Gandalf charts the way out of the Dark Forest.

[Walt Zingmatilder]

https://bigthink.com/series/legends/philosophy-and-science/

Personally I think he has it Arse about face.

[jeremyp]

Gets what arse about face? I can't watch the video at the moment.

[Walt Zingmatilder]

Gets what arse about face? I can't watch the video at the moment.

He thinks philosophers should take time out to seek out scientists whereas Others think scientists should be taking a bit of time finding out about philosophy, rather than, as that Hawking chap did, write it off.

[Nearly Sane]

https://bigthink.com/series/legends/philosophy-and-science/

Personally I think he has it Arse about face.

Not really sure what 'arse about face' means in the context. Are you suggesting thar scientists should know more about philosophy? If so, I don't think Dennett would disagree, or that the ideas are in any sense exclusive.

You may mean something else as it's a bit of a ramble from Dennett. I find his idea that historians are in search of truth rather than truthiness naive.

I think Dennett is a valuable thinker but an even better salesperson. Why name a book 'Some thinking about Consciousness' when you can call it 'Consciousness Explained'

His use of evolution, and memes here, as in 'Darwin's Dangerous Idea' underlines for me the seductiveness of metaphor for him. To an extent, he seems to substitute his expanded idea of evolution for the idea of a purposeful 'god'. There is a tendency to turn questions into why rather than how too quickly because he has a live of an explanatory simplicity.

That said, I think it is good for philosophers, a category that I find harder to define as I get more curmudgeonly, to know more about science generally, and particularly in relation to any areas they are looking at.

[jeremyp]

Not really sure what 'arse about face' means in the context. Are you suggesting thar scientists should know more about philosophy? If so, I don't think Dennett would disagree, or that the ideas are in any sense exclusive.

You may mean something else as it's a bit of a ramble from Dennett. I find his idea that historians are in search of truth rather than truthiness naive.

I think Dennett is a valuable thinker but an even better salesperson. Why name a book 'Some thinking about Consciousness' when you can call it 'Consciousness Explained'

I haven't read the book, but my guess would be that doesn't explain consciousness in it.

His use of evolution, and memes here, as in 'Darwin's Dangerous Idea' underlines for me the seductiveness of metaphor for him. To an extent, he seems to substitute his expanded idea of evolution for the idea of a purposeful 'god'. There is a tendency to turn questions into why rather than how too quickly because he has a live of an explanatory simplicity.

That said, I think it is good for philosophers, a category that I find harder to define as I get more curmudgeonly, to know more about science generally, and particularly in relation to any areas they are looking at.

This attempt of Vlad to try to create a dichotomy between philosophy and science is interesting. Science is what happens when philosophers start testing their ideas in the real world. Science is a natural outgrowth of philosophy. This is why I'm interested in what Vlad thinks Dennett got arse about face.

[Nearly Sane]

I haven't read the book, but my guess would be that doesn't explain consciousness in it.

This attempt of Vlad to try to create a dichotomy between philosophy and science is interesting. Science is what happens when philosophers start testing their ideas in the real world. Science is a natural outgrowth of philosophy. This is why I'm interested in what Vlad thinks Dennett got arse about face.

There's a lot of 'oughts' in philosophy that will never be within science's pursuit of the 'is'. I think Vlad's take is that scientists should know more philosophy is more important than philosophers knowing science. As I said, I don't think Dennett is arguing against that, though I probably would. I think the problem with some scientists and philosophy is not a lack of knowledge, but an assumption of great knowledge which leads to pronouncements about philosophy that are incredibly simplistic. That said, I think there are swathes of philosophy which are intellectual wanking. (Thought I might go for an incredibly simplistic pronouncement there as a piece of irony)

[Walt Zingmatilder]

I'm wondering what more about methodological naturalism, an academic philosopher needs to know? More scientific facts?

[Nearly Sane]

I'm wondering what more about methodological naturalism, an academic philosopher needs to know? More scientific facts?

Since he's not suggesting that the philosopher needs to know more about methodological naturalism, that's a strawman.

He is suggesting that knowing about relevant science would be beneficial, and that seems sensible. If you are going to talk about what philosophically consciousness is then knowledge of what is happening in science in the relevant area is surely useful?  If you don't think so, can you explain why?

[Walt Zingmatilder]

Since he's not suggesting that the philosopher needs to know more about methodological naturalism, that's a strawman.

He is suggesting that knowing about relevant science would be beneficial, and that seems sensible. If you are going to talk about what philosophically consciousness is then knowledge of what is happening in science in the relevant area is surely useful?  If you don't think so, can you explain why?

Dennett wants philosophers to know more science and collaborate with scientists more.  Questions arise. How much more science and collaboration is enough? How does philosophy benefit? Who are the philosophers who would benefit? How does he expect scientific to change philosophy other than it becoming philosophically naturalist(not guaranteed surely), How can there be more collaboration when, it seems several prominent scientists are moving away from a need for philosophers?

[Nearly Sane]

Dennett wants philosophers to know more science and collaborate with scientists more.  Questions arise. How much more science and collaboration is enough? How does philosophy benefit? Who are the philosophers who would benefit? How does he expect scientific to change philosophy other than it becoming philosophically naturalist(not guaranteed surely), How can there be more collaboration when, it seems several prominent scientists are moving away from a need for philosophers?

  This seems to entirely ignore the question I asked. Your questions also seem odd. Why, if someone is arguing thar it would be useful for philosophers to know more science would one have to specify an exact amount of what would constitute 'enough'? Why have you talked about collaboration between philosophers and scientists when that isn't what the articles talk about?

Your post reads like an attempted distraction from a fairly simple idea by a Gish gallop of largely irrelevant questions.

[ProfessorDavey]

It is, of course, valuable for philosophers to understand more about science, and for scientists to understand more about philosophy. More knowledge and a wider exchange of knowledge it always a good thing.

But, and it is a big but, science and philosophy are not equivalents - one is about uncovering actual, verifiable understanding of our world etc, the other uncovering a way of understanding and a structured approach to ask 'why' questions.

The point being that science without philosophy might lack context or value, but it would still be correct. Philosophy without science runs a major risk of being plain, flat out wrong.

[Nearly Sane]

It is, of course, valuable for philosophers to understand more about science, and for scientists to understand more about philosophy. More knowledge and a wider exchange of knowledge it always a good thing.

But, and it is a big but, science and philosophy are not equivalents - one is about uncovering actual, verifiable understanding of our world etc, the other uncovering a way of understanding and a structured approach to ask 'why' questions.

The point being that science without philosophy might lack context or value, but it would still be correct. Philosophy without science runs a major risk of being plain, flat out wrong.

Science can be wrong.

[jeremyp]

It is, of course, valuable for philosophers to understand more about science, and for scientists to understand more about philosophy. More knowledge and a wider exchange of knowledge it always a good thing.

But, and it is a big but, science and philosophy are not equivalents - one is about uncovering actual, verifiable understanding of our world etc, the other uncovering a way of understanding and a structured approach to ask 'why' questions.

The point being that science without philosophy might lack context or value, but it would still be correct. Philosophy without science runs a major risk of being plain, flat out wrong.

Science is philosophy. It is that branch of philosophy that deals with the real world. In fact, before the term "science" was coined, it was called "natural philosophy".

[ProfessorDavey]

Science can be wrong.

But it is self correcting.

[ProfessorDavey]

Science is philosophy. It is that branch of philosophy that deals with the real world. In fact, before the term "science" was coined, it was called "natural philosophy".

Sure - I get that. But that isn't what we are really talking about here, is it JP. We are talking about philosophy in a distinct sense from science or there would be no point in discussing whether scientists need to know more about philosophy ... as they would be ... err ... just another group of philosophers who know a shit load of natural philosophy.

[Nearly Sane]

But it is self correcting.

Not necessarily and it still means your statement: 'The point being that science without philosophy might lack context or value, but it would still be correct' was wrong. Is it yourself that is correcting that now?

[ProfessorDavey]

Not necessarily

The whole point about the scientific method is that hypotheses are falsifiable and repeatable. Should a scientific theory (the best current explanation for the current data) prove to be no longer sustainable on the basis of new data then a new (or more detailed) theory is developed. Hence it is self correcting. The only proviso is that further science is performed, but the whole point of repeatability in the scientific method requires there to be 'more science'.

'The point being that science without philosophy might lack context or value, but it would still be correct' was wrong. Is it yourself that is correcting that now?

Not really unless you ossify something at a single point in time as the science will always be self-correcting.

The problem with philosophy by contrast, is firstly that it is non-falsifiable (so you cannot know whether or not it is correct), but that isn't my point. If you have philosophy without scientific underpinning then you may apply incorrect assumptions on which to develop your philosophy and therefore any philosophy, however sophisticated, however clever, however complex - will just be wrong. So it doesn't matter one jot how sophisticated your philosophy is to describe the way the universe was created in 6 days in 4000BC. if this is based on an assumption that has been robustly falsified by science.

[Nearly Sane]

The whole point about the scientific method is that hypotheses are falsifiable and repeatable. Should a scientific theory (the best current explanation for the current data) prove to be no longer sustainable on the basis of new data then a new (or more detailed) theory is developed. Hence it is self correcting. The only proviso is that further science is performed, but the whole point of repeatability in the scientific method requires there to be 'more science'.
Not really unless you ossify something at a single point in time as the science will always be self-correcting.

The problem with philosophy by contrast, is firstly that it is non-falsifiable (so you cannot know whether or not it is correct), but that isn't my point. If you have philosophy without scientific underpinning then you may apply incorrect assumptions on which to develop your philosophy and therefore any philosophy, however sophisticated, however clever, however complex - will just be wrong. So it doesn't matter one jot how sophisticated your philosophy is to describe the way the world was created in 6 days in 4000BC. if this is based on an assumption that has been robustly falsified by science.

If your statement had been that science was in theory, capable of being correct, then fine, but it wasn't so you were wrong.

As to it always being self correcting, that would assume that humans would have no limit to investigation methods, and that you could never reach a position that was based on all the possible information that we could gather, that was wrong, but would need information that we were incapable of gathering to correct. I don't see a way of demonstrating that.

[ProfessorDavey]

If your statement had been that science was in theory, capable of being correct, then fine, but it wasn't so you were wrong.

As to it always being self correcting, that would assume that humans would have no limit to investigation methods, and that you could never reach a position that was based on all the possible information that we could gather, that was wrong, but would need information that we were incapable of gathering to correct. I don't see a way of demonstrating that.

All methods have their limitations NS - but the point about the scientific method is that it both recognises those limitations (and therefore bases conclusions firmly within the context of the limitations) and is also self correcting as further methods allow us to gain more information. It is rare, of course, for this to completely change the prevailing hypothesis - more often more data, using more sophisticated methods cements the basic theory but provides greater levels of detailed understanding.

But philosophy really doesn't have any of those features as there isn't objectivity nor falsifiability. Philosophy may help us to think about stuff, but it isn't good at actually moving us towards the truth in an objective sense.

[Nearly Sane]

All methods have their limitations NS - but the point about the scientific method is that it both recognises those limitations and is self correcting as further methods allow us to gain more information. It is rare, of course, for this to completely change the prevailing hypothesis - more often more data, using more sophisticated methods cements the basic theory but provides greater levels of detailed understanding.

But philosophy really doesn't have any of those features as there isn't objectivity nor falsifiability. Philosophy may help us to think about stuff, but it isn't good at actually moving us towards the truth in an objective sense.

And your original statement didn't recognise those limitations and was therefore wrong.

And since you cannot get beyond the problems of hard solipsism, all you can claim for science is that it appears to be intersubjectively correct, mot objectively so.

[ProfessorDavey]

And your original statement didn't recognise those limitations and was therefore wrong.

With respect NS - you are not a scientist. Science and the scientific method requires studies to take account of the limitations of the methods and for conclusions to be bounded by those limitations.

If you try to publish a scientific paper where you try to expand conclusions beyond the limitations set by your methodology you will rapidly find that the peer review process will require you to alter your discussion and conclusions sections before the study is accepted for publication.

[Nearly Sane]

With respect NS - you are not a scientist. Science and the scientific method requires studies to take account of the limitations of the methods and for conclusions to be bounded by those limitations.

If you try to publish a scientific paper where you try to expand conclusions beyond the limitations set by your methodology you will rapidly find that the peer review process will require you to alter your discussion and conclusions sections before the study is accepted for publication.

Oh look a courtier's reply. And one that doesn',t address any of the points that were made.

[ProfessorDavey]

Oh look a courtier's reply. And one that doesn',t address any of the points that were made.

Call it what you like - it is inherent when discussing science and the scientific methods that any conclusions drawn must take account of the limitations of the methodology.

You claimed that 'And your original statement didn't recognise those limitations and was therefore wrong.'. Your statement is wrong as the limitations are an inherent part of the scientific method - I shouldn't need to state this separately (although I ultimately had to as it would appear you don't really understand how the scientific method works).

[Nearly Sane]

Call it what you like - it is inherent when discussing science and the scientific methods that any conclusions drawn must take account of the limitations of the methodology.

You claimed that 'And your original statement didn't recognise those limitations and was therefore wrong.'. Your statement is wrong as the limitations are an inherent part of the scientific method - I shouldn't need to state this separately (although I ultimately had to as it would appear you don't really understand how the scientific method works).

No, you see the problem here is the limitations you are discussing here are epistemology, not science. And the objection applies because it was incorrect based on what thise limitations are. That you had your fingers crossed, and said to yourself that you were a scientist, doesn't really help.

[ProfessorDavey]

No, you see the problem here is the limitations you are discussing here are epistemology, not science. And the injection applies because it was incorrect based on what thise limitations are. That you had your fingers crossed, and said to yourself that you were a scientist, doesn't really help.

Wrong again - the limitations I am talking about are inherently part of the scientific process and any conclusions drawn from studies.

So - to use an example:

I, as a scientist have a hypothesis that a particular pharmacological agent up-regulates a particular enzyme, so I perform a study and I measure (using PCR) the expression level of the gene that codes for that enzyme. If I conclude that the pharmacological agent up-regulates that particular enzyme the peer review process will put me straight back in my box as the limitations of the methodology I used are not consistent with the conclusions drawn. So I'd be told to either:

1. Temper my conclusions to indicate that the pharmacological agent upregulates the expression of the gene in question alone or
2. Perform more studies to look at whether the increased gene expression is translated into more protein and/or whether there is increases enzymatic activity.

When using the scientific method you cannot draw conclusions that go beyond the inherent limitations of the methods used.