ecology, no, because the language of ecology takes inherent short-cuts so as not to have to account for the innumerable individual sub-atomic interactions. A sufficiently large computer with an appropriate dataset, however, could accurately plot activity so that you could describe in ecological language the exact future of any given piece of land, sea or atmosphere.

O.

[Walt Zingmatilder]

No, we can accurately predict interactions between a small number of particles. The interactions themselves do not become more complex in larger systems, there are simply a vast number of them to be considered. The problem isn't one of understanding when one tries to scale up to macroscopic effects, but rather one of scale.

And yet we have increasingly accurate models for any number of phenomena, from air-flow over formula 1 aerofoils to population growth of bacteria in various media.

It is an unfortunate aspect of reality that it's really, really hard to find perfectly spherical chickens which do not evince wind resistance in order to conduct experiments in ideal conditions... Is the language of physics sufficient for ecology, no, because the language of ecology takes inherent short-cuts so as not to have to account for the innumerable individual sub-atomic interactions. A sufficiently large computer with an appropriate dataset, however, could accurately plot activity so that you could describe in ecological language the exact future of any given piece of land, sea or atmosphere.

O.

Yes, geological modelling sounds the ideal job for a supercomputer but I wonder if we take chaotic events into consideration. Predicting chaos though doesn't sound like predicting everything. how do you handle chaos in aerodynamics?

[jeremyp]

This article on Reductionism vs Emergence has, er, emerged.

https://bigthink.com/13-8/reductionism-vs-emergence-science-philosophy/

Yeah. It's nonsense.

A phenomenon is emergent if it cannot be reduced to, explained or predicted from its constituent parts… emergent phenomena arise out of lower-level entities, but they cannot be reduced to, explained nor predicted from their micro-level base

This is saying that the laws of physics are wrong. It's obviously bollocks.

[Walt Zingmatilder]

Yeah. It's nonsense.

This is saying that the laws of physics are wrong. It's obviously bollocks.

How does it say the laws of physics are wrong? The author is a physicist isn't he?

[Outrider]

Yes, geological modelling sounds the ideal job for a supercomputer but I wonder if we take chaotic events into consideration. Predicting chaos though doesn't sound like predicting everything. how do you handle chaos in aerodynamics?

With more processing power and more accurate start data.

The problem with modelling chaos is insufficient capacity, it's different to randomness. Genuine randomness is difficult for a computer to simulate, you typically need some form of analogue input to provide the randomness, and even then by its nature that limits the effectiveness of any prediction or modelling. Chaos, though is about the instability of a system, how quickly and significantly small changes to input variables can result in a change. That's not difficult in principle for a computer to model because chaos is still a product of an absolutely deterministic system, it's just a product of a deterministic system which is volatile.

That can be difficult to model, but isn't always.

O.

[Walt Zingmatilder]

With more processing power and more accurate start data.

The problem with modelling chaos is insufficient capacity, it's different to randomness. Genuine randomness is difficult for a computer to simulate, you typically need some form of analogue input to provide the randomness, and even then by its nature that limits the effectiveness of any prediction or modelling. Chaos, though is about the instability of a system, how quickly and significantly small changes to input variables can result in a change. That's not difficult in principle for a computer to model because chaos is still a product of an absolutely deterministic system, it's just a product of a deterministic system which is volatile.

That can be difficult to model, but isn't always.

O.

Thanks for that. I did hear that chaos was not the same as random.
I still wonder, since we are dealing at the molecular and particulate level whether terms like complexity, order and disorder equate to the term emergent or whether the term emergent is, effectively, redundant.

[Outrider]

Thanks for that. I did hear that chaos was not the same as random.
I still wonder, since we are dealing at the molecular and particulate level whether terms like complexity, order and disorder equate to the term emergent or whether the term emergent is, effectively, redundant.

In my experience, and there might be a more technical use of it that I'm not familiar with, it tends to be used when a system elicits a behaviour or function which wasn't the original 'point'. In design terms, for instance, and emergent property of hard drives turned out to be that you could use them as musical instruments - they weren't designed to do that, the production of noise was a result of manufacturing imperfections and the physical reality of not being able to produce a frictionless surface, but once that noise was there it could be modulated.

In evolutionary terms its used when there's no obvious evolutionary purpose for a particular trait, but it can be linked to a potentially useful trait that either observed or was possible. Unfortunately with the lack of so much of the detailed evidence for each evolutionary tree, there's an awful lot of supposition to try and fill the gaps.

O.

[Stranger]

In my experience, and there might be a more technical use of it that I'm not familiar with...

Probably one of the simplest ways to define emergence is something like what Wiki says:-

"In philosophy, systems theory, science, and art, emergence occurs when an entity is observed to have properties its parts do not have on their own, properties or behaviors that emerge only when the parts interact in a wider whole."

-- Emergence

[Stranger]

Just to add, probably one of the most striking examples is how chemistry emerges from physics because we can actually do the maths for it, starting from quantum mechanics and ending up with a model of an atom that can explain its chemical properties (although it's horrendously complicated even for a simple hydrogen atom). It's also interesting that there are some macro level behaviours that chemistry can't deal with and we have to go back to quantum mechanics - semiconductors, for example.

[jeremyp]

How does it say the laws of physics are wrong? The author is a physicist isn't he?

Because, if you can't reduce emergent behaviour in terms of the fundamental particles that it is made of, it means the fundamental particles are not behaving within the laws of physics.

[Walt Zingmatilder]

Because, if you can't reduce emergent behaviour in terms of the fundamental particles that it is made of, it means the fundamental particles are not behaving within the laws of physics.

They can be working fine within the laws of Physics without describing the tax arrangements of the principality of Leichtenstein in any meaningful way.

[bluehillside Retd.]

Vlad,

They can be working fine within the laws of Physics without describing the tax arrangements of the principality of Leichtenstein in any meaningful way.

Why do you think that's true even in principle (which is the claim)?