Exactly the kind of atheist troll we've come to expect
Accusing other people of trolling instead of addressing the point is the sort of thing we've come to expect from yourself.
I thought soundness depended on true and false premise.
It depends on premises being
true. If we can't be sure, then the argument cannot be considered sound.
I take it then that you think the case for a universe where God doesn't exist is as good or better than a case for a universe where God does exist and therefore that universes in the multiverse are discreet.
Non-sequitur of the week (at least). What I think about the various multiverse ideas is irrelevant to the how good a case I think can be made for some god(s).
The trouble with your response was though was your use of the word evidence, which is an appeal to science in the exercise of logic.......and that could be classed as scientism.
Still going way over your head. If an argument is based on a premiss about the universe, or any idea of a multiverse, then the only way in which we can assess its truth is via science and evidence. Those are the relevant tools for examining physical reality.
Here though is Plantigna, his ontological theory which is under the microscope. I don't think anyone who's heard of him and it sounds as though you hadn't, considers him an online theist
https://joshualrasmussen.com/articles/an-ontological-argument-from-value.pdf#:~:text=One%20of%20the%20most%20intriguing%20contemporary%20defences%20of,God%3A%20maximal%20knowledge%2C%20maximal%20power%2C%20and%20moral%20perfection.
Well, at least it gave me a laugh. What a pile of shit. Even the linked document points out some of the massive gaping holes it the 'argument'. Anyway, here is the summary (don't know why you couldn't be bothered to post this yourself):
C1. There is a possible world W in which there exists a being with maximal greatness.
C2. A being has maximal greatness in a possible world only if it has maximal greatness
in every possible world, including the actual world.
C3. Therefore, there is a being with maximal greatness in the actual world.First of all, how the hell are you going to define a nebulous idea like 'greatness' in an exact, and therefore logically relevant, way?
Secondly, what exactly is meant by a 'possible world'? There is no reference to a multiverse hypothesis, so I have no idea why you were gibbering about them. I would regard a 'possible world' as any self-consistent (contradiction free) 'world' that anybody could imagine. Since it is perfectly self-consistent to imagine a world that has nothing but empty Newtonian space in it, with do idea of any 'beings' at all, the idea of a being that exists in 'every possible world' becomes incoherent in itself. If the idea was to restrict the 'possible worlds' in some way, then how, and why isn't it in the argument?
This counts as a specific instance of the 'parallel arguments' that is mentioned in the article itself:
D1. There is a possible world W in which there is no being with maximal greatness.
D2. A being has maximal greatness in a possible world only if it has maximal greatness
in every world.
D3. Therefore, there is no being with maximal greatness in the actual world.I've just given an example of D1.
It then starts wittering on about plausibility, which is another subjective notion that has no place in a logical deduction. What one person finds plausible may be entirely different to what somebody else does.
What's the point of it all, when you might just as well say "I find the idea of god plausible, therefore god"? Every bit as unconvincing and without the comical pseudo-logical nonsense.