Putting an end to scientism

[Walt Zingmatilder]

https://iai.tv/articles/we-must-put-an-end-to-scientism-guiseppina-doro-auid-2747

Partially hidden behind paywall.

[Outrider]

https://iai.tv/articles/we-must-put-an-end-to-scientism-guiseppina-doro-auid-2747

Partially hidden behind paywall.

I can't see beyond the paywall, but it strikes me that the scene-setting is that evidence undermines his preferred philosophical viewpoint on how mind and brain are related and his answer is therefore  #stopwiththesciencealready.

I don't imagine I'll be paying to read that one.

O.

[Nearly Sane]

https://iai.tv/articles/we-must-put-an-end-to-scientism-guiseppina-doro-auid-2747

Partially hidden behind paywall.

Archived version


https://archive.vn/Ywk1Z

[Walt Zingmatilder]

Archived version


https://archive.vn/Ywk1Z

Thanks.

[jeremyp]

the days when the idea that mental states are reducible to physical states was a given are over

Are they? Why? Unless you believe in something like a soul (I accept that Vlad believes this), I would have thought it was axiomatic that mental states are reducible to physical states, because there is no alternative.

[Walt Zingmatilder]

Are they? Why? Unless you believe in something like a soul (I accept that Vlad believes this), I would have thought it was axiomatic that mental states are reducible to physical states, because there is no alternative.

If it was reducible to physical states it should be totally describable in those terms. There is though, the explanatory gap.

Reductionism has a view of emergence which seems to ignore novelty and makes the emergent redundant or illusory.

Total positivism, it could be argued, is dehumanising.

[SteveH]

Are they? Why? Unless you believe in something like a soul (I accept that Vlad believes this), I would have thought it was axiomatic that mental states are reducible to physical states, because there is no alternative.

This sounds like ontological reductionism, which ignores emergent properties.

[Outrider]

If it was reducible to physical states it should be totally describable in those terms. There is though, the explanatory gap.

That we can't currently do it doesn't mean that it can't be done. We couldn't fly for a long time, but now we can.

Reductionism has a view of emergence which seems to ignore novelty and makes the emergent redundant or illusory.

I can't make that mean anything.

Total positivism, it could be argued, is dehumanising.

Anything can be argued, otherwise Theology wouldn't be possible, but that doesn't mean that coherent arguments can be made. Not, of course, that anyone's advocating positivism, but don't let that stand in the way of you making ad hominems in the absence of an actual point or argument. Again.

O.

[jeremyp]

This sounds like ontological reductionism, which ignores emergent properties.

Emergent properties are in principle describable in terms of their physical states. In fact, sometimes the rules are fairly simple. Other times they are too complex for us humans to fully grasp.

There's no magic needed.

[Walt Zingmatilder]

Emergent properties are in principle describable in terms of their physical states. In fact, sometimes the rules are fairly simple. Other times they are too complex for us humans to fully grasp.

There's no magic needed.

That ignores the novelty of the property and therefore in principle explains the emergent away. It could be argued then that a reductionists emergent isn't actually an emergent.

These are the reasons people have suggested that Daniel Dennett's book Consciousness explained should be retitled Consciousness explained away.

[jeremyp]

That ignores the novelty of the property and therefore in principle explains the emergent away.

You'll need to write that in English.

It could be argued then that a reductionists emergent isn't actually an emergent.

Only by idiots.

These are the reasons people have suggested that Daniel Dennett's book Consciousness explained should be retitled Consciousness explained away.

I haven't read it so I can't comment.

Have you read it?

[Walt Zingmatilder]

You'll need to write that in English.
Only by idiots.

I haven't read it so I can't comment.

Have you read it?

No but that doesn't stop me from communicating how his peers have responded.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consciousness_Explained

[Walt Zingmatilder]

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=tFpubXb1KMUC&pg=PP11&source=kp_read_button&hl=en&newbks=1&newbks_redir=0&gboemv=1&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false

First few chapters of Consciousness Explained.

[Nearly Sane]

No but that doesn't stop me from communicating how his peers have responded.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consciousness_Explained

Woo, someone's read a wiki entry on a book, that's like an internetology

[bluehillside Retd.]

Vlad,

If it was reducible to physical states it should be totally describable in those terms. There is though, the explanatory gap.

There are lots of explanatory gaps, and in the past there were even more. So what though? That we can’t explain something in material terms now isn’t an argument for “therefore magic” for reasons that have been explained to you many times here.

Reductionism has a view of emergence which seems to ignore novelty and makes the emergent redundant or illusory.

And something else that’s been explained to you many times here is that you can’t claim reductionism unless you’ve demonstrated first that there’s something to reduce from.

Before rainbows were understood would it have been "reductionism" to settle for a "don't know" without asserting too that leprechauns put them there to store their gold? Why not?

Total positivism, it could be argued, is dehumanising.

Nope, no idea. What are you trying to say here?

[Walt Zingmatilder]

Vlad,

There are lots of explanatory gaps, and in the past there were even more. So what though? That we can’t explain something in material terms now isn’t an argument for “therefore magic” for reasons that have been explained to you many times here.

And something else that’s been explained to you many times here is that you can’t claim reductionism unless you’ve demonstrated first that there’s something to reduce from.

Before rainbows were understood would it have been "reductionism" to settle for a "don't know" without asserting too that leprechauns put them there to store their gold? Why not?

Nope, no idea. What are you trying to say here?

[Nearly Sane]

Is there an echo on here?

[Walt Zingmatilder]

Vlad,


And something else that’s been explained to you


 you can’t claim reductionism unless you’ve demonstrated first that there’s something to reduce from.

Did you have any examples in mind, or did you just feel like saying it?

[SteveH]

I suspect that when Walt writes "scientism", he really just means "science", but he knows he'll never get away with criticising science, so he calls it "scientism" instead. Basically, "scientism", for Walt, means "science I don't like".

[Nearly Sane]

I suspect that when Walt writes "scientism", he really just means "science", but he knows he'll never get away with criticising science, so he calls it "scientism" instead. Basically, "scientism", for Walt, means "science I don't like".

To be fair here, it seems based on the article but I'll admit that it feels badly defined in what is a messy article  Oakeshott's a pretty easy read as a philosopher and this makes it more obscure rather than clearer.


I have the same issues that jeremyp with the opening to thd article. I'd suggest rather that this shouldn't be about refuctionism and scientism but about a clarity of approach as to the purpose of any investigation into the mind.

[bluehillside Retd.]

Vlad,

Did you have any examples in mind, or did you just feel like saying it?

Yes - the example is that you introduced reductionism as an accusation (because it's "dehumanising" apparently). I merely explained to you with some weariness given how often I've done it before without reply that you cannot claim the charge of reductionism unless you can demonstrate first that there's something that's been reduced from. See the rainbows and leprechauns analogy - again. 

Why do you struggle with this? 

[Walt Zingmatilder]

I suspect that when Walt writes "scientism", he really just means "science", but he knows he'll never get away with criticising science, so he calls it "scientism" instead. Basically, "scientism", for Walt, means "science I don't like".

No I mean scientism.
I have no beef with methodological naturalism or methodological reductionism, only claims that science is the only means of describing or defining reality.

[Nearly Sane]

No I mean scientism.
I have no beef with methodological naturalism or methodological reductionism, only claims that science is the only means of describing or defining reality.

Could you outline your other method(s)?

[Walt Zingmatilder]

Vlad,

Yes - the example is that you introduced reductionism as an accusation (because it's "dehumanising" apparently). I merely explained to you with some weariness given how often I've done it before without reply that you cannot claim the charge of reductionism unless you can demonstrate first that there's something that's been reduced from. See the rainbows and leprechauns analogy - again. 

Why do you struggle with this?

Since you apparently can't name an example of the type of reductionism I am criticising let me help you out. An example is Dennett's reductionism of Consciousness. His reduction here is to state it as merely an illusion and not a thing at all.

Your starting point would seem to be that we have to prove that consciousness exists because all we can observe is computing and it's hardware. Thus the illusion of consciousness is really complex intelligence.

Your fault Hillside is to both talk about things having emerged while what has emerged doesn't actually exist. A most egregious example of cake-ism.

Own it and stop referring to emergence.

[Walt Zingmatilder]

Could you outline your other method(s)?

Your manifest error here is to mistake the philosophy with the method. Yes science can tell us what exists physically and that physicality might well be real but it cannot be shown to define reality.
While you were trying then to outline the shortcomings of other people and other domains and magisteria you were steering your wee wizards away from the limitations of methodological naturalism.